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Abstract 
The South Korean criminal justice system is often described as 'Prosecutorial Justice'. 
Most investigative and prosecutorial powers are exercised only by prosecutors. It is 
decisions made by prosecutors that usually decide the outcomes of trials. On the basis of 
its extensive powers, the prosecution service has achieved a conviction rate exceeding 
ninety-nine per cent, which is one of the highest in the world. 
This thesis explores the Korean prosecutor's position and its impact. Three aspects 
are discussed: the trial which relies heavily on prosecution file and records of interview; 
the protection of the defendant's constitutional rights; and the relationship between the 
police and prosecutors. Unlike previous studies, this research has employed quantitative 
and qualitative empirical methods including content analysis (464 news articles), a 
survey based on self-completion questionnaires (1,144 police officers), and semi-
structured interviewing (20 legal professionals). In addition, in order to gain insight into 
the Korean criminal procedure, the role, power and accountability of the Korean 
prosecution service are compared to those of five representative systems in England and 
Wales, the USA, France, Germany and Japan. 
The findings of this study are that a ninety-nine per cent of conviction rate does not 
demonstrate any great capability of the prosecution service. Rather, it leads to restricted 
constitutional rights of the defendants and meaningless trials which serve only to 
confirm the prosecutorial decisions. In addition, this domination over the criminal 
justice system and the powers of direct investigation increase occupational stress for 
police officers. This in turn leads to the performance of the police being downgraded, 
and as a result, inefficiency in the criminal justice system. 
Justice cannot be achieved by the monopoly of one legal actor over all criminal 
proceedings. Rather, the criminal process needs a system of checks and balances. The 
powers which are currently monopolised by the prosecutors should be separated and 
their decisions should be reviewed by appropriate monitoring schemes including 
citizens, judges and independent reviewing mechanisms. 
Author's Note 
All translations are by the author, unless otherwise stated. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
1. Themes, the Scope of the Study and Research Questions 
The Korean 1 system of criminal justice has been often called a 'prosecutorial justice 
system. ,2 This study explores the dominant position of the prosecution serVice and its 
impact on the criminal proceedings not least a ninety-nine per cent conviction rate. In 
particular, the impact is discussed by focusing on the constitutional rights of the defence 
and a relationship between the police and prosecutors.3 
In general, the public prosecutors are viewed as some of the most powerful officials 
in the government since they can decide 'whether or not to bring criminal charges; who 
to charge; what charges to bring; whether a defendant will stand trial, plead guilty, or 
enter a correctional program in lieu of criminal charges; and whether to confer 
immunity from prosecution. ,4 In other words, the prosecutor in fact has the authority to 
invoke or deny punishment. In those jurisdictions where the capital punishment exists, 
such prosecutorial powers, as Gershman put it, may literally determine life and death. S 
Vorenberg described these prosecutorial powers as thus: 
The prosecutor's charge decision determines the extent of the suspect's contact with the 
criminal justice system. It is also the key to the prosecutor's control over plea bargaining, 
although prosecutors may also bargain directly about sentence by offering to make 
I In this thesis, Korea hereinafter refers to the Republic of Korea (South Korea). 
2 Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' 
(2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 386. 
3 Korean Supreme Court, 'Judicial Statistics in 2007 [Sabeopyeongam]' KSC (Seoul) ch 5 Criminal Trials. 
4 Bennett L. Gershman. 'The New Prosecutors' (1991) 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 393,405 n 74. 
s ibid 405; Because of such an extensive power, many commentators may draw attention to the role of the 
prosecutors in the criminal proceedings. See Julia Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A 
Comparative Study ([Oxford monographs on criminal law and criminal justice], Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York 1995) 268; Andrew Ashworth. 'Developments in the Public 
Prosecutor's Office in England and Wales' (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 257; James Vorenberg. 'Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power' (1980) 94 Harv L Rev 
1521; Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J 
Crim Law 197; Stanley Z. Fisher. 'The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police 
Hands: Lessons From England' (1999-2000) 68 Fordham L Rev 1379; Fred C. Zacharias. 'Structuring the 
Ethics ofProsecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice' (1991) 44 Vand.L.Rev. 45; Wayne R. 
LaFave. 'The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States' (1970) 18(3) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 532; H. Richard Uviller. 'The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a 
Passionate Dispute' (1999) 68 Fordham L.Rev. 1695. 
1 
Introduction 
recommendations to the judge or by agreeing to a plea on condition that a specific sentence is 
imposed. Prosecutors can reduce a charge for a killing with ambiguous motives from murder 
to manslaughter, ignore a minor drug offense or charge it to the hilt, or charge a potential 
"three-time loser" accused of a small theft under a mandatory life sentence statute or a one-
year felony statute.6 
Such examples show the variety of prosecutorial powers in the criminal process. 
However, the Korean public prosecutors, as we shall see in Chapter 5, have even 
more powers than their counterparts in England and Wales, the USA, Japan, France, and 
Germany. First, the pre-trial proceedings are monopolised by the public prosecutors.7 
Not only can they direct the investigation of the police, but they also conduct 
investigations with their own investigative units.8 Second, only the prosecutors have 
the authority to charge.9 Unless the prosecutor brings cases to the court, the criminal 
proceedings in general cannot be initiated. In addition, there is no scheme to review 
such a prosecutorial decision to charge. to Once the prosecutor decides to charge the 
suspects, they must go through the criminal process without exception. Finally, the 
decisions taken by the prosecutors have a considerable impact on a trial. Most of all, 
trials mainly rely on the dossiers, which have been written by the prosecutors in the pre-
trial process. 11 The confessions included in such dossiers play a significant role in 
proving the guilt of the defendants. 12 The statements in the dossier are regarded more 
important than those in the open court. Consequently, the pre-trial prosecutorial 
decisions play a role in determining the verdicts and sentences. This is reinforced by 
their power to recommend a sentence and to appeal against judicial decisions. 13 
Notwithstanding such notable features of the Korean public prosecution service, 
there are not many studies addressing the impact of the prosecutorial powers on the 
6 James Vorenberg. 'Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power' (1980) 94 Harv L Rev 1521, 1526. 
7 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 99-102 (Professor 
Lee indicated that 'in the Korean criminal procedure, the public prosecutor is regarded as "the ruler of the 
investigation". ') 
8 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 2 I December 2007 No. 8717 (1949) arts 195, 196. 
9 ibid art 246. 
10 Unlike the English, American, German, and French systems of criminal justice, preliminary hearings 
by courts are not allowed in the Korean criminal procedure. For more details, see ch 5. 
11 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (IV): From 14th to 27th 
Conference' PCJR (Seoul January 2005), 267 (The presidential committee stated that 'in the Korean 
criminal procedure, verdicts and sentences are generally decided in the judge's office based on the 
investigative dossiers rather than in court.') 
12 ibid 271. 
13 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 2 I December 2007 No. 87 J 7 (1949) arts 302, 338. 
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criminal process. For instance, in the study of 'the unfinished criminal procedure 
revolution of post-democratization South Korea', Professor Cho argued some problems 
resulted from the monopoly of powers by the public prosecutors.14 In particular, he 
mainly researched the abuse of the monopolised power: 
Korean prosecutors have often been criticized for their reluctance to investigate corruption 
cases involving powerful politicians or high-ranking government officials, or for their 
politically based investigation of the cases. For the last decade, the opposition party and civic 
organizations have argued for establishing independent counsel to investigate such cases. 15 
Hee-Kyoon Kim's study of 'The Role of the Public Prosecutor in Korea: Is He Half-
Judge?' is another example dealing with the prosecutorial powers.16 In this study, he 
chiefly explored the impact of the prosecutorial protocols. He described the Korean 
criminal process relying on the dossiers written by the prosecutors as follows: 
Worthy of note is that the Korean prosecutors actually interrogated the suspects and the 
prospective witnesses ... Furthermore, they reported the result to the trial courts, and the 
courts' decisions were widely based on those reports, as a practical matter. We might be able 
to say that, in that sense, the Korean prosecutors might be considered half-judges. I' 
It is the considerable power of the Korean prosecutors to determine the verdict and 
sentence which is mainly investigated in Kim's study.18 
Unlike these studies, Professor Jong-Gu Kim's study of 'the reform of the Korean 
criminal justice system' as well as Dong-Hee Lee and others' study of 'investigative 
systems' explore comparatively the roles of the prosecutors in the criminal procedure. 19 
In particular, Dong-Hee Lee and others focused on the relationship between the police 
14 Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' 
(2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 381-393. 
15 ibid 386. 
16 Hee-Kyoon Kim. 'The Role of the Public Prosecutor in Korea: Is He Half-Judge?' (2006) 6 J.Korean L. 
163,163-179. 
17 ibid 163. 
18 Professor Kim stated that 'Even ifhe [the prosecutor] is not an examining magistrate or district judge, 
he seems to have the right to compile an authoritative written dossier recording his examinations of 
witnesses and accused ... [Nevertheless], there was also not any means to stop the prosecutor's misuse of 
power. All the more horrible was that the courts themselves aggravated this problem by abandoning their 
duty of control.' See ibid 179. 
19 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004); 




and prosecutors in the criminal proceedings, whereas Jong-Gu Kim examined general 
roles of the prosecutors in different jurisdictions. 
Those studies mainly addressed the problems resulting from the monopoly of 
powers by the public prosecutors in the Korean criminal procedure. Much attention was 
paid to the abuse of powers and the impact of prosecutorial dossiers. However, those 
studies have not examined the influence of the investigative function of prosecutors 
upon the criminal proceedings. Studies, which observe the prosecutorial investigative 
function in a critical way, are very rare. 
This thesis focuses on the prosecutorial investigative function in Korea and its 
impact on the criminal procedure. First of all, it considers two specific aspects of 
prosecutorial investigation: namely, directing the police investigation and conducting an 
investigation with their own units. But, the criminal procedure, as Ashworth and 
Redmayne put it, should be a sequential process: 
[W]ith suspects being identified by the police and the case then moving on to further stages. 
At various points suspects may drop out of the system, perhaps because the evidence is 
thought not to be strong enough, or it is decided that the case is suitable for diversion, or 
because the CPS decides on review that the case should be discontinued. The process 
potentially continues up to trial, which may result in conviction or acquittal. After trial, there 
are further stages of the process, involving appeals.20 
Delmas-Marty categorised this process into four functions with distinctive aims: 
'Investigation - gathering proof of the crime and identifying the perpetrator(s); 
Prosecution - publicly presenting the evidence; Judgment - legally finding guilt or 
innocence and, in case of the former, imposition of penalty; and Execution of 
. d t ,21 JU gmen. 
However, these functions are not completely separated from each other, but instead 
they are interactive elements, which keep influencing other factors, because every 
function is a part of a consecutive process. Thus, in practice, as Professor Uglow put it, 
a complete separation between the investigation and prosecution is impossible, 22 
although the aims of investigation and of prosecution, as the Report of the Royal 
20 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3rd edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; New York 2005), 19. 
21 Mark A. Summers (tr), Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Criminal Process and Human Rights: Toward a 
European Consciousness (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 10. 
22 Steve Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), 190. 
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Commission on Criminal Procedure in 1981 stated, are incompatible.23 
As we shall see in Chapter 5, the involvement of the prosecutors in investigation can 
be observed mainly in three different ways: giving advice to the police, directing the 
investigation of the police, or conducting investigations in a direct way.24 Of such 
methods, the Korean prosecutors are fully involved in the investigation by use of direct 
investigation and supervision. 
Secondly, the thesis explores the impact of the prosecutorial investigation. As seen 
above, the criminal procedure is a consecutive process. One variable in the process may 
have impact on the other elements. In particular, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the 
Korean prosecution service has the potential to exert much more influence upon the 
criminal proceedings than that of the other legal professionals. However, it is not 
possible for this study to explore all prosecutorial impacts on the criminal proceedings 
because the prosecutors are involved in nearly all stages in the criminal process and 
have very different influences on them. Therefore, this study examines three impacts of 
the prosecutorial investigative function: the impact on the rights of the defendants, on 
the police investigation, and on the trial. 
First, the prosecutorial impact on the outcomes of trials is explored by focusing on 
the prosecutor's interrogation documents. The records written by the prosecutors during 
the interrogation play a significant role in determining the verdict in the Korean 
criminal procedure.2s If the suspects make a confession to the prosecutor at the pre-trial 
stage, it will be the most important evidence to prove their guilt even if they later argue 
that such a confession was coerced. The statements of the suspects and witnesses 
recorded during the prosecutorial investigation are much more important than those in 
the open court. Professor Shin described this as follows: 
In general, suspects employ a defence counsel after being charged. At this moment, the most 
important fact to the defence lawyer is whether the defendants have confessed in front of the 
prosecutors or not. ... If the confessions are recorded in the prosecutorial dossiers, the 




23 Sir Cyril Phillips, 'The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: Report' HMSO (Cmnd 8092, 
London) para 6.23. 
24 In the English and US criminal procedure, prosecutors are generally involved in the investigation by 
giving advice to the police, whereas in France and Germany, prosecutors have the right to direct the 
investigation. See ch 5. 
25 See ch 6. 
26 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the Law of Evidence' 
(2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132, 109; For the reason why suspects employ a defence counsel 
after being charged, see ch 6 pt 5. 
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Whether or not the defendant's right to a fair trial in Korea is appropriately preserved is 
obviously an important issue. 
Second, this study examines whether the prosecutorial investigative function can be 
compatible with due process values, which are created to protect the rights of the 
defendants.27 As Sanders and Young put it, the rights of the defendants 'to be treated 
fairly and without discrimination, to be presumed innocent, and of an innocent person 
not to be convicted should be regarded as having special weight. ,28 However, 
investigation dominated by the prosecutors may have an adverse influence upon the 
rights of the defendants. An analogy may be drawn from the situation in England prior 
to 1986 when the prosecution was dominated by the police.29 
Finally, the prosecutorial impact on the police investigation is discussed. In most 
jurisdictions, investigations are in general conducted by the police.3o However, where 
the prosecutors monopolise the investigation process and conduct investigations with 
their own investigative units, the autonomy and responsibility of the police can be 
decreased, as stated in the Runciman Report.31 In addition, as Professor Kim put it, 
direct investigation by the prosecutors 'leads the police to regard the prosecutors as 
27 Packer described these elements as 'due process values': 'Each of its successes stages is designed to 
present formidable impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the process.' See Herbert L. 
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. 1968) 385, 163. 
28 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 
28. 
29 In England and Wales, the police had a considerable impact on the prosecution before the 
establishment ofthe Crown Prosecution Service. Professor Fionda described the situation as follows: 'In 
the view of alarming number of directed acquittals in Crown Courts across the country caused by 
insufficiency of evidence in prosecuted cases and by the potential partiality of police decisions on 
prosecution ... the Philips Report made proposals to separate the investigative and the prosecution 
functions of the police.' See Julia Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study 
([Oxford monographs on criminal law and criminal justice], Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; New York 1995) 268, 17 and Sir Cyril Phillips, 'The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: 
Report' HMSO (Cmnd 8092, London) paras 6.23, 24, 27; For more details, see ch 5. 
30 Apart from the police, administration agencies carry out investigative function in certain fields. For 
example, Environment Agency in England and Wales investigates and prosecutes the environmental 
offences. See Andrew Sanders and Richard Young op. cit. 360-361; For statistical information on the 
investigation by the police, see ch 5. 
31 With regard to the supervision by prosecutors over the police investigation, the Runciman Report 
stated that 'we do not consider it appropriate for the CPS to supervise police officers in the investigation. 
It is the responsibility of the police to investigate crime. There is no reason to believe that another service, 
whose members are recruited and promoted for their legal skills and experience, would be more proficient 
at investigating crime or at supervising and monitoring investigations conducted by those specifically 
trained for the purpose ... Such a step would also remove accountability in this area from the police, with 
whom it most naturally belongs ... the CPS must be in a position to advise on the evidence that is 
required if the case is to go forward to trial, it should not be in the position of supervising the gathering of 
the evidence.' See Walter G. Runciman, 'The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Report' HMSO (Cm 
2263, London) ch 2 para 67. 
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another powerful investigative authority rather than as a director of police investigation 
to guarantee the rights of the defendants. ,32 Such a situation may both lead the police to 
reject the direction of the prosecutors and to cause conflicts between the police and 
prosecution.33 In short, the direct investigation of the prosecutors seems to decrease the 
commitment of the front-line law enforcement officers and bring about unnecessary 
conflicts between them. 
In light of the scope of the study, the fundamental questions that this thesis seeks to 
explore are summarised as follows: 
1. To what extent does the prosecution service dominate criminal proceedings in 
Korea? 
2. Is that dominant position of the prosecution service appropriate to preserve the 
defendant's constitutional rights and to achieve efficiency in the criminal 
procedure? 
3. Do the functions, discretion, and accountability of the Korean prosecution 
service correspond to the international standards? 
2. Research Methods 
In order to explore the various functions of the prosecution service and their impact on 
criminal proceedings, the thoughts and experiences of the legal professionals are very 
important since they can show what takes place in practice. Thus, this thesis, unlike 
previous studies, has employed both quantitative and qualitative empirical methods such 
as content analysis, a survey based on self-completion questionnaires, and semi-
structured interviewing. 
Firstly, through content analysis, the point of view of the public as represented in the 
newspaper on the prosecution service in Korea was examined.34 Content analysis is a 
technique to make an objective inference by analysing data e.g. document, texts, and 
32 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 
532-533. 
33 There are two representative cases indicating the conflict between the police and prosecutors. The 
police officers who challenged the directions from prosecutors were charged. See 2007 GOHAP 6 (2007) 
48 Kakgong 30 April 2007 1713 (Chunchon District Court Kanglung Branch Court) and ibid 2007 
GOHAP 4 51 13 September 2007 2453 (Daejon District Court) 
34 See ch 4. 
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images.35 Mass media is a good source for content analysis. As Krippendorff argued, 
the perceptions and opinions of the public can be inferred through the content 
analysis.36 
Content analysis of the Korean mass media gave the basic information on the 
dominant position of the prosecution service and its main function. For this study, all 
front-page articles published for one year by two newspapers labelled either 
conservative or progressive bias were reviewed. Of them, 464 valid articles were 
employed and analysed through the content analysis.37 
Secondly, using stratified random sampling and self-completion questionnaires, a 
survey was administered.38 First of all, in this survey, the sample population was 
separated into two groups: investigating police officers and non-investigating police 
officers. They were asked about three categories: 
• Their perceptions on the role of the public prosecutors 
• The relationship between the police and prosecutors 
• Any role conflicts which the police officers experience in dealing with the prosecutors 
The results of the survey were compared between those two groups. In this respect, this 
study is different from the previous studies which focused on the analysis in the same 
group.39 
Such a survey based on self-completion questionnaires provided and answered to 
more specific question than did the content analysis indicating general opinions 
reflected in the mass media. Nevertheless, this survey did not give detailed information 
on the thoughts and perspectives of the legal actors.40 Thus, it was supplemented by in-
3S Bernard Berelson. 'Content Analysis in Communication Research' (1952) New York - Healthcare 
Related Statutes and Regulations cited from Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (2nd edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York 2004) 592,274; Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis/or the Social 
Sciences and Humanities (Addison-Wesley Reading, MA, 1969), 14. 
36 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Sage, 2004), 28 
(Krippendorff stated that' A stereotypical aim of mass-media content analysis is to describe how a 
controversial issue is "depicted" in a chose genre. Efforts to describe how something is "covered" by, 
''portrayed'' in, or "represented" in the media invoke a picture theory of content. ') 
3 See ch 4. 
38 Stratified random sample means' A sample in which units are randomly sampled from a population that 
has been divided into categories (strata).' See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York 2008) 748, 173-174,699. 
39 See Hwan-Beom Lee, Soo-Chang Lee and Deog-Bo Shim. 'The Effects of Police Investigator's Role 
Conflict on Job Stress in Korean Police Investigation Structure' (2007) 45(1) Korea Journal of Public 
Administration [Hangjeong Nonchong] 255 and Mi-Young Hong, The Relationship between the Police 
and Prosecutors: A Survey (Korean National Assembly, Seoul 2005) 
40 The self-completion questionnaires cannot give more precise information than the interview due to 
some technical limitations: 'There is no one present to help respondents if they are having difficulty 
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depth interviewing, which was carried out from July to October 2010. 
For the in-depth interview, a semi-structured interviewing method was employed. 
First of all, interviewees were chosen by snowball sampling.41 A small group of people 
from four categories - the police officers, public prosecutors, judges, and defence 
counsel - were initially contacted. Then, these contacts were used to establish new 
contacts with others in those groups. As a result, twenty legal professionals were 
interviewed - five persons from each group. In particular, among five prosecutors, three 
prosecutors were incumbent officers and the others were retired prosecutors. Those 
interviews not only gave opinions on the results of the survey, but also perspectives on 
the various issues being raised in this study. 
The interview was designed mainly to find various views of the roles, duties, and 
discretion of the Korean prosecution service. Therefore, there were not many ethical 
issues. The gathering of personal information was probably the key ethical issue. To 
protect personal information, confidentiality and anonymity were considered as 
significant elements. To ensure them, participants' names were all removed from data 
sources and were, as seen in Appendix, replaced with pseudonyms. In addition, among 
20 interviews, two interviews were recorded using note-taking during the interview as 
the interviewees did not want their sessions to be audio-recorded. Permission of note-
taking was also sought as in audio-recording. 
The length of each interview was about two hours. The participants were assured of 
confidentiality and anonymity and that no information about individuals would be given 
to anyone. Once such issues were resolved, permissions to audio-record was sought and 
obtained. Indeed, as seen above, the participants could select note-taking instead of 
audio-recording. Then, participants were reminded once more that they were free to 
withdraw from the study at any time. The interviews collected in this manner were 
analysed individually and in groups. Common themes emerged and different views were 
identified. Then they were organised into key themes and were employed to understand 
the current situation of the Korean criminal justice system. 
In addition to these empirical methods, by comparative study, various roles, powers, 
and the accountability of the prosecution services were explored. This comparative 
study was designed not to find an alternative system to transplant into the Korean 
criminal procedure, but to gain insight into the current situation of the Korean criminal 
answering a question ... There is no opportunity to probe respondents to elaborate an 
answer ... Respondents are more likely than in interviews to become tired of answering questions that are 
not very salient to them.' See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; New York 2008) 748, 218-219. 
41 ibid 184-185. . 
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justice system.42 For this comparative study, five jurisdictions - England and Wales, the 
United States, France, Germany, and Japan - were selected. The systems of criminal 
justice in those jurisdictions are representative of global criminal justice models. They 
provide a benchmark of functions of the public prosecution service in the criminal 
process.43 In addition, all of them have influenced the establishment of the modem 
system of criminal justice in Korea.44 As a result, the comparative study is based on 
those systems to illustrate the status of the Korean prosecution service. 
Finally, such empirical and comparative studies were complemented by other data-
gathering methods. For instance, relevant cases in several jurisdictions were explored. 
Articles and books on prosecution service and related criminal justice subjects were 
reviewed. Statistical data and official reports also were studied. In addition, there were 
many informal conversations with police officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, 
journalists, suspects, victims, and members of the Parliament which gave different ideas 
on the issues of this study. Those are based on the author's previous career as a police 
officer.45 
The author's career provided fundamental knowledge for this study. However, it 
might cause any bias unknowingly. To prevent such prejudice, objectivity has been 
emphasised from the beginning of the research. Terms, research methods, and results of 
42 Winterdyk et al. suggested four main grounds for the comparative study: First, 'By examining how 
different cultures address similar problems ... we can gain insight into what might work or not work and 
under what conditions these differences express themselves.' Second, 'In criminology and criminal justice, 
as with all social sciences, we strive to be able to explain relevant phenomenon such as why do people 
kill, why do some people become involved in organized crime, why doesn't imprisonment not seem to 
work, etc.' Third, 'Sometimes it is just interesting to be able to understand and appreciate other cultures 
and broaden our understanding of the world.' Finally, 'as the nature of certain [globalised] criminal 
activity continues to evolve in its breath and complexity, it becomes increasingly necessary to address 
such problems from al global and international perspective.' See John Winterdyk, Philip Reichel and 
Harry Dammer (eds), A Guided Reader to Research in Comparative Criminology/Criminal Justice 
(Universitatsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 2009), 21-22. 
43 George F. Cole, Stanislaw J. Frankowski and Marc G. Gertz (eds), Major Criminal Justice Systems: A 
Comparative Survey (2nd edn Sage Publications, Inc, 1987), Francis J. Pakes, Comparative Criminal 
Justice (Willan Publishing, Cullompton; Portland 2004), Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer 
(eds), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002), and Harry R. Dammer, Erika 
Fairchild and Jay S. Albanese, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems (3rd edn WadsworthlThomson 
Learning, Belmont, CA 2006); For more details on the representative systems, see ch 5. 
44 For the in-depth information on the development of the Korean public prosecution service, see ch 3. 
45 Such informal conversations mainly resulted from my previous two careers. First, from February 2005 
to July 2008, I studied the Korean criminal procedure as a police researcher at the National Police Agency, 
which is the headquarters of the Korean police. During this period, I had many chances to discuss with 
scholars, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, and members of the Parliament concerning the status of the police 
and prosecutors in the criminal procedure. Second, from November 1998 to February 2004, I worked 
respectively, as an investigator dealing with property crimes at the police station and a detective 
investigating violent offences at the Police Agency. In this period, unlike the former career, I took 
practical experiences in the criminal process and opportunities to communicate with suspects, prisoners, 
victims, police officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers, and prison officers. 
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analysis have been thoroughly reviewed and amended through the supervision meetings. 
3. Plan of Chapters 
The following chapters systematically explore prosecutorial powers in Korean criminal 
procedure and their impact on the basic rights of the defendants, the police investigation, 
and the outcomes of trials. This thesis unfolds in three sections. 
Before moving on to prosecutorial impacts, Chapter 1, 2, 3 and 4 provide basic 
information for this study. First of all, Chapter 1 gives the theoretical framework for 
understanding and evaluating the criminal procedures. Chapter 2 describes the contexts 
for the Korean criminal process. In Chapter 3 and 4, the functions and pre-eminent 
status of the prosecutors in the Korean system of criminal justice are illustrated. 
Especially, Chapter 4 includes the content analysis revealing the extent of their 
investigative function. 
Chapter 5 explores the roles, powers, and accountability of the prosecution service 
in six jurisdictions including Korea. First of all, it introduces the development of 
modem public prosecution services. Then, the investigative function of the prosecutors, 
different prosecutorial discretion at the pre-trial stage, and influences upon trials are 
respectively examined. In the end, the different systems of accountability of public 
prosecution services are compared. This comparative study proposes a combined model 
to indicate the direction in which the prosecution services should be developed. Along 
with the theoretical framework, it provides another significant tool to analyse and 
critique the prosecutorial roles. 
Finally, Chapter 6, 7, and 8 explore the prosecutorial impact on the criminal 
proceedings. Chapter 6 explores the prosecutorial impact on the outcomes of a trial 
particularly based on the interrogation records written by the prosecutors. This chapter 
includes two key issues: the reliability of the confessions recorded during the 
investigative interview and the consequences caused by trials heavily relying on the 
prosecutorial dossier. In conclusion, I propose a number of methods to safeguard the 
suspects in the interrogation room. Chapter 7 examines the impact of the prosecutorial 
investigation on the rights of the defendants. The issue whether or not the dominant 
position of the prosecutors can guarantee those rights is addressed. Chapter 8 discusses 
the impact on the police and their investigation. This chapter, as briefly stated in the 
research methods set above, is mostly based on a survey of police officers' practices, 
perceptions, and attitudes regarding the investigation by the prosecutors. Through the 
11 
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survey, three key issues were examined: the necessity of prosecutorial supervision over 
the police investigation, the relationship between the police and prosecutors, and the 
responsibility of the police as front line law enforcement officials. 
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Chapter 1 Theoretical Framework of the Study 
This study is not only descriptive, but also comparative and critical because it analyses 
the dominant position of the Korean prosecution service and its impact on the criminal 
process. To this goal, a theoretical framework is required that will guide the analysis. 
In this thesis, Packer's models are basically exploited to evaluate criminal 
proceedings. The two conflicting models of the criminal justice - the crime control and 
due process models - have been widely regarded as some of the most important 
contributions to systematic thought about criminal procedure. 1 However, Korea is a 
developing democracy and this needs to be reflected in the criminal justice system, e.g. 
public accountability, checks and balances, and separation of powers. Consequently, the 
correlation between these elements and Packer's models needs to be explored. 
1. How to Evaluate Criminal Justice 
Criminal justice has many different values and interests. For instance, as Sanders and 
Young put it, the criminal justice system must 'convict the guilty, protect the innocent 
from wrongful conviction, protect victims, maintain human rights - the protection of 
everyone (innocent and guilty) from arbitrary or oppressive treatment, maintain order, 
secure public confidence in, and cooperation with, policing and prosecution, and pursue 
these goals efficiently and effectively without disproportionate cost and consequent 
harm to other public services. ,2 
Those different objectives, as Packer suggested, may be irreconcilable with each 
other.3 In the system, for example, where the nature of the political regime weighs 
heavily on maintaining social order, the protection of human rights may be considered 
relatively insignificant, and as a consequence, is readily ignored.4 Thus, it is very 
1 John Griffiths. 'Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third Model of the Criminal Process' (1969) 79 
Yale LJ 359, 360; Kent Roach. 'Four Models of the Criminal Process' (1998) 89 Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 671, 671. 
2 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 
43. 
3 Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. 1968) 
385, 153-158. 
4 Sanders and Young stated that 'Many people, especially politicians, like to pretend that ... [various 
values and interests in the criminal justice] are all equally achievable, but we have seen that this is 
dangerously misleading.' See Andrew Sanders and Richard Young op. cit. 43. 
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difficult to evaluate certain systems by considering all factors in the criminal justice 
system. Packer's two models 'permit us to recognize explicitly the value choices that 
underlie the details of the criminal process. ,S Different values keep competing for 
priority.6 Where crime control values are emphasised, the repression of crimes is 
considered as by far the most important function.7 Thus, acting in an informal setting 
can be permitted for the purpose of efficient investigation and prosecution of crimes. 
However, the system focusing on due process values is far more deeply impressed 
within the formal structure of law than is the crime control model. 8 Indeed, the informal 
and non-adjudicative fact-finding tactics are generally rejected. 
These models have been often referred to by many commentators as a useful tool to 
evaluate the system of criminal justice. Sanders and Young state that Packer's two 
models can represent extremes on a spectrum of possible ways of doing criminal justice: 
'Use of the models enables one to plot the position of current criminal justice practices 
at each stage, as well as to highlight the direction of actual and foreseeable trends along 
any given spectrum. ,9 Based on such models, McConville and Baldwin suggested in 
1981 that at that time the English system places more emphasis on the crime control 
values than in the United States. In their study of reliability of the police interrogation, 
they illustrate: 
'[T]he safeguards available to suspects in police custody are virtually non-existent [in 
England and Wales]. Yet it is at this stage that the suspect is most vulnerable and where, as 
Packer rightly argues, the disparity in resources between the state and the accused is 
greatest. ... The situation is indeed more favourable to the accused in the United States 
where the courts have striven in recent years to give meaning to his rights.' 10 
However, Packer has been also subjected to a number of criticisms. For example, 
Ashworth and Redmayne suggest five limitations to the models: unclear explanation of 
the relationship between models; failure to consider various factors affecting crime rate; 
SHerbert L. Packer, The Limits o/the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. 1968) 
385,153; Padfield indicated that 'No one would suggest today that these models are entirely satisfactory, 
but they do allow us to recognize the value choices that underlie the details of the criminal process.' See 
Nicola Padfield, Text and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process (4th edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; New York 2008) 536, 10. 
6 Packer op. cit. 153. 
7 ibid 158. 
8 ibid 163. 
9 Sanders and Young op. cit. 19. 
\0 Mike McConville and John Baldwin, Courts, Prosecution, and Conviction (Clarendon, Oxford 1981) 
232,5. 
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underestimation of the importance of resource management as an element in the 
criminal process; no allowance for victim-related matters; and failure to consider delays, 
which are also a source of considerable anxiety and inconvenience in the criminal 
process. I I Padfield also suggested that Packer's models are not sufficient to illustrate all 
the various aspects in the criminal process. 12 
In addition to those studies, numerous researchers have also developed their ideas 
based on Packer's models. 13 In particular, Sung analysed the relationship between the 
development of democracy and the due process model of the criminal process. He 
suggested that 'the transformation of justice administration in democratizing countries 
is a transition from a crime control to a due process orientation.' 14 Therefore, in 
authoritarian states, criminal justice is considered as maintaining social order. As a 
result, a large law enforcement-punishment apparatus plays a significant role in the 
criminal process. In contrast, in liberal democracies, the defence of civil liberties is one 
of the most important values in the criminal justice. Thus, in order to guarantee the due 
process of law, such systems invest many resources in the judiciary, which consequently 
leads to a higher rate of case attrition. 
Based on Packer's models and Sung's analysis, there is an argument that to 
guarantee due process values taking place alongside the development of democracy, the 
roles and powers of the legal actors, in particular of the public prosecution service, need 
11 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3rd edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; New York 2005),38-40; David J. Smith. 'Case Construction and the Goals of Criminal Process' 
(1997) 37(3) Br J Criminol 319, 335 (Smith indicated that 'Due process is not a goal in itself'. In other 
words, 'the Crime Control Model is concerned with the fundamental goal of the criminal justice system, 
whereas the Due Process Model is concerned with setting limits to the pursuit of that goal. '); John 
Griffiths. 'Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third Model of the Criminal Process' (1969) 79 Yale LJ 
359. 
12 Nicola Padfield, Text and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process (4th edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; New York 2008) 536, 10 (Padfield stated that 'Packer's models are not enough. There are not just 
two clear-cut alternative value systems competing for priority in the criminal process. ') 
13 Anthony E. Bottoms and John D. McClean, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1976), 226-232 (Bottoms and McClean introduced a third paradigmatic model, which is different 
from the Crime Control and Due Process Model: 'The Liberal Bureaucratic Model is the model of the 
criminal justice process typically held by humane and enlightened clerks to the justices and Crown Court 
administrators in this country.'); Kent Roach. 'Four Models of the Criminal Process' (1998) 89 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 671 (Roach critically assessed Packer's crime control and due process 
models and suggested two models reflecting victim's rights: 'the crime control model represents our past; 
the due process and the punitive victims' right models compete in the present and the future depends on 
whether punitive or non-punitive forms of victims' rights dominate. '); Douglas E. Beloof. 'The Third 
Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model' (1999) Utah L.Rev. 289 (Beloofargued that 
'The three-model concept, which includes the Victim Participation Model, is more functional than the 
two-model concept because the law now reflects the significance of genuine values of victim participation, 
while the two-model concept provides no room for the values of victim participation.') 
14 Hung-En Sung. 'Democracy and Criminal Justice in Cross-National Perspective: From Crime Control 
to Due Process' (2006) 605( I) Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 311, 311. 
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to be reformed to be compatible with those values. Due to the Japanese colonial period 
(1910-1945), the Korean War (1950-1953), and military dictatorship (1961-1993), the 
Korean system of criminal justice evolved under the influence of an authoritarian state 
for almost 80 years. IS Democracy has been established since 1987, when 'the 
authoritarian regime agreed to carry out a set of democratic reforms including direct 
presidential elections.' 16 Such reforms have contributed to the partial democratic 
development of the criminal justice system. For example, a number of provisions to 
protect the basic rights to a fair trial were introduced in the Korean Constitution. 17 
Notwithstanding such developments, the dominant position of the public prosecution 
service in the criminal process has never been reformed. In this context, rather than 
guaranteeing due process values, this study argues prosecutorial monopoly inhibits them 
from working properly. As a consequence, the protection of the constitutional rights of 
the individual, as noted in Chapter 7, has been neglected. In addition, ironically, 
efficient crime control also has been restricted because, as we shall see in Chapter 8, the 
prosecution service has played a role in decreasing the sense of responsibility among the 
frontline police officers. 
This chapter aims to provide the theoretical framework for this argument. Firstly, 
Packer's two models are examined. Then, the relationship between two models and 
democracy are discussed based on Sung's analysis. Finally, the Korean system of 
criminal justice is evaluated in light of the powers of the public prosecution service and 
the development of democracy. 
2. The Crime Control and Due Process Models 
Packer developed the crime control and due process models in order to illustrate two 
conflicting values systems competing for priority in the operation of the criminal 
15 Bruce Cumings, 'Civil society in West and East' in Carles K. Annstrong (ed), Korean Society: Civil 
Society. Democracy and the State (2nd edn Routledge, Oxon; New York 2007) 9, 21-24. 
16 Sun-Hyuk Kim, 'Civil society and democratization in South Korea' in Carles K. Annstrong (ed), 
Korean Society: Civil Society. Democracy and the State (2nd edn Routledge, Oxon; New York 2007) 53, 
58. 
17 Kuk Cho. 'The Unfmished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' 
(2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 377-378 (Professor Cho stated that 'The nationwide June 
Struggle of 1987 led to the collapse of Korea's authoritarian regime and opened a road toward 
democratization. Under the authoritarian regime, the 'crime control' value dominated over the 'due 
process'value in regards to criminal procedure. The Constitution's Bill of Rights was merely nominal, 
and criminal law and procedure were no more than instruments for maintaining the regime and 
suppressing those dissident. It was not a coincidence that the June Struggle was sparked by the death of a 
dissident student tortured during police interrogation. ') 
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procedure. IS The two models reflect extremes on a scale of feasible ways to conduct 
criminal justice in criminal proceedings. However, these polarities are not observed in 
reality. They are not the ideals of the criminal justice. As a consequence, they were 
presented' as an aid to analysis, not as a program for action. ,19 
2.1. The Crime Control Model 
In the crime control model, the most important function of the criminal process is the 
repression of the criminal conduct. In order to perform this function, the model focuses 
on efficiency enabling the criminal process to deal with a large number of offences in an 
efficient and effective way. Therefore, every stage of the criminal proceedings is 
conducted on the basis of a standard of efficiency. Packer defined efficiency as 'the 
system's capacity to apprehend, try, convict, and dispose of a high proportion of 
criminal offenders whose offences become known. ,20 
For the purpose of successful operation of the criminal process, this model must 
produce a high rate of apprehension and conviction. As it must deal with many offences 
with limited resources, speed and finality are regarded as critical elements in this model. 
In order to increase the speed, the criminal process depends on informality and on 
uniformity. In addition, by minimising the occasions for challenge, the criminal 
procedure tries to secure finality. 
In the crime control model, the fact-finding process is generally conducted through 
the informal process in the police station and the prosecutor's office rather than through 
the formal process in COurt.21 However, such informality may not be sufficient for the 
effective crime control. Thus, the criminal process is supplemented by the uniformity, 
which plays a role in helping the legal professionals to dispose of large number of cases 
with limited resources. Such a progress was described as 'an assembly-line conveyor 
belt' by Packer: 
[It] moves an endless stream of cases, never stopping, carrying the cases to workers who 
stand at fixed stations and who perform on each case as it comes by the same small but 
18 Packer op. cit. 154. 
19 ibid. 
20 See ibid 158. Subsequent discussion is based around ibid 158-159. 
21 Fact-finding process is not only limited to the verdict, but it also, as Herman put it, may have an 
impact on sentencing process: 'Judges historically were afforded fact-fmding power at sentencing so that 
they could play their assigned role in an indeterminate, offender-oriented sentencing scheme.' See Susan 
N. Herman. 'Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
and the Limits of Due Process, The' (1992) 66 S.Cal.L.Rev. 289, 305. 
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essential operation that brings it one step closer to being a fmished product, or, to exchange 
the metaphor for the reality, a closer file?2 
In this process, the conviction of the person is de facto decided at an early stage. Police 
and prosecutors determine the probable innocence or guilt. Those who are probably 
innocent drop out of the process at an early stage. In contrast, the probably guilty 
persons are moved quickly through the remaining stages of the process. Indeed, the 
defendants in this model are presumed guilty rather than innocent. As Packer put it, the 
presumption of guilt is an important device to enable the system to deal with large 
numbers of cases in an efficient way. 
The significant assumption for this model is that 'screening processes operated by 
police and prosecutors are reliable indicators of probable guilt': 
Once a man has been arrested and investigated without being found to be probably innocent, 
or, to put it differently, once a determination has been made that there is enough evidence of 
gUilt to permit holding him for further action, then all subsequent activity directed toward him 
is based on the view that he is probably gUilty. The precise point at which this occurs will 
vary from case to case; in many cases it will occur as soon as the suspect is arrested, or even 
before, if the evidence of probable guilt that has come to the attention of the authorities is 
sufficiently strong. But in any case the presumption of gUilt will begin to operate well before 
the "suspect" becomes a "defendant.,,23 
As a result, in this model, the pre-trial fact-finding process is considered more important 
than any adjudicative process. 
2.2. The Due Process Model 
Whereas the crime control model looks like a conveyor belt in a factory, the due process 
model resembles an 'obstacle course' .24 Formidable impediments are established which 
playa role in filtering cases for prosecution. The features of the due process model can 
be illustrated in five aspects: lack of confidence in informal fact-finding process; the 
22 ibid 159. Further discussion is based around ibid 160-161. 
23 ibid 160; Packer emphasises that the presumption of gUilt is not an opposite concept of the presumption 
of innocence. Rather, he suggests that 'The presumption of innocence is a direction to officials about how 
they are to proceed, not a prediction of outcome. The presumption of guilt, however, is purely and simply 
a prediction of outcome. The presumption of innocence is, then, a direction to the authorities to ignore the 
presumption of guilt in their treatment of the suspect.' See ibid 161. 
~4 ibid 163. 
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rejection of finality; limitations on the official powers; equality between the state and 
defendants; and scepticism about the morality of criminal sanction. 
Firstly, advocates of due process have no confidence in the informal pre-trial fact-
finding processes, unlike those of the crime control model. The due process model 
stresses the limitations resulting from the informal and non-adjudicative fact-finding 
process: 
People are notoriously poor observers of disturbing events - the more emotion-arousing the 
context, the greater the possibility that recollection will be incorrect; confessions and 
admissions by persons in police custody may be induced by physical or psychological 
coercion so that the police end up hearing what the suspect thinks they want to hear rather 
than the truth; witnesses may be animated by a bias or interest that no one would trouble to 
discover except one specially charged with protecting the interest of the accused.2s 
These considerations all lead the due process model to reject informal fact-finding 
processes and to place emphasis on formal, adjudicative, and adversarial fact-finding 
process.26 
Secondly, the due process model rejects the demand for early finality because of the 
possibilities of human error. There is always a possibility that a case needs to be 
reopened to examine new facts, which have been discovered since the last public 
hearing.27 The due process model stresses that subsequent scrutiny by formal process 
must be available whenever there is an allegation of factual error. 28 
With respect to such an error, the due process model has a different perspective from 
the crime control model, in which the probabilities of mistakes are in general accepted 
because the reliability of the system can be secured by its efficiency. However, the due 
process model rejects this relationship between the reliability and efficiency. Instead, the 
model stresses that mistakes in the criminal process must be eliminated to the greatest 
extent possible in order to achieve the reliability of systems,z9 In sum, in the due 
process model, 'the aim of the process is at least as much to protect the factually 
innocent as it is to convict the factually guilty.'30 
2S ibid. 
26 Packer stated that 'the factual case against the accused is publicly heard by an impartial tribunal and is 
evaluated only after the accused has had a full opportunity to discredit the case against him.' See ibid 163-
164. 
27 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 
21. 
28 Packer op. cit. 164. 
29 ibid 164-165. 
30 Packer described this feature of the Due Process Model as quality control in industrial technology: 
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Thirdly, the due process model considers the official powers of the government must 
be controlled in order to protect the liberty of individuals.3! The model needs various 
schemes to control the powers of the state to prevent state officials from exercising their 
coercive powers in an oppressive manner. In particular, the doctrine of legal guilt is the 
most far-reaching mechanism to control official power. 
According to the doctrine of legal guilt, reliable evidence itself is insufficient to 
prove the guilt for the accused. Instead, such a factual determination must be 
supplemented by procedural propriety. For instance, 'the tribunal that convicts [a person] 
must have the power to deal with this kind of case ("jurisdiction") and must be 
geographically appropriate ("venue"); too long a time must not have elapsed since the 
offence was committed ("statute of limitations"); he must not have been previously 
convicted or acquitted for the same or a substantially similar offense ("double 
jeopardy"); he must not fall within a category of persons, such as children or the insane, 
who are legally immune to conviction ("criminal responsibility")'. 32 Packer indicated 
the abuse of power as the major reason to establish such checking mechanisms: 
Power is always subject to abuse - sometimes subtle, other times, as in the criminal process, 
open and ugly. Precisely because of its potency in subjecting the individual to the coercive 
power of the state, the criminal process must, in this model, be subject to controls that prevent 
it from operating with maximal efficiency. According to this ideology, maximal efficiency 
means maximal tyranny.33 
Fourthly, the due process model tries to sustain the ideal of equality. This norm does 
not require the government to provide literally equal opportunities for all criminal 
defendants to challenge the process. Instead, the norm emphasises the public obligation 
to ensure that 'financial inability does not destroy the capacity of an accused to assert 
what may be meritorious challenges to the processes being invoked against him. ,34 
Miranda in the USA and duty solicitor in England are examples. The defence lawyers 
have a significant part to play in checking the operations of the system. In particular, the 
'tolerable deviation from standard varies with the importance of conformity to standard in the destined 
uses of the product. The Due Process Model resembles afactory that has to devote a substantial part of 
its input to quality control. This necessarily cuts down on quantitative output.' See ibid, 165. (Emphasis 
added) 
31 Packer indicated that the due process values 'can be expressed in, although not adequately described by, 
the concept of the primacy of the individual and the complementary concept of limitation on official 
rower.' See ibid 165-166. 
2 ibid. 
33 ibid (Emphasis added). 
34 ibid 168-169. 
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point in time at which the equality norm is introduced into the criminal process 
determines the impact. For example, the model, which ensures the defence lawyers to 
become involved in a case at an early stage of criminal process, can have a considerable 
impact on the result of the case at the trial. 
Finally, the due process model is sceptical about the morality and utility of the 
criminal sanction.35 The model, as Bator put it, regards such a sanction as an apparatus 
to be mainly used against 'the psychologically and economically impaired': 
[I]n summary we are told that the criminal law's notion of just condemnation and punishment 
is a cruel hypocrisy visited by a smug society on the psychologically and economically 
crippled; that its premise of a morally autonomous will with at least some measure of choice 
whether to comply with the values expressed in a penal code is unscientific and outmoded; 
that its reliance on punishment as an educational and deterrent agent is misplaced, particularly 
in the case of the very members of society most likely to engage in criminal conduct; and that 
its failure to provide for individualized and humane rehabilitation of offenders is inhuman and 
wasteful.36 
Therefore, in this model, the attempts to catch and punish alleged offenders are 
generally restrained.37 Packer summarised this feature of the due process model into 
thus: 'doubts about the ends for which power is being exercised create pressure to limit 
the discretion with which that power is exercised. ,38 
3. The Relationship between Democracy and Due Process 
Values 
The cnme control and due process models are opposite ends of the spectrum and 
represent simplified models that in practice coexist to various degrees and with different 
blends.39 The crime control model places emphasis on the conviction of the guilty. To 
35 ibid 170-171 
36 Paul M. Bator. 'Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners' (1963) 76(3) 
Harv Law Rev 441, 442. 
37 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 
22. 
38 Packer op. cit. 171. 
39 Hung-En Sung. 'Democracy and Criminal Justice in Cross-National Perspective: From Crime Control 
to Due Process' (2006) 605( 1) Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 311, 313. 
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this goal, the model accepts some human errors, which may lead the innocent persons to 
be convicted. In addition, the liberty of the suspects can be limited to the extent that the 
society accepts. In contrast, the due process model focuses on the need for the acquittal 
of the innocent. To achieve this value, the model accepts the acquittal of the guilty. In 
particular, the protection of the civil liberties is regarded as the most crucial value to 
uphold the whole grounds for integrity of the system.40 
Both models have their own strong arguments for the importance of their core values, 
but nevertheless, each model cannot completely exclude the values of the other model. 
As Packer stated, 'A person who subscribed to all of the values underlying one model to 
the exclusion of all of the values underlying the other would be rightly viewed as a 
fanatic. ,41 
Based on Packer's models, Sung suggested that 'the democratization process is 
characterized and facilitated by a simultaneous transition of the criminal justice system 
from crime control-oriented structure and operations to due process-oriented 
organization and functions.,42 In other words, the quality of a society's democracy can 
in part be judged by its adherence to values of due process. 
Criminal justice systems, which emphasise the crime control values, are generally 
administered by authoritarian regimes because they give priority to social control.43 In 
this context, social control means the 'unilateral suppression of disturbances,.44 The 
state powers exceed the claims of the accused. The executive authorities may exercise 
unrestrained powers, whereas the rights of citizens are extensively regulated.4s When 
taken to extremes, such countries are described as 'police states' since the regimes are 
maintained mainly by the police forces. 46 Similarly, the public prosecution service 
plays a role as an organ of state coercion.47 In addition, the judges meticulously apply 
40 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 
22. 
41 Packer op. cit. 154. 
42 ibid 313; Based on the history of the USA, Packer also acknowledged a gradual progression from the 
Crime control Model to the Due Process Model. See ibid. 
43 ibid, 314; C. Neal Tate and Stacia L. Haynie. 'Authoritarianism and the Functions of Courts: A Time 
Series Analysis of the Philippine Supreme Court, 1961-1987' (1993) 27(4) Law & Society Review 707, 
733-736. 
44 Sung op. cit. 314. 
45 The authoritarianism influences not only the police and prosecutors, but also the judges. See n 48 
below. 
46 David H. Bayley, Patterns a/PoliCing: A Comparative International Analysis (Rutgers Univ Pr, 1990), 
202. 
47 Burrage indicated that' During the 70 years of socialism the law came to playa rather different role in 
Russian SOCiety. It sought less to protect rights of individuals than to instruct and guide the population, to 
declare the intentions and ideology of the state and, above all, enforce its will. The rights of Soviet 
citizens were placed in the custody not of the citizens and their advocates but of the prokuratura. The only 
empirical analysis of pro curacy's work in this regard was based on 433 published cases between 1955 and 
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the laws of the ruler as administrative bureaucrats.48 In short, as Sung suggested, 'The 
values and practices found in authoritarian societies fit all the basic traits of Packer's 
crime control model of justice administration. ,49 
In the crime control-oriented system, fact-finding processes, which are managed by 
the police and prosecution service, are considered more important than the adjudicative 
process. Greater statutory powers and discretion are given to the law enforcement 
agencies in order to maximise the efficiency of the system. Therefore, the investigative 
authorities have wide powers to determine factual guilt. Almost all cases are passed 
through the court without particular attrition. 
Unlike the crime control-oriented systems, due process-oriented criminal justice 
prevails in liberal democratic jurisdictions. In these systems, government officials have 
the 'vertical accountability' to the public through the various channels such as an 
electoral process, civic organisations, or the news media. In addition, they also have the 
'horizontal accountability', which leads legally empowered state agencies to screen 
other branches of the government and check acts of abuse or neglect by state officials in 
routine and effective ways. 50 In addition, criminal justice operations are insulated from 
political interference by a commitment to professionalism and respect for expertise.51 
Liberal democracies can be characterised by extensive provisions for individual 
rights and legal restrictions against the intrusion of state powers. For example, 
unreasonable searches and seizures are restricted generally by the court. Similarly, 
illegal detention, torture, and cruel punishment also are strictly prohibited. In addition, 
the system of criminal justice respects the rights to a fair trial e.g., habeas corpus and 
the right to legal counsel. In short, a liberal democracy, as Sung suggested, 'encourages 
1974. That study found that 'no published cases exist in which procurators issued protests or 
representations on behalf of aggrieved citizens and in conflict with the State's interest.' None have come 
to light since that time, not even since 1985.' See Michael Burrage. 'Russian Advocates: Before, During, 
and After Perestroika' (1993) 18 Law & Soc.lnquiry 573, 588. 
48 Tate and Haynie indicated that 'the fear of coercion causes as least some judges to alter their 
decisionmaking [sic] in ways pleasing to the ruler(s).' See C. Neal Tate and Stacia L. Haynie. 
'Authoritarianism and the Functions of Courts: A Time Series Analysis of the Philippine Supreme Court, 
1961-1987' (1993) 27(4) Law & Society Review 707, 735. 
49 Sungop. cit. 314-315. 
so Guillermo O'Donnell. 'Delegative Democracy' (1994) 5 Journal of Democracy 55, 61-62; Diamond 
stated that 'In addition to regular, free, and fair electoral competition and universal suffrage, ... 
[democracy] requires the absence of "reserved domains" of power for the military or other social and 
political forces that are not either directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate. Second, in addition 
to the "vertical" accountability of rulers to the ruled (which is secured most reliably through regular, free, 
and fair elections), it requires "horizontal" accountability of officeholders to one another; this constrains 
executive power and so helps protect constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the deliberative process. Third, 
it encompasses extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and group 
freedoms.' See Larry J. Diamond. 'Is the Third Wave Over?' (1996) 7 Journal of Democracy 20,23-24. 
SI Sung op. cit. 315. 
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individual freedom by restraining the intrusion of the state into citizens' lives; this is 
achieved by insisting on a formal adjudicative fact-finding process, often at the cost of 
increasing inefficiency and a high rate of case attrition in the criminal justice process. ,52 
By use of a systemic comparison, Sung analysed the relationship between the 
democratisation and due process values. He hypothesised that 'the organization and 
operation of criminal justice administration vary according to the attained level of 
democratization. ,53 In order to examine such propositions, he compared 111 criminal 
justice systems based on the data from the United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and 
the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems.54 
According to his analysis, higher degrees of democratic achievement are closely 
related to the development of 'a resourceful criminal justice system characterized by a 
high rate of case attrition in the criminal justice process.'55 In other words, liberal 
democratic countries place more emphasis on due process values than on crime control 
ones. This feature is mainly reflected in a rate of case attrition. 56 To sum up, in 
democratising countries, justice administration is gradually transformed from a crime 
control to a due process orientation. Sung described this transition of the system as 
follows: 
That the deepening of democratization increases the size, and paradoxically decreases the 
efficiency, of the criminal justice system highlights the dramatic and interesting changes in 
the administration of justice that the rule of law can set in motion. The system loses some of 
its efficiency because different rights of the victims, offenders, and the public at large are 
taken seriously at different stages of the process.S7 
Although due process values themselves do not create democracy, they can 
contribute to build and maintain the sense of fairness, which sustains the trust in 
S2 ibid. 
S3 In this study, he employed eight indicators and explored them through the statistics. Of them, 'four (i.e., 
judicial personnel rate, police contact rate, conviction rate, and incarceration rate) demonstrated 
statistically significant variations that were consistent with the hypothesis, two personnel categories (Le., 
rates of police staff and correctional personnel) showed statistically significant relationships that 
contradicted the hypothesis, and both prosecutorial variables proved consistently unrelated to the level of 
democracy. While the personnel indicators provided only partial support to the proposition of structural 
differences, the operational indicators strongly corroborated the argument of higher criminal case attrition 
among democratic countries.' See ibid 315-326. 
54 ibid 317-318. 
55 ibid 329. 
56 The rates of case attrition were secured based on conviction rate of each jurisdiction. In Sung's analysis, 
'Very powerful support was found for the argument that the rate of case attrition in the criminal justice 
process is lower in more authoritarian countries and higher in more democratic countries.' See ibid, 324. 
~7 ibid 329. 
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democratic institutions. 58 People tend to consent and cooperate with criminal justice 
agenc'ies in a democratic way when they think that their constitutional rights and 
concerns are guaranteed and respected by the criminal procedure. 59 
4. Korean Criminal Justice Values 
The Korean system of criminal justice has been reformed with the development of 
democracy. Different forms of government have an impact on the legal institutions 
through different sets of demands and constraints. Recently, the global trend of 
democratisation has made the systems of criminal justice more transparent and 
accountable than before.6o In particular, many countries have succeeded in demolishing 
authoritarian regimes and replacing them with freely elected governments by the 
public.61 However, there are few countries in which criminal justice institutions and 
practices have been fully reformed to correspond to the democratic ideals of equality, 
openness, and fairness. 62 Such a limitation is observed in the development of the 
Korean criminal justice system. 
The modem system of Korean criminal justice was established during the Japanese 
colonial period. In addition, because of the Korean War and military governments, the 
criminal justice system had developed mostly under authoritarian regimes. In those 
periods, democracy in Korea was a meaningless title. As Professor Cho stated, the 
Korean Constitution was described as the 'Emperor's New Clothes. ,63 The police used 
S8 Tom R. Tyler. 'Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law' (2003) 30 Crime & Just. 
283, 349-352. 
S9 Similarly, Moore stated that 'By building a constituency for ... [ due process] values, we not only 
increase the legitimacy of the criminal justice institutions and enhance their efficiency, we also 
accomplish the broader goal of reweaving the fabric ofa liberal community--"liberal" in the old-
fashioned sense. We can teach what we most fundamentally owe to one another. After all, it is in the 
interstices created by the restraint we impose on ourselves and the wide latitude we give to others that the 
maximum of liberty and security is found. ' See Mark H. Moore. 'Notable Speech: Legitimizing Criminal 
Justice Policies and Practices' (1997) 66(10) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 8 
60 Hung-En Sung. 'Democracy and Criminal Justice in Cross-National Perspective: From Crime Control 
to Due Process' (2006) 605( 1) Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 311, 311. 
61 Teresa P. R. Caldeira and James Holston. 'Democracy and violence in Brazil' (1999) 41(04) 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 691, 691 (Caldeira and Holston indicated that 'Democracy 
has expanded remarkably throughout the world during the last quarter of the twentieth century. In 1972, 
there were fifty-two electoral democracies, constituting 33 percent of the world's 160 sovereign nation-
states. By 1996, the number had risen to 118 electoral democracies out of 191 states, or 62 percent of the 
total, for a net gain of66 democratic states.') 
62 Sung op. cit. 312; Mark Ungar, Elusive Reform: Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America 
(Lynne Rienner Pub, 2002), 201-202. 
63 The Korean Constitutional Court (tr), Constitution of the Republic of Korea [HeonbeopJ (1948); Kuk 
Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 
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illegal arrest and detention without particular restrictions. In addition, beating, 
threatening, and torture by water or electricity were often used at the investigation stage. 
Some high profile cases which took place in the 1980s can illustrate these practices: 
Supporters for [former] President Kim Dae-Jung, a political dissident at that time, were 
severely tortured when arrested for their alleged conspiracy to overthrow the state in 1980. In 
particular, those who violated the National Security Law were brutally tortured, and accused 
of being "pro-enemy leftists." For instance, [former] Presidential Secretary Lee Tae-Bok and 
Congressman Kim Geun-Tae, who were then leaders of the democratization movement, were 
brutally tortured when arrested for the violation of the National Security Law in 1980 and in 
1983 respectively. In 1987, Professor Kwon In-Sook, then a labor movement activist, was 
sexually abused by a policeman when arrested, and Park Jong-Chul, a dissident student, was 
suffocated to death in the bathtub during police torture. Besides political dissidents, ordinary 
people also had to go through the cruel investigation process. Illegally-obtained confessions 
and physical evidence were usually admitted by the Court to prove a defendant's gUilt. From 
the standpoint of human rights, it was no more than a "Dark Age". 64 
However, the authoritarian regime was brought down by nationwide protests in 1987.65 
A new road toward democratization opened.66 
This democratisation process led the Korean Constitution to be reformed, including 
the protection of the citizen's rights in the criminal procedure. Therefore, the 1987 
Constitution is often described as 'a blueprint for the constitutionalization of criminal 
procedure' in Korea.67 The general principle of due process in criminal procedure was 
explicitly incorporated in the Constitution: 'All citizens shall enjoy personal liberty. No 
person shall be arrested, detained, searched, seized or interrogated except as provided 
by Act. No person shall be punished, placed under preventive restrictions or subject to 
involuntary labor except as provided by Act and through lawful procedures' .68 In 
addition, this principle has been repeatedly emphasised by the Constitutional Court: 
30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 378. 
64 ibid 378-379. 
6S James M. West and Edward J. Baker. 'The Constitutional Reforms in South Korea 1987: Electoral 
Processes and Judicial Independence' (1988) 1 Harv.Hum.Rts.YB 135, 135; Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished 
"Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law 
Policy 377, 377. 
66 As seen above briefly, this process is often called the 'June Struggle'. 
67 ibid 379. 
68 The Korean Constitutional Court (tr), Constitution of the Republic of Korea [Heonbeop} (1948) art 12 
(1). 
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The principle of due process requires that both the fonnal procedure described by the law and 
the substantial content of the law be reasonable and just ... In particular, it declares that the 
whole criminal procedure should be controlled from the standpoint of guaranteeing the 
constitutional basic rights.69 
Such a jUdgement ensured that the principle of due process is to guarantee the legality 
of the procedure.70 













the right not to be tortured71 
privilege against self-incrimination 72 
strict requirements for obtaining judicial warrants for coercive measures 73 
the right to counsef4 
the right to be infonned of the reason of arrest or detention7S 
the right to request judicial hearing for arrest or detention76 
exclusionary rule of illegally obtained confession 77 
protection against double jeopardy78 
the right to a fair triaf9 
the right to speedy and open trial80 
. f· 81 presumptIon 0 mnocence 
These rights had been ignored under the authoritarian regimes. Thus, the people's 
desires to guarantee their human rights were carefully reflected in the Korean 
69 94 HEONBA 1 (1996) 8(2) Panrejib 808 (Korean Constitutional Court) Translated by Kuk Cho. 'The 
Unfmished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 30(3) Denver 
J Int Law Policy 377, 379. 
70 90 HEONBA 35 (1993) 5(2) Panrejib 14 (Korean Constitutional Court) 
71 The Korean Constitutional Court (tr), Constitution of the Republic of Korea [HeonbeopJ (1948) art 12 
~ara 2. 
2 ibid art 12 para 2. 
73 ibid art 12 para 3. 
74 ibid art 12 para 4. 
7S ibid art 12 para 5. 
76 ibid art 12 para 6. 
77 ibid art 12 para 7. 
78 ibid art 13 para 1. 
79 ibid art 27 para 1. 
80 ibid art 27 para 3. 
81 ibid art 27 para 4. 
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Constitution. In addition, such constitutional requests have also led the Criminal 
Procedure Act (KCPA) to be revised to protect the rights of the defendants. 
Due to these efforts, for the last twenty years the Korean criminal justice system has 
steadily developed in the direction of guaranteeing the defendant's rights. A number of 
convictions were quashed on appeal because the constitutional rights of the defendants 
were infringed on by the investigative authorities. For instance, in 1992, a landmark 
decision, which is often called the Korean version of Miranda, was taken by the 
Supreme Court.82 In this case, the Korean Supreme Court confirmed the importance of 
the right to silence: 
Article 200 (2) provides that prosecutors or policeman should inform a present suspect of the 
right to silence before interrogation. The right is based on the privilege against self-
incrimination, which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the statements elicited 
without informing of the right to silence in interrogation are iJlegalJy obtained evidence, and 
so should be excluded, even if they are disclosed voluntarily.83 
In addition, in 1990s, two defendants accused of violation of the National Security 
Law had been quashed by the Supreme Court which emphasised the right to counse1.84 
In these cases, two suspects arrested by National Security Agency officers made 
requests for meeting with the defence counsel. However, their demands were rejected 
and they were interrogated by the public prosecutors. In the end, based on self-
incriminating statements, they were charged by the prosecutors. However, the court 
made it clear that the confessions which do not observe the constitutional rights of 
defendants cannot be used as evidence: 
Article 12 (4) of the Constitution provides people with the right to assistance from counsel 
when arrested or detained, accordingly Articles 30 and 34 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
prescribe the right of suspects or defendants to appoint counsel and communicate with 
counsel when they are in custody. The right to counsel like this constitutes the nucleus of the 
constitutionalJy guaranteed right to assistance from counsel .,. The limitation of the right to 
meet and communicate with counsel violates the constitutionalJy guaranteed basic right, so 
the illegalJy obtained confession of the suspect should be exclude, and the exclusion means a 
82 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (The U.S. Supreme Court); Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished 
"Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law 
Policy 377, 383. 
83 92 DO 682 (1992) 926 Panre Gongbo 2316 (Korean Supreme Court). 
84 ibid 90 DO 1285 (1990) 882 2054; ibid 90 DO 1586 884 2229 
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substantial and complete exclusion.85 
The preliminary hearing system for issuing a detention warrant is also a simple 
example which shows the increased control over the executive power of the 
investigati ve authorities by the court.86 Through the revision of the KCPA in 1995, the 
judges began to interview suspects before issuing a detention warrant in order to review 
the propriety of the detention. Prior to 1995, the judges did not have the authority to 
interview suspects. Thus, they issued a detention warrant only by reviewing the 
documents referred by the public prosecutors.87 However, this judicial control was 
limited again in 1997 as a result of the resistance of the prosecution service.88 The 
judges could interview the suspects only when the suspects request judicial review. 89 
This limitation to the judicial review has been often criticised by a number of 
commentators90, and through the revision of the KCPA in 2007, all suspects began to 
have the right to challenge the necessity of detention in front of judges.91 At the same 
time, the judges have been able to review the cases investigated by the police and 
prosecutors although such a review is limited only to the facts to find out whether 
d 
., 92 etentlOn IS necessary. 
Regular cycles of elections are not sufficient to establish a mature democracy. 
Korean democracy, which is still located between authoritarianism and liberal 
democracy, as Caldeira and Holston suggested, can be defined as 'disjunctive 
democracy: ,93 
By calling democracy disjunctive, we want to emphasize that it comprises processes in the 
institutionalization, practice, and meaning of citizenship that are never uniform or 
homogeneous. Rather, they are normally uneven, unbalanced, irregular, heterogeneous, 
arrhythmic, and indeed contradictory. The concept of disjunctive democracy stresses, 
therefore, that at anyone moment citizenship may expand in one area of rights as it contracts 
85 ibid (translated by Professor Cho, see Kuk Cho op. cit. 384) 
86 The judicial control, as Rodigues illustrated, is one of the important indicators to refer to the 
development of democracy. See n 98 and accompanying text. 
87 Kuk Cho. 'The Unfmished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' 
(2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 385. 
88 ibid 385. 
89 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 251-253. 
90 ibid 252 n 2. 
91 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act (HyungsasosongbeoPJ partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 201-2. 
92 In Korea, this is the only filter, through which the judges can screen the pre-trial fact fmding processes. 
See ch 5. 
93 Teresa P. R. Caldeira and James Holston. 'Democracy and violence in Brazil' (1999) 41(04) 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 691, 715-718. 
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in another. The concept also means that democracy's distribution and depth among a 
population of citizens in a given political space are uneven. It is in this lack of balance and 
unevenness that contemporary Brazil exemplifies a disjunction typical of many emerging 
democracies.94 
Rodrigues identifies three aspects of this disjunctive democracy.95 Firstly, the citizens 
are not able to participate in the public sphere. Therefore, the performance of 
government does not achieve sufficient public confidence which is critical to increase 
accountability of the governmental institutions. 96 The jury system and private 
prosecution are examples showing such citizen's participation. Secondly, the citizens 
within a disjunctive democracy do not have an equal chance to have access to the 
judicial system because of financial costs and complexity of the system.97 Finally, and 
more important, 'the judicial system is incapable of successfully regulating the practices 
of citizens or the state.' 98 In short, in the disjunctive democracy, the powers of 
government are not appropriately controlled due to the lack of monitoring mechanisms 
although citizens are entitled to participate in free elections. 
In contrast, in more matured democracies, the power of elected officials is controlled 
by constitutional institutions, which are designed to protect the rights and freedoms of 
individuals and minorities. Similarly, the will of the majority is also constrained to some 
extent. Sung argued that 'Disjunctive democracies differ from liberal democracies in 
that they still suffer serious defects in interethnic relations, discrimination against 
minorities and disadvantaged groups, an unrestrained executive power, and/or a 
subdued press.' 99 In this respect, the separation of powers as well as checks and 
balances are significant elements in matured democracies. As Maravall and przeworski 
stated, 'Divided and limited powers can be stable and avoid the constrained will of 
94 ibid 717. 
9S Corinne D. Rodrigues. 'Civil Democracy, Perceived Risk, and Insecurity in Brazil: An Extension of the 
Systemic Social Control Model' (2006) 605(1) Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 242, 247-248 (Rodrigues stated 
that 'In a disjunctive democracy, while citizens participate in free elections and associations, civil 
democracy is limited. ') 
96 Rodrigues suggested that 'levels of civic participation have been linked to government performance, 
particularly in terms of effective social policy and reduced corruption as well as to increased confidence 
in state institutions and the maintenance of democracy. ' See ibid 247. 
97 ibid 248 (Rodrigues argued that 'the poor suffering criminal sanctions from which the rich are 
generally immune, while the rich enjoy access to private law (civil and commercial) from which the poor 
are systematically excluded. This process discredits the judicial system as a viable means of obtaining 
justice.') 
98 ibid (In particular, Rodrigues indicated the powers of the police as an example in Brazil.) 
99 Hung-En Sung. 'Democracy and Criminal Justice in Cross-National Perspective: From Crime Control 
to Due Process' (2006) 605(1) Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 311, 312. 
30 
Chapter J Theoretical Framework of the Study 
ruler. ,100 
The modem doctrine of separation of powers can be traced from the Glorious 
Revolution (1688) in England. John Locke (1690) and Charles de Montesquieu (1748) 
are eminent commentators who specified the separation of powers on the basis of a 
system of checks and balances. In 'Two Treaties of Government', Locke suggested the 
separation of two powers - legislative and executive power. 101 Montesquieu developed 
the ideas of Locke by, presenting the separation of three powers - legislative, executive, 
and judicial power. 102 In the constitutional tradition, the legislature exercises general 
powers of legislating; the executive administer the laws and matters of the state; and the 
courts interpret the law with an independent status. 103 
However, a mere separation of powers cannot guarantee the democratic ideals of 
equality, openness, and fairness. Such a separation may leave unlimited latitude to the 
legislature and the executive. 104 Their decisions can be implemented by the branches of 
government without an appropriate limitation. In this sense, a system of checks and 
balances should be performed along with the doctrine of separation of powers. As 
Manin argued, any particular authority should not undertake actions unilaterally without 
the cooperation or concent of some other authorities. 105 The means and incentives to 
check one another have to be given to the several agencies. As Manin conceptualised, 
'unchecked checkers', agencies which can check others without being checked by them, 
should not exist in the democratic government. 106 
A number of commentators state that Korea remains at some distance from a mature 
democracy. 107 Professor Lim suggested 'Despite three consecutive civilian 
governments through the peaceful transfer of power, democracy has not matured, in that 
representation from the people does not go hand in with government's accountability. 
Civil society is not strong enough to act against the state; political parties as a main 
100 Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski (eds), Democracy and the Rule of Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 10. 
101 John Locke, Two Treaties of Government (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
102 Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge Texts in tr he History of 
Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989). 
103 John Alvey and Neal Ryan, 'The Separation of Powers in Queensland' (Australasian Political Studies 
Association Conference 2006). 
104 Maravall and Przeworski op. cit. 10. 
lOS Bernard Manin, 'Checks, Balances and Boundaries: The Separation of Powers in the Constitutional 
Debate of 1787' in Biancamaria Fontana (ed), The Invention of the Modern Republic (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1994) 27 quoted in Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski (eds), 
Democracy and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10. 
106 ibid. 
107 Yunhan Zhu (ed), How East Asians View Democracy (Columbia University Press, New York; 
Chichester 2008); Yun-Shik Chang, Hyun-Ho Seok and Donald L. Baker (eds), Korea Confronts 
Globalization (Routledge, New York; Abingdon 2009). 
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organ of political society do not properly function to mediate conflicting interests 
among diverse classes and groups in the process of policy information.' 108 In particular, 
as we shall see in following chapters, when considering the extensive and monopolised 
powers of the prosecutors as well as the lack of monitoring mechanisms to check 
prosecutorial decisions, the Korean prosecution service can be described as an 
'unchecked checker'. This leads the Korean society to be far nearer to a disjunctive 
democracy than to a mature democracy. 109 
Making provision for protecting the basic rights of the defendants is not enough to 
fully preserve the values of due process. Such a provision itself cannot protect the 
constitutional rights for the defendants. For instance, the suspect has the constitutional 
right to counsel. However, if there are not sufficient numbers of defence lawyers or 
legal aid, and the prosecutors as well as the police easily limit the participation of the 
counsel during the interrogation, the right to counsel is of little practical value. I 10 
To date, most of the efforts to guarantee due process have been concentrated on the 
establishment of individual provisions to protect the basic rights of the defendants. By 
contrast, the roles and powers of the legal actors, in particular, of the public prosecution 
service, have not drawn much attention. As a result, even in the democratisation period 
the powers of prosecutors, as Professor Cho described, have been considerably 
increased without an appropriate monitoring mechanism: 
Although democratization after 1987 led to the weakening of the police and the intelligence 
agency's powers, the power of the prosecutors has not been damaged under the Kim Young-
Sam and Kim Dae-Jung governments. This is probably because, like the authoritarian 
government, the two civilian governments were not free of the temptation to use the 
. fi h' I't' I 111 prosecutIOn or t elr po I Ica purpose. 
However, such powers and expanded functions of the prosecution service, as we shall 
see in the remaining chapters, are inappropriate to protect the constitutional rights of the 
defendants. At the same time, the efficiency of the process cannot be achieved as the 
legal actors, in particular police officers, do not have sufficient ownership of their roles. 
\08 Hyun-Chin Lim, 'Stumbling Democracy in South Korea: The Impacts of Globalization and 
Restructuring' in Yun-Shik Chang, Hyun-Ho Seok and Donald L. Baker (eds), Korea Confronts 
Globalization (Routledge, New York; Abingdon 2009), 159. 
109 See ch 3 and ch 5. 
110 For further discussion about the right to counsel in the Korean criminal process, see ch 6. 
III Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' 
(2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 381 (Emphasis added); For more details on the prosecutorial 
powers, see ch 3. 
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In conclusion, when considering the development of democracy in Korea, Packer's 
two models and Sung's analysis provide a significant theoretical framework to compare 
and critique the roles and powers of the Korean prosecution service. In particular, the 
due process values should be important indicators showing the direction to which the 
Korean system of criminal justice flows. On the basis of this theoretical framework, the 
dominant position of the prosecution service and its impact both on the constitutional 
rights of the defendants and on the relationship between the police and prosecutors are 
explored in the following chapters. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the Korean criminal justice system. In the context of this thesis, 
it focuses on the role of the prosecutor because one of the significant aspects in the 
Korean system is various roles of the prosecution service. From the investigation to the 
execution of judgements, the prosecutor has an impact on the process at the every stage 
by carrying out following functions: investigating offences; supervising the police 
investigation; charging the offenders; maintaining, suspending, and withdrawing 
prosecutions; recommending sentences; appealing against acquittals; supervising 
execution.! The Korean criminal justice system can only be understood by exploring 
the prosecutorial roles and powers. 
2. Historical Development of the Criminal Justice System 
The modem system of criminal justice was introduced to Korea by the Gap-O 
Modernizing Reformation 1895 [Gap-O Gae-Hyuk].2 Koreans had a traditional legal 
system based on monarchy before that time. During the Joseon dynasty (1392-1897), 
petty civil and criminal cases were handled by local heads of administration. The 
governor of each province took care of the first instance trials of serious criminal cases 
and the appellate cases. Citizens who lost an appellate case against a governor could 
appeal to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry dealt with civil and criminal trials as the 
final appeals court. The functions of the judiciary were not distinct from the 
administration. 
This traditional system was reformed by Gap-O Reformation embracing the concept 
of separation of powers, which led judicial affairs to be separated from the 
administration. In 1895, five different courts were established by the Court Organization 
1 Wan Kyu Lee, The Status of the Korean Public Prosecutor (Sungmin, Seoul 2005), 264-404; Jae-Sang 
Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 99-103. 
2 Peter H. Lee and William Theodore De Bary, Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume II from the Sixteenth 
to the Twentieth Centuries (Introduction to Asian civilizations, Columbia University Press, New York; 
Chichester 1997), 272-274. 
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Act: Local Courts (first instance tribunals); Hanseong and Port Courts; Special Courts; 
Circuit Courts (second instance tribunals); and High Court (supreme court). 
However, during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), the Korea system of 
criminal justice was distorted as a tool to exploit and control the colony. Japanese 
judges and prosecutors took over from native Korean legal professionals in all judicial 
matters. The criminal procedure largely focused on effective ruling rather than the 
protection of human rights.3 A three-tier system was introduced in 1912. However, the 
right to a fair trial was not guaranteed. The judges just confirmed the statements of the 
interview documents recorded and translated into Japanese by the police since they did 
not understand the statements of the Korean defendants. Employing interpreters was 
simply regarded as extravagance for the colonial citizens.4 Accordingly, the statements 
at the pre-:trial stage were more important than those in courts. This tradition, as we 
shall see in detail in Chapter 4, has continued to the modem system. 
Another noticeable aspect in the colonial system was the concentration of power in 
the hands of the Japanese prosecutors. The colonial government combined the 
prosecution service and the police force by use of an intensive order-obedience 
relationship.5 Most powers to direct the prosecution service were concentrated on the 
chief of colonial government [Jo-Sun Chong-Dok]. He appointed the public prosecutors 
and they followed his orders according to 'the principle of uniformity of prosecutors. ,6 
After independence from Japan in 1945, the relationship between the police and 
prosecutors significantly changed. The US Military Government (USMG) (1945-1948) 
which was installed in the South Korea after the World War II reformed the function of 
the police and the prosecution service as well as their relationship. The USMG 
abolished the prosecutorial authority to investigate crimes and limited the function of 
the prosecution service to prosecution.7 Moreover, the hierarchical relationship changed 
into a more co-ordinate structure with defined separate roles.
8 
3 Bung Jik Chao 'The Development, Characters, and Problems of Korean Legal Profession' (2006) 77 
Critical Review of Korean History 46-66, 51. 
4 For more details, see ch 3. 
5 I will refer to the relationship between the police and prosecutors as order and obedience. This concept 
will be discussed further in the following chapters; Dong-Woon Shin. 'An Historical Study on the 
Competence of Criminal Investigation between the Police and Prosecution' (2001) 42( I) Seoul Law 
Journal 178-230, 181. 
6 ibid; For more details on the principle of uniformity ofthe prosecutors, see ch 4. 
7 Rule No.3 of the Bureau of Justice art. 1 'The function of the public prosecutor is to prosecute in court.' 
cited from ibid 209. 
8 There was no provision for the relationship between prosecutors and the police in the Rule of the 
Bureau of Justice. However, it could be assumed by article 2(e) of the rule. The article stipulated that '(the 
public prosecutors) can request the po~ice to .conduct routine works in terms of investigations. The 
investigation is the function of the polIce. It IS not a role of the prosecution service.' cited from ibid 210. 
35 
Chapter 2 The Korean Criminal Justice System 
However, this relationship ended in 1954 when the Korean Criminal Procedure Act 
was enacted.
9 
The members of the Assembly set up the order-obedience relationship 
and gave the prosecutors superior status. This change seems to stem from public distrust 
in the police. After independence from Japan, Korean society was very chaotic. Because 
of the lack of an independent police force, the government employed a large number of 
police officers who had worked for the Japanese colonial government. Such a police 
force could not command trust from the people as a result of misconduct such as the 
torture employed during the colonial period. lo It was considered necessary for the 
police to be supervised by the prosecution service. I I Sang-Seop Um,12 the Chair of the 
National Assembly Committee on Legislation and JUdiciary, said: 
We have a centralized police force. So, if the police have the right to investigation without a 
proper monitoring mechanism, they can be used as a tool to oppress citizens. It could cause 
more serious problems than the other situation in which the prosecutors monopolise the 
investigation process. As a result of the discussion, we have decided that the prosecutors 
should have exclusive authority over the investigation .... But, in the near future, I think it 
would be better to separate the investigative function from the prosecution service. 13 
He suggested that the prosecutors should be responsible for the investigation as in 
Germany. He noted the reason why the prosecutors must have authority over the 
investigation process. Both the police and prosecution service can be used for political 
ends. However, the drafters of the KCPA were more concerned that the police would be 
employed in this way. Accordingly, the Committee decided to give the prosecutors the 
authority to control the police and investigation process. Nevertheless, Sang-Seop Um 
noted the possible problem and suggested the necessity of the functional separation 
between the investigation and prosecution in the criminal process. 
9 For further discussion, see ch 3. 
10 ibid 212; Kuk Cho. 'The Ongoing Reconstruction of the Korean Criminal Justice System' (2006) 5(1) 
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 100, 117. 
II Similaryly, prosecutor's interview documents obtained a special evidentiary impact to safeguard the 
suspects against inappropriate police interrogation. For further discussion about the prosecutorial 
interview records, see ch 3 and 5. 
12 Sang-Seop Um played an important role in making Korean Criminal Procedure Act 1954. He was a 
~rosecutor from 1941 to 1949 and elected as a member of Korean Assembly in 1950. 
3 Korean Institute of Criminology, Source Book on the Establishment of Korean Criminal Procedure 
Code (Korean Institute of Criminology, Seoul 1990), 109. 
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3. Judicial Police and Investigation 
'Judicial police' is a legal term embracing all law enforcement personnel, who can 
conduct investigations of crimes. 14 They are generally categorised into three groups: the 
police officers of the National Police Agency (NPA), special judicial police officers, and 
the criminal investigators of the prosecution service. 1 5 
Firstly, there are police officers of the NPA who belong to the Home Office which is 
distinct from Ministry of Justice. 16 The NPA is a centralised hierarchical organisation 
dealing with crime prevention, public safety, criminal investigation, traffic affairs, and 
public security. It has 16 local agencies and 244 police stations affiliated to the local 
agencies. At present, there are 100,460 police officers in Korea. 17 Of these, about 
fifteen per cent conduct investigations. 18 Officers who are involved in investigation of 
crimes are legally known as 'judicial police', and investigate most offences under 
prosecutorial direction. In 2009, all investigation authorities dealt with 1,917,052 
criminal cases. Of those cases, about ninety per cent of offences (N=I,761,252) were 
initially investigated by the judicial police officers of the NPA.
19 
Secondly, there are special judicial police officers who investigate designated crimes 
such as those involved wild animals, forests, taxes, the military, etc. They are distinct 
from the police officers in the NPA. They mostly work for the local governments and 
are appointed by the prosecution service. Their powers for investigation are limited by 
law as well as the prosecutor's direction?O 
Finally, the prosecutor's offices have approximately 5,000 criminal investigators, 
about one third of the NPA judicial police. 21 They are recruited and trained by the 
Ministry of Justice. As an assistant of the prosecutor, they deal with about one per cent 
of all criminal cases (N=16,514) from the beginning as well as supplement 
investigations being conducted by the police.22 
14 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act {Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954), art 196. 
IS ibid arts 196-197. 
16 Korean Administrative Organisation Act (Jeongbu-Jojik-Beop] partially amended on 4 June 2010 No. 
10339 (1948), art 29. 
17 See ch 8. 
18 Kuk Cho. 'The Ongoing Reconstruction of the Korean Criminal Justice System' (2006) 5(1) Santa 
Clara Journal ofIntemational Law 100, 117. 
19 Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, 'Analytical Report On Crimes' SPO (Seoul), 108-207. 
20 The Code for Judicial Police Officers and their Authorities 1956 partially amended on 13 June 2008 
No.9109; KCPAarts 196-197. 
21 Kuk Cho op. cit. 
22 For further discussion about supplementary investigation by the prosecution service, see ch 3. 
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Investigation in general starts from the report of a victim or interested parties, but 
may also start from self-denunciation or information obtained by the authorities. A large 
number of criminal cases are investigated without the need for arrest and detention.23 
Investigative authorities generally summon suspects as well as witnesses in order to 
both interview them and gather evidence. 
Once a crime is reported, the police officers of NPA in general begin the 
investigation. They deal with most criminal cases such as thefts, robberies, frauds, and 
murders. When they finish an investigation, they have to send all files and evidence in 
relation to the case to the public prosecutor's office.24 If the police need to conduct 
additional investigation on the same case, they carry out supplementary investigation 
under the direction of the prosecutors. The involvement by the police ends at this stage. 
However, the investigation continues to be carried out by the prosecutors even when 
the criminal case is very trivial. Only the public prosecutors can decide when an 
investigation ends. As we shall see in Chapter 6, the public prosecutors themselves 
interrogate the suspects again in order to obtain confessions and record them on their 
dossiers. They interview witnesses. 2s In addition, they examine the documents and 
occasionally collect further evidence. The prosecutors argue that such additional 
investigation tests the sufficiency of evidence, and as a result, increase the conviction 
rate.26 
However, additional investigation is conducted mainly because of the impact of 
interview records written by the prosecutors, which enables them to readily prove the 
guilt of defendants?7 For instance, the defendants can easily retract their confessions 
23 According to the Korean National Statistical Office, 46,020 (1.8%) of all suspects were detained by 
warrants in 2007. See Korean National Statistical Office. 'The Issuance of Detention Warrants' 
hm>:/lwww.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potallsttsIPO SITS IdxMain.jsp?idx cd= 1 727&bbs=INDX 001 
24 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 238 'When ajudicial police officer receives a complaint or 
accusation, he shall investigate the relevant document and evidence matter pertaining thereto promptly 
and transfer them to a public prosecutor.'; The Rule for the Judicial Police Investigation 1959 Instruction 
of the Ministry of Justice 2007/629 art 54. 
25 Yong Se Kim. 'The Problems of the Current Investigation System' (2000) 19(1) Daejon Social Sciences 
Journal 77, 82. 
26 Young-Chul Kim. 'The Effective System of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution in Korea' (2003) 60 
UNAFEI Annual Report For 2001 and Resource Material Series 77-93, 79; Hae-Chang Chung. 'The 
Criminal Justice System in Korea: The Role of Public Prosecutor' (1982) 10 Korean Journal of 
Comparative Law 53-69, 61. 
27 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the Law of Evidence' 
(2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132, 118; Dong-Hee Lee. 'The Reform of Korean Criminal 
Procedure and Its Impact on the Role of the Police and Prosecution Service' (2005) 9 Korean Police 
JoumaI45-75, 63; Kyoung-Moon Kye. 'Evidential Capacity of Protocol About Suspect Examination 
Written by the Prosecutor' (2005) 17 Kukmin Law Journal 141, 163-164. 
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made before the police in courts because ofartic1e 312 of the KCPA.28 However, if they 
confess before the public prosecutors, the situation would be very different. Such 
confessions are very hard to dispute. Hence, the public prosecutors need to re-interview 
the suspects and to record their statements in the prosecutorial dossiers. 
Any coercive investigative measures rely on the prosecution service. The Korean 
Constitution has provisions that any restriction on the right to liberty and security of 
person as well as the right to privacy must be executed based on a warrant being issued 
byajudge.29 Warrants can be issued only at the request of the prosecutors. 
In an investigation, suspects are in principle arrested by arrest warrants. According 
to the KCPA, there are two exceptions: an arrest in flagrante delicto and an emergency 
arrest. The KCPA stipulates that' Any person may arrest a flagrant offender without a 
warrant.,30 In addition, in an emergency, police can arrest a suspect without a warrant. 
However, such an arrest can only be carried out under limited conditions.31 
After arresting suspects, investigation authorities can detain the suspects for 48 
hours. However, they must have a detention warrant in order to detain them more than 
48 hours. 32 The suspect detained by the police must be transferred to the public 
prosecutor's office or be released in 10 days.33 During this detention, the police can 
investigate additional offences and supplement investigations. In addition to the police, 
the prosecutors have the authority to detain a suspect for 20 days in order to carry out 
their investigations.34 
Search and seizure is also conducted, in principle, on warrants issued by a judge.35 
The procedure is similar to that of warrants of arrest and detention. Hence, the public 
prosecutor requests a search warrant for a judge. However, the police cannot request a 
28 For detailed information, see chs 3 and 6. 
29 The Korean Constitutional Court (tr), Constitution o/the Republic 0/ Korea [Heonbeop} (1948) art 
12(1) 'warrants issued by a judge through due procedures upon the request of a prosecutor shall be 
presented in case of arrest, detention, seizure or search'; For article 16 ofthe Korean Constitution, see 
n 36 below. 
30 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop} partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954), art 212. 
31 ibid art 200-3(1) 'In cases where there are good reasons to suspect that any suspect commits crimes 
punishable with death penalty, imprisonment for life or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison 
labor for a maximum period of three years or more, and he falls under any of the following subparagraphs, 
a public prosecutor or judicial police officer may, if it is not possible to obtain a warrant of arrest of a 
judge of the district court because of urgencies, arrest the suspect without the warrant, upon statement of 
reasons therefore. The urgencies means the cases where issue of warrant of arrest is pressed for time, such 
as the suspect is found by chance, etc.: (amended by Act No. 8496, Jun. 1,2007) If the suspect is likely 
to destroy evidence; and If the suspect escaped or is likely to escape.' 
32 KCPA, art 200-4. 
33 ibid art 202. 
34 ibid art 205; For the discussion why prosecutors repeatedly interrogate a suspect, see ch 6. 
3S ibid art 215. 
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warrant, but instead, as we shall see below, can simply ask the prosecutors to do so. 
Only the public prosecutors have the authority to demand a warrant.36 
As this outline shows, the Korean prosecutors have the main responsibility for any 
investigation. 37 By contrast, the police can conduct an investigation only under the 
direction of the prosecutors.38 There is no exception to this principle so that the police 
themselves cannot investigate offences and must follow the instructions from the 
prosecutors at every stage in the investigation process. As a consequence, the police act 
as an assistant to the public prosecutors.39 
The Public Prosecutor's Office Act [Keomchalcheongbeop] provides that 'judicial 
police officers shall obey any official order issued by the competent public prosecutor in 
a criminal investigation.' 40 In addition, the public prosecutor has the authority to 
request internal disciplinary action against police officers.41 Those provisions establish 
'order and obedience relationship' between the police and prosecutors.42 Professor Cho 
illustrated the investigation procedure under such a relationship as follows: 
Prosecutors can not only request police officers to supplement the investigation after the 
police investigation is completed, but can also intervene in a police investigation and stop 
the police investigation. Prosecutors can order the investigation transferred even before the 
investigation is finished by the police.43 
Such a superior status may help the public prosecutor to efficiently direct the police 
36 The Korean Constitutional Court (tr), Constitution of the Republic of Korea [Heonbeopj (1948) art 16 
'All citizens shall be free from intrusion into their place of residence. In case of search or seizure in a 
residence, a warrant issued by a judge upon request of a prosecutor shall be presented.' translated by the 
Constitutional Court; Young-Lan Lee. 'Korean Investigation System' (1995) 7 Korean Criminal Justice 
Journal 187-205, 197. 
37 KCPA art 195 'A public prosecutor shall, where there is a suspicion that an offense has been committed, 
investigate the offender, the facts of the offense, and the evidence.' 
38 ibid art 196 (1) 'Investigators, police administrative officials, police superintendents, police captains or 
police lieutenants shall investigate crimes as judicial police officers under instructions of a public 
~rosecutor. ' 
9 Wan Jung and Jin Kuk Lee. 'The Analysis of the Relocation ofinvestigative Power' (2003) 14(2) 
Korean Criminal Justice Journal 157, 163; Jin Ho Chun. 'A Study on the Efficient Investigation System' 
(2005) 9 Korean Police Journal 9-44, 14; Kuk Cho. 'The Unfmished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of 
Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377,381. 
40 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [Keomchalcheongbeopj partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8717 (1949), art 53. This provision is abolished from 1st Janunary 2012. 
However, this does not have an impact on the relationship as the other articles still exist. The impact of 
the abolition of article 53 needs to be discussed in the future study. 
41 ibid art 54; Violence Act[PokCheoBeop] 1961 partially amended on 24 March 2006 No. 7891 art 10. 
42 I refer to such a relationship as order-obedience. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
43 Kuk Cho. 'The Ongoing Reconstruction of the Korean Criminal Justice System' (2006) 5(1) Santa 
Clara Journal ofInternational Law 100, 117. 
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investigation. However, it has often functioned as one of the elements causing conflicts 
between the police and prosecution service. 44 Moreover, the order and obedience 
relationship leads the police to be subject to the prosecution service, and consequently, 
as we shall see in Chapter 8, may playa role in weakening the sense of responsibility of 
the police.45 The dominant position of the prosecutors is guaranteed by a number of 
measures. Such features have intensified the order-obedience relationship between the 
police and prosecutors. Under these circumstances, the police in general serve as a 
subsidiary of the prosecution service, rather than as an autonomous investigation body. 
4. The Prosecution Service 
The Korean prosecution service is a centralised organisation which belongs to the 
Ministry of Justice. It consists of the Supreme Prosecutors' Office, five high prosecutors' 
offices, 18 district offices, and 39 branch prosecutors' offices. 46 In Korea, only the 
prosecution service has the legal authority to conduct an investigation. The prosecutors 
can directly investigate crimes with their own investigative units and supervise the 
1·· . t 47 po Ice mvesttga or. 
Other criminal investigation organisations can conduct an investigation only under 
the direction of the prosecutors.48 In theory, the police cannot begin and carry out an 
investigation under their own initiative.49 In practice, however, police officers generally 
conduct investigations without direction from the prosecutors because complete 
supervision over all police investigations is almost impossible. 50 Nevertheless, when the 
police need a warrant in order to conduct coercive actions, they must obtain this from 
the prosecutors. 51 
After finishing the investigation, only the public prosecutors can charge the suspects 
when they decide that they have sufficient evidence to prove the guilt and other 
requirements for a trial are satisfied. 52 In addition, they can choose a summary 
44 Woong Suk Jung, A Study on the Public Prosecutor's Supervision over the Police Investigation (Dae 
Myung Press, Seoul 2007), 648. 
4S For further discussion about the relationship between the police and prosecutors, see ch 8. 
46 For the organisational features, see ch 4. 
47 KCPA arts 195-196. 
48 ibid 'Investigators, police administrative officials, police superintendents, police captains or police 
lieutenants shall investigate crimes as judicial police officers under instructions of a public prosecutor.' 
49 Wan Jung and Jin Kuk Lee. 'The Analysis of the Relocation of Investigative Power' (2003) 14(2) 
Korean Criminal Justice Joumal157, 163. 
so Wan Kyu Lee, The Status of the Korean Public Prosecutor (Sungmin, Seoul 2005), 362. 
S\ See ch 3. 
S2 KCPA art 246. 
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indictment rather than fonnal charge. S3 The summary indictment is filed for the 
summary trial which can be conducted only based on documents written by the 
prosecutors. Such a procedure is designed for a prompt trial. In principle, the cases 
punishable by fine can be charged by summary indictment. This part briefly illustrates 
the prosecutorial functions for outlining the system of criminal justice in Korea. More 
specific features will be explored in subsequent chapters. 
5. Criminal Courts and Trials 
There are six types of courts in Korea: Supreme Court, High Court, District Court, 
Patent Court, Family Court, and Administrative Court. Criminal trials are conducted at 
three levels: district courts, the high courts, and the Supreme Court. The district courts 
are first instance courts, i.e. trial courts. The high courts and Supreme Court are courts 
dealing with two levels of appeal. A district court may establish branch courts and 
municipal courts, if additional support is necessary to carry out their tasks. 
As in the recruitment of prosecutors, graduates of the Judicial Research and Training 
Institute immediately become judges. Young lawyers at the beginning of their careers 
decide whether they will serve as judges, prosecutors, or defence lawyers. Unlike the 
English system, there is no jury in criminal cases in Korea. Hence, verdicts as well as 
sentences are detennined by those professional judges alone. 
Criminal proceedings begin when prosecutors institute criminal actions unless 
otherwise provided by law. The prosecutor may request a regular trial or bring a case 
before the court by summary proceedings for the case punishable by fine. For the 
summary cases, the judges generally issue the summary order without holding a trial. If 
they deem it inappropriate, they can refer the case to regular trial proceedings. 
According to the Korean Criminal Procedure Act, a criminal trial consists of 
approximately six stages. Firstly, a trial begins with a question by a judge about the 
personal identification of the accused. S4 Secondly, the public prosecutor states the 
nature of the accusation. 55 Then, there is the examination of evidence. S6 After finishing 
the investigation of evidence, the public prosecutor questions defendants as well as 
witnesses, and a defence counsel examines them. 57 Then, at the last stage, the public 
53 ibid art 449. 
54 ibid art 284. 
55 ibid art 285. 
56 ibid arts 290-296. 
57 ibid art 296-2. 
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prosecutors state their opinion and recommend a sentence to the judge. 58 A defence 
lawyer as well as the accused also delivers a closing argument. 59 Finally, the judge 
makes a decision whether or not a defendant is guilty. 
If the prosecutor cannot prove the gUilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge will 
declare that the defendant is not guilty. 60 However, if evidence is sufficient for 
conviction, the judge will find the accused guilty. 61 Once the defendant is convicted, the 
judge imposes a punishment. These include the death penalty, imprisonment, and 
deprivation of qualifications, suspension of qualifications, fine, penal detention, and 
minor fine. The imprisonment can be either for life or for a specified term.62 
After sentencing, not only the accused but also the prosecutors can bring an appeal 
against the judgement given by the trial court within seven days from the judgement. 
Appeals against the judgement of appellate jurisdiction of the High Courts may be filed 
with the Supreme Court also within seven days. This appellate process can be 
summarised as Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Appellate Process in the Korean Judiciary 
Appellate Jurisdiction only 
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Source: The Korean Supreme Court 
58 ibid art 302. 
59 ibid art 303. 
60 ibid art 325. 
61 ibid art 321. 
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Korean law provides an open trial, but the trial is often called 'Jo-Seo Jae-Pan' 
which indicates a trial mainly depending on dossiers.63 Judges in general decide the 
guilt and innocence in their offices by examining the dossiers which are prepared by the 
public prosecutors. However, in practice, the prosecutorial dossiers playa major role in 
determining the verdicts and sentences of the courts. 
Even if the trial is defined by law, this bears little resemblance to a real trial. Even 
experts in criminal law sometimes cannot readily understand what goes on.64 A real 
trial will begin with a question about the identification of a defendant by judges. In 
addition, they inform a defendant of the right to silence. The public prosecutor in 
general skips statements about the accusation in most cases and moves on to the 
examination of defendants. At this stage, the public prosecutor asks the defendants 
whether or not they received and read the indictment. If the defendant says "Yes", the 
public prosecutor begins examination based on the indictment. The public prosecutor 
asks about the offence and the defendant in general answers 'Yes' or 'No'. They just 
confirm the facts that they already know. In these circumstances, the audience rarely 
understands what goes on.65 
After the examination by the public prosecutor, a defence counsel questions the 
defendant. In general, they prepare questionnaires and give them to the judge before the 
examination. Then, they question the defendant. However, this does not consist of a 
short question and a long answer, but instead, a long question and a short answer. Such a 
way of questioning has developed in order to include the statements favourable to the 
defendant into the judicial documents because these dossiers play an important role in 
determining the verdicts as well as sentences.66 
Following the examination by both the public prosecutor and the defence counsel, 
judges question the defendant. This examination by a judge is neither detailed nor long 
when compared to the examination by the lawyers.67 The judges often state that they act 
as an umpire in the trial, and as a result, it is the public prosecutor as well as defence 
63 The Korean Constitutional Court (tr), Constitution of the Republic of Korea [Heonbeop} (1948) art 27 
para 3 'All citizens shall have the right to a speedy trial. The accused shall have the right to a public trial 
without delay in the absence of justifiable reasons to the contrary'; ibid art 109 'Trials and decisions of 
the courts shall be open to the public: Provided, That when there is a danger that such trials may 
undermine the national security' or disturb public safety and order, or be harmful to public morals, trials 
may be closed to the public by court decision.' translated by KCC. 
64 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (IV): From 14th to 27th 
Conference' PCJR (Seoul January 2005), 267. 
6S Jin-Su Jung and others, 2IC The Directionfor the Reform of the Criminal Justice System and the 
Development of Judicial Service [11} (Korean Institute of Criminology, Seoul 2004), 66. 
66 ibid 66. 
67 Presidential Committee op. cit. 267. 
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counsel who have the major role.68 
After the examination of the defendant, the court begins to examine evidence. The 
public prosecutor submits additional evidence apart from the interview documents. The 
judge asks the defendants whether or not they have an objection to such evidence. If the 
defendants consent and do not give additional evidence to the court, the examination of 
evidence ends at this stage. For the most part, the audience can hardly know about the 
evidence which is presented to the court because the most important part is contained in 
the documents written by the prosecutors.69 
Korean law requires the judges to read the prosecutorial dossiers or explain the key 
aspects in open court.70 However, at a real criminal trial, those methods are rarely used. 
Even senior judges have hardly any experience of conducting such a close 
examination. 71 In general, the examination of prosecutorial dossiers ends with the 
submission by the public prosecutors in court. The judges take those documents to their 
chambers and examine them by themselves behind closed doors. 
The next stage is public prosecutor's recommendation on sentencing. Except for 
some important cases, most recommendations are very concise. Accordingly, in general, 
there is no particular explanation for their recommendation. After listening to the 
recommendation, the judge announces the date for a judgement in two or three weeks. 
The trial is over. The audience have scarcely heard the evidence, which plays an 
important role in the judgment. The court is not considered as a place to discover the 
truth, but instead, an agency to deliver a predicted and predictable result. 
Distrust in the Korean criminal justice system stems from this point. According to 
the result of survey in 2003, 83.7 per cent of people stated that 'the criminal trials are 
unfair' .72 Rather than hearing in the open court, the outcomes of criminal trials are in 
general decided based on dossiers read in the judge's room, and these practices are 
critically called 'Jo-Seo Jae-Pan ,.73 As mentioned, the Korean Constitution provides 
for the right to an open trial,74 but the trials mainly depending on dossiers cannot 
68 Jin-Su Jung and others, 21C The Directionfor the Reform of the Criminal Justice System and the 
Development of Judicial Service [II] (Korean Institute of Criminology, Seoul 2004), 66. 
69 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (IV): From 14th to 27th 
Conference' PCJR (Seoul January 2005), 271. 
70 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 292. 
71 Jung et al. op. cit. 88. 
72 See Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (III): From 1st to 13th 
Conference' PCJR (Seoul May 2004), 259. 
73 Jung et a1. op. cit. 
74 The Korean Constitutional Court (tr), Constitution of the Republic of Korea [Heonbeop] (1948) art 109 
'Trials and decisions of the courts shall be open to the pUblic: Provided that when there is a danger that 
such trials may undermine the national security or disturb public safety and order, or be harmful to public 
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guarantee any monitoring by press or public.7s 
The Presidential Committee on the Korean Judicial Reform suggests that the 
historical background such as the period of Japanese colonisation as well as the impact 
of interview records written by the public prosecutors have mainly contributed to this 
distortion of a criminal trial. 76 The drafters of the Korean Criminal Procedure clearly 
considered that the evidentiary impact of the prosecutorial dossiers may result in the 
trials relying on documents. 77 However, they hesitated to adopt a completely new 
system, which would rely on full oral hearings, because of the unstable social situation 
after the independence from Japan and the Korean War. Subsequently, as noted in detail 
in Chapter 6, in order to increase the efficiency of criminal trials, they made a decision 
to allow the interview records written by the public prosecutors to have an intensive 
'd ., h urt 78 eVl entlary Impact at t e co . 
This provision was designed to permit the dossiers as exceptional evidence 
employed to supplement the hearings in the open COurt.79 However, unlike the drafters' 
intention, the exception has taken the place of the principle. This has led the Korean 
investigation procedure to focus on obtaining confessions and recording them. 8o In 
addition, the examination of evidence by judges has been degraded into an action to 
routinely accept the interview records written by the public prosecutors as evidence.8) 
Such a measure may contribute to increasing efficiency of trials, but it has led to a 
number of unanticipated consequences in the Korean criminal process, such as an 
infringement of defendant's rights and the functional distortion of the prosecution 
service as well as the police.82 
morals, trials may be closed to the public by court decision.' translated by KCC 
7S Susan Dente Ross. 'Secrecy's Assault on the Constitutional Right to Open Trials' (2004) 40(2) Idaho 
Law Review 351, 355. 
76 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (IV): From 14th to 27th 
Conference' PCJR (Seoul January 2005), 271. 
77 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Public Prosecution' (1988) 29(2) Seoul Law Journal 39, 
45,46. 
78 Another important reason is to safeguard suspects against inappropriate police interrogations. For more 
details on the historical background for this decision, see ch 3. 
79 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 312; Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. 45-46. 
80 Presidential Committee op. cit. 
81 ibid. 
82 For further discussion about these unanticipated consequences, see ch 6. 
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6. Conclusion 
The Korean criminal process can only be understood by examining the role of the 
prosecution service. At every stage, it plays a key role in determining the fate of the 
suspects. Firstly, although the investigation is conducted by the police and prosecutors, 
their legal status is very different. The prosecutors monopolise most powers in the 
process as the 'ruler of the investigation'. 83 In contrast, the police can carry out their 
investigations only under the instruction of prosecutors as a 'subsidiary organ of the 
prosecution service'. 84 Secondly, the prosecution have considerable discretion. They 
can decide whether or not to charge, whom to charge, and what charges to bring. In 
addition, as we shall see in subsequent chapter, the prosecution can be suspended and 
withdrawn at the discretion of the prosecutors. Finally, criminal trials are determined 
based on the interrogation documents written by the prosecutors. The trial judges simply 
confirm the evidence in the prosecutorial dossier. As a consequence, the defendant's 
right to a fair trial is hardly guaranteed in the Korean criminal process as the verdicts are 
virtually determined by the prosecutors in their closed room.8S This reflects in Packer's 
crime control model where there is absolute confidence in the pre-trial process. 
83 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 99. 
84 ibid 100. 
85 As the Supreme Prosecutors' Office (SPO) illustrated, ninety-nie per cent of conviction rate is a good 
example indicating the contexts of the Korean criminal process. The SPO introduced the prosecutor's 
responsibilities and achievements as follows: 'The workload for prosecutors is continuously increasing 
every year. As of February 2009, one prosecutor handles cases averaging investigation ofapproximately 
10 suspects a day. In addition to investigation work, prosecutors are spending considerable amount of 
time reviewing requests of warrants and providing direction to the police in regard to the progress of 
"accusation cases." Out of the total number of cases, the ratio of instituting prosecution is roughly 50%, 
and approximately 99.9% of the accused are beingfound guilty.' See Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office. 
'Introduction to the Korean Prosecution Service' <htt;p:llwww.spo.go.kr> accessed 26 November 2010, 
(Emphasis added by the author); For the statistics of conviction rate, see ch 7. 
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Chapter 3 The Functions of the Prosecution Service in 
Korea 
1. Introduction 
It has been argued in the preceding chapter that due to the influence of the colonial 
experiences, the Korean War and military governments for three decades, the Korean 
criminal process has tended more heavily toward crime control than due process 
values. I Korean law concentrates most powers in criminal proceedings on the 
prosecution service, which is a centralised hierarchical bureaucratic organisation. 
This chapter aims to explore the legal position and powers of the prosecution service 
in Korea. First of all, the legal position of the public prosecutor is described. Then, 
various powers of the prosecutors are examined. Part 3 examines the trial work of the 
prosecutors. Part 4 focuses on the investigative arm of the Korean public prosecutors as 
it is an extraordinary function for the prosecution service, which is rarely observed in 
other criminal justice systems.2 
2. The General Role of the Korean Prosecutor 
The Korean law requires the prosecutor to play various roles. The powers and specific 
functions of the Korean prosecution service, as we shall see in detail in Chapter 5, are 
different from those in other jurisdictions. However, the general role of the prosecution 
service seems to be similar even if they are in different contexts. 
The general role of the public prosecutor can be separated into three categories: the 
'quasi-judicial', 'adversarial', and 'administrative' roles.3 Alschuler described the role 
of the public prosecutor as 'administrator', 'advocate', and 'minister of justice', who 
acts like a judge and legislator.4 There are slight differences in the expression, but these 
I See Introduction and ch 1; Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, Calif. 1968) 385, 149-246. 
2 See ch 5. 
3 Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) IS Am J 
Crim Law 197,215. 
4 Albert W. Alschuler. 'Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining' (1968) 36 U.Chi.L.Rev. 50, 52-53. 
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three main roles of the public prosecutor can be noted in a number of studies and 
codes.s 
First, the public prosecutor has a quasi-judicial role, which is to seek justice as a 
representative of public interests.6 Ashworth described the 'quasi-judicial' role of the 
prosecutor as follows: 
[P]rosecutors should be bound by a strict ethical code, which directs them to act in the spirit 
of impartial officers who uphold not merely the letter of the criminal law but also those legal 
values which belong to fundamental human rights and the idea of a Rechtsstaat. 7 
As an example, in the English system, the Code for Crown Prosecutors provides such a 
role in a specific way: 
Prosecutors must be fair, independent and objective. They must not let any personal views 
about the ethnic or national origin, gender, disability, age, religion or belief, political views, 
sexual orientation, or gender identity of the suspect, victim or any witness influence their 
decisions. Neither must prosecutors be affected by improper or undue pressure from any 
source. Prosecutors must always act in the interests of justice and not solely for the purpose of 
obtaining a conviction.8 
This quasi-judicial role requires the public prosecutors to act impartially like ajudge. As 
Delmas-Marty has said, the prosecutors should be neutral when they present evidence in 
5 There are different descriptions on the public prosecutor's function. LaFave explains that the public 
prosecutor has four functions: trial counsel for the police, house counsel for the police, representative of 
the court and mirror of community opinion. Meanwhile, Blumberg describes five main roles of the 
prosecutor: collection agent, dispenser of justice, power broker fIXer, political enforcer and overseer of 
the police. See Fisher op. cit. 215 n 97. The Standards for Criminal Justice (SCJ) of American Bar 
Association also indicated three roles of the public prosecutors in the criminal process: 'administrator of 
justice', 'advocate', and an 'officer of the court' See American Bar Association, Standardsfor Criminal 
Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3rd ednABA, New York 1993) Standard 3-1.2 The Function 
of the Prosecutor (b) 'The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the 
court; the prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance of his or her functions.' For the 
discussion about the roles of Crown Prosecutor in England and Wales, see n 8 below. 
6 Kenneth Bresler. 'Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and Administrator of Justice' 
(1995) 9 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 1301, 1305; Fisher op. cit. 216; Alschuler op. cit. 53. 
7 Andrew Ashworth. 'Developments in the Public Prosecutor's Office in England and Wales' (2000) 8 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 257, 281-282. 
8 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 20 I 0, para 2.4; Similarly, Bresler suggested five duties of the 
prosecutor as a quasi-judicial officer: 'protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty; guard the 
rights of the accused as well as to enforce the rights of the public; refuse to measure prosecutorial 
effectiveness by the severity of the sentences imposed; after conviction, accord a defendant continued 
procedural justice and a fair sentence; reveal exculpatory information to the sentencing judge.' See 
Bresler op. cit. 1303. 
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court.9 
The quasi-judicial role can be an ideal for prosecutors to aim at, \0 but it is very 
difficult for them to carry out such a role effectively because they have another 
contrasting role, i.e., to prove the defendant's guilt as an advocate. lIOn the one hand, 
the public prosecutors should bear in mind the interest of the defendant, but on the other 
hand they should try to secure convictions because the public want them to punish 
criminals. Under these ambiguous circumstances, why should the prosecutor seek 
justice? As Green argued, 'doing justice' is an important objective of the state in terms 
of enforcing the criminal law, and the public prosecutor should seek justice as a 
representative of the state. 12 
The next function is the adversarial role. 13 According to Sanders and Young, the 
prosecutors have a duty to prove the guilt of the defendants and to enforce the criminal 
law. 14 The adversarial role, as Fisher stated, is an opposite function to the quasi-judicial 
role. The prosecutors have to attack the defendant and defend their position on behalf of 
the state. IS In the adversary system, the public prosecutors should simply be a party 
who is equal to the defendants. In this context, there is a possibility that the two roles of 
the public prosecutor - quasi-judicial and adversary - can conflict with each other. 
However, prosecutor's ethics still require they only adduce relevant. and reliable 
9 Mark A. Summers (tr), Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Criminal Process and Human Rights: Toward a 
European Consciousness (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 10 (Delmas-Marty described the aims of 
each function as follows: 'Investigation - gathering proof of the crime and identifying the perpetrator(s); 
Prosecution - publicly presenting the evidence; Judgment - legally finding guilt or innocence and, in case 
of the former, imposition of penalty; and Execution of judgment. '). 
10 Andrew Ashworth. 'Developments in the Public Prosecutor's Office in England and Wales' (2000) 8 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 257, 282 (Ashworth stated that 'This 
approach [to the 'quasi-judicial role] is not consistent with the notion of a prosecutor who aims for 
convictions above all.'); Leslie Griffin. 'Prudent Prosecutor' (2000) 14 Georgetown Journal of Legal 
Ethics 259, 286 (GritI'm argues that 'The prosecutor's duty is to seek justice.'); Abbe Smith. 'Can You Be 
a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor' ibid 355, 376-377; Fred C. Zacharias and Bruce A. Green. 
'Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors' (1999) 88 Georgetown Law J 207, 226-228. 
11 George T. Felkenes. 'Prosecutor: A Look at Reality' (1975) 7 Sw.UL Rev. 98, 117-119; David T. 
Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Studies on law and social control, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2002), 29. 
12 Bruce A. Green. 'Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice' (1998) 26 Fordham Urban Law J 607, 634. 
13 Felkenes op. cit. 109-110; Fred C. Zacharias. 'Structuring the Ethics of Prose cut oria I Trial Practice: 
Can Prosecutors Do Justice' (1991) 44 Vand.L.Rev. 45, 56; C. Ferguson-Gilbert. 'It Is Not Whether You 
Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for 
Prosecutors' (2001) 38 California Western Law Review 283,284; Stephanie Beck. 'Under Investigation: A 
Review of Police Prosecutions in New Zealand's Summary Jurisdiction' (2006) 12 Auckland University 
Law Review 150, 153; Susan Bandes. 'Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision' 
(2006) 49(2) Howard Law J 475,483-492. 
14 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 
14. 
IS Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J 
Crim Law 197,216. 
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evidence and any attack on the defence or their witnesses is within ethical and legal 
boundaries. 16 
Finally, the public prosecutor plays an administrative role in the criminal process. 
This role, as Alschuler pointed out, is related to the efficiency of the administrative 
procedure. In other words, for the benefit of the prosecution service and the court, the 
public prosecutor should deal with the case in an efficient and effective way so as not to 
cause delay. 17 
Inevitably, the prosecutor has difficulty in striking a balance between these roles 
because each role has a different aim. In particular, a quasi-judicial role and an 
adversarial role, as Johnson argued, are 'anchored in a contradiction' .18 The prosecutors 
are expected to be objective as a quasi-judicial officer. They have to disclose 
exonerating evidence for the defendants. However, at the same time, they have to obtain 
convictions on behalf of the state and victims. 19 
The Korean prosecutors have been regarded as one party in the adversarial 
structure.20 They have a role to play in proving the gUilt of defendants in courts as an 
adversary.21 The Korean Supreme Court and Constitutional Court clearly confirmed the 
role by stating that 'the public prosecutor's status is an adversary in a trial, who has to 
prove the guilt of the defendant.' 22 
At the same time, the Korean prosecutors have a duty to protect defendants as a 
representative of public interests.23 They are not only an adversary, but also a minister 
of justice?4 They have to disclose evidence which is favourable to the defendants and 
appeal for the defendant's interest.25 The Public Prosecutor's Office Act provides the 
16 Steve Uglow, Comments at the Supervision Meeting (4tlt November 2011) 
17 Alschuler op. cit. 52. 
18 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Studies on law and 
social control, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2002), 29. 
19 ibid; George T. Felkenes. 'Prosecutor: A Look at Reality' (1975) 7 Sw.UL Rev. 98, 117-119. 
20 Korean Supreme Court and Constitutional Court stated that Korean criminal procedure is based on the 
adversary system. See 84 DO 796 (1984) Panre Gongbo 12 June 1984 1322 (Korean Supreme Court); 92 
HEONMA 44 (1995) 7(2) Panrejib 646-676 (Korean Constitutional Court). 
21 Sanders and Young op. cit. 13-14. 
22 See n 20 above. 
23 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 
60. 
24 Fisher op. cit. 198; American Model Rules of Professional Conduct 2009 Rule 3.8 Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor - Comment' A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice 
and not simply that of an advocate.' 
2S ibid Rule 3.8 (g) 'When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a 
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was 
convicted, the prosecutor shall: (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority'; 
In England and Wales, Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 chap. 25 ss.I-21 Disclosure. 
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duty as follows: 26 
As a representative of the public interests, the public prosecutor shall have following duties: 
takes measures necessary for investigation of crimes as well as filing and maintaining of 
prosecution; directs and supervises the police and other law enforcement agencies concerning 
investigations of crimes; requests the court for appropriate application of laws; directs and 
supervises the execution of criminal judgments; and, files, directs and supervises civil and 
administrative litigations in which the government or government agency is a party or a 
participant. 
The powers of the public prosecutor should be exercised under a duty as a 
representative of the public interests. Accordingly, if the prosecutors' operations are 
conflicted with their duty to protect the public interest, the quasi-judicial role must take 
precedence over other actions. 
3. Trial Decisions 
The Korean law gives the prosecutors a pre-eminent position by allowing them to be 
involved in all stages with significant powers. The public prosecutors monopolise most 
powers which are necessary to enforce criminal law. In addition, they have a 
considerable impact on trials by recommending a sentence and appealing against verdict. 
As this section will demonstrate, the prosecutor exercises a wide discretion which is 
seldom scrutinised. 
In Korea, only the prosecutors can decide whether or not to file an indictment.27 It is 
called 'the monopoly of indictment by the prosecutor' [Kisodokjumjui]' However, there 
is one exception to the monopoly. The chief of the police station can prosecute some 
minor offences, which are punishable by fines of not more than KRW 200,000 
(approximately equal to GBP 100) or detention for less than thirty days?8 
26 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 2 J December 2007 No. 8717 (1949) art 4. 
27 KCPA, art 246. 
28 Speedy Trial Procedure Act [Jeukkyeolsimpan Jeolchabeop] 1957 partially amended on 21 December 
2007 No. 8730 art 2 • According to article 14, the defendant is entitled to request a regular trial if the 
defendant is not satisfied with the judgment in the Speedy Trial' Translated by Professor Cho See Kuk 
Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 
30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 381; In terms of the exclusive charging power, there are two exceptions in 
Korea. First, the chief of the police can bring minor offences to the criminal court without a formal 
indictment. Second, the court can direct the prosecutors to charge criminals when the court decides that 
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This means that prosecutors have discretion not to charge the offenders.29 Even if 
the prosecutors have sufficient evidence and a confession, they can decide not to 
prosecute by considering a number of conditions such as age, character, and 
circumstances of the offender.3o Due to such discretion, a number of offenders who 
committed petty crimes may avoid the stigma of criminal conviction. In addition, by 
these means, prosecutors can reduce the workload of the court. 3 1 This authority is 
called the 'suspension of prosecution [Kisoyuye] and the extent of this prosecutorial 
discretion can be seen in Table 3.1. In the period 2005-2009, prosecutors charged forty-
eight per cent of suspects. About fifteen per cent of prosecution are suspended. No 
action was taken in the remaining thirty-seven per cent were presumably there was 
insufficient evidence.32 
Table 3.1 The number of suspects charged or uncharged 33 




Average 2,471,291 1,194,151 1,277,139 357,341 919,797 
100% 48.3% 51.7% 14.5% 37.2% 
2009 2,675,224 1,196,716 1,478,448 471,680 1,006,768 
100% 44.7% 55.3% 17.6% 37.6% 
2008 2,620,373 1,316,987 1,303,386 370,031 933,355 
100% 50.3% 49.7% 14.1% 35.6% 
2007 2,442,231 1,217,284 1,224,947 331,456 893,491 
100% 49.8% 50.2% 13.6% 36.6% 
2006 2,320,730 1,094,113 1,226,617 322,056 904,561 
100% 47.2% 52.9% 13.9% 39.0% 
2005 2,297,895 1,145,597 1,152,298 291,484 860,814 
100% 49.9% 50.2% 12.7% 37.5% 
the prosecutor's decision not to charge is inappropriate. However, Professor Lee states that these 
exceptions are conducted very partially and most indictments are conducted exclusively by the prosecutor. 
See Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) 
Seo-Kang Law Journal 43, 43 n 1. 
29 KCPA, art 247. 
30 Criminal Act [Hyungbeop] 1953 partially amended on 29 July 2005 No.7623 art 51. 
31 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (III): From 1st to 13th Conference' 
PCJR (Seoul May 2004), 173. 
32 For the discretion exercised by prosecutors and comparisons to other jurisdictions, see ch 5. 
33Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, The Annual Report o/the Public Prosecutors' Office in 2009 
[Keomchalyeongamj (KSPO, Seoul 2010), 454-455. 
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Along with those powers, the prosecutors have the authority to withdraw a 
prosecution, which is called 'Kongsocheuisokwon.' 34 They can retract an indictment at 
any moment before judgment without giving a reason.3S In principle, the prosecutors 
cancel an indictment when there is a significant change of circumstances which suggest 
that the prosecution is inappropriate. Insufficiency of evidence, lack of formal 
accusation proceedings, and generation of reasons for the suspension of prosecution are 
examples of such a change?6 
Not only do the public prosecutors exercise exclusive powers over the decision to 
prosecute, but they also have a substantial impact on judgements. This is based on two 
main elements. Firstly, the Korean prosecutors can recommend a sentence to the judge, 
and the judges generally follow those recommendations [KeomsaKuhyung]. In the 
KCPA, there is no provision requiring the judges to follow the recommendation.37 The 
judgment does not need to comply with the recommendation.38 However, in practice, 
the judges usually do not give a sentence exceeding the recommendation. In case study, 
Il-Jun Yu analysed 574 criminal cases of Seoul Pukbu District Court in 1994 and found 
that no judgments exceeded the recommendation of prosecutors. 39 
This can also apply to the judgments of 'stay of execution [Jiphaingyuye] , where 
judge orders that the sentence is suspended. In 2003, Byung-Ju Oh analysed 550 
criminal cases which were recommended a 'stay of execution' by prosecutors. No 
sentence exceeded the recommendation of the prosecutors. Furthermore, in ninety-three 
per cent of cases (N=512), stay of execution was recommended by the prosecutors.40 
Secondly, only the public prosecutors can decide the scope of a trial, in other words, 
the form and nature of the charges.41 The judges can make a judgement based on the 
indictment as filed by the prosecutors. Even if the judges find out new facts or offences 
34 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 255. 
3S Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 355. 
36 ibid. 
37 KCPA, art 302. This provision articulates the prosecutor's duty to present an opinion including 
recommendation for the sentence: 'After the examination of the defendant and evidence, the prosecutor 
should present an opinion about the fact and the application of a law.' 
38 83 DO 1789 (1984) Panre Gongbo 945 (Korean Supreme Court). Justice Yun stated that 'the 
prosecutor's recommendation for a sentence is an opinion about sentencing and the judges do not have to 
conform to this advice.' 
39 II Jun Yu. 'An Analysis of the Relationship between the Prosecutor's Recommendation for a Sentence 
and the Judgments' (1994) 18 Korean Journal of Criminal Justice [Hyungsajungchaikyeongu] 227,237. 
40 Byung Ju Oh, An Examination about the Rationalization of Judgments (Pusan High Prosecutors' Office, 
Pusan 2003), 113. 
41 KCPA, art 298. 
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during the trial, they cannot alter the indictment on their own initiative.42 In a recent 
case, a trial judge advised the prosecutor to modify the indictment but the prosecutor did 
not accept the recommendation. As a consequence, the defendants charged with bribery 
were acquitted, and there was much public criticism.43 This again shows prosecutorial 
influence upon the trial. 
Prosecutors also direct the execution of judgments.44 They can issue warrants in 
order to arrest and imprison guilty persons on the basis of sentences and order the clerks 
to collect fines or confiscate properties of the defendants found guilty.45 Exceptionally, 
the judges can direct the execution of a warrant to detain and search.46 However, in 
principle, the KCPA gives the power to direct the execution of judgments to the 
prosecution service. As Professor Lee stated, this can guarantee the speedy execution of 
judgments by the prosecutor.47 However, Professor Shin argued that 'the execution of 
judgments has to be supervised by the judges rather than prosecutors in order to protect 
human rights by guaranteeing due process. ,48 
In short, the Korean prosecutors have the power to charge, suspend, maintain, and 
retract a prosecution. They can recommend a sentence to the judges and appeal against 
their decisions. In addition, they decide the scope of a trial. Finally, they are in charge of 
the execution of sentences. 
4. The Investigative Function 
Unlike other jurisdictions, the Korean prosecutors are directly and closely involved in 
conducting an investigation.49 As seen briefly in Chapter 2, Korean law provides them 
with the legal authority to conduct investigations and to direct investigation agencies. In 
42 Jae-Sang Lee stated that such a limitation to the judicial power can protect the rights of defence by 
limiting a scope of a trial. See Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 
2008),412. 
43 Hung-Kyo Jang and Hung-Du Park. 'Why did not the public prosecutors change the charges?' Kyung-
Hyang (9 January 2010) 
44 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 460 'The executions of judgments are directed by the 
prosecutor. However, exceptionally the judges can direct the execution according to the characteristics of 
judgments. ' 
4S ibid arts 473 and 477(1). 
46 ibid arts 81 and 115 
47 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 103-104. 
48 Hyun Ju Shin, Korean Code o/Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Parkyoungsa, Seoul 2002), 101 cited 
from Sang Jin Park. 'Suggestions for Reforming the Prosecution of Organization and Prosecution of 
Power' (2002) 15 Kun Kuk Journal of Social Science 75, 79 n 8. 
49 For the comparative study, see ch 5. 
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particular, they have sufficient resources to carry out an investigation on their own 
initiatives. 
4.1. The Authority to Investigate 
The Korean Criminal Procedure Act gives the power to investigate crimes only to the 
prosecutors. 50 As an investigator, they interview suspects and witnesses. They conduct 
coercive measures such as arrest, detention, search, and confiscation by themselves. 
Without exception, all investigations are conducted directly or indirectly by the 
prosecutors. As seen below in Table 3.2, approximately 26,000 cases (1.6 per cent of all 
cases) are directly investigated and prosecuted by the prosecutors. 51 
Table 3.2 The number of cases investigated by the prosecution service and the policeS2 
Year Total Prosecution Service Police 
Average 1,618,872 26,108 1,592,764 
100% 1.6% 98.4% 
2009 1,777,766 16,514 1,761,252 
100% 0.9% 99.1% 
2008 1,780,588 19,451 1,761,137 
100% 1.1% 98.9% 
2007 1,587,015 23,620 1,563,395 
100% 1.5% 98.5% 
2006 1,439,546 30,792 1,408,754 
100% 2.1 % 97.9% 
2005 1,509,449 40,164 1,469,285 
100% 2.7% 97.3% 
Note 1. In this table, the police include the police investigators of the NPA and Special Judicial Police 
Officers. For more infonnation on these law enforcements, see Chapter 2. 
2. The cases being investigated by the police are all sent to the prosecutor's office for additional 
investigation by the prosecutors. 
The prosecutors begin the investigation by themselves and charge the suspects on the 
basis of the results they extract from the investigation. Apart from them, around 98.4 per 
cent of investigations are carried out by the police, but only under the direction of the 
so The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act {Hyungsasosongbeop} partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 195. 
SI As we shall see in below, there is no limitation to the prosecutor's investigation. Therefore, they are 
directly involved in most types of crimes. 
S2 Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, 'Analytical Report On Crimes' SPO (Seoul) (Published from 
2005 to 2010). 
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prosecutors. 
The police are not an independent investigation authority. They simply support the 
prosecutor's investigation. 53 They have a statutory duty to follow the instructions from 
the prosecutors. 54 The prosecutors also initiate their own investigation. For the 
prosecutor's effective investigation, KCPA allows the prosecutors to ask the court to 
preserve evidence and to examine the witnesses before the formal trial. 55 Only 
prosecutors can obtain judicial warrants to arrest, detain, or search and police officers 
must go through the prosecutors to employ any such coercive measures. 56 Professor 
Shin and Lee argued that 'the monopoly of the authority to request a warrant was 
mainly created to increase the prosecutor's domination in the criminal process, and as a 
result, expanded the prosecutorial control over the police.' 57 
This may help to reduce unnecessary arrests, detentions, or searches by the police. 
However, it has produced two adverse impacts. Firstly, the pre-eminent position of the 
prosecutors has been intensified as other investigation agencies cannot carry out an 
investigation on their own initiative without the prosecutorial approval. For instance, in 
2003, the Young-San Police Station in Seoul asked Jung-Ang Public Prosecutor's Office 
to request a warrant for search and seizure in order to investigate a corruption case 
involving public prosecutors and defence lawyers. However, the request was rejected 
three times by the prosecution service. As a result, the police could not carry out the 
investigation. But as a result of media criticism, the prosecution service itself began an 
investigation and found accusations of corruption. 58 However, the prosecution service 
53 KCPA art 196; Sang Jin Park. 'Suggestions for Refonning the Prosecution of Organization and 
Prosecution of Power' (2002) 15 Kun Kuk Journal of Social Science 75, 78 (park stated that 'the police 
are not an independent investigation agency, but a subsidiary organization to prosecutorial investigation.'); 
Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 100;Wan Jung and Jin 
Kuk Lee. 'The Analysis of the Relocation ofInvestigative Power' (2003) 14(2) Korean Criminal Justice 
Journal 157, 163; Jin Ho Chun. 'A Study on the Efficient Investigation System' (2005) 9 Korean Police 
Journal 9-44, 14; Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization 
South Korea' (2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 381. 
54 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [Keomchalcheongbeop} partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8717 (1949) art 53 'police officers shall obey the orders issued by prosecutors 
[in relation to the investigation].' translated by Professor Cho See Kuk Cho. 'The Ongoing Reconstruction 
of the Korean Criminal Justice System' (2006) 5(1) Santa Clara Journal ofInternational Law 100, 117. 
55 ibid arts 184 and 221-2. 
56 The Korean Constitutional Court (tr), Constitution of the Republic of Korea [Heonbeop} (1948) art 
12(1) 'warrants issued by a judge through due procedures upon the request of a prosecutor shall be 
presented in case of arrest, detention, seizure or search'; The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal 
Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop} partially amended on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) arts 200-
2,201. 
57 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Refonn of the Korean Public Prosecution' (1988) 29(2) Seoul Law Joumal39, 
45; Young-Lan Lee. 'Korean Investigation System' (1995) 7 Korean Criminal Justice Journal 187-205, 
197. 
58 Hee-Kyung Hwang. 'The Investigation into Lawyers' Corruption by the Police' fun-Hap News (23rd 
April 2003); Ju An Kang. 'Internal Disciplinary Action to the Senior Public Prosecutors' Jung Ang I1bo 
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did not charge the offenders, but instead dealt with the matter internally. Even today, 
there is still no external agency to investigate the criminal offences by the prosecutors. 59 
Secondly, the public prosecution service uses the power in order to control the police. 
The prosecutors can demand the police to obtain significant evidence when the police 
ask a request for a warrant.60 Such a high demand, as Professor Shin stated, 'leads the 
police officers to face with the dilemma that they should obtain much evidence under a 
pressing situation in which the police need to conduct urgent measures such as an arrest 
and search.'61 As a consequence, the police focus on obtaining a confession from a 
suspect. Although such a confession may be easily retracted by the defendant in court, it 
enables the police to obtain a warrant. Indeed, under this circumstance, the police often 
use inappropriate interrogation tactics such as torture and threats. 62 
Once the investigation is finished, only the prosecutor can decide whether or not to 
charge.63 Accordingly, the police send all investigative dossiers and evidence to the 
prosecutor's office. 64 They review the results and charge the suspect if there is 
sufficient evidence to prove guilt. If the public prosecutors need more evidence and 
information, they direct the police to investigate further or investigate the case with their 
own investigative units. However, for the most part, the public prosecutors re-interview 
suspects before charging them because of the evidentiary impact of the interview 
records. 65 
Taken together, most statutory powers for investigation are concentrated in the hands 
of the public prosecutor in Korea. 66 Even if criminal investigation authorities are 
categorized into two groups - public prosecutors and judicial police officers, only the 
public prosecutors have the power to investigate crimes as well as control other 
(12 July 2003) 
59 For more details on reviewing mechanisms in Korea, see ch 5 and 7. 
60 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Public Prosecution' (1988) 29(2) Seoul Law Journal 39, 
45. 
61 ibid. 
62 For further discussion about the inappropriate interrogation methods by the police and prosecutors, see 
ch6. 
63 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) arts 246,247. 
64 ibid art 238. 
65 Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. 55 (Professor Shin stated that 'if there is a confession in the interview records 
written by the public prosecutors, it is almost impossible to expect a judgement of acquittal. '); Dong-Hee 
Lee. 'The Reform of Korean Criminal Procedure and Its Impact on the Role of the Police and Prosecution 
Service' (2005) 9 Korean Police Journal 45-75, 63; Kyoung-Moon Kye. 'Evidential Capacity of Protocol 
About Suspect Examination Written by the Prosecutor' (2005) 17 Kukmin Law Journal 141, 163-164. 
66 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 100; Ho Joong Lee. 
'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) Seo-Kang Law 
Journal 43, 43; Woong Hyuk Lee. 'The Analysis of Multiple Organizational Outcome of the Public 
Prosecution Service' (2006) 15(1) Korean Journal of Public Administration 3,8; Young-Lan Lee. 'Korean 
Investigation System' (1995) 7 Korean Criminal Justice Journal 187-205, 192. 
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investigation authorities. 
4.2. Human Resources for Investigation 
According to the Public Prosecutors Personnel Management Act, 1,724 public 
prosecutors work for the prosecution service in Korea.67 They are recruited immediately 
after the National Judicial Examination and two-year training at the Judicial Research 
and Training Institute. In addition to prosecutors, there is 7,524 support staff including 
prosecutorial investigators (about 5,000), administrative clerks, and secretaries.68 
Despite relatively small population size, the number of personnel of the Korean 
prosecution service is larger than, for example, that in England and Wales. 69 
Furthermore, there is a major difference in their main function. As we shall see in detail 
in Chapter 5, the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales serves as the second 
filter to screen the police investigation and is mainly in charge of prosecution of crimes 
at trial. But the Korean prosecution service focuses its attention on the investigation. 
This is noted in managing human resources of the prosecutors' offices. 
The prosecutor's offices have their own investigators supporting the prosecutor's 
investigation. The number of the investigators reaches around 5,000 which is 
approximately one third of police investigators of the National Police Agency. 70 
Interestingly, such prosecutorial investigative units are not to be found in other 
jurisdictions. 71 Table 3.3 shows the number of the investigators in the prosecutor's 
offices, which had increased by one hundred and ten per cent from 1986 to 2002.72 
67 Public Prosecutors Personnel Management Act [Kumsa-Jeongwon-Beop] 1956 amended on 21 
December 2007 No.8716. The figure is the maximum number provided in the Act. 
68 Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office. 'Manpower of Korean Prosecution' 
<http://www.spo.go.kr/user.tdf?a=user.pm.PmApp&seg= 11 00&chungcd=02000000&catmenu=020 1 OO&c 
=2001&catmenu=m02 01>, accessed 28 February 2011. 
69 The population of South Korea is around 48 million. England and Wales have combined population of 
around 53 million. In the English system, 8316 staffs including around 2900 qualified prosecutors work 
for the prosecution service. See The Crown Prosecution Service. 'Facts about the CPS' 
<http://www.cps.gov.uklaboutlfacts.html>. accessed on 7 March 2011. 
70 Woong Hyuk Lee. 'The Analysis of Multiple Organizational Outcome of the Public Prosecution 
Service' (2006) 15(1) Korean Journal of Public Administration 3, 16. 
71 For more details on the prosecutorial investigation in other jurisdictions, see ch 5. 
72 ibid (Professor Lee analysed the correlation between the increase of investigators as well as 
investigative budget and the conviction rate. He found a negative correlation between those variables.) 
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Table 3.3 The number of the investigators in the prosecution service 
Year Investigators Cumulative Year Investigators Cumulative 
N Percentage N Percentage 
% % 
1986 2,323 0.00 1995 4,335 86.61 
1987 2,490 7.19 1996 4,455 91.78 
1988 2,590 11.49 1997 4,572 96.81 
1989 3,247 39.78 1998 4,619 98.84 
1990 3,546 52.65 1999 4,609 98.41 
1991 3,921 68.79 2000 4,746 104.30 
1992 4,022 73.14 2001 4,766 105.17 
1993 4,102 76.58 2002 4,892 110.59 
1994 4,189 80.33 
A large number of prosecutors are assigned to the investigation departments. Eighty-
seven per cent (N=I,243) of prosecutors (N=I,427 in 2004) work on investigation.73 In 
contrast, only thirteen per cent (N=184) take charge of trials. 74 For instance, in the 
Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office, 17 of 20 departments are in charge of 
investigations and only one department takes up trials.7s This shows that the Korean 
prosecutors focus their attention on the investigation rather than the prosecution as well 
as trials: 
[J2-RS] The prosecutors are interested simply in conducting an investigation because it's 
closely related to preserving their powers. Therefore, the most capable prosecutors and 
staffs are working for the investigation departments. In general, the junior prosecutors carry 
out an adversarial role in COurt.76 
[PP3-RC] At the present time, the prosecutors draw their attention to carrying out an 
investigation. Most resources of the prosecution service are used for the investigation. 
Maintaining a prosecution at trial is regarded as a worthless work by the prosecutors. 
73 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (III): From 1st to 13th Conference' 
PCJR (Seoul May 2004), 76 (This was presented to the Presidential Committee on the Korean Judicial 
Reform by the Public Prosecutors' Office in 2004.) 
74 ibid 76. 
7S Dong-Hee Lee. 'A Comparative Study on the Structure of Crime Investigation Authorities in Korea and 
the Reform Strategy' (2004) 7 Korean Police Journal 146, 164. 
76 For information on the interviewees, see Appendix. 
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Conducting an investigation seems to be the most important work for the prosecutors. 
By contrast, handling a trial is considered as 'a worthless work', which is mainly carried 
out by junior prosecutors. This tendency has been reflected on the allocation of human 
resources in the prosecution service. 
4.3. Types of Prosecutorial Investigation 
In practice, public prosecutors investigate all offences from high-profile corruption to 
traffic accidents.77 There is no limitation to the prosecutorial investigation. In addition, 
they have sufficient investigators and budget to support their investigative operations. 
The investigation administered by the prosecutors can be categorized into three groups. 
First, the public prosecutors conduct investigations by depending on the information 
which they obtain by themselves. High-profile corruption and complex fraud are 
examples of those investigations. 78 However, as Jong Gu Kim pointed out, the 
prosecutorial initiatives have expanded into all offences, which are normally regarded as 
an objective of police investigation, e.g. minor violations of administrative procedure, 
water pollution, and illegal construction.79 Such an expansion increases the workload of 
the service and leads it to be regarded as another investigation agency. 80 
Second, the public prosecutor investigates crimes reported by the victims, public 
organisation, and other interested citizens. In Korea, most people regard the public 
prosecution service as another investigation authority. 81 This can be also noted in the 
interviews with the legal professionals: 
[J4-/C] Judges often say, in Korea there is no prosecution service. Only two investigative 
agencies carry out their duties. The Korean prosecution service is another investigation 
agency. The prosecutors don't care for trial works. They regard their role is finished when 
77 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 
534 (Kim stated that 'for last 10 years [1991-2000] most investigations by prosecutors were mainly 
involved with illegal constructions, counterfeit goods, air pollution, and violation of food hygiene. ') 
78 Dong Hee Lee stated that 'the Central Investigation Department (CID) of the Korean Supreme 
Prosecutors' Office is one example indicating the prosecutor's direct investigation. The cm deals with 
high-profile corruption cases under direction of the Prosecutor General.' See Dong-Hee Lee. 'A 
Comparative Study on the Structure of Crime Investigation Authorities in Korea and the Refonn Strategy' 
(2004) 7 Korean Police Joumal146, 164. 
79 Jong Gu Kim op. cit. 534. 
80 See ch 8. 
81 Dong-Hee Lee op. cit. 181. 
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they arrest the suspects and get confessions from them.82 
[P03-IS] The Korean prosecutors absolutely focus their attention on conducting an 
investigation themselves. They think of the investigation itself as a significant power. 
[DL3-IS] In Korea, the conviction rate is 99 per cent. If something is differently determined 
in court, the prosecutors probably have some interests in maintaining a prosecution. But, 
now, they don't need to do so. 
The only difference between the police and prosecutorial investigation is the public 
prosecutors have much more powers than the police.83 This leads the people to prefer a 
direct investigation by the public prosecutors and results in the increase of crimes 
d h 
. . 84 
reporte to t e prosecutlOn servIce: 
[DL2-ISI] Under the current system, the prosecutors actually make almost all decisions in 
the criminal process. So, the citizens generally want the prosecutor to be directly involved 
in their cases. 
[PP2-RS] The prosecution service is an investigative organisation. In particular, many 
people believe that only the prosecutors can successfully conduct investigations of 
corruption cases. So, the citizens want the prosecution service to completely crack down on 
corruptions. Consequently, because of such a request from the public, the prosecutors have 
to conduct an investigation themselves. 
Finally, the public prosecutors spend time in supplementing investigations originally 
conducted by the police.85 The public prosecutors who receive the cases from the police 
do not only review the cases, but they also investigate the offences by interviewing 
suspects and witnesses. This is called 'supplementary investigation' [Bo-Gang Su-Sa]. 
The process is almost the same as the police investigation except for that the documents 
are written by the prosecutors. Why do the public prosecutors investigate the cases in a 
repetitive way? The answer, as we shall see in detail in the subsequent section, can be 
found in the different evidentiary impact of the interview records written by the police 
82 For more relevant statements of this judge, see ch 8. 
83 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 
532-533. 
84 The crimes, which are reported to the prosecution service, were 89,224 in 2000. See ibid 495. 
8S ibid 529. 
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and those of the prosecutors. In order to maximise the evidentiary impact of the 
prosecutorial dossier, the public prosecutors have to investigate all cases again even if 
the police have already finished investigation. 
To sum up, the Korean public prosecutors directly investigate crimes with their own 
resources. In addition, only they have the power to charge the offenders. Both the 
investigative and prosecutorial arms are legally and practically exercised only by the 
prosecutors. 
5. The Prosecutor's Focus on Investigation 
The public prosecutor's focus on investigation can be explained by three aspects. Firstly, 
prosecutors regard the prosecution as a delivery service transporting the cases from the 
police station to COurtS. 86 This leads the prosecutors to find their institutional and 
occupational identity in the investigation. After the establishment of the Republic of 
Korea in 1948, the Public Prosecutors' Office Act (PPOA) was enacted in 1949. The 
PPOA had an important change when it was compared to the Act of the US Military 
Government. The PPOA had a provision that permits the installation of its own 
investigative units in the Supreme Prosecutors' Office (SPO).87 Sung Ryul Kwon, the 
Minister of Justice in 1949, stated at the National Assembly as follows: 88 
The public prosecutors cannot work unless the police arrest the criminals. ... Under the 
current system, the public prosecution service has only a head without hands and legs. 
However, if you provide us with hands and legs, we can walk ourselves. ... Otherwise, the 
public prosecution servic~ would be an organization that just delivers the criminal cases from 
the police station to the court. In this situation, the public prosecutor's mission can't be 
completed. In this regard, I strongly want you to allow the establishment of the Investigation 
Department in the Public Prosecutors' Office. 
Apparently, prosecutors did not find their identity or job satisfaction in trial work. The 
86 This is noted in the records of the National Assembly. See Sung Ryul Kwon's statement at n 88 and 
accompanying texts. 
87 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8717 (1949) art 29 'The investigation department may be installed in the 
Supreme Prosecutors' Office. It may deal with the study on criminal investigation and investigate crimes 
which are considered to be important by the chief of the Supreme Prosecutors' Office.' 
88 Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, The History of Public Prosecutors' Office Law (KSPO, Seoul 
1996),213. 
63 
Chapter 3 The Functions of the Prosecution Service 
prosecution service without a direct investigative function was described as 'the body 
without hands and legs'. This is still very much the case. One prosecutor, whom I 
interviewed, compared the prosecutors dealing with supervisions over the police 
investigation to the machine: 
[PP3-RC] Perhaps, all prosecutors want to investigate significant crimes themselves. Most 
prosecutors want to work for the Special Investigation Department. Honestly, the prosecutors 
dealing with the cases sent from the police are almost machines. They mainly talk as this: "I 
have finished 50 cases, but I still have another 50 cases". Prosecutors actually don't want to 
do such a work. They want to aggressively achieve something by conducting an investigation. 
The public prosecutors regard the prosecutorial investigation as one of their important 
missions and need their own investigative units to conduct investigations. 
Secondly, the investigation is considered as one of important indices to test for the 
job performance of the prosecutors. 89 The public prosecutor who successfully 
investigates a crime leading to a conviction is highly reputated:90 
[PP2-RS] Prosecutors generally prefer conducting investigations to both maintaining 
prosecution and supervising police investigation. The Special Investigation Department in the 
prosecutors' office is the most popular place for the prosecutors. In fact, we feel self-esteem 
and achievement when we investigate corruption cases while working in the Special 
Investigation Department .. To be honest, conducting an investigation and showing capability 
are absolutely useful for the promotion. 
[PP3-IS2] Indeed, the prosecutors want to investigate a crime with their own investigative 
units. Such an investigation is actually one of the best ways to show their abilities. 
In contrast, the prosecutors who focus on trial work and dropping the weak cases do not 
89 On 21 February 2009, there was a nationwide personnel shift of the Prosecutors' Office. 426 
prosecutors swapped their posts. Popular positions were all related to the investigation: e.g., Director of 
the Office of Investigation Planning (OIP) in Supreme Prosecutors' Office, 2nd and 3rd Chief Prosecutor in 
Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office. In particular, the Director of the OIP, who belongs to the 
Central Investigation Department, was regarded as the most significant post by prosecutors. See Hye Mi 
Seong. 'The Prosecution, Medium Rank Prosecutors' Personnel Shifts' fun-Hap News (21 January 2009); 
Jae Seop Yun and Sun Sik Jeong. 'New Personnel. Who are Big Three?' Herald Business (22 January 
2009). 
90 Bung Duk Jeon. 'Central Investigation Department In the Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office' Mae-II 
Financial (30 January 2009). 
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have a chance to show their ability. 91 For instance, if public prosecutors directly 
investigate a high profile public servant and prove his guilt, their reputation is enhanced. 
However, finding a drawback in a criminal case, which has been investigated by the 
police, correcting those errors, and charging [or not] the suspects do not often provide 
the prosecutors with improved status. 
Third, most importantly, the evidentiary impact of the investigative dossiers written 
by the public prosecutors has helped them to be routinely involved in the criminal 
investigations. 92 The interview records written by the public prosecutor have such 
evidentiary weight that they are generally accepted as proof regardless of the statements 
of defendants in court. In contrast, the interview records written by the police are not 
accepted into evidence unless the defendant agrees with the facts in the interview 
records.93 As a result, not only does this difference enable the prosecutors to prove guilt, 
but it also leads them to conduct investigations by themselves.94 
Since 1954, the prosecutorial documents, instead of police interview records, have 
come to be employed as robust evidence to prove confessions or admissions in the 
Korean criminal process. This safeguard was suggested by the National Assembly 
Committee on Legislation and Judiciary (Chair: Sang-Seop Urn) in 1954: 
In terms of investigation, there was an important issue how to prevent torture and coerced 
confessions. The prosecutors and police officers told me that they never use torture. 
However, everybody knows that such tactics are still used during the interrogation. 
Therefore, in order to prevent those problems, interrogation reports should not be used as 
evidence under any circumstance. '" This would be good in terms of protecting defendants. 
But, the trials will be delayed and a number of problems may take place. So, we made a 
decision that although the defendants deny their statements of the documents in court, 
prosecutorial documents can be admissible into evidence because the quality of prosecutors 
is higher than that of the police officers. Then, the confessions being made in the police 
station can be easily abolished. In this situation, even though torture is not completely 
removed from the police investigation, I believe that we can at least reduce those illegal 
91 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 
531-532. 
92 ibid 529. 
93 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 312. For further discussion, see ch 6. 
94 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the Law of Evidence' 
(2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132, 118;. Dong-Hee Lee. 'The Reform of Korean Criminal 
Procedure and Its Impact on the Role of the Pollce and Prosecution Service' (2005) 9 Korean Police 
Journal 45-75, 63; Kyoung-Moon Kye. 'Evidential Capacity of Protocol About Suspect Examination 
Written by the Prosecutor' (2005) 17 Kukmin Law Journal 141, 163-164. 
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. 95 practIces. 
This suggestion seems to stem from both the chaotic situation in Korea in 1950s and the 
experiences of the colonial system of criminal justice. In 1950s, South Korea was very 
unstable. After a 35-year colonial period (1910-1945), before the independent legal 
system was fully established, it had to face another disaster in history, 'the Korean War 
(1950-1953)'.96 Thus, in 1954, one of the most important factors in the formation of 
criminal justice system, as Professor Shin stated, was to secure efficiency necessary to 
stabilise the state. 97 For the legislators, the prosecutorial interview document was 
probably considered as a significant alternative to both safeguard the suspects and 
achieve efficiency with a minimal effort. 
In particular, the experiences of the colonial period might have an impact on creating 
such an idea. During the Japanese colonial period, the criminal trials mainly relied on 
the interview records written by the police.98 In the colonial criminal justice system, 
most judges and prosecutors were Japanese.99 Indeed, the language barrier was one of 
the significant problems for the trials. The courts needed much resource and time in 
order to preserve the value of an open trial. For instance, they had to employ a large 
number of interpreters who can deliver the statements of the defendants and witnesses. 
However, the right to a fair trial, as Professor Shin stated, was regarded as 
'extravagance for the colonial people'. 100 Subsequently, in order to maximise the 
efficiency in the colony, the criminal trials were conducted on the basis of interview 
documents being recorded and translated into Japanese by the police. 
The role of the prosecution service was largely limited to review the results of the 
police investigation and to maintain the prosecution in court. As the police interview 
9~ Korean Institute of Criminology, Source Book on the Establishment of Korean Criminal Procedure 
Code (Korean Institute of Criminology, Seoul 1990), 290 quoted in Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. 115. 
96 Bruce Cumings, 'Civil society in West and East' in Carles K. Armstrong (ed), Korean Society: Civil 
Society. Democracy and the State (2nd edn Routledge, Oxon; New York 2007) 9, 21-24; Gi-Wook Shin 
and Michael Edson Robinson, Colonial Modernity in Korea (Harvard East Asian monographs, Harvard 
University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1999) 466, 466; 
Peter H. Lee and William Theodore De Bary, Sources of Korean Tradition: Volume II from the Sixteenth 
to the 1Wentieth Centuries (Introduction to Asian civilizations, Columbia University Press, New York; 
Chichester 1997); Dong-Woon Shin, 'An Analysis of the Korean Criminal Procedure during the Japanese 
Occupation' in Korean Legal History Review (Parkyoungsa, Seoul 1991) 401-417. 
97 For further information on historical background, see chs 2 and 3. 
98 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the Law of Evidence' 
(2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132, 112. 
99 For instance, 150 judges and 72 prosecutors were Japanese in the colonial criminal justice system in 
1930. By contrast, the numbers of Korean judges and prosecutors were very small, i.e. respectively 38 
and 7. See Jun Young Mun, The Establishment of the Court and Prosecution Service in Korea (Yuksa 
Bypyung Sa, Seoul 2010) 976, 451. 
100 Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. 111-112. 
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records were routinely accepted into evidence by the colonial law, the prosecutors, 
unlike in the current system, did not have to re-interview the suspects in order to 
confirm the confessions. 101 The criminal trials in the colony can be described thus: 
When the prosecutors charged the suspects, they provided the court with a file of 
investigative documents. Before the trial, the judges read those documents written in 
Japanese. In court, the judges just conflrmed whether or not the statements in the 
documents had been correctly recorded by the police. The trials were conducted in Japanese 
by Japanese-speaking judges and prosecutors. They did not have to consider the Korean 
accused and audience. The fairness resulting from the right to an open trial was not a 
significant requirement for the colonial defendants. 102 
Under these circumstances, the colonial police, who were mostly Korean, focussed 
on drawing a confession from the suspects because it was the most certain and easiest 
way to prove the guilt. Indeed, inappropriate methods such as threats and tortures were 
largely used during the interrogation. l03 As a result, the public had no confidence or 
. h I· 104 trust In t e po Ice. 
However, this distrust in the police, as seen in the previous chapter, continued to 
exist after the independence from Japan since most colonial police officers were again 
employed by the independent government. After independence, Korea was in the very 
chaotic situation. In particular, the new government did not have sufficient resources to 
recruit new police officers and educate them. Thus, unlike judges and prosecutors, the 
new government made use of the same police forces as under the colonial 
government. IOS There was no sufficient public in those police forces. 
In contrast, the public did trust the prosecutors because a large number of lawyers, 
who had defended the Korean people and tried to achieve the independence during the 
colonial period, were employed as the public prosecutors.106 They were very popular 
among the Korean people, and themselves had much self-esteem and integrity.l07 Based 
101 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Public Prosecution' (1988) 29(2) Seoul Law Journal 39, 
45. 
102 Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. (2006) 112-113. 
103 Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. (1988) 45. 
104 Kuk Cho. 'The Ongoing Reconstruction of the Korean Criminal Justice System' (2006) 5(1) Santa 
Clara Journal ofinternational Law 100, 117-118; Dong-Woon Shin. 'An Historical Study on the 
Competence of Criminal Investigation between the Police and Prosecution' (2001) 42(1) Seoul Law 
Journal 178-230, 211-212. 
lOS KukChoop. cit. 117-118. 
106 Dong-Woon Shin. 'An Historical Study on the Competence of Criminal Investigation between the 
Police and Prosecution' (2001) 42(1) Seoul Law Journal 178-230, 212. 
107 ibid. 
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on this public trust, the prosecution service began to be regarded as an important 
organisation to both control the police investigation and conduct an investigative 
interview for safeguarding the suspects. 108 
In the 1950s, the role of the Korean prosecution service was mainly limited to 
supplement police investigations by interviewing suspects repeatedly and recording the 
results in their documents. In particular, most resources of the prosecution service were 
used for charging the suspects and maintaining the prosecution. 109 In addition, with the 
development of democracy, there was an attempt to achieve public confidence in the 
prosecution service by reducing the prosecutor's tenure to 10 years and allowing the 
external people to participate in the personnel assignment of the prosecutors. 110 
However, due to the military coup by Jung Hee Park on 16th May 1961, all those 
reforms could not be implemented. 
Rather, under the military government (1961-1993), the prosecution service 
significantly developed its powers. Professor Mun described that 'the "1960s" provided 
a great opportunity for the Korean prosecution service to develop to its fullest 
potential. ' III In the 1960s, one of the emphasised factors for the prosecution service 
was the 'aggressive involvement in the investigation.' The investigation was regarded as 
a method to show the capability of the prosecution service, and subsequently, the 
prosecutors were required to play a key role in the direct investigation and the 
supervision over the police investigation. I 12 
In 1962, the Central Investigation Department (CID) was created in the Supreme 
Prosecutors' Office. 113 Then, the functions and powers of the CID were extensively 
expanded in 1969 by the amendment of the Public Prosecutor's Office ACt. 114 In 
addition, the district prosecutors' offices had expanded their own investigative units. I I 5 
Particularly, in order to consolidate their role as a ruler of the investigation, the 
\08 For more details on the prosecutorial control over the police investigation, see ch 2. 
\09 Jun Young Mun, The Establishment of the Court and Prosecution Service in Korea (Yuksa Bypyung 
Sa, Seoul 2010) 976, 895-900. 
110 In particular, such an attempt included the reform of the relationship between the police and 
prosecutors. The National Assembly Committee on Internal Affairs suggested that the police should 
conduct investigations without the supervision from prosecutors. The committee noted that 'the police 
investigation can be manipulated by the instructions from prosecutors.' Thus, it argued that basic 
investigation should be carried out by the police on their own initiatives. See ibid 890-891. 
111 ibid 897. 
112 ibid 898. 
113 Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended on 20 August 1962 No. 
1130 (1949), art 29 para 3. 
114 Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended on 16 January 1969 No. 
2078 (1949), art 29 and The Code for the Public Prosecutor's Office Organisation [Keomchalcheong 
Samukiku Kyujeong] amended on 20 March 1969 No. 3810 (1962), art 4. 
115 In 1969, the Seoul and Pusan District Prosecutors' Offices created the Great Investigation 
Departments. See Jun Young Mun op. cit. 
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prosecutors had been advised to conduct a direct investigation rather than supervise the 
police investigation. 116 Such a development of the Korean prosecution service can be 
well observed in the Prosecutor Jeong's illustration presented in 1970: 
The prosecution service has significantly developed. The prosecutor is not a person who 
does simply and boring jobs for the police any more. The number of investigations being 
conducted by the prosecutors has remarkably increased. New investigative functions have 
been created for the cm and investigation departments in the district offices. In terms of 
cracking down on administrative offences, the prosecution service has made an 
accomplishment worthy of note. On the basis of this change of prosecutorial functions, the 
prosecution service should develop a new scope of work. The visual angle of the 
prosecutorial enormous potential has been expanded from 50 degrees to 100 degrees, from 
100 degrees to 150 degrees. Now, the prosecution service needs to have a concern about the 
. f' 117 prevention 0 crImes. 
In addition to the expansion of the prosecutorial function and power, during this 
period, various schemes to screen prosecutorial decisions had been removed from the 
draft of the KCPA on the basis of the suggestion from the prosecutors. I IS Firstly, the 
judicial power to review the prosecutorial discretion not to charge was almost 
eliminated by the amendment of the KCPA in 1973.119 As a result, the prosecution 
service, as Professor Shin stated, could exclude external control over the prosecutorial 
decisions. 12o Secondly, through this amendment, the judges lost their power to question 
the suspects for examining the propriety of detention. 121 Accordingly, they had to issue 
a warrant simply by relying on the documents written by the prosecutors. 122 
Furthermore, the prosecutors came to have a power to appeal against the judicial 
decisions to release the detained defendants by bail and cancellation of detention. 123 
116 ibid 898 n 449. 
117 Ik Won Jeong. 'Prosecutorial Role for the Prevention of Crimes' (March 1970) Prosecution Service 
[Keomchal] 36, 36-37 quoted in Jun Young Mun, The Establishment of the Court and Prosecution Service 
in Korea (Yuksa Bypyung Sa, Seoul 2010) 976,898-899. 
\18 ibid 899-900 and n 453. 
119 Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended on 25 January 1973 No. 2450 
(1954), art 260. 
120 With respect to this amendment, Professor Shin stated that 'through this amendment, the prosecution 
service excluded the external control over the prosecutors. However, it maintained the control over the 
police by preserving exceptions for unlawful activities of the police.' See Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform 
of the Korean Public Prosecution' (1988) 29(2) Seoul Law Journal 39, 43. 
121 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 16. 
122 This limitation to the judicial review continued over 30 years in the Korean criminal process and was 
reformed partially through the amendment of the KCPA in 2007. See ibid, 16-20. 
123 ibid 15. 
69 
Chapter 3 The Functions o/the Prosecution Service 
In short, as Professor Mun noted, 'various mechanisms leading the prosecutors to 
feel uncomfortable had been improved and abolished by the amendment in 1973 from 
the perspectives of the prosecution service.' 124 However, those revisions have been 
often criticised as 'a change for worse' in the Korean legal history.12S 
The changes in favour of the prosecution service continued to emerge during the 
military government for over 30 years. 126 The prosecutorial investigation had been 
made routine. The supervision over the police investigation had been firmly established. 
In addition, the prosecution service had expanded their roles in the prevention of crimes, 
the control over the administrative offences, and the inspection into the state affairs. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Justice had been manipulated by the prosecutors. A number 
of mechanisms for guaranteeing the defendant's rights had been abolished in the 
KCPA. 127 
Taken together, the prosecutor's interview with suspects seems to emerge because of 
various elements in the Korean legal history: concerns about the coercive police 
interrogation being experienced in the colonial period; low public trust in the police; 
experienced efficiency of the trials based on interview documents; and high trust in the 
prosecution service after independence. Given those elements, the proposal for article 
312 was perhaps considered as an alternative to maintain the efficiency of criminal 
process as well as to safeguard the defendants, and in the end, was provided in the 
KCPA. 128 
However, with the development of the prosecutorial investigation under the military 
governments, such a safeguard has been turned into a significant method to uphold the 
investigations being directly conducted by the prosecutors. Consequently, the 
prosecution service has become another powerful investigative agency employing, as 
we shall see in Chapter 6, torture and threats to elicit confessions and admissions. In 
particular, because of the considerable evidentiary power of the documents, the result of 
a trial is mostly determined in the prosecutor's office, not in open court. 129 
124 Jun Young Mun, The Establishment o/the Court and Prosecution Service in Korea (Yuksa Bypyung 
Sa, Seoul 2010) 976,899. 
12S ibid; Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. 42;Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 16 (professor Lee stated that 'a number of 
measures to protect the defendant's rights were abrogated by the amendment in 1973. ') 
126 Jun Young Mun op. cit. 900. 
127 Professor Mun stated that such 'changes are very similar to those in Japan under the militarism in 
1930s and 19405.' See ibid. 
128 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Refonn of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the Law of Evidence' 
(2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132, 113. 
129 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Refonn, 'Committee Report (IV): From 14th to 27th 
Conference' PCJR (Seoul January 2005), 337-342. 
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6. Conclusion 
The Korean prosecutors, as we shall see in Chapter 5, have general roles as an advocate 
and a minister of justice as in other jurisdictions. They are regarded as one party in the 
adversarial structure. At the same time, they have a duty to protect defendants as a 
quasi-judicial officer. However, they have extensive discretion for trial works. Only 
prosecutors can charge the suspects in Korea. They can suspend and retract the 
prosecution without judicial intervention. The form and nature of a trial is decided only 
by prosecutors. They also recommend a sentence to the judge. 
Particularly, in relation to the investigation, not only they direct the police, but also 
investigate offences on their own initiatives. They have sufficient resources to conduct 
such a function. Most resources are concentrated on the investigation rather than trial 
works. The prosecutorial investigation has been increased by several elements. 
Prosecutors seek their institutional and occupational identity in the investigative actions. 
Investigative ability is regarded as a significant factor to assess the reputation of the 
prosecutors. More importantly, the evidentiary impact of the prosecutorial dossier has 
led the prosecutors to be routinely involved in the investigation, but it also enables them 
to maintain superior status. 
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Chapter 4 The Organisation and Social Authority of 
the Korean Prosecution Service 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to examine the organisational features of the Korean prosecution 
service and its social authority. Firstly, several organisational characteristics are 
explored stemming from the centralised authority. This discusses not only the internal 
aspects, but also the relationship between the prosecution service and Ministry of 
Justice. Then, the level of influence of the prosecution service and its functions are 
assessed. This is based on content analysis of newspapers and the influential power is 
comparatively measured. 
2. Organisation: Centralised Authority 
The Korean prosecution service is a centralised authority based on the 'principle of 
unity of prosecutors [Kumsa-dongilche-wonchik],' which was created to secure the 
fairness of the investigative and prosecutorial affairs conducted nationwide. I Because of 
the principle, 'the prosecutors shall obey the prosecutors in higher office in 
prosecutorial affairs.' It has developed as a hierarchical organisation.2 Citizens consider 
the prosecution service as 'one closed and dominant elite faction,.3 
As we shall discuss later, a monopoly of power can lead to abuse.4 Where there is 
no proper system to monitor their operations, the organisational characteristics of the 
I Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' 
(2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 381; This may be a significant feature of continental legal 
tradition - centralised authority. See ch 5. 
2 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act (KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8717 (1949) art 7(1). 
3 Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) 
Seo-Kang Law Journal43, 43. 
4 Professor Cho described this problem as follows: 'In the cases involving powerful politicians or high-
ranking government officials, prosecutors in charge had to unwillingly quit their investigation, often 
facing pressure or persuasion from prosecutors in higher office, and through the Supreme Prosecutor's 
Office, the ruling political party has kept a substantial influence on the prosecutors in charge of the cases. 
Consequently, public distrust of the prosecution has increased.' See Kuk Cho op. cit. 381-382. 
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service - centralised authority based upon the principle of unity - have occasionally 
caused the prosecutorial power to be manipulated by external political influence and 
internal direction by superiors. 5 This results in distrust in the operations by the 
prosecution service. According to the results of the survey by Woo, a member of 
National Assembly, 69.4 per cent of citizens answered that 'the prosecution service has 
dominant position'. In addition, 71.6 per cent of respondents considered that 'the 
prosecution service is unfair and unjuSt'.6 
2.1. Ministry of Justice 
The Korean prosecution service is part of the Ministry of Justice. However, it exists as 
an independent agency to prevent the office from being used in a political way. In 
addition to the structural independence, the Public Prosecutors Office Act prohibits the 
Minister of Justice from directing the prosecutor in relation to a specific case.7 They 
can enunciate general policy and direct only the prosecutor general. This was created to 
cut off unjust interference by government, and consequently, to secure the political 
neutrality of the prosecution service.8 
However, in the face of such a measure, the prosecution service does not have 
sufficient independence from political influence due to its characteristic as a centralised 
authority. This can be noted in three aspects. Firstly, prosecutors seek to be actively 
involved in the affairs of the Ministry of Justice rather than to be independent from 
them. Most actions of the Ministry of Justice are directed and decided by the 
prosecutors since the key posts of the ministry are occupied by incumbent and retired 
prosecutors. For instance, the Minister of Justice is a cabinet member, and with few 
exceptions, as seen in Table 4.1, former prosecutors have been assigned to this job. 
In addition to the minister, one of the incumbent chief prosecutors is always 
5 Bo Hak Seo. 'Political Independence and Checks on the Public Prosecutor's Powers' (2004) Next 9, 10 
(Professor Seo argued that 'the independence of the prosecution service is guaranteed by a number of 
measures. However, there is no proper system to check the monopolised power of the prosecution 
service. '); Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (200S) 
9(2) Seo-Kang Law Journal 43, 44 (Professor Lee pointed out that 'the prosecutors tend to refuse any 
monitoring systems by arguing that those measures can infringe on the independence of the prosecution 
service. '); Sang Jin Park. 'Suggestions for Reforming the Prosecution of Organization and Prosecution of 
Power' (2002) 15 Kun Kuk Journal of Social Science 75, 76 (Professor Park stated that 'whereas the 
prosecutors monopolise most powers in the criminal proceedings, there is no reviewing system to control 
prosecutorial powers. This leads to the abuse of power and corruptions of prosecutors.'). 
~ See Tae Jong Kim. 'Unjust Prosecution Service' fun-Hap News (19 October 200S). 
7 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [Keomchalcheongbeop} partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8717 (1949), art S. 
8 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 200S), 9S. 
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allocated as vice-minister.9 As shown in Figure 4.1, key posts in the ministry are also 
filled by the prosecutors. This is required by the Executive Order 21350. 
Table 4.1 The previous careers of ministers of justice (1992 - 2011)10 
Main Career Total Judge Prosecutor Defence Lawyer Politician 
N 22 3 18 o 
Percentage 100% 14% 82% 0% 4% 
Figure 4.1 The organisation chart of the Ministry of Justicell 
l Minister I 
I Office of Spokesperson 
I I Y Oftl" of Po Ii", Ad.;"" Inspector General • I Vice Minister .. - Inspection and Review 
-Audit I General Service Division 
I 
I i I I 
Planning & Legal Affairs Criminal Affairs Crime 
Coordination Bureau • Bureau • Prevention and 
Bureau * Policy Bureau • 
- Legal counsel - Prosecution 
- Planning - Litigation Service - Social 
- Budget - Legal Profession - Criminal Protection Policy 
- Refonn Policy Legislation - Probation & 
Parole 
I -.l I 
Human Rights Correctional Immigration 
Bureau Service Service 
, 
Note. * The five posts - Inspector General; Director of Planning and Coordination Bureau; Director of 
Legal Affairs Bureau; Director of Criminal Affairs Bureau; Director of Crime Prevention Policy Bureau _ 
must be filled only by the prosecutors according to the executive order. 12 
9 The profiles of 23 Vice-Ministers of Justice from 4 March 1993 to 28 February 2011 show that the vice-
ministers have been appointed from the chief prosecutors without exception. See The Ministry of Justice. 
'The Profiles of the Previous Vice-Ministers of Justice' accessed on 3 March 2011. 
10 This is a result of the research on personnel records of the Ministers of Justice from 9 October 1992 to 
28 February 2011. See The Ministry of Justice. 'The Profiles of the Fonner Ministers of Justice' 
<htljl:llwww.moj.go.krIHPIM0J03/menu.do?strOrgGbnCd=100000&strRtnURL=MOJ 50204030> 
accessed on 3 March 2011. 
11 This has been cited from the web page of the Ministry of Justice. See The Ministry of Justice. 'The 
Organization Chart' <htljl:llwww.moLgo.krl>. accessed 3 March 2011. 
12 Executive Order 21350 on the Organization of the Ministry of Justice [Beopmubu-wa-Sosokkikwan-
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•• Vice Minister has been occupied by the prosecutor without any exceptions. 13 
The prosecutors can occupy other ministry positions as well without limitation. 14 In a 
sense, prosecutors run the Ministry of Justice making policies, rules, and lawsls : 
[DL2-IS1] In fact, the prosecutors run the Ministry of Justice. Do you know this anecdote? 
If the prosecutors are asked whether they will be the Prosecutor General or the Minister of 
Justice, all of them answer that they want to be the Prosecutor General. The Ministry of 
Justice is another prosecutor's office in Korea which is run by the prosecutors. 
This has helped develop the pre-eminent position of the prosecutors. However, at the 
same time, it means that the prosecution service is controlled by the Minister of Justice 
through the prosecutors working in the ministry. The prosecution service can be easily 
manipulated by political interests. 16 
Secondly, independence of prosecutors is jeopardised by the extraordinary practice 
of reallocating prosecutors every two year. Personnel assignment is one of the major 
concerns of the Korean prosecutors:' This is determined by the Ministry of Justice: s 
According to the PPOA, the president decides the personnel assignments on the basis of 
advice from the Minister of Justice. The minster himself will rely on the opinion of the 
prosecutor general. 19 However, this process involves redeployment in a nation scale. As 
Jikge] 2009 partially amended on 18 March 2009, arts 4-3,8(2),9(2), 10(1), 11(1). 
13 See n 9 above. 
14 Executive Order op. cit. arts 4-2,4-4, 11-2, 12, 13. 
IS This circumstance may be similar to Japan. See David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: 
Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Studies on law and social control, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New 
York 2002); About thirty per cent (N=563) of legislations, which were passed into law through the 
National Assembly from 2004 to 2008, were initiated and drafted by government. See Korean National 
Assembly. 'Legislation Statistics (2004-2008)' <httj>:lllikms.assembly.go.krlbilVjsp/StatFinishBiII.jsp>; 
Tae-Hun Ha. 'Political Prosecutor [Jungchi Kumchal]' (2008) (9) Participatory Society [Chamyusahoi]; 
Sang Hee Han. 'The Change of the Prosecution Service' ibid; In Seop Han, 'Legal Control on High Profile 
Corruption: the Public Prosecutor's Role and Limitation' in A Vision for the New Millennium: The 
Establishment of Transparent Society (The Korean Association for Public Administration, Seoul 1999), 
109 n 12 (Professor Han pointed out that 'many prosecutors wants to work in the Ministry of Justice or 
the Supreme Prosecutors' Office because this can give them benefits in terms of the personnel assignment 
and promotion. '). 
16 Sang Hee Han. 'The Change of the Prosecution Service' (2008) (9) Participatory Society 
[ ChamyusahOll 
17 In Seop Han op. cit. 109 (Professor Han stated that 'the personnel assignment is one of the important 
methods to control the prosecution service by the politicians. Where most prosecutors hope to work in 
Seoul, the personnel movement can be a significant factor to influence the prosecution service. '); Ku Ho 
Choe. 'The Personnel Assignments and Promotion of the Prosecutor' (2008) 504 The Law Journal. 
18 See n 21 below and accompanying texts. 
19 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8717 (1949), art 34 para 1. 
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Goodman pointed out, this can help to maintain a high-level of bureaucracy nationwide 
and to obtain uniformity. It can also prevent 'the development of unwholesome 
relationship' between the prosecutors and the populace.2o But, as Ku-Ho Choe stated, 
there is no principle for such a personnel assignment in Korea. The prosecutors cannot 
predict the next position to which they will move. This is of a significant concern to the 
prosecutors:21 
[PP2-RS] The main reason why I stepped out of the prosecutor's office is the personnel 
movement. The prosecutors often have to work at the different provinces. It was quite 
difficult for me because I had to live away from my family. So, I decided to resign the post. 
Now, I'm very happy even though I have an obligation to fmd a case. 
[PP3-IS2] I think personnel assignment is the most stressful factor for the prosecutors. 
Depending on my personnel assignment, the whole family has to move to a new place. 
Children have to be transferred to a new school.. .. Most prosecutors would like to work in 
Seoul. One of my colleagues experienced serious depression when he was posted to the 
island of Jeju. 
The consequence of this is that to obtain a good position, the prosecutors may try to 
please politicians and civil servants who can influence their personnel assignments, e.g. 
the Minister of Justice, the senior secretary to the president for civil affairs, and the 
leader of the political party in power.22 In Korean society, as Professor Park stated, such 
a relationship between the prosecutors and politicians is an open secret, i.e. 'the 
politicians exercise their influence on the personnel assignments of the prosecutors and 
the prosecutors seek to find proper politicians who can provide them with a good 
pOSt.,23 
Finally, lack of independence occurs because of the concentration of power on the 
Supreme Prosecutors' Office (SPO), which is the headquarters of the Korean 
prosecution service. 24 As discussed in Chapter 3, prosecutors have considerable 
20 Marcia E. Goodman. 'Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan' (1986) 5 UCLA 
Pac.Basin LJ 16,22. 
21 Ku Ho Choe op. cit. 
22 Sang Jin Park. 'Suggestions for Reforming the Prosecution of Organization and Prosecution of Power' 
(2002) IS Kun Kuk Journal of Social Science 75, 85. 
23 ibid 85-86. 
24 In Seop Han op. cit. 109. 
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discretion in Korea. However, local prosecutors' offices are subject to the decisions of 
the SPO rather than make autonomous decisions:2s 
[J3-IS] Centralised power is one of the big problems of the prosecution service. At present, 
the offences violating social security are controlled by the Supreme Prosecutor's Office. 
However, because the prosecutor's office is a part of the government, the decisions are 
virtually made by the presidential office. It's very hard for the prosecutors in the field to 
carry out their duties with their own accountability. 
Most significant decisions are made by a small number of high ranking officials in the 
SPO?6 
This seems to be compatible with the political interest of the party in power. 
Professor Han argued that 'in practice, the party in power cannot control every 
prosecutor's activity. Therefore, they communicate with a small number of high ranking 
officials in the SPO in order to make a decision on the direction of investigations as well 
as personnel assignments of the prosecutors. ,27 Similarly, one defence lawyer whom I 
interviewed pointed to the manipulation of investigation by the political influence: 
[DL2-ISJ] Under the current system, the whole investigation process can be easily 
manipulated by the politicians. All investigation agencies construct one body based on 
order-obedience relationship between the judicial police and prosecutors. Indeed, the head 
is the prosecution service. Once the politicians control the prosecution service, they can 
manipulate all investigation process because the prosecutor monopolises most powers and 
controls the police. 
2' This centralised decision-making was one of the significant issues in England and Wales. With respect 
to the establishment of the Crown Prosecution Service at the national level, there was a debate on the 
integrated national system: 'The only other country with a unitary constitution which to our knowledge 
has established a fully integrated prosecution service on a comparable scale is Japan; and because of the 
scale of service that would be required in England and Wales many commentators are concerned about 
the risk of overloading the central headquarters. Such fears could be realised if an integrated national 
service did not contain appropriate safeguards against unnecessary centralisation of decision-making.' See 
Home OfficelLaw Officers' Department, 'An Independent Prosecution Service For England and Wales' 
HMSO (Cmnd 9074, London), 20. 
26 According to Executive Order for the Prosecutors Personnel Management, 47 of 1,847 prosecutors 
work in the SPO to support the operations of the Prosecutor General. See Executive Order 21273 for 
Public Prosecutors Personnel Management [Kumsa-Jeongwon-Beop Sihaengryung] 2009 amended on 23 
January 2009, annex. 
21 In Seop Han, 'Legal Control on High Profile Corruption: the Public Prosecutor's Role and Limitation' 
in A Vision/or the New Millennium: The Establishment o/Transparent Society (The Korean Association 
for Public Administration, Seoul 1999) 99, 109. 
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Political influence is a fact of life for prosecution service. The prosecutor general has 
been unable to disconnect the line between the prosecution service and politicians. 
Institutional independence is still a long way away. 
2.2. The Hierarchy 
The Prosecutor General ranks at the top of the hierarchical organisation. The basic rule 
is called 'the principle of unity of the prosecutors [Kumsa-dongilche-wonchik].,28 All 
public prosecutors form a hierarchical organisation and act as one body which cannot be 
separated. 
This principle of unity is maintained to produce the uniformity among individual 
prosecutors and regions. 29 The decisions by the prosecution service needs to be 
consistent nationwide to guarantee fairness. The principle of unity helps the service to 
be consistent and not depend on individual characteristics of prosecutors or regions. 
Professor Lee argued that 'for the efficient investigation, the criminal justice system 
needs a unified investigation structure. In particular, the principle of unity of the 
prosecutors has a part to play in integrating different investigative circumstances' .30 
The PPOA articulates two elements in order to preserve the principle. First, 
prosecutors are bound to obey orders from their superiors.3! An order and obedience 
relationship exists between the superior and subordinate prosecutors. This is regarded as 
the fundamental element to guarantee the principle of unity. 32 In particular, the 
relational hierarchy is emphasised more in the eastern Asian cultures - China, Korea, 
and Japan - than in other parts of the world because of the influence of Confucianism.33 
The order and obedience relationship of the Korean system should be stricter than the 
28 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 95. 
29 Sang Jin Park. 'Suggestions for Reforming the Prosecution of Organization and Prosecution of Power' 
(2002) 15 Kun Kuk Journal of Social Science 75,81; Marcia E. Goodman. 'Exercise and Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan' (1986) 5 UCLA Pac.Basin LJ 16, 56 (Goodman indicated that 'review 
by superiors, customary practice emerging from tradition and experience in dealing with cases, as well as 
the principle of unity of the procuracy' are three elements to preserve the uniformity of the prosecutors' 
office in Japan. ') 
30 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 95; Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public 
Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) Seo-Kang Law Journal 43, 56; Sang Jin Park op. cit. 82. 
31 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 2 J December 2007 No. 87 J 7 (1949), art 7 para 1. 
n Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 95-96. 
33 Xiaoge Xu, 'Asian Values Revisited: In the Context of Intercultural News Communication' (1998) 25(1) 
Media Asia 37; Yan Bing Zhang and others, 'Harmony, Hierarchy and Conservatism: A Cross-Cultural 
Comparison of Confucian Values in China, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan' (2005) 22(1/4) Communication 
Research Reports 109; Danny Lam, Jeremy T. Paltiel and John H. Shannon, 'The Confucian Entrepreneur? 
Chinese Culture, Industrial Organization, and Intellectual Property Piracy in Taiwan' (1994) 20(4) Asian 
Affairs 205. 
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line management in other jurisdictions. 
Second, the prosecutor general and the chief of prosecutors can take over the cases 
from the subordinate prosecutors when the cases are considered to be improperly dealt 
with [Jikmu-Sungkye-Kwon].34 They can also transfer such a case to other prosecutors 
[Jikmu-Leejeon-Kwon].35 These are based on the order and obedience relationship. 
However, such measures may limit prosecutor's independence.36 In sum, the principle 
of unity has a basic role to play in managing the Korean prosecution service. This can 
increase fairness by balancing the prosecution service nationwide through the 
uniformity. However, the independence of the prosecutors can be limited by leading the 
prosecutors to obey the orders from the superiors. 
The principle of unity, as Johnson stated, provides 'all prosecutor managers with 
authority to direct their subordinates in any work-related area, whether investigation, 
trial, or the decision to charge. ,37 The Minister of Justice, a member of cabinet and 
politician, can lawfully influence the outcome of a case by this principle even if they are 
not a prosecutor. For the purpose of protecting the political independence of the 
prosecutor, the PPOA limits the Minister of Justice to direct only the prosecutor general 
in relation to a specific case. This has an impact on the outcome because the prosecutor 
general can give orders to all prosecutors.38 
For instance, on 13th October 2005, justice minister Jung-Bae Chun ordered the 
prosecutor general to investigate Professor Kang of Dongkuk University without 
detention.39 This caused a significant debate in the Korean society. Most of all, it was 
the first case for a minister to direct the prosecutor general on a specific case with an 
official document. Such a direction was legally preserved but had never been used 
because of the concerns over the independence of the prosecution service. The case also 
caused a conflict between the progressive and conservative camp. The Grand National 
34 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 2 J December 2007 No. 8717 (1949), art 7-2 para 2. 
3S ibid art 7-2 paras 1-2. 
36 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 96. 
37 David T. Johnson. 'Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order' (1998) 32 Law & Society 
Review 247, 260; Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' 
(2008) 9(2) Seo-Kang Law Joumal43, 55 (Professor Lee stated that 'four articles of the Prosecutors' 
Office Act playa main role in making the hierarchical organization in which the prosecutor general ranks 
at the top: article 7(1) - 'all prosecutors should obey orders from superiors'; article 12(2) - 'the 
prosecutor general may deal with affairs of the Supreme Prosecutors' Office and direct prosecutors in the 
office'; article 17 and 21 - the Chief of prosecutors may deal with affairs of the High Prosecutors' Office 
as well as the District Prosecutors' Office, and direct prosecutors in the office.') 
38 Johnson op. cit. 260. 
39 Rahn Kim. 'Prosecutor Accepts Minister's Order' Korea Times [HankukilboJ (14 October 2005); Joo 
Hee Lee. 'Justice minister's move over professor ignites ideological and political strife' Korea Herald (14 
October 2005). 
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Party, which has a conservative bias, argued that the progressive forces 'tainted the 
nation's ideology' by encouraging the hands of radical leftists. 4o In particular, 
prosecutors rose up in major opposition. The minister was not a former prosecutor. As 
discussed in the previous section, this was very rare in the Korean system. Nevertheless, 
he had sought to reform the prosecution service before this case. For the prosecutors, 
the direction from the minister, who was a former politician, was perhaps regarded as 
political interference in their work. As a consequence, the prosecutor general resigned 
after fulfilling just six months of his two-year tenure amid a controversy over the 
independence of the service. 
In the case, Professor Kang was investigated because of his remarks allegedly 
glorifying North Korea's 1950 invasion of the South. He wrote an article said 'Korean 
War was part of a crusade by North Korea to reunify the two Koreas' and that 'the 
United States is the archenemy, not a benefactor' of the South.41 This would be in 
violation of the National Security Law. Suspects who violate the National Security Law 
are in general detained by a warrant issued by the court at the request of the prosecutor. 
However, the minister directed the prosecutor not to request a detention warrant, and 
consequently, the suspect was interviewed as well as charged without detention. 
Prosecutors claimed that such involvement infringed their independence. The prosecutor 
general raised his concern: 
The prosecution accepts the minister's order. But it is regretful that the Justice Minister issued 
an ordered on whether to detain a suspect in a specific case, because that violates the 
prosecution's political neutrality. However, ifI don't follow the order due to its impropriety, I, 
the prosecutor general, will be in violation of the law. And the prosecution could be criticized 
as an uncontrollable body.42 
However, Professor Lee argued that 'the direction from the Minister of Justice can 
have a positive role to play in controlling the prosecutorial investigation infringing the 
defendant's basic rights by abusing detention.'43 The prosecutors occasionally overuse 
their powers under the pretext of preserving independence. In a sense, this can be 
controlled by direction from the Minister of Justice. However, under current 
circumstances where prosecutors have the key posts in the Ministry of Justice including 
40 Joo-Hee Lee, 'President accepts chief prosecutor's resignation' The Korea Herad (17 May 2005). 
41 ibid. 
42 Rahn Kim. 'Prosecutor Accepts Minister's Order' Korea Times [HankukilboJ(14 October 2005). 
43 Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) 
Seo-Kang Law Journal 43, 64. 
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the Minister, the direction from the Minister may mainly playa role in jeopardising the 
independence of the prosecution service. 
The case was made public because the Minister used an official way to direct the 
prosecutor general. However, as Professor Lee pointed out, the directions over the 
prosecutorial affairs are generally conducted through the informal methods such as 
discussions and instructions. The power of the minister to direct the actions of the 
prosecutor has been mainly used to exercise political influence on the prosecution 
service rather than control the power of the prosecutors.44 
2.3. Political Interference and Abuse of Power: Case Examples 
Prosecutors increase their pre-eminence by running the Ministry of Justice where 
policies, rules, and laws are made. However, this also weakens their political 
independence. As a result, the operations of the prosecution service have been often 
manipulated by the external pressure. The order and obedience relationship between 
superiors and subordinates makes the Korean prosecution service more susceptible to 
external and internal influence. 
On 14th June 2007, the Korean Supreme Court found Sung-Nam Shin, the former 
prosecutor general, guilty of wrongful exercise of authority. 45 According to the 
judgement, he ordered the chief of prosecutors of the Ulsan Prosecutors' Office to 
discontinue the investigation of a corruption case involving the mayor of Ulsan. 
Because of the order, the prosecutors stopped the investigation even though they had 
obtained sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the suspects.46 
In particular, the prosecutor general told the chief of Ulsan Prosecutors' Office that 
'you have to help the company because someone "who is close to the influential 
politician" made a request.' 47 He wrongfully ordered him to discontinue the 
investigation. The case of corruption could not be investigated any more even by other 
law enforcements because only the prosecutor has the power to investigate offences in 
Korea. 
Another prosecutor who was ordered to stop an investigation was Jin-Su Eun. He 
was working in the Seoul Dong Bu Prosecutors' Office and pointed out a number of 
elements impeding the political independence of the prosecution service in Korea. He 
44 ibid 63. 
4S 2004 DO 5561 (14 June 2007) 278 Panre Gongbo ll08 (Korean Supreme Court). 
46 ibid; 2003 NO 3391 (20 August 2004) (Seoul High Court). 
47 2003 NO 3391 (20 August 2004) (Seoul High Court); Yong Woo Jo. 'The Former Prosecutor General, 
Sung-Nam Shin, Found Guilty' Dongailbo (16 June 2007). 
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wrote about the problems of political interference in an article and in relation to bribery 
case, suggested a method to reform the current system. He described the unlawful 
involvement of the Minister of Justice as follows: 
The justice minister ordered me to discontinue the investigation into the corruption case of a 
member of the National Assembly even though there was sufficient evidence to prove his 
gUilt of accepting bribes in return for recommending a post. In addition, in another case, the 
minister ordered not to detain a member of the National Assembly while saying that "he is 
one of the poor politicians and how can you arrest such a person?,,48 
Prosecutor Eun argued that 'for the political independence of the prosecution service, 
the rule of ministry of justice demanding the prosecutor to receive a permission in order 
to arrest a politician or a high profile public servant should be abolished. ,49 In particular, 
he stated that 'the justice minister can protect corrupted politicians by ignoring the 
Public Prosecutors' Office Act as he has the power to manipulate the personnel 
assignments of the prosecutors.' so As Professor Park suggested, this indicates a 
structural problem leading prosecutors to reluctantly follow wrongful orders from their 
• 51 supenors. 
The third case was related to an episode ofPD Notebook - a popular news magazine 
programme of Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). On 29th April 2008, the 
MBC reported the risk of 'mad cow' disease in the USA and the decision by the 
government to resume the import of American beef without an explanation. S2 Due to the 
influence of the programme, many people criticised the government in relation to that 
48 Jin Gu Kang. 'An incumbent prosecutor requesting for the political independence of the prosecution 
service' Kyunghyanshinmun (17 July 2000). 
49 ibid; K wang Seop Jung. 'The argument of an incumbent prosecutor about the political independence' 
Hankyoreh (16 July 2000); However, Such an instruction was abolished in 2001, in order to preserve the 
political independence of the prosecution service. See Won Myung No and Yong Sik Kim. 'The conflict 
between the Ministry of Justice and Prosecutors' Office' Hankukilbo (29 March 2004). 
50 Jin Gu Kang op. cit. (In addition, he illustrated that 'the personnel appointments and promotions 
relying on favouritism rather than on the ability of performance are another problem in the Prosecutors' 
Office.'). 
51 Sang Jin Park. 'Suggestions for Reforming the Prosecution of Organization and Prosecution of Power' 
(2002) 15 Kun Kuk Journal of Social Science 75, 81-82 (With respect to the personnel assignment of the 
prosecutors, Professor Park described the problem as follows: 'The prosecutor must challenge the 
wrongful orders from the superiors and perform their duties based upon law and conscience. However, it 
is far away from reality. For the prosecutors, the personnel assignment is a significant issue like some 
expressions well known in the Prosecutor~' Offic~ - "There is nothing for the prosecutors except for the 
personnel assignment" and "No Hercules m relation to the personnel assignment." In this context, it is 
very difficult for the prosecutors not to follow the orders'). 
52 Si-Soo Park. 'Prosecutor quits amid probe ofPD Notebook' Korea Times [HankukilboJ (8 January 
2009). 
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decision. The criticism led to the massive street protests from May to September and the 
presidential approval rating was just ten per cent. 53 
In this situation, the Minister of Agriculture reported six people who were involved 
in the production of the programme to the prosecution service by claiming that the 
programme defamed the minister and other government officials by airing wrong 
information. 54 This was investigated by Su-Bin Lim, the prosecutor of the Seoul Central 
Prosecutors' Office. However, Prosecutor Lim tendered his resignation on 8th January 
2009. 
The main reason for this resignation was the conflict with his superiors. He argued 
that 'the intentional mistranslation and exaggeration of some contents of the programme 
were done at a tolerable level', and refused to initiate any prosecutorial action against 
the suspects in the face of the chief prosecutors' request to take a hard-line approach. 55 
For a similar reason, he refused to arrest the programme directors even when the 
Minister of Justice required him to do so. S6 That is to say, the prosecutor in charge of 
the investigation did not follow the orders from the superiors, and subsequently, 
resigned from his post. In Korean legal history, it is very rare for the prosecutor to tum 
down the superior's order and to resign because of such a conflict. 57 
The case, as the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy [Chamyuyundae] 
pointed out, indicates the problems caused by the hierarchical organisation based upon 
the order-obedience relationship. The prosecutors are often forced to conduct 
investigations and prosecutions by depending on orders from the superiors as well as the 
Minister of Justice rather than on law and conscience. 58 
Due to the considerable power of the prosecution service, its political independence 
is an important issue. The prosecutors belong to the Ministry of Justice, which is one of 
53 ibid. 
54 Rahn Kim. 'Four 'PD Notebook' Staff Apprehended' ibid (28 April ). 
55 Si-Soo Park op. cit. 
56 People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, Political Prosecutors (PSPD, Seoul 2009) 100, 29-30; 
Jong-Seok Yun. 'The Concerns of the Prosecutors' Office about the Investigation on the PD Notebook' 
fun-Hap News (7 September 2008). 
57 Kyung Eun Kim. 'Prosecutor Su-Bin Lim's resignation is disobedience [Hangmyung).' (2009) 809 
Weekly Kyunghang. 
58 The Japanese prosecution system, which is based upon the principle of unity of the procuracy as in 
Korea, shows a similar situation. Johnson described the situation as follows: 'The law says that in the 
procuracy those above command and those below obey. We call this "the unity of prosecutors." ... I am 
sorry to employ such a plebeian example, but if we compare a criminal investigation to basic construction 
work, then the front-line investigating prosecutor is like a human wheelbarrow used for flattening the 
earth. The managing prosecutor wields a stick to direct the front-line prosecutor to "carry mud here" and 
"place a stone there," and then goes off to the. next construction site to do more of the same. The human 
wheelbarrow then works very hard to carry dirt and pound cement as directed. The only job left to the 
human wheelbarrow is how to pound the concrete and to what depth.' See David T. Johnson. 
'Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order' (1998) 32 Law & Society Review 247, 261. 
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the branches of government. Thus, the prosecutorial independence is not as strong as 
judicial autonomy. 59 In particular, the hierarchical order-obedience relationship has 
been deemed as another important factor. 60 Professor Cho stated this problem as 
follows: 
In the cases involving powerful politicians or high-ranking government officials, prosecutors 
in charge had to unwillingly quit their investigation, often facing pressure or persuasion from 
prosecutors in higher office, and through the Supreme Prosecutor's Office, the ruling political 
party has kept a substantial influence on the prosecutors in charge of the cases. Consequently, 
public distrust of the prosecution has increased.61 
This incomplete independence has often led the public prosecution service to be used as 
a political tool to both control individuals and oppress political opposition. It can be 
argued that it is happening more regularly than what is exposed in the media. In 
particular, as the prosecution service monopolise investigation as well as prosecution, as 
Professor Seo suggested, law enforcement can be manipulated by the government. 62 
Both the guarantee of the prosecutorial independence and the separation of prosecutorial 
b "fi . 63 powers have een a sIgn! Icant Issue. 
As Professor Han illustrated, this results from 'the political tendency of the 
prosecution service. The. operations of the prosecution service are politically and 
economically slanted toward the group in power, and as a result, such tendency prevents 
59 Korean prosecutors have a statutory duty to follow instructions from the internal superiors. See Yong 
Se Kim. 'The Problems of the Current Investigation System' (2000) 19(1) Daejon Social Sciences Journal 
77,79. 
60 In this study, the concept of order and obedience relationship is used in two aspects: between the police 
and prosecutors and between prosecutors and their superiors. The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public 
Prosecutor's Office Act [Keomchalcheongbeop] partially amended on 2 J December 2007 No. 87 J 7 (1949) 
art. 7(1) 'Prosecutors shall obey the prosecutors in higher office in prosecutorial affairs.' Translated by 
Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 
30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 381. 
61 ibid 381-382; In Seop Han, 'Legal Control on High Profile Corruption: the Public Prosecutor's Role 
and Limitation' in A Visionfor the New Millennium: The Establishment of Transparent Society (The 
Korean Association for Public Administration, Seoul 1999) 99, 99-116. 
62 Bo Hak Seo, 'The Reasonable Allocation of Investigative Powers between the Police and Prosecutors' 
in Supreme Prosecutors' Office and National Police Agency (eels), Public Hearingfor Allocating 
Investigative Powers in Korea (SPO; NPA, Seoul 2005) 197, 197. 
63 The National Assembly Committee on Legislation and Judiciary, A Theoretical Study of the Reform of 
the Prosecution Service (KNA, Seoul 2010); II Soo Kim, New Perspectives On the Prosecutorial Culture 
(Se-Chang Pub., Seoul 2010); Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the 
Revision of the Law of Evidence' (2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132; Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished 
"Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law 
Policy 377;Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Public Prosecution' (1988) 29(2) Seoul Law 
Journal 39. 
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justice, impartiality, and consistency of the prosecution service.,64 A number of legal 
professionals whom I interviewed implied such distrust in the prosecution service: 
[P03-ISJ] The prosecution service isn't independent from the politicians. Furthermore, the 
prosecution service itself is another big political power group in the Korean society. 
[DL2-ISJ] I've never seen the prosecutors investigating the politicians in power. They only 
pretend to try when the media press them to carry out an investigation. In fact, they can't 
conduct such an investigation because they're subjected to the political power. 
[DL3-IS] The prosecutors don't investigate and charge the politicians, entrepreneurs, and 
high profile public servants being friendly to them. That's why the people try to give bribes 
to the prosecutors and several prosecutors have been criticised by accepting bribes. 
The monopoly of power is one of the main causes of political interference. Professor 
Seo argued that 'the prosecution service has become a subject that politicians and 
plutocrats must control for the purpose of protecting their interests because the 
prosecution service monopolises most powers and the decisions made by the 
prosecutors have a significant impact on politics and social changes.'65 Similarly, one 
judge described the prosecutor as the most necessary person to the politicians: 
[J3-IS] The enormous powers of the prosecutor must be used for the citizens. However, the 
Korean prosecutors use them as means to preserve their powers .... For the Korean 
politicians, the prosecutor is one of the most necessary persons. They obviously need the 
prosecutorial assistance in order to survive in their world. 
The prosecutor's operations should be conducted objectively on the basis of law and 
conscience. However, Korean prosecution service degrades into the 'extended arms' of 
64 In Seop Han op. cit.; Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution 
Service' (2008) 9(2) Seo-Kang Law Journal 43, 47 (Professor Lee stated that 'the prosecution service has 
developed into a power group and forms a secret relationship with politicians as well as plutocrats. '); W.H. 
Lee presented empirical evidence showing that the quality of the prosecution service can be different 
depending on fortune and academic backgrounds of the suspects and victims. According to this research, 
the person having much fortune in general receives better service from the prosecutors than the others. 
See Woong Hyuk Lee. 'The Analysis of Multiple Organizational Outcome of the Public Prosecution 
Service' (2006) 15(1) Korean Journal of Public Administration 3, 23-24. 
65 80 Hak Seo. 'The Reasonable Allocation of Investigative Power' (2002) 8(4) Korean Journal of 
Constitutional Law 177-210, 195-196. 
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politicians and plutocrats. 66 In particular, this has been exacerbated by both the 
organisational characteristics of the prosecutors' office - national, centralised, and 
hierarchical and the Ministry of Justice administered by the prosecutors.67 
3. The Social Authority of the Korean Prosecution Service: A 
Content Analysis 
This section aims to assess both the level of influence of prosecution service and how 
the public view its function. In particular, for the purpose of providing empirical 
evidence, the discussion is based on 'content analysis' by analysing articles in 
newspapers with reference to the actions of the prosecutors. Content analysis can help to 
indicate public perception about the prosecution service. 
Content analysis is a technique to make objective inferences from analysing data 
such as documents, texts, and images. There are some well-known definitions. Berelson 
originally defined content analysis as follows: 'Content analysis is a research technique 
for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication.,68 Holsti similarly defined content analysis as 'any technique for 
making inference by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics 
of messages. ,69 Krippendorf replaced Berelson's requirements that the content analysis 
should be 'objective' and 'systematic' with 'replicability' and 'validity': 'Content 
analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inference from texts (or 
other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use. ,70 
In short, content analysis is a scientific tool that should be reliable and be expected 
to yield valid results. When researchers use the same data and technique, they should 
66 ibid; Ho Joong Lee op. cit. 47-48. 
67 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act {KeomchalcheongbeopJ partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8717 (1949); Ho Joong Lee op. cit. 45-47; Yong-duck Jung. 'Administrative 
Reform in Korea: A Historical-Institutionalist Perspective' (1999) Korea Journal, 9 (Professor Jung stated 
that 'the state administrative system has been centralized in order to monitor and control the daily lives of 
its citizens.'); No-Wook Park and Rohini Somanathan. 'Patronage in Public Administration: Presidential 
Connections, Position Assignments and the Performance of Korean Public Prosecutors, 1992-2000' 
(NEUDC 2001 Conference at Boston University 2004), 6-7. 
68 Bernard Berelson. 'Content Analysis in Communication Research' (1952) New York - Healthcare 
Related Statutes and Regulations, 18 cited from Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (2nd edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York 2004) 592, 274. 
69 Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Addison-Wesley Reading, MA, 
1969), 14. 
70 Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Sage, 2004), 18. 
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have the same results although there are differences in points of time and 
circumstances. 71 Mass communication is a typical area for content analysis. Many 
researchers tend to be interested in 'communicator conceptions, media biases and 
effects, institutional constraints, implications of new technologi~s, audience perceptions, 
public opinion, and how certain values, prejudices, cultural distinctions, and reality 
constructions are distributed in society - relying on mass-media messages as their 
causes or expressions.' 72 
Few studies have explored the functions of the prosecution service through the 
content analysis.73 However, there is one important study where Professor Oh analysed 
the public interest in the Prosecutors' Office by carrying out such an analysis. 74 He 
collected newspaper articles that commented on the prosecution service on the front 
page of newspapers for two years from 2003 to 2004. The results were compared with 
44 other government organisations, e.g. the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice, 
Home Office, Police Agency etc. 
Among 45 government organisations, the prosecution service drew more attention 
from newspapers than other agencies. He concluded 'the prosecution service is one of 
the most influential organisations in Korea. In particular, such a high interest in the 
prosecution service arises from the prosecutorial investigation. Prosecutors often 
investigate politicians, high profile public servants, and entrepreneurs, and those 
investigations generally lead to such a high interest'. 75 But he did not present any 
empirical evidence supporting his argument about investigative function. 
Unlike Oh's study, this content analysis not only explores the influence of the 
prosecution service, but it also examines its main function and the reasons behind the 
high level of public interest in prosecutorial operations. 
3.1. Data Collection 
For the content analysis, 275 articles dealing with the operations of the prosecution 
service were collected from two newspapers: Hankyoreh and Dongailbo.76 They were 
selected by considering circulation, but also the fact that Hankyoreh represents 
71 Krippendorf stated that 'research techniques should result in fmdings that are replicable.' See ibid. 
72 ibid 28. 
73 Except for Ob's study, there seems to be no study to assess tbe influence of prosecutors and police by 
means of content analysis. 
74 Jae Rock Ob, Bureaucratic Power in Korea (Korean Studies Infonnation, Paju 2007) 424. 
75 ibid 187-189. 
76 The articles were acquired fro~ Dongailbo and Hankyoreh through the Korean Integrated Newspaper 
Database System (KINDS) by usmg the search tenn, 'Prosecution Service [Keomchal].' See < 
h!tl.:llwww.kinds.or.kr/> managed by the Korean Press Foundation. 
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progressives, whereas Dongai/bo has a conservative bias.77 Additionally, 496 articles 
illustrating activities of the police, courts, defence counsel, and victims were collected 
in the same way in order to compare the prosecutors with other legal actors.78 
The collection of data was conducted by the computer-based search by using the 
Korean Integrated Newspaper Database System (KINDS).79 However, some articles 
had contents that are irrelevant to the purpose of this analysis. For instance, the article 
of Dongailbo on 23 January 2008 introduced a story about the 'LA Federal Prosecution 
Service' in the USA. Even if the article included the term 'Prosecution Service', the 
content was inappropriate to the study about the Korean Prosecution Service. 80 
Therefore, after examining 771 articles collected from KINDS by using the search terms 
'Prosecution Service', 'Police', 'Court', 'Defence Lawyer', and 'Victim,' 307 articles of 
them were excluded from the data because their contents were not pertinent to the 
research. As a consequence, 464 articles were ultimately selected. 81 
The articles were gathered only from the front page of newspapers because of two 
reasons. First, such a limitation reduces the number of articles for validity of the 
analysis.82 Second, it reflects the importance of the articles. Analysing the articles on 
front pages perhaps reflects the importance of the contents as opposed to articles 
elsewhere in the papers.83 The placement also suggests that it is more likely to be seen 
by the public, to influence them and to reflect editorial assumption about public interest 
77 Dongailbo and Hankyoreh respectively account for 23.3 per cent and 4.7 per cent of circulation for 
Korean newspapers. See Mun Seok Yang and Dong Jun Kim, The Research on the Actual Condition o/the 
Newspaper Industry (Korea Press Commission, Seoul 2008) 94, 73; Hankyoreh and Kyonghang are 
grouped as the progressive newspapers, whereas Dongailbo, Chosunilbo, and Jungailbo are categorized 
as the conservative newspapers. See Kyong Seong Kwon. 'The Conflict Regarding the Title of the Press 
Law' Media Today (24 December 2008). In a broad sense, they represent respectively the Guardian and 
the Times in the UK context. 
78 326 articles were chosen from Dongailbo and 445 stories were selected from Hankyoreh. 
79 Korea Press Foundation. 'Korean Integrated Newspaper Database System' <http://www.kinds.or.krl>. 
80 Won Su Jung. 'Kim's Prison Records' Dongailbo (23 January 2008). 
81 The 464 articles consis of Prosecution Service (181), Police (107), Court (85), Defence lawyer (55), 
and victim (36). This may indicate a high level of interest in the criminal justice in Korea. 
82 Provided that the articles are collected from all pages in the two newspapers, the number of articles 
will be 3,715 articles, which are over ten times as many articles as those (N=275) collected from front 
Eages. 
3 Christina A. Studebaker and others. 'Assessing Pretrial Publicity Effects: Integrating Content Analytic 
Results' (2000) 24(3) Law Hum Behav 317 (Studebaker et al. used four methods to measure the 
importance of the articles of newspapers: 'The length of the headline (to the nearest 1/16 in.), the height 
of the largest font used in the headline (to the nearest 1116 in.), the location of the article on the page (e.g. 
above the fold, left side of the page), and the location of the article in the paper (front page vs. other).' 
And they argued that 'These measures were considered to be indicators of the importance of an article 
and the likelihood that it would be read.'; According to the statistics of Korean Association of 
Newspapers from 2004 to 2007, approximately 51.4 per cent of people are more interested in the front 
page than other sections in the newspaper. See Korean Association of Newspapers. 'Data & Statistics' 
<http://www.presskorea.or.kr/english/data2.asp>. accessed on 25 February 2011. 
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in the content. 84 In addition, the articles all were published in 2008. The year was 
chosen because there were the most recent data when the analysis was conducted in 
2009. To ensure that the data were manageable, the searching period was limited to one 
year. 
An increase in both the number of newspapers and the period would have helped to 
conduct a more accurate analysis. However, it was time-consuming and difficult for one 
researcher to carry out such an extensive content analysis. As the results of the content 
analysis were supplemented by the in-depth interviews with legal professionals, the 
one-year data should be sufficient. Based on such data, this analysis aims to assess the 
influence of the prosecution service and the public perception about its main functions. 
3.2. Methods of Analysis 
The visibility and function of the prosecution service was measured alongside those of 
other legal actors. Two methods were used: the comparison of the number of articles in 
the newspaper and the analysis of word-frequency. 
First, for the purpose of assessing the relative influence of the prosecution service, 
the number of articles that discuss the operations of the public prosecutor was compared 
with those dealing with the actions of the other four actors in the criminal proceedings: 
the courts, the police, defence lawyers, and victims. 8s As Krippendorff argued, 'the 
relative frequency and space devoted to a topic' can be 'an index of an author's 
knowledge or interest or the importance that the mass media attached to that topic. ,86 
For such an analysis, two hypotheses were established: 
Hypothesis 1: The five legal actors in the criminal proceedings receive a different level of 
concern from the newspapers. 
Hypothesis 2: The two newspapers show a different level of interest in the operations of 
each actor depending on their biases. 
84 Steve Uglow, Comments at the Meeting for Supervision (18 November 2011) 
85 There are previous studies which analysed the influence by measuring the amount of information such 
as 'the number of articles printed in the newspaper about the case, the total number of paragraphs that 
comprised each article, and the amount of space allotted to text.' See Christina A. Studebaker and others. 
'Assessing Pretrial Publicity Effects: Integrating Content Analytic Results' (2000) 24(3) Law Hum Behav 
317,325; Jae Rock Oh, Bureaucratic Power in Korea (Korean Studies Information, Paju 2007) 424, 187-
189' Marianne G. Pellechia. 'Trends in Science Coverage: A Content Analysis of Three US Newspapers' 
(1997) 6( 1) Public Understanding of Science 49 (This study analysed the number of science articles being 
reported at three major daily newspape~s in the USA.) 
86 Klaus Krippendortf, Content AnalYSIS: An Introduction to its Methodology (Sage, 2004),181. 
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In the previous work, Professor Oh compared the prosecution service with other 44 
government organisations. However, he included only the police and prosecution 
service because he focused on bureaucratic powers. 87 However, this study measured 
and compared articles focusing on the actions of the five legal actors. 
Second, in order to find out the main functions of the public prosecution service, the 
words with reference to the prosecutorial actions in the news articles were counted and 
word frequencies were analysed. As Krippendorff stated, indicative functions are often 
closely related to frequencies. For example, the proportion of 'discomfort' words can be 
an index of anxiety.88 Weber also noted 'the most frequently appearing words reflect the 
greatest concerns.' 89 The main function of the public prosecution service can be 
inferred from the frequencies of words reflecting operations. For instance, Dongailbo 
published an article about a crime which the public prosecutor investigated: 'The public 
prosecutor "investigating" a corruption case in relation to the KTF "detained" Young Ju 
Jo, CEO of the KTF, on 22th September 2008 ... The public prosecutor will "summon" 
Jo's wife to "investigate" whether she helped to manage the money.'90 In this article, 
there are some words reflecting the actions of the public prosecutor in Korea such as 
'investigating', 'detained', and 'summon.' The frequency of these words helps to 
identify the functions of the public prosecution service. For this analysis, two further 
hypotheses were set up: 
Hypothesis 3: The number of words representing the different actions of the prosecution 
service varies significantly. 
Hypothesis 4: The two newspapers show a different level of interest in the different 
operations of the public prosecution service. 
The words for analysing frequency were selected by examining the KCPA 
[Hyungsasosongbeop]. Such words are all related to the operations in the criminal 
proceedings: (a) Investigation [Susa, Josa]91; (b) Direction of the investigation of the 
police [Susajihuit2; (c) Summon [Sohwan]93; (d) Arrest [Chepo]94; (e) Detention 
87 Jae Rock Oh op. cit. 187-189. 
88 Krippendorff op. cit. 181. 
89 Robert P. Weber, Basic Content Analysis (Sage, 1990), 51, 
90 Won Su Jung and Yong Seok Kim. 'The Detention of Young Ju Jo, CEO ofKTF' Dongailbo (23 
September 2008). 
91 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeopj partially amended 
on 2 J December 2007 No. 8730 (1954), art 195. 
92 ibid art 196. 
93 ibid art 200. 
94 ibid arts 200-2, 200-3 .. 
90 
Chapter 4 The Organisation and Social Authority 
[Kusok]9S; (f) Seizure and search [Apsu Susaek]96; (g) Interview [Shinmun]97; (h) 
Indictment [Kiso] 98; (i) Summary indictment [Yaks'ikkiso] 99; CD Suspension of the 
prosecution [Kisoyuye]IOO; (k) Withdrawal of the prosecution [Kongsochuiso]IOI; (I) 
Submission of dossiers [Seomyunjechul] 102; (m) Applications to take evidence 
[Jungkeojosashincheong] 103; (n) Submission of evidence [Jungkeojechul] 104; (0) 
Examination of defendants [Pikoinshinmun] lOS; (p) Examination of witnesses 
[Junginshinmun] 106; (q) Changes in the indictment by the prosecutors 
[Kongsojangbyunkyung]107; (r) Recommendation of sentences [Keomsakuhyung]108; (s) 
Appeal [Hangko, Hangso, Sango] 109; (t) Direction of the execution of judgments 
[Jiphangjihui].IIO According to the chapters of the KCPA, those words were grouped 
into four categories: investigation (a-g), prosecution (h-k), trial (I-s), and execution of 
judgments (t).111 
Each word selected from the KCPA was measured by counting the total number of 
frequencies. The numbers of each word were summed up into four categories: 
investigation, prosecution, trial, and execution. The measurement was based on 181 
articles, which were collected from two newspapers by searching KINDS using a term 
. S . ,112 of 'ProsecutIOn ervlce. 
Finally, for the statistical analysis of data, chi-square tests were carried out by use of 
PASW 18.113 The statistical methods were used to measure the differences between 
95 ibid art 201. 
96 ibid art 215. 
97 ibid art 241. 
98 ibid art 246. 
99 ibid art 448. 
100 ibid art 247. 
101 ibid art 255. 
102 ibid art 266-6. 
103 ibid art 291-2. 
104 ibid art 292. 
105 ibid art 296-2. 
106 ibid art 161-2. 
107 ibid art 298. 
108 ibid art 302. 
109 ibid arts 338, 339, 357, 371. 
110 ibid art 460. 
III ibid; Similarly, Delmas-Marty categorised the criminal proceedings into four groups: Investigation 
(gathering proof of the crime and identifying the perpetrator), Prosecution (publicly presenting the 
evidence), and Judgment (legally finding guilt or innocence and, in case of the former, imposition of 
penalty), and Execution of judgments. See Mark A. Summers (tr), Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Criminal 
Process and Human Rights: Toward a European Consciousness (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), 10. 
112 Originally, 275 articles weres collected through the KINDS. However, 94 of them were excluded 
because they were irrelevant to this study. See nn 80, 81 above. 
113 For this analysis, two types of chi-square tests were used: two-way and one-way chi-square tests. 
Bryman stated that two-way chi-square test 'allows us to establish how confident we can be that there is a 
relationship between the two variables in the population.' See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods 
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variables and groups. 
3.3. Results 
As stated earlier, for the purpose of analysing people's perception on the prosecution 
service and its role, two measures were taken: comparison of the number of articles 
dealing with the activities of the different legal actors and the analysis of frequency of 
words reflecting the functions of the public prosecutor. I 14 
3.3.1. The Influence of the Prosecution Service 
The amount of information published in the newspapers about the legal professionals 
can be an index to measure interest in their actions. 115 As shown in Table 4.2, 464 
articles were presented in the front pages of two newspapers in relation to the actions of 
five legal professionals. 
Table 4.2 The comparison of the number of articles 
Newspapers 
Actors in the Criminal Procedure 





181 107 85 55 36 
% 
100% 




99 50 35 17 18 
% 
100% 
45.2% 22.8% 16.0% 7.8% 8.2% 
Hankyoreh 245 
11.298· 
N 82 57 50 38 18 
% 
100% 
33.5% 23.3% 20.4% 15.5% 7.3% 
Note. Dongailbo represents a conservative newspaper, whereas Hankyoreh has a progressive bias . 
• p < 0.05, .. P < 0.01 
(3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2008) 748, 334-335. But, one-way chi-square test, 
for example, 'can be used to test the null hypothesis that the children have no preference for any 
particular toy.' See Paul R. Kinnear and Colin D. Gray, SPSS 16 Made Simple (1 st edn Psychology Press, 
Hove, East Sussex; New York 2008), 17-21,207-210,413-418; Donald L. Diefenbach. 'The Portrayal of 
Mental Illness on Prime-Time Television' (1997) 25(3) J Community Psychol, 294; ChristinaA. 
Studebaker and others. 'Assessing Pretrial Publicity Effects: Integrating Content Analytic Results' (2000) 
24(3) Law Hum Behav 317,327-328. 
114 As seen above, these are prosecution service, police, court, defence counsel, and victim. 
lIS See n 86 above and accompanying text. 
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F or the purpose of verifying the statistical significance, two hypotheses need to be 
tested. First, as hypothesis one suggested, different legal actors had different levels of 
coverage. 1l6 A substantial difference was in fact found (Xl = 1.368,p < 0.01). This is to 
say, the legal actors received a significantly different level of interest from the 
newspapers. In particular, the greatest number (N=181, 39.0%) was the articles 
discussing the operations of prosecution service. The other four actors account for sixty-
one per cent of 464 articles: the police (N=107, 23.1%), courts (N= 85, 18.3%), defence 
counsel (N = 55, 11.9%), and victims (N = 36, 7.8%).117 
Second, as hypothesised, the two newspapers showed a significant different level of 
interest in the operations of each actor depending on their biases (Xl = 11.298, df = 4, p 
< 0.05).118 It may be argued that this reflects their editorial approach. For instance, the 
progressive newspaper was more interested in the operations of defence counsel (15.5%) 
and court (20.4%), whereas the conservative newspaper showed a higher level of 
interest in the actions of the prosecution service (45.2%). However, of primary interest 
to both of them were the activities of the public prosecution service. 
To sum up, while the different legal actors attract different levels of interest from the 
newspapers, the media p.ays much more attention to the actions of the prosecution 
service than it does to those of other legal actors. It is fair to suggest that this represents 
within the Korean culture generally. 
3.3.2. The Functions of the Prosecution Service 
The frequency of words or concepts is a significant element in content analysis because 
the frequency of words can be an index to indicate a function. 119 This has been applied 
116 Hypothesis I: The five legal actors in the criminal proceedings receive a different level of concern 
from the newspapers. 
117 According to Professor Oh, the number of news articles dealing with the operations of the prosecution 
service was the greatest of 45 government organizations in 2003 and 2004. The number was more than 
five times as many as those presenting the activities of the police. See Jae Rock Oh, Bureaucratic Power 
in Korea (Korean Studies Information, Paju 2007) 424, 188-189. However, in my research, the number of 
news articles about the police greatly increased in 2008 because there were massive street demonstrations. 
This resulted in the increase of actions of the police. Based on the KINDS database, 65 (60%) of 107 
articles were related to the demonstrations. See Korea Times Editorial Office. 'Ten Main News in 2008' 
Korea Times {HankukilboJ (22 December 2008) (2,398 demonstrations took place in Korea from 2 May 
to 15 August in 2008). 
118 The null hypothesis was rejected that two newspapers have the same level of interest in the operations 
of the legal actors. See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford; 
New York 2008) 748, 334-335. 
119 Kathleen M. Carley. 'Coding Choices for Textual Analysis: A Comparison of Content Analysis and 
Map Analysis' (1993) Sociological methodology 75, 81; Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An 
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to diverse fields, e.g. conceptual shifts in presidential addresses and cultural changes. 120 
In this study, the content analysis was used to clarify the functions of the Korean 
prosecution service. 
Table 4.3 refers to the results of such an analysis, which was statistically proved by 
h· t 121 two c t-square tes s. 














Suspension of the prosecution 
Withdrawal of the prosecution 
Total 
Submission of Dossiers 
Application to take evidence 
submission of evidence 

























846 (56.9%) 642 (43.1 %) 
245 (27.1%) 287 (31.7%) 
1 (0.1%) 2(0.2%) 
63 (7.0%) 23 (2.5%) 
32 (3.5%) 15 (1.7%) 
124 (13.7%) 92 (10.2%) 
175 (19.3%) 41 (4.5%) 
206 (22.8%) 182 (20.1%) 
53 (5.9%) 45 (6.5%) 
48 (5.3%) 45 (5.0%) 
1 (0.1%) 0 
4 (0.4%) 0 
0 0 
6 (0.7%) 8 (1.2%) 
0 0 
0 0 
3 (0.3%) 1 (0.1%) 
0 0 
Introduction to its Methodology (Sage, 2004), 181; Robert P. Weber, Basic Content Analysis (Sage, 1990), 
51. 
120 M. P. Sullivan and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Perceptions of 
Symbols in Foreign Policy: Datafrom the Vietnam Case (Inter-University Consortium for Political 
Research Ann Arbor, MI, 1973); J. Zvi Namenwirth and Robert P. Weber, Dynamics of Culture (Allen & 
Unwin Boston, 1987) cited from Kathleen M. Carley. 'Coding Choices for Textual Analysis: A 
Comparison of Content Analysis and Map Analysis' (1993) Sociological methodology 75, 181. 
121 For the details on these tests, see n 113 above. 
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Examination of witnesses 0 0 0 
Change of the prosecution 0 0 0 
Recommendation of sentence 2 2 (0.2%) 0 
Appeal 8 1 (0.1%) 7 (0.7%) 
Execution Direction of the execution 0 0 0 
2.790" 92.731" 
Note. For the accuracy of statistical analysis, functions are recoded into 9 variables, i.e. investigation (7), 
prosecution (1), and trial (1) . 
... p < 0.05, .. P < 0.01 
First of all, given the result of a chi-square 'goodness-for-fit' test, the significant 
difference, as expected, was found between variables of functions (X2=2.790, df=10,p < 
0.01). In other words, the denotation of each variable was meaningful and could be 
compared with the other variables. The prosecution service conducted various functions 
which draw a different level of attention from the newspapers. In relation to the actions 
of the prosecution service, 1,600 words from two newspapers were counted as 
indicators of functions. Among them 1,488 words, which account for ninety-three per 
cent, were found to be associated with the investigative function. By contrast, the 
number of words being related to the prosecution or trial was very small: prosecution 
(N=98, 6.1%) and trial (N=14, 0.8%). The word in relation to execution was not found 
at all. 
Second, the conservative and progressive newspapers showed a significantly 
different level of interest in the functions of the prosecution service (X'=92. 731, df=8, p 
< 0.01). The value of chi-square contingency test rejected the null hypothesis that two 
newspapers indicated a similarity in terms of introducing the actions of the prosecution 
service. In other words, the discrepancy in the bias of newspapers led to a different level 
of attention as to the prosecutorial operations. Dongailbo showing conservative bias 
placed more emphasis on 'summon (7.0%)" 'arrest (3.5%)', 'detention (13.7%)" and 
'seizure & search (19.3%), than its counterpart did. In contrast, Hankyoreh having 
progressive bias drew more attention to 'appeal (0.7%)' and 'direction of police 
investigation (0.2%) than Dongailbo did. Nevertheless, the articles from both 
newspapers mostly concentrated on the investigation actions of the prosecution service 
_ Dongailbo (56.9%) and Hankyoreh (43.1%). 
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3.4. Discussion 
The results of the content analyses confirm two important points. First, the prosecution 
service is perceived as the most influential organisation in the Korean criminal justice 
system by the media. This is consistent with a previous study and public opinion 
surveys. According to the previous work of Jae-Rock Oh, the prosecution service was 
analysed to be one of the most powerful organisations in Korea. 122 The results of public 
opinion polls also support such analyses. In 2007 and 2008, Jungangi/bo administered 
opinion surveys to examine the influence and trust of the governmental organisations. 
The surveys suggested that the level of influence of the prosecution service was seen as 
much higher than those of the Supreme Court or the police. 123 
The results of the interviews with legal professionals confirmed the outcomes of the 
content analysis. Eighty-five per cent (N=17) of interviewees stated that the prosecution 
service is the most influential organisation in the Korean criminal process: 
[P04-IS/] The prosecution service has considerable powers. In particular, such powers play 
a key role in the criminal process. For example, once the prosecutor decide not to charge 
someone, it's not possible to charge such a person. 
[J4-/C] Let me describe like this. The courts generally decide which food they will eat after 
the prosecutors make a dinner table. But, in Korea, the prosecutors virtually determine the 
particular food that the judges must have .... Given the enormous powers of the prosecution 
service, South Korea seems to be governed by the prosecutors. 
[PP3-RC] Indeed, the potential of the prosecution service is the most enormous. The 
influential power of the prosecution service can't be compared to that of the court. Do you 
know this expression? 'The Judges eat the food with a spoon, which has been prepared by 
the prosecutor.' This expression is a little bit adverse to the judge's role. But, this is the 
reality. 
Second, of primary interest to the newspapers, consequently to the citizens, are the 
investigative actions conducted by the prosecution service even though prosecutors are 
involved in many other roles. Such interest from the public through the media, as 
122 Jae Rock Oh, Bureaucratic Power in Korea (Korean Studies Information, Paju 2007) 424, 187-189. 
123 Chang Woon Shin. 'Public Opinion Survey about the Power Organizations' Jungangi/ho (14 June 
2008); Chang Woon Shin. 'The Public Opinion Survey about the Influence and Credibility of 25 Powerful 
Organizations' Jungangi/ho (3 July 2007). 
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Professor Kim suggested, encourages prosecutors to concentrate on direct 
. .. 124 
investigation. 
Since investigations of high profile public servants or politicians attract much public 
attention, newspapers have a tendency to publicise the articles dealing with such 
investigations. For the public prosecutors, the pUblication of their investigations would 
be a chance to show their abilities. Jong Gu Kim, the former Minister of Justice and 
Chief of prosecutors, stated that 'the prosecutors receive high evaluation from the 
superiors and colleagues when they investigate a case being widely publicised by mass 
media.,125 The prosecutors often try to prove their competence through the newspapers: 
{DL2-IS2] In the Suwon homeless girl murder case, the prosecutor provided the reporters 
from the newspapers and TV with the results of the investigation. He appeared even on TV 
programmes. The suspects were all innocent juveniles... . .. Nevertheless, he publicized 
that he got the real criminals whom the police had missed. He became a hero by the media: 
'An almost forgotten murder case was solved by the capable prosecutor.' 126 
This content analysis has two main limitations as to the methodology and 
interpretation of results. First, this analysis was mainly carried out in a relatively simple 
way by comparing the number of articles and words with reference to the actions of the 
public prosecutor instead of analysing the tones of articles, which could make the 
analysis more sophisticated. Most articles collected for this content analysis 
concentrated on the delivery of facts rather than a critical review. Thus, there was a 
limitation to analysing the tone of articles. 
Second, there are few precedent studies that analyse the prosecution service in this 
fashion. Because of the lack of empirical research, comparisons could not be conducted. 
However, this analysis was supplemented by the results of public opinion surveys being 
conducted in 2007 and 2008. 127 In addition, as noted in detail in Chapter 8, the survey 
of police officers as well as interviews with legal professionals has provided indicative 
material which tends to confirm the hypotheses. 
124 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 
531. 
125 ibid. 
126 For more information on this case, see ch 6. 
127 See n 123 above. 
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4. Conclusion 
The Korean prosecution service is a centralised hierarchical organisation. The 
prosecutor general ranks at the top of this. An order and obedience relationship exists 
between the superior and subordinate prosecutors. Because of the influence of 
Confucianism, such a relationship should be stricter than the line management in other 
systems in the world. On the basis of such a structure, prosecutors in a sense run the 
Ministry of Justice by occupying key positions. This has contributed to develop the pre-
eminent position of prosecutors along with their considerable discretion in the criminal 
process. However, at the same time, this leads the prosecution service to be easily 
manipulated by political interests. The operations of the service have been often 
distorted by the external and internal pressure. 
The pre-eminent status of prosecutors is confirmed not only by the interviews with 
legal professionals, but also by content analysis. In the Korean criminal justice, the 
prosecution service is perceived as the most influential organisation. In particular, the 
public pay much attention to the prosecution service even though prosecutors are 
involved in many other roles. Such interest encourages prosecutors to concentrate on 
direct investigation. In the subsequent chapter, those roles, duties, discretion and 
accountability of the Korean prosecution service are compared with those in other 
jurisdictions. 
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systems, the civil law tradition had its effect on Korean criminaljustice.3 
However, after the defeat of Japan in the World War II in 1945, Korea became an 
independent country but, as happened in Japan, with a US military administration. This 
began to influence South Korea and introduced the US legal system.4 However, this 
influence could not change the basic structure of the colonial criminal procedure 
because of two reasons. Firstly, as Korean society was in disorder due to the Korean 
War (1950-1953), legislators were worried that a major change could burden the judicial 
process.s Secondly, there was little research on the impact that such reforms might have 
on the Korean legal system. As a consequence, reform was limited and when Korean 
Criminal Procedure Act 1954 was established, it had a combined structure of the 
adversary and inquisitorial system. The fundamental contours of the colonial criminal 
proceedings remained intact. 6 
Korean criminal justice system has developed under the influence of other legal 
systems: England and Wales, USA, France, German, and Japan. Such influences have 
created the unique characteristics of the Korean public prosecution service.7 As a result, 
the comparison with those five jurisdictions can help to delineate clearly the 
extraordinary status, powers and roles of the prosecution service in Korea. 8 
Second, those five jurisdictions represent ideal types of criminal justice systems and 
the differing role and functions of the prosecution service. It may be argued that the 
criminal justice systems in the world can be categorised into five groups - the common 
law or accusatorial, the civil law or inquisitorial, the hybrid, the socialist and the 
Islamic.9 However, Cole and others suggested that just three systems were sufficient: 
3 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 15; For the details on 
the development of the Japanese legal system, see below pt 2. 
4 United States Anny Military Government in Korea Ordinance 1948 No. 176. For more detail, see Hee 
Gi Shim. 'USAMGIK Ordinance No. 176 and Criminal Procedure Reform of 1948' (1995) 16 Legal 
History Journal 117. 
5 Dong-Woon Shin. 'An Analysis of the Korean Criminal Procedure: Focusing on the Establishment of 
the Act' (1987) 69 Seoul Law Journal 144, 153. 
6 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit., 15. 
7 With respect to the importance of historical and social contexts, Fairchild and Dammer stated that 'The 
fact is that a nation's way of administering justice often reflects deep-seated cultural, religious, economic, 
political, and historical realities. Learning about the reasons for these different practices can give us 
insight into the values, traditions, and cultures of other systems. ' See Erika Fairchild and Harry R. 
Dammer, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems (2nd edn WadsworthlThomson Learning, Belmont, CA 
2000) 412, 9 cited from Francis J. Pakes, Comparative Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, Cullompton; 
Portland 2004),3. 
8 Pakes suggested one of the benefits of the comparative study thus: 'A further incentive for comparison 
relates to the question of' Where do we stand?' In order to gain insight into states of affairs at home it 
might be helpful to examine matters abroad.' See ibid 4. 
9 For more details, see George F. Cole, Stanislaw J. Frankowski and Marc G. Gertz (eds), Major Criminal 
Justice Systems: A Comparative Survey (2nd edn Sage Publications, Inc, 1987); Pakes op. cit. ; Mireille 
Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 
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First, there are so called common-law or adversarial systems. The three examples ... are 
England and Wales, the US and Nigeria. Originating from the British Isles, they are found 
in all English-speaking countries, with the possible exceptions of Scotlancl and South Africa. 
Second, there are civil law or inquisitorial systems. These originate in continental Europe ... 
The third group consists of socialist law systems ... of the former USSR and Poland. lo 
This seems somewhat limited and Dammer and colleagues considered seven countries 
as representing world criminal justice systems - England, the USA, France, Germany, 
Japan, China and Saudi Arabia. 11 However, they selected four jurisdictions for the 
discussion of common law (England and the US) and civil law (France and Germany) 
tradition because systems even in the same tradition have distinctive characteristics. 12 
For instance, the French and the German legal systems stem from the civil law tradition. 
However, the French criminal justice system has more inquisitorial elements than the 
German. t3 In addition, the Japanese criminal justice system, as Dammer described, 
which developed under the influence of common law and civil law tradition but shows 
considerable differences from such traditional systems, represents the hybrid situation: 
Japanese law and criminal justice is hybrid, having borrowed from the Chinese, the French, 
the Germans, and the Americans. The final product, however, is peculiarly Japanese and 
certainly not analogous to any of the systems of origins. 14 
The Chinese and Saudi Arabian systems are also important comparators which represent 
the socialist and Islamic traditions. Yet, it is difficult to include those countries in this 
study. As Dammer and others suggested, they cannot be easily compared to other 
countries as they tend to place the emphasis on a unique element such as 'sacred law 
legal tradition' or 'the ideals of the communist party.' 15 As a result, this study is based 
2002), and Harry R. Dammer, Erika Fairchild and Jay S. Albanese, Comparative Criminal Justice 
fl'stems (3rd edn WadsworthlThomson Learning, Belmont, CA 2006). 
I Pakes op. cit. 13-14. 
II Dammer et al. op. cit. 13. 
12 For the details on the distinctive features of each country and tradition, see ibid 71-99, 135-170; John 
Hatchard, Barbara Huber and Richard Vogler, Comparative Criminal Procedure (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 1996),7. 
13 Delmas-Marty and Spencer op. cit. 3-4. (Spencer argues that the French system is the 'most faithful to 
the original inquisitorial idea,' whereas the German system places relatively more emphasis on 'the 
principle that the court of trial must hear the witnesses orally, and reinforcing the divide between the 
functions of investigation and of judging by abolishing the German equivalent of the juge d 'instruction. ') 
14 Dammer et al. op. cit. 93. 
I' ibid 88-98. 
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on the five representative jurisdictions - England and Wales, the USA, France, Gennany, 
and Japan. 16 
Limitations of the Research 
In undertaking a comparative study, there are two main methodological difficulties. The 
first relates to the language barriers. Comparative researchers, as Winterdyk and others 
put it, can confront practical problems such as language barriers as well as 
understanding cultural differencesY Pakes suggested that 'anything less than complete 
fluency leaves one vulnerable to misinterpretation.' 18 However, this difficulty has not 
prevented scholars from researching foreign systems without having acquired the native 
language. 19 
Because of the language barrier, this study is carried out based on literature written 
in English and Korean. Fortunately, there are several comparative studies of the public 
prosecution service in those languages. They do not necessarily directly address the 
issues of this study nor do they compare all five jurisdictions. Professor Fionda's study 
of public prosecutors and discretion,20 Jackson's study of the effect of legal culture and 
proof in decisions to prosecute, 2 I Johnson's study of Japanese way of justice,22 and 
16 Along with those jurisdictions, the Dutch and Kazakhstan prosecution services may be helpful to 
realise extensive powers of the prosecution service. The public prosecutor in the Netherlands is often 
cited as a powerful officer in Europe. See Francis J. Pakes. 'The Positioning of the Prosecution Service in 
the Netherlands and England and Wales: Lessons from One Extreme to Another' (1999) 21 (2) Liverpool 
Law Rev 261, 263 (Pakes stated that 'The Dutch Public Prosecution Office is ... an example of a strong 
and independent service.') and Fionda op. cit. 96 (Professor Fionda suggests that the influence of the 
public prosecutors in the Netherlands is 'wide and their powers extensive in the determination of the 
penalty imposed upon an offender in any particular case. ') 
Similarly, in Kazakhstan, the public prosecutors dominate the whole legal system while 
'overshadowing the judiciary.' As they belonged to the fonner USSR, as Staberock put it, they have the 
legal legacy: 'the function of law in the former Soviet Union was to allow the Government to rule. Law 
constituted a tool for the Communist Party to implement its policies, but could also be set aside if needed . 
... This legal legacy left a positivist legal culture and a legal system dominated by the Prosecutor's Office 
(Prokuratura), exercising not only traditional criminal law functions, but also 'overall legal oversight' 
over the whole legal system, overshadowing the judiciary as well. The judiciary was largely dependent, 
with little prestige, and advocates were weak and state-controlled through a Collegium of Advocates.' See 
Gerald Staberock. 'A Rule of Law Agenda for Central Asia' (2005) 2( 1) Essex Human Rights Review, 3. 
Such dominance of the prosecutors has continued until recently. See ibid 11 (Staberock argues that 
'judicial human rights enforcement is dependent on key reforms of the Soviet-style prosecutor's office, 
which continues to dominate the legal system in Central Asia. ') 
17 John Winterdyk, Philip Reichel and Harry Dammer (eds), A Guided Reader to Research in 
Comparative Criminology/Criminal Justice (Universitatsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 2009), 23. 
18 Francis J. Pakes, Comparative Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, Cullompton; Portland 2004), 23. 
19 ibid 23. 
20 Fionda op. cit. 
21 John D. Jackson. 'The Effect of Legal Culture and Proof in Decisions to Prosecute' (2004) 3(2) Law, 
Probability and Risk 109. 
22 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Studies on law and 
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Hodgson's study of French criminal justice system 23 are all English examples of 
comparative work in this area. 
Professor Fionda discussed the sentencing role of the public prosecutors through the 
comparison of four prosecution systems: England and Wales, Scotland, the Netherlands, 
and Germany. Jackson drew attention to the role of the public prosecutors in the 
investigation procedure. In particular, he accounted for various functions of the public 
prosecutors in different countries with respect to the pre-trial fact-finding process. 
However, Johnson focused on the role of the Japanese public prosecutors while 
comparing them with their counterpart in the US. Hodgson explored the French criminal 
justice system. In particular, she focused on the investigation and prosecution of crime. 
She compared the prosecution service in England and Wales with the French 
prosecution system. In addition, Pakes's study of comparative criminal justice took up 
various aspects in the criminal proceedings such as policing, prosecution and pre-trial 
justice, systems of trial, judicial decision-makers, and punishment. 24 
Along with these works, there are recent comparative studies about the public 
prosecution systems of 11 European countries. Jehle and others considered the role of 
the public prosecutor as a key player in the criminal justice system.2s They noted that 
the prosecution services conduct various functions depending on their legal status and 
discretion in the different criminal justice systems. Elsner and others concentrated on 
the role of the police in the investigation stage, their ability to end such investigations 
and their relationship with the prosecutors.26 
There are also comparative studies written in Korean. In the study of 'Reforms of 
the Korean Criminal Justice System,' Jong Gu Kim carried out a much wider analysis of 
the organisation of the prosecution systems in five countries?' Byung Dae Jung's study 
also relates to the public prosecution system. He focused on the roles of the prosecution 
service at the investigation stage?8 In addition to the prosecution services, he studied 
the police systems in various jurisdictions. Finally, Dong Hee Lee and others made a 
comparative study analysing the relationship between the police and prosecutors in 
social control, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2002). 
23 Jacqueline Hodgson, French Criminal Justice: A Comparative Account of the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Crime in France (Blackwell Synergy, 2005). 
24 Pakes op. cit. 
2S J6rg-Martin Jehle, Paul Smit and Josef ZHao 'The Public Prosecutor as Key-Player: Prosecutorial Case-
Ending Decisions' (2008) 14(2) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 161. 
26 Beatrix Elsner, Chris Lewis and Josef ZHao 'Police Prosecution Service Relationship within Criminal 
Investigation' ibid (2-3) 203-224. 
27 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004). 
28 Byung Dae Jung, Investigation Structure: A Comparative Study (Legal Research and Training Institute, 
2007) 450. 
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different systems.29 Those works are all based on the same jurisdictions as this study.3o 
The second methodological difficulty is neutrality. Researchers should choose what 
to read, what to observe, and whom to interview. However, many issues of criminal 
justice can be controversial. As Pakes pointed out, it is significant 'to try to assess both 
sides of any argument and not limit oneself to talking to a restricted range of people 
with a shared set of opinions and knowledge. ,31 To offset such a methodological hazard, 
this comparative study is based on a 'descriptive approach. ,32 Such an approach draws 
attention to the structure of the system rather than the political and socio-philosophical 
development. Terrill regarded this approach as the 'institutional-structural approach. ,33 
For instance, it can include research questions such as: Do the public prosecutors 
directly involve themselves in the investigation with their own resources? How does the 
public prosecutor become involved in the police investigation? Does the investigation 
dossier have an evidentiary impact? The descriptive approach, as Vagg suggested, is 
based on explaining dissimilarities and highlighting similarities.34 In particular, those 
dissimilarities are explained on the basis of the historical development of the systems. 
29 Dong Hee Lee and others, Investigation Systems: A Comparative Study {BigyosusajedoronJ 
(Pakyoungsa, Seoul 2004). 
30 Jong Gu Kim op. cit. 34; For a similar reason, the criminal justice systems of those jurisdictions have 
been often introduced in the various comparative studies in Korea .. See Byung Dae Jung op. cit. 2. 
31 Pakes op. cit. 23. 
32 Winterdyk et al. categorised the approaching types in the comparative studies into five groups: First, 
'Historical approach - what do earlier experiences tell us about the present and how can knowledge of the 
past serve to inform/guide us for the future?', Second, 'Political approach - how does politics affect 
interaction among nations and how is a country's legal tradition affected by politics?', Third, 'Descriptive 
approach - what are the main components of a justice system and who are the main actors in a justice 
system and/or model?', Fourth, 'Socio-Philosophical approach - For example, how do different countries 
view the causes of youth crime and what are the ideological approaches to addressing such issues?', 
Finally, 'Analytical-Problem approach - Perhaps one of the more challenging approaches to employ in 
comparative research this approach 'emphasizes the development of theory' ... and the testing of such 
theories with problems associated with the justice system.' John Winterdyk, Philip Reichel and Harry 
Dammer (eds), A Guided Reader to Research in Comparative Criminology/Criminal Justice 
(Universitatsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 2009), 29-30. 
33 ibid 29 citing Richard J. Terrill, World Criminal Justice Systems: A Survey (5th edn Anderson Pub. Co., 
Cincinnati, OH 2002). 
34 Vagg suggested an approaching method to accomplish a comparative study. He drew attention to 
'linkage' and 'relevance' on the basis of examination of dissimilarity and similarity. Jon Vagg. 'Context 
and Linkage: Reflections on Comparative Research and 'Internationalism' in Criminology' (1993) 33(4) 
Br J Criminol541. Winterdyk, Reichal, and Dammer categorised Vagg's typology into four groups: 
'Linking variables - the researcher(s) attempt to link crime/criminal justice trends to common social, 
economic, or political denominators.'; 'Explaining dissimilarity - based on a particular question, two or 
more countries are examined with a comparative focus.'; 'Highlighting similarity - with a practical 
orientation in mind, broad generalization are drawn based on summarizing material on a specific 
question.'; 'Indicating consequences - international comparison results from particular 
regionaVintemational developments as a way to show what consequences may flow from a particular 
development. • 
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Plan of this Chapter 
This chapter attempts to find where the Korean prosecution service stands among world 
criminal justice systems. Before moving on to the main issues, the development of the 
modem public prosecution systems and their general roles are described in Part 2 and 3. 
Then, the main features are addressed based on the Damaska's framework of coordinate 
and hierarchical structures of authority. 3S Three issues which are chosen from 
discussion of the main chapters are explored. 
Firstly, Part 4 addresses the investigative function of the prosecution service. As 
noted in Chapter 3 and 4, the public prosecutors can be involved in the investigation 
through direct and indirect methods. Indirectly they supervise the police investigation, 
but they can also directly question witness and investigate themselves. Thus, this part 
examines these two aspec~s in the relationship between the police and prosecutors. 
Secondly, Part 5 explores the discretion of the public prosecutors at the pre-trial 
stage.36 Such discretion attracts a great deal of attention not least as it has a role to play 
in reducing the workload of the COurt. 37 In particular, the comparison between the 
comparative discretion exercised by the police and prosecutors at this stage is a good 
indicator of their relationship. 
Thirdly, Part 6 explores the influence of the prosecution services upon trial outcomes. 
Three elements are considered: recommending a sentence; appealing against verdicts 
and sentences; and the evidentiary impact of investigative dossiers. In particular, in 
Korea, the dossier is used. as significant evidence in court rather than information about 
the offences.38 The confessions in the dossier are admitted as key evidence and the 
dossier has a considerable impact on the result. 39 The investigative dossier and its 
impact can be an important indicator to decide the role and power of the prosecutors. 
Finally, Part 7 explores the accountability of the prosecution services. In general, 
35 Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 480. 
36 Marcia E. Goodman. 'Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan' (1986) 5 UCLA 
Pac. Basin LJ 16; Fionda op. cit.; Abraham S. Goldstein. 'The State and the Accused: Balance of 
Advantage in Criminal Procedure' (1959) 69 Yale LJ 1149. 
37 JOrg-Martin Jehle, Paul Smit and Josef Zila. 'The Public Prosecutor as Key-Player: Prosecutorial Case-
Ending Decisions' (2008) 14(2) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 161; Beatrix Elsner, 
Paul Smit and Josef Zila. 'Police Case-Ending Possibilities within Criminal Investigations' (2008) 14 (2-3) 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research II; JOrg-Martin Jehle and others, Coping with 
overloaded criminal justice systems: the rise of prose cut oria I power across Europe (Springer, Berlin; 
New York 2006) 333. 
38 Pakes drew attention to the status of the dossier in inquisitorial trials. He stated that 'It is worth a 
moment of reflection about what it means for a panel of judges to have access to the case-file before the 
defendant appears before them in court. Via its contents the court will usually know what the defendant 
said to the arresting police officers and what was found at a house search.' See Pakes op. cit. 85. 
39 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 312; For further discussion, see ch 6. 
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prosecutors exercise extensive discretion. Such discretion has the potential for abuse. 
Most jurisdictions have established mechanisms to check the discretion of the 
• • 40 
prosecutIOn servIce. 
2. The Development of the Modern Public Prosecution 
Systems 
This part explores the origins of the modem public prosecution systems. As the 
countries have different historical backgrounds, their developments of public 
prosecution have distinctive features. However, there are also similarities as their 
fundamental purposes will be the same, namely to control crime in an effective way and 
protect defendants. 
2.1. Japan 
The Korean modem public prosecution system was introduced during the Japanese 
colonial period (1910-1945). Thus, there exist relatively many similarities between the 
Korean and the Japanese systems. However, the Japanese system itself is a hybrid which 
has elements of the Chinese, the French, the German, and the US systems.41 It has 
developed distinctive features, which cannot be easily seen in other jurisdictions.42 
The modem Japanese system was established on the basis of the French mode1.43 At 
the start of the process of modernizing the Japanese legal system, G. Boissonade,44 a 
professor of the University of Paris, was employed by the government and became 
involved in the establishment of Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure 1880 (JCCP). He 
40 Hans-Jorg Albrecht. 'Criminal Prosecution: Developments, Trends and Open Questions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany' (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 245,254 . 
(Albrecht noted that 'control and supervision of public prosecutors certainly are necessary insofar as the 
legal substance is concerned and as regards the implementation of prosecution policies which must be 
based upon discretion.') 
41 Cole et al. op. cit. 85 (Cole et al. stated that' Japan may be viewed as a mixture of civil law with regard 
to substantive criminal law yet with elements of the common law in the field of criminal procedure.'); 
Dammer et al. op. cit. 93. 
42 ibid. 
43 A. Didrick Castberg. 'Prosecutorial Independence in Japan' (1997) 16 UCLA Pac.Basin LJ 38, 38; 
Mark D. West. 'Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan's Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial 
Discretion' (1992) Columbia Law Rev 684, 686. 
44 Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabe (1825-1910). 
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introduced the Code d'instruction criminel/e (1808) of France to Japan.45 In 1922, there 
was a revision of the JCCP 1880, which was mainly based upon the German Code of 
Criminal Procedure 1877.46 As the Japanese modem criminal procedure was created on 
the basis of the French legal system and influenced by German criminal code, it was 
mainly inquisitorial in nature.47 
In the late nineteenth century, both prosecutors and judges belonged to the Ministry 
of Justice. They had equal statuS.48 Yet, the prosecutors had relatively limited power in 
terms of investigation. For instance, the modem Japanese prosecutors can become 
directly involved in the investigation, but they could not do so in 1880s. As Kiyoura put 
it, 'a prosecutor has the power to request the investigation of a crime, but not to 
investigate the crime on his own initiative. ,49 However, they expanded their powers so 
that they could conduct their own investigations, a process that had been completed by 
1916. 50 This was with the support of the people who were concerned about the 
conviction rates. 51 Nagashima described the causes which led the public prosecutors to 
be involved in the investigation as follows: 
"[T]he people in general wanted [the public prosecutor] to investigate crimes so that he 
would not institute proceedings with insufficient evidence to support conviction of the 
defendants; the percentage of acquittals entered by the courts was amounting to nearly 30 
percent of the total cases. The effort was successful, for in 1916 the rate of acquittals was 
only 7 percent by examining magistrates and 2.5 percent in the trial courts. This practice 
has continued to the present.S2 
Such prosecutorial power was further increased while 'the Japanese government became 
4S B. J. George (tr), Shigemitsu Dando and Wayne State University Law School. Comparative Criminal 
Law Project., The criminal law of Japan: the general parI (Publications of the Comparative Criminal 
Law Project; v.19, Rothman, Littleton, Colo. 1997) 35. 
46 Kenzo Takayanagi, 'A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961' in Arthur 
Taylor Von Mehren (ed), Law in Japan. The Legal Order in a Changing Society (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass 1963) 22. 
47 Marcia E. Goodman. 'Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan' (1986) 5 UCLA 
Pac.Basin LJ 16,20; Castberg op. cit. 38. 
48 Goodman op. cit. 20 (Goodman suggested that the judge and the prosecutor were given equal status 
and they 'sat side by side on a raised platform, the accused more an object than a party.') 
49 Keigo Kiyoura (1880) Zuicho Zuihitsu (Random Things Heard and Noted) quoted in West op. cit. 686. 
so ibid 687. 
51 Castberg op. cit. 38. 
52 Atsushi Nagashima, 'The Accused and Society: The Administration of Criminal Justice in Japan' in 
Arthur Taylor Von Mehren (ed), Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1963) 297,298-299. 
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increasingly militaristic, fascist, and repressive in the 1930s.'s3 As West described, the 
enormous powers of the prosecution service in this period are often referred to 
'prosecutorial fascism [Kensatsu Fassho).'54 In the Tanaka's work, those powers are 
illustrated as follows: 
[Prosecutors] occupied most of the key positions in the Ministry of Justice (Shiho Sho), 
which had the power to decide on the promotion of judges. Some of the [prosecutors] 
exerted a strong influence on politics, especially in the 1920's and 1930's, primarily 
through the exercise of their authority to prosecute or not to prosecute persons for suspected 
crimes, such as bribery and violation of electorallaws.55 
However, the roles and powers of the Japanese prosecution service were radically 
changed after Japan's defeat in the World War II. The reform managed by the US 
military government focused on giving the 'criminally accused rights with which to 
defend themselves from powerful prosecutors.' 56 As a consequence, the Japanese 
criminal justice system adopted new elements from the USA through the reform of the 
Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) of 1948.57 
Those changes can be summarised into three features. First, the investigative 
function of the prosecution service became restricted. Before this reform, the 
investigation and prosecution were dominated by the prosecutor. 58 However, the new 
code limited the investigative role of the prosecutors, and instead made them 
concentrate on the trial work. 59 As a result the investigation was carried out mainly 
under the responsibility of the police.60 Yet, this reform did not abolish completely the 
involvement of the public prosecutors in the investigation. They still have been able to 
conduct supplementary investigations on their own initiatives, and to supervise the 
53 West op. cit. 687. 
54 ibid 687 n 17. 
55 Hideo Tanaka and Malcolm D. H. Smith, The Japanese Legal System: Introductory Cases and 
Materials (University of Tokyo Press; distributor, [SBS, Tokyo; Forest Grove, Or. 1976) 556 cited from 
West op. cit. 687. 
56 ibid. , 
57 Atsushi Nagashima, 'The Accused and Society: The Administration of Criminal Justice in Japan' in 
Arthur Taylor Von Mehren (ed), Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a Changing Society (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1963) 297, 297. 
58 Dong Hee Lee and others, Investigation Systems: A Comparative Study {Bigyosusajedoron] 
(pakyoungsa, Seoul 2004), 664,719-739 
59 Nagashima op. cit. 302. 
60 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Japan, Code of Criminal Procedure (Act no. 131) {I 948) art 189 '( I) A 
police official shall perform his/her duties as a judicial police official pursuant to the provisions of other 
acts, or pursuant to the regulations of the National Public Safety Commission or Prefectural Public Safety 
Commission. (2) Ajudicial police official shall, when he/she deems that an offense has been committed, 
investigate the offender and evidence thereof.' 
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police investigation after receiving the cases from the police.61 
Second, the new code put the emphasis on the principle of open trial. Unlike the old 
procedure in which the prosecutors presented documents as well as other evidence 
before the trial and just waited for the judgement, they now had to examine witnesses in 
court.62 In addition, there were new rules of evidence which dealt with confessions, 
hearsay and so on. Finally, the status of the prosecutor was defined as a lawyer for the 
government rather than an impartial party to the trial. 63 Taken together, in contrast with 
their role in the old procedure focusing on investigation, the prosecutors now had to 
concentrate on the trial. 
Nevertheless, the elements rooted in continental tradition have still existed in the 
Japanese criminal justice system. The public prosecutor's office is structured as a 
centripetal hierarchical organisation.64 Accordingly, the prosecutors conduct their work 
by relying on the instructions from the superiors based on 'the principle of uniformity of 
the prosecutors. ,65 
2.2. France 
The modem French criminal justice system has influenced many different jurisdictions 
across the world based on France's colonial expansion. 66 Because of this extensive 
impact, it is often used to represent the civil law tradition or inquisitorial system.67 As 
61 ibid art 191 (1) 'A public prosecutor may, if he/she deems it necessary, investigate an offense 
himlherself.'; art 193 '( 1) A public prosecutor may, within his/her jurisdiction, give necessary general 
instructions to judicial police officials regarding their investigation. Such instructions shall be given by 
setting forth general standards for a fair investigation and other matters necessary for the fulfilment of 
prosecution. (2) A public prosecutor may, within hislher jurisdiction, also issue to judicial police officials 
such general orders as are necessary for them to cooperate in investigations. (3) A public prosecutor may, 
when it is necessary for the prosecutor himlherselfto investigate an offense, issue orders to judicial police 
officials and have them assist in the investigation. (4) In the case of the preceding three paragraphs, 
judicial police officials shall follow the instructions and orders of the public prosecutor.' 
62 Nagashima op. cit. 302. 
63 ibid. 
64 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Studies on law and 
social control, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2002) 119-143; Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures 
of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 483-507 (Damaska stated that 'a 
general continental [inquisitorial] pattern can be discerned from these features: the strong tendency to 
arrive at uniform policies through the centralization of authority; the rigorously hierarchical ordering of 
agencies participating in the administration of justice; the preference for precise and rigid normative 
directives over more flexible standards; and, fmally, the great importance accorded official 
documentation. ') 
6S Byung Dae Jung op. cit. 
66 Vue Ma. 'Exploring the Origins of Public Prosecution' (2008) 18(2) International Criminal Justice 
Review 190, 198; Pieter Verrest. 'French Public Prosecution Service' (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 210, 211. 
67 Pakes op. cit. 13. 
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we have seen, the Japan and the Korean systems have been influenced by the French as 
it was a model for the modernisation of the Japanese legal system.68 
The French system of public prosecution was created by the Napoleonic Code of 
Criminal Procedure [Code of d'instruction Criminelle] of 1808.69 However, this system 
was not totally new, but instead had been developing for centuries in France. Prior to the 
1200s, the accusation of crime was a private right. The right to bring the criminals 
before the court was limited strictly to the hands of injured individuals.7o Only kings 
and sovereign lords could protect their interest by employing a representative who is 
called 'procureur du rof (king's prosecutor).71 In this period the king's prosecutors did 
not involve themselves in all criminal matters. They prosecuted crimes which impinged 
on the king's interest. As the accusation of crime was the right of private individuals, 
even the king's prosecutor could not interfere in cases which were irrelevant to such 
interests.72 However, in the 1200s, as the concept of territorial state developed, the king 
began to be more involved in the control of crime.73 Since then, his prosecutors had 
been involved in more criminal prosecutions of private individuals,74 and their title was 
68 See above pt 1 Introduction. 
69 Richard Vogler. 'Reform Trends in Criminal Justice: Spain, France and England & Wales' (2005) 4 
Wash.U.Global Stud.L.Rev. 631, 631; Verrest op. cit. 211. 
70 John Simpson (tr), Adhemar Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure, with Special 
Reference to France (The continental legal history series ... [vol.v], Little, Brown, and company, Boston 
1913) 640, 114. 
71 ibid; John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France (Studies in 
legal history, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1974) 321, 217; Ma op. cit. 117; However, as 
Esmein put it, although the king's prosecutors had already existed for a long time, it firstly appeared in 
the law book in 1302. See John Simpson (tr), Adhemar Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal 
Procedure, with Special Reference to France (The continental legal history series ... [vol.v], Little, Brown, 
and company, Boston 1913) 640, 115-116 (In 1302, 'Philip the Fair regulates their duties in terms which 
carry the conviction. ') 
72 ibid (Esmein stated that 'One of the most important duties of the king's procurator or fiscal was the 
superintendence of the prosecution of certain offenses: fines and forfeitures, the fruit of penal sentences, 
were one of the chief sources of revenue of the king and the nobles.') 
73 ibid 98, 115; Ma op. cit. 197. 
74 Simpson op. cit. 98-99 (Esmein described the accusations by the king's prosecutors as follows: 'since 
the king is directly interested in the repression of crime, why not employ the inquest in this case as in all 
cases where the king's interests are concerned? This is a strong argument; and it happens that in the same 
chapter of the "Livre de Jostice et de Plet" in which we read that old maxim "none shall be put to the 
inquest to lose life or limb" we see the inquest admitted in criminal matters: "If injury is caused to a poor 
person who cannot prosecute his rights, either by himself, his goods, or his friends, such matter should 
proceed by inquest; for such matters are not allowed to come to naught because of such poverty. And if he 
claim [sic] for an offense involving capital punishment it is not a matter for inquest, except it happens that 
the king should grant conditional absolution." I And a little further on: "If the man or the woman who is 
killed shall have no relative" or friend who can avenge him or her, the king can prosecute and punish 
according to what is ascertained in the 'aprise,' without capital condemnation." 2 - "The king can make an 
inquisition by reason of evil notoriety on keepers of brothels, thieves, doers of malicious mischief, 
rioters."') 
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changed into the 'public prosecutor [ministere pub/ique].' 75 Such involvement 
increased gradually, but by the 16th century the public prosecutors had exclusive control 
over the prosecution of crime.76 Based on this office, the modem public prosecution 
system was set up by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1808. 
In contemporary France, the main characteristics of the traditional system remain 
intact. 77 One of the distinctive features is a centralised hierarchy. As Hodgson stated, 
'this centralised state tradition, or etatisme, remains an important feature. The state 
enjoys the moral and political authority firstly, to become widely involved in areas 
which touch upon the public interest and secondly, to exercise significant powers in the 
protection of that public interest.' 78 Such a feature stems from the early 19th century 
Napoleonic state in which the military played a role as a model in establishing the civil 
service and justice. 79 Hazareesingh described this tradition as follows: 80 
There were many distinctive features of the Napoleonic State: an emphasis on power, 
authority, and technical competence, a strict system of hierarchy, a clearly delineated 
system of rules, which were applied in a uniform manner, and a scope of intervention in 
matters both public and private which was pervasive (in comparison with its predecessors). 
The most important and durable feature of the Napoleonic system was the principle of 
centralisation, which Napoleon consciously adopted from the Jacobin heritage of the 1790s. 
This centralised hierarchical structure remains. 81 The public prosecutors must follow 
the direction from the Minister of Justice as well as from their superiors.82 As Hodgson 
suggested, such hierarchy of authority was produced to guarantee 'the legitimacy and 
75 Ma op. cit. 197; Simpson op. cit. 114. 
76 John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France (Studies in legal 
history, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1974) 321, 224-228 (Langbein stated that 'The 
criminal sanction pertained to a wrong conceived to be against the king and the public; only the procureur 
might demand it. The aggrieved victim or kin was limited to civil damages in his own right. '); Robert 
Vouin. 'The Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Trials' (1970) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 483, 485. 
77 Pieter Verrest. 'French Public Prosecution Service' (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice 210, 211. 
78 Jacqueline Hodgson, French Criminal Justice: A Comparative Account of the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Crime in France (Blackwell Synergy, 2005), 16. 
79 ibid. 
80 Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford University Press, 1994), 159. 
81 Hodgson op. cit. 75. 
82 Richard S. Frase. 'Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How do the 
French do it, how can we find out, and why should we care' (1990) 78 Calif Law Rev 539, 559-561 (Frase 
described this feature as follows: 'Although individual prosecutors are theoretically free to speak their 
own minds in court, in their written submissions they must follow the written orders of their superiors. If 
they do not, they are subject to disciplinary action, including dismissal. ') 
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democratic accountability of the procurers, as well as a degree of centralisation and 
uniformity within the parquet, this hierarchical control defines and constrains the 
exercise of the procurer's discretion.'83 
In Damaska's study of 'structure of authority and comparative criminal procedure', 
he argued that 'Certainty in decision making requires that uniform policies be 
developed.,84 Hence, this process can be achieved by the centralisation of authority 
which is the key factor to constitute the hierarchical organisation. 8s Goldstein and 
Marcus also argue that hierarchical structure is an important element in the inquisitorial 
system.86 Such characteristics have influenced other countries in Europe through the 
Napoleon's military expansion such as Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, 
Germany, and Poland.87 These countries adopted the French public prosecution service 
as a model for their own systems.88 
French criminal procedure has developed while remaining rooted in its inquisitorial 
roots. It has adopted adversarial features to protect the rights of the defendants.89 These 
changes are not limited to the role of the public prosecutors and relate to the criminal 
proceedings as a whole. However, as they can have an effect on the prosecution process, 
it is important to note those modifications happened after the establishment of the 
modem public prosecution system in 1808. 
Such changes can be summarised into three aspects. First, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1808 was reformed in 1897. This reform aimed to increase the power of 
the defence during the judicial investigation.9o Due to this reform, the defendants began 
to have the assistance of lawyers for judicial questioning, allowing them to attend the 
judicial investigation process and to consult the case documents in advance. 91 
83 Hodgson op. cit. 75. 
84 Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 480, 
484. 
85 ibid. 
86 Abraham S. Goldstein and Martin Marcus. 'The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial 
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany' (1977) 87ibid240, 247 (Goldstein and Marcus suggested that 'The 
Code's provisions are to be applied rigorously by prosecutors and police, both of whom are organized 
nationally and hierarchically and are subject, in theory, to greater control by superiors than under 
American practice. '); Jacqueline Hodgson. 'Hierarchy, Bureaucracy, and Ideology in French Criminal 
Justice: Some Empirical Observations' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 227, 232. 
87 Ma op. cit. 198; Verrest op. cit. 211. 
88 Richard Vogler. 'Reform Trends in Criminal Justice: Spain, France and England & Wales' (2005) 4 
Wash.V.Global Stud.L.Rev. 631, 632-633; Verrest op. cit. 211. 
89 Jacqueline Hodgson, French·Criminal Justice: A Comparative Account of the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Crime in France (Blackwell Synergy, 2005), 27. 
90 ibid. 
91 Hodgson stated that this reform was designed to check the enormous power of the examining 
magistrate Uuge d'instruction]. However, as she put it, after this reform, 'Ironically, in order to avoid the 
presence of the defence lawyer, the procureur and the police began their own process of investigation 
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Second, the French legal reform of 1958 secured the independence of the 
investigating magistrate Uuge d'insfrucfion] from the prosecution service to protect the 
interests of defendants. 92 As Hans Gross put it, around 1903 the investigating 
magistrate was considered to be a better safeguard for the interests of the defendant than 
defence counsel. 93 However, as the investigating magistrates belonged to the police 
judiciaire and were under the surveillance of the public prosecutor,94 it was difficult for 
them to remain impartial.95 Thus the investigating magistrate was separated from the 
police judiciaire and became independent of the public prosecutor. 
Finally, although criminal proceedings rest heavily on written documents rather than 
oral evidence, the importance of the debate on the evidence by the parties has been 
increased in the trial and even in some of the pre-trial hearings. 96 This trend, as 
Hodgson noted, has taken place through the influence of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The participation rights of the defence lie in the heart of such a change.97 
2.3. Germany 
The German criminal justice system is another important representative of the civil law 
tradition but it also has features of common law system as a result of the influence of 
which included the detention of suspects. This remained outside any legal framework until the 1958 code 
of criminal; procedure laid down procedures for the regulation of this long standing practice of garde a 
vue (the period of police detention.' See ibid 27 n 137. 
92 John D. Jackson. 'Theories of Truth Finding in Criminal Procedure: An Evolutionary Approach' (1988) 
10 Cardozo Law Review 475, 510-511; Hodgson op. cit. 27. 
93 Quoted in Jackson op. cit. 510. 
94 ibid; Robert Vouin. 'The Protection of the Accused in French Criminal Procedure' (1956) 5(0 I) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 13-15; Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean 
Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), l31. 
9S Jackson op. cit. 510 (Jackson suggested that 'during the course of this century [until the French Code 
of 1958], concern has been expressed in France that thejuge d'instruction was too close to the 
~osecution. ') 
For instance, in 1993 the suspect began to have the right to access to custodial legal advice. In 2000, 
the police should provide the suspect with greater information concerning the nature of charges related to 
the detention. In addition, suspects have a greater opportunity to take part in the judicial investigation. See 
Hodgson op. cit. 27-28. 
97 ibid; With respect to this trend, Jackson argued that 'This may be seen as the beginnings of the 
development of a new rights-based model of proof. Neither traditionally adversarial nor inquisitorial in 
character, the new model is better classified as 'participatory' on the ground that it seeks to enable all 
those capable of giving relevant evidence in the proceedings to do so in as least a coercive manner as 
possible.' For more details, see John D. Jackson and R. Castle. 'The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal 
Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?' (2005) 68(5) Modem Law 
Review 737, 737; Swart and Young stated that this trend has made non-adversarial systems become more 
adversarial. See Bert Swart and James Young, 'The European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal 
Justice in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom' in Phil Fennell, Christopher Harding and Jorg Nico 
(eds), Criminal Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, 1995),86. 
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the US after the World War 11.98 As Dammer suggested, German criminal procedure is 
mostly grounded in the civil law process and has been considered as a significant model 
for any comparative study.99 The German system of public prosecution had a 
considerable impact, as did the French, on the development of the Japanese and Korean 
systems. 
In Germany, the modem institution of public prosecution was created in the middle 
of 19th century under the influence of French criminal process. IOO This new system was 
adopted to overcome the weaknesses caused by the inquisitorial judge and private 
prosecution of crime. As Professor Fionda put it, the investigation, prosecution, and 
adjudication were concentrated in the hands of the inquisitorial judge before the 
establishment of the public prosecution system. As a consequence, it was difficult to 
expect a fair trial based on neutrality of the judge. 101 Concerning this neutrality, Jackson 
argued that 'In the 1840s, Zachariae, among others, believed that it was impossible to 
require unbiased impartiality from someone whose task was to investigate and discover 
those who are guilty.' 102 The German criminal justice system sought to improve the 
'procedural lot' of the defendant by securing the independence of the judge from the 
investigation and prosecution.103 This reform had been completed by the establishment 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877. 104 A modem public prosecution system 
bedded down into German criminal proceedings. lOS 
Even though the German public prosecution system was created based on the French 
criminal proceedings, it has four distinctive features. Firstly, the German prosecutors, 
unlike their counterparts in France, monopolise the prosecution of crime. 106 The private 
individual could not institute a criminal case. As Langbein put it, 'If the German 
prosecutor has determined not to prosecute, the victim can bring his civil action only in 
tort.,107 This monopoly over prosecution has been expressed as 'the principle of the 
98 Cole et al. op. cit. 85; Dammer et al. op. cit. 84. 
99 ibid 13, 84. 
100 Dong Hee Lee and others, Investigation Systems: A Comparative Study {Bigyosusajedoron] 
(pakyoungsa,SeouI2004),258. 
101 Fionda op. cit. 133. 
102 Jackson op. cit. 511. 
103 John H. Langbein. 'Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany' (1974) 41(3) The University of 
Chicago Law Review 439, 446; John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, 
Germany, France (Studies in legal history, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1974) 321, 321. 
104 Howard D. Fisher, The German Legal System and Legal Language: A General Survey together with 
Notes and German Vocabulary (4th edn Routledge-Cavendish, London; New York 2009) 344, 262; Dong 
Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 259. 
lOS Fisher op. cit. 264. 
106 Langbein op. cit. 442. 
107 ibid. 
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formal criminal charge.' 108 
Secondly, the German prosecutors must prosecute in any criminal case where there 
is sufficient incriminating evidence. 109 The Code prohibited the prosecutors from 
dismissing criminal cases based on their discretion. This is called literally 'the legality 
principle [Legalitatsgrundsatz]'110 which was created 'to restore the Rule of Law, and 
to achieve an equal application of the law.' 111 
However, this rule of compulsory prosecution has been weakened and public 
prosecutors have begun to exercise discretion in the prosecution of crime. 112 In the 
1960s, the criminal justice process was faced with 'the phenomenon of mass crimes'. 113 
This new environment led the policy makers to find a way to reduce the workload of the 
court and non-prosecution policies were considered as an alternative. As a consequence, 
prosecutorial discretion was introduced into the code. 114 This discretion was gradually 
expanded in order to satisfy social needs such as the decriminalisation of juvenile 
offenders or the economic difficulties caused by the re-unification of Germany. I IS 
Thirdly, the German public prosecution system, unlike the nationalised French 
approach, is organised on a federal basis. Each state has its own criminal justice system 
which is managed by a Ministry of Justice who is responsible for the prosecutorial 
decisions. 116 However, Damaska argued that although the German criminal procedure is 
108 According to Langbein, '[i]t was designed to constrain to inquisitorial judge of earlier centuries, who 
had been empowered to conduct the entire criminal process, from the gathering of first suspicions to final 
adjudication and sentencing.' See ibid. 
109 Howard D. Fisher, The German Legal System and Legal Language: A General Survey together with 
Notes and German Vocabulary (4th edn Routledge-Cavendish, London; New York 2009) 344, 264; With 
respect to the evidence, the code of criminal procedure articulates that 'the prosecutor the public 
prosecution office shall be obliged to take action in the case of all criminal offenses which may be 
prosecuted, provided there are sufficient factual indications.' See Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), 
Germany, Criminal Procedure Code [StrafprozefJordnung] (1987) s 152 (2) (Emphasis added) 
110 Fisher op. cit. 264; Langbein defined this principle as 'the rule of compulsory prosecution.' See 
Langbein op. cit. 442. 
111 Fionda op. cit. 167. 
112 Hans-Jorg Albrecht. 'Criminal Prosecution: Developments, Trends and Open Questions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany' (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 245,246. 
113 ibid. 
114 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code [StrafprozefJordnung] (\ 987) s 
153 '( 1) If a less serious criminal offense is the subject of the proceedings, the public prosecution office 
may dispense with prosecution with the approval of the court competent for the opening of the main 
proceedings if the perpetrator's culpability is considered to be of a minor nature and there is no public 
interest in the prosecution. The approval of the court shall be not required in the case of a less serious 
criminal offense which is not subject to an increased minimum penalty and where the consequences 
ensuing from the offense are minimal.' Translated by German Federal Ministry of Justice. 
<http://www.iuscomp.orglglalstatutes/StPO.htm#153>;Hans-JorgAlbrecht.·Criminal Prosecution: 
Developments, Trends and Open Questions in the Federal Republic of Germany' (2000) 8 European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 245, 246. 
m ibid 247. 
116 Fionda op. cit. 134. 
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based on the federal system, 'strong forces are at work to coordinate law enforcement 
among federal units and establish uniform national policies;' 117 In other words, in 
Germany the prosecutor's offices are organised at a state level rather than national, but 
nevertheless they seek national uniformity by relying on the hierarchical structure. I IS In 
short, the German criminal justice system, as in France, shows the characteristics of a 
hierarchical structure irrespective of its federalised organisation. I 19 
Finally, the German criminal procedure abolished the investigating magistrate who 
actively conducted serious investigations. In Germany, the investigating magistrate was 
considered as an urmecessary element in the criminal proceedings that 'duplicates ... the 
work already done by the public prosecutor.,120 Hence, the reform of the code of 
criminal procedure of 1974 eliminated the investigating magistrate, and instead gave the 
responsibility for pre-trial investigation to the public prosecutor. Since then, the 
magistrate has merely played a passive role by issuing warrants to arrest and search. As 
Goldstein and Marcus noted, 'the elimination of the examining magistrates has meant 
that judges can supervise pre-trial investigation only if police and prosecutor adhere 
strictly to the Code.' 121 This is in contrast to France where the investigating magistrate 
Uuge d 'instruction] is still involved in the investigation of serious crimes. 
The German public prosecution system has developed distinctive features even 
though it is rooted in the French code of criminal procedure of 1808 [code d'instruction 
criminelle]. The German prosecutors monopolise the prosecution process, but they have 
a duty to prosecute all crimes in order to prevent the misuse of the monopolised 
power. 122 The investigating magistrate who involved in the serious investigations was 
abolished. Instead the public prosecutors have the responsibility for a pre-trial 
investigation. With respect to the organisation, the public prosecutor's offices are 
117 Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 
480,488. 
Jl8 Damaska stated that 'the police and prosecutorial offices are organized on the state, not federal, level. 
But s striving for uniformity is nevertheless obvious. In this connection it must also be noted that, for the 
sake of uniformity, both substantive and procedural criminal law tends to be heavily 'federalized' in all 
continental federations.' See ibid 488 n 9. In addition, in Germany, as external constraints are rooted in 
hierarchical structure, 'official agencies, including the police, are legally bound to report all criminal 
activity to the prosecutor's office.' For more details, see ibid 502-503. 
119 See ibid. . 
120 Abraham S. Goldstein and Martin Marcus. 'The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial 
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany' (1977) 87 Yale LJ 240, 259. 
121 ibid 261-262. 
122 John H. Langbein. 'Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany' (1974) 41 (3) The University of 
Chicago Law Review 439,461 (Langbein stated that 'It is the prosecutorial monopoly that makes this 
such an extremely important question, because other officers or private citizens cannot come forward to 
take up the neglected prosecution. There are two ways to prevent the abuse of a monopoly-break it or 
regulate it. The prosecutor's monopoly would be broken if citizen prosecution were allowed as in England 
or France. ') 
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structured on a federal basis. However, the German and French systems still have 
similarities which result from their hierarchical structure. 
2.4. The United States 
The United States system, as is the English, is representative of the common law 
tradition. 123 However, it is different from the English and, after World War II, its 
criminal procedure had an impact on a number of countries such as Japan and Korea. 124 
In the USA, the origin of public prosecution can be traced back to the system of 
private prosecution in the early colonial period when important elements of criminal 
process such as the court structure, the jury and the tradition of the private prosecution 
itself were introduced to the American colonies by the English. 12S However, the system 
of private prosecution, unlike its ancestor in England, existed for a relatively short 
period and was replaced by the public prosecution. 
Private prosecution was considered to be incompatible with the colonial situation. 
For the colonists, crime control was one of the most important values, as they have to 
survive in a foreign environment. 126 Thus, the colonial government needed an effective 
system to control crime, which is difficult to achieve by depending on private 
prosecution. 127 As a consequence, some forms of public prosecution such as English 
'attorney general,' Dutch 'schout,' and French 'ministere public' appeared soon after the 
settlement of colonies. 128 
Among those schemes, the system of attorney general contributed considerably to 
123 Francis J. Pakes, Comparative Criminal Justice (Willan Publishing, Cullompton; Portland 2004), 13. 
124 Dong-Woon Shin. 'An Analysis of the Korean Criminal Procedure: Focusing on the Establishment of 
the Act' (1987) 69 Seoul Law Journal 144; Dong-Woon Shin, 'An Analysis of the Korean Criminal 
Procedure during the Japanese Occupation' in Korean Legal History Review (Parkyoungsa, Seoul 1991) 
401-417. 
125 David H. Flaherty, 'An Introduction to Early American Legal History' in David H. Flaherty (ed), 
Essays in the history of early American law (Published for the Institute of Early American History and 
Culture of Williamsburg, Va., by the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1969) 3,3-38; Juan 
Cardenas. 'The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process' (1986) 9 Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 357, 366; Angela 1. Davis, Arbitrary justice: The power of the American prosecutor (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 9; Yue Ma. 'Exploring the Origins of Public Prosecution' (2008) 18(2) 
International Criminal Justice Review 190, 199. 
126 ibid. 
127 Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary justice: The power of the American prosecutor (Oxford University Press, 
2007), 10; Juan Cardenas. 'The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process' (1986) 9 Harvard Journal of 
Law & Public Policy 357, 366-372. 
128 In the early Dutch colonies such as New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, the Dutch 
officer'schout' dealt with the prosecution of crime. See Van Alstyne, W. Scott Jr. 'The District Attomey-A 
Historical Puzzle' (1952) Wis.L.Rev. 125, 130-131. In the region of Louisiana, as it was a French colony, 
it followed the French criminal procedure including the prosecution system. For more details, see Alain A. 
Levasseur. 'The Major Periods of Louisiana Legal History' (1995) 41 Loyola Law Review 585, 585-628. 
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the establishment of the modem public prosecution in the USA. As the attorney general 
stemmed from England, their role was initially limited to the protection of the interests 
of the Crown, as in England. 129 Yet, with increasing interest in crime control,130 the role 
of attorney general was expanded into the prosecution of all crimes. 131 
This system developed further after the American Revolution. The US public 
prosecution service has brought about three important features which make it distinctive 
from other systems. Firstly, the US attorneys have enjoyed considerable independence 
even though they are federal public prosecutors who belong to the Department of 
Justice. The federal public prosecution service was established by the judiciary Act of 
1789.132 This federal system was headed by the US attorney general and structured on a 
hierarchical organisation. However, the limits of the federal system were soon apparent 
as the US attorney general was 'a weakened office with vague supervisory powers, 
acting in an advisory capacity.' 133 There was almost no centralised control for the state 
district attorneys. This feature was rooted in the US tradition that 'local affairs should be 
handled locally', which prevented the attorney general from 'interfering with U.S. 
attorneys' daily operation.' 134 As a consequence, the district attorneys became so 
independent that they could make a decision autonomously in their districts. 13S 
Secondly, the local public prosecutors achieved the elective status which led 
129 Cardenas op. cit. 369. 
130 ibid; Davis op. cit. 450 (Davis suggested that 'This development [of public prosecution] occurred not 
only as a remedy for the problems and abuses of private prosecution, but also as a result of the shift in 
philosophical view of crime and society .... crime should be viewed as a social problem, not simply as a 
wrong against an individual victim.') 
131 For example, the Virginia state government appointed the first attorney general in 1643, whose main 
duty was to protect the interests of the English King. However, they began to deal with the public 
prosecution in the last quarter of the 17th century, and by 1711, assumed the responsibility of all 
prosecutions as well as trials in relation to serious crimes. See Oliver Perry Chitwood, Justice in colonial 
Virginia (Ams Pr Inc, 1905), 120. There are similar patterns noted in other colonies such as Maryland, 
New Hampshire, and Carolinas. See Ma op. cit. 200. 
132 The act provided the role of the US attorneys: 'a meet person learned in the law to act as attorney for 
the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, 
whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable 
under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be 
concerned.' See 'Establishment of the judicial courts of the United States (September 24, 1789) s 35' in R. 
Peters (ed), The public statutes at large of the United States of America (Charle C. Little and James 
Brown, Boston 1846) quoted from Ma op. cit. 20 I. 
133 Joan E. Jacoby. 'The American Prosecutor: From Appointive to Elective Status' (1997) 31 (5) The 
Prosecutor, 2. 
134 Ma op. cit. 202; This situation applied to the state level. The state attorney general also rarely 
exercised the power to overrule the county attorneys' decisions. For example, in Massachusetts, the office 
of the district and county attorney was created and placed under the 'nominal supervision' of the state 
attorney general in 1817. However, by 1843, with the increase in the independence of those attorneys, the 
state attorney general's office was eliminated because it was considered as unnecessary. See Joan E. 
Jacoby. 'The American Prosecutor: From Appointive to Elective Status' (1997) 31(5) The Prosecutor, 2. 
13S Ma op. cit. 
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increased their independence. The vote was extended to almost all citizens and many 
governmental offices were decided by election. 136 This trend, which is called 
'Jacksonian democracy,' influenced the whole country, and in the end also changed the 
way of judicial selection. \37 As the public prosecutors were seen as part of the judiciary, 
the method to select them also changed. Before this, public prosecutors were mostly 
appointed. 138 This limited prosecutor's independence, as the authority who appointed 
them could interfere in making prosecutorial decisions. 139 However, nowadays, most 
states select the public prosecutors by election 140 and this is one of the most important 
elements in the development of the modem public prosecution service because, as 
Professor Ma noted, it has caused significant changes of 'the role and image' of the 
public prosecutors. 141 They are not organised in a centralised hierarchical structure, and 
moreover selected by election on a local basis. Thus, they are accountable to their 
constituents rather than superiors or ministry of justice. 
Finally, soon after achieving elective status, the public prosecutors began to 
monopolise the prosecution of crime. 142 In general, the public prosecutors have the 
power to charge a suspect. 143 Unlike the German prosecutors, they do not have a duty to 
prosecute every crime as a principle, but instead enjoy 'broad discretion to prosecute or 
not to prosecute.' 144 Ramsey stated that this monopoly of prosecution resulted from 
136 Jacoby op. cit. I. 
137 ibid; Berkson stated that 'By the time of the Civil War, 24 of34 states had established an elected 
judiciary .... As new states were admitted to the Union, all of them adopted popular election of some or 
all judges until the admission of Alaska in 1959.' For example, in 1812, Georgia's constitution was 
amended to select inferior court judges by election. In Mississippi, all judges had been elected since 1832. 
New York began to select judges by election from 1846. See Larry C. Berkson. 'Judicial Selection in the 
United States: A Special Report' (1980) 64(4) Judicature 176, 176. 
138 For example, the public prosecutors were appointed by the governor in Pennsylvania, by the attorney 
general in North Carolina, and by the local courts in Connecticut and Virginia. See Jacoby op. cit. 2. 
f39 Ma op. cit. 202 (Professor Ma suggested that due to the appointive status, the prosecutors 'had to 
consider the wishes of the actors who had appointed them. ') 
140 New Jersey and Connecticut still have the appointive system of selecting judges and prosecutors. See 
ibid. 
141 ibid 203. 
142 Until the mid-19th century, public prosecution had shared a room with private prosecution. See Mike 
McConville and Chester Mirsky. 'The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York, 1800-1865' (1995) 22(4) Journal 
of Law and Society 443, 453-454,464-466. However, in the second half of the 19th century, private 
prosecution began to disappear and instead public prosecution took over the monopoly of prosecution of 
crimes. For instance, in New York, criminal cases were often presented by the private lawyers in courts in 
the early 19th century. However, after the mid-19th century, representing victims by private lawyers was 
stopped. In addition, private settlements also were abolished. See Carolyn B. Ramsey. 'The Discretionary 
Power of' Public" Prosecutors in Historical Perspective' (2002) 39(4) Am Crim Law Rev 1309, 1327. 
143 Susanne Walther. 'The Position and Structure of the Prosecutor's Office in the United States' (2000) 8 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 283, 289. However, as Walther put it, 
there are a small number of exceptions: 'Only in a minority of jurisdictions can the decision to file certain 
(minor) criminal charges be made by the police.' 
144 ibid. 
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both the elective status of the prosecutors and the increasing public demand for crime 
control. 145 The increase of crimes, which resulted from both industrialisation and 
growing population in urban areas, led people to demand greater state involvement. 146 
Such a demand played a part in giving rise to the monopoly of the prosecution by the 
bl ' 147 pu IC prosecutors. 
The modem public prosecution in the USA stems from private prosecution but this 
was replaced because of the public demand for effective crime control. In this regard, 
the origin of the public prosecution system in the USA has a similarity to the French. 
The public prosecution of crimes in both countries began from the idea that crimes 
should be controlled by the state rather than private individual. However, unlike other 
countries in this study, the US public prosecutors are elected and as a result their roles 
and image have been developed in a different way to other systems. In particular, the 
greater independence of the US prosecutor has become one of the important features 
which can help them to reach 'the decision most appropriate to the circumstances of 
each case.' 148 
2.5. England and Wales 
The English legal system is also representative of the common law tradition. 149 It has 
influenced the establishment of common law systems across the world, including the 
US. Consequently, as Dammer put it, many similarities are readily apparent. 150 
However, there are still distinctive characteristics between two systems, in particular, as 
to the functions and status of the public prosecutors. The English system has indirectly 
influenced the Korean system through the US as it has provided the Korean criminal 
proceedings with the fundamental accusatorial elements. 
In England and Wales, the modem public prosecution system was only created in the 
last quarter of the 20th century which was very recent when compared to other countries. 
The previous prosecution system was developed from the private prosecution of crime. 
145 Carolyn B. Ramsey. 'The Discretionary Power of Public Prosecutors in Historical Perspective' (2002) 
39(4) Am Crim Law Rev 1309, 1327-1328. 
146 ibid; McConville and Mirsky op. cit. 460. 
147 Professor Ma stated that 'The establishment of urban police departments and the shift to the model of 
full public prosecution were driven by the same idea that state sponsored criminal justice would be more 
effective in accomplishing the goal of crime controL' See Ma op. cit. 203. 
148 Damaska op. cit. 509. 
149 Mireille Delmas-MaTty and John R. Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 3; Dammer et al. op. cit. 13, 77; Cole et al. op. cit. 27; John Bell, Judiciaries 
within Europe: a comparative review (Cambridge Univ Pr, 2006), 2. 
150 Dammer et al. op. cit. 
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Until early in the 19th century, as Professor Uglow stated, 'enforcement of the law was a 
communal responsibility'. 151 Ordinary citizens had as much power as the police in 
t f t h d · t t' 152 Th . . . . .. d th erms 0 arres, searc ,an In erroga Ion. e private citizens Initiate e 
prosecution, presented the evidence and examined witnesses in court. IS3 The criminal 
process was only controlled by the court through the judicial monitoring methods, for 
instance, by issuing a warrant for arrest or search and deciding the prosecution. 154 
However, this private prosecution was a burden to individuals. Not only did it cause 
inconvenience, but also resulted in the loss of money as well as time. ISS Thus, the 
power to prosecute was generally exercised by the 'member of the propertied class.' 156 
To the working class, the criminal justice based upon the private prosecution was often 
considered as the unjust tool for 'social discipline.' 157 Such distrust in criminal justice 
played a part in developing the 'public' prosecution service but initially one in the hands 
ofthe police. 158 
In the 19th century, the mechanism of law enforcement was developed by the social 
changes which resulted from industrial revolution. 159 This development led to citizens 
increasingly expecting the police officer to conduct the prosecution on behalf of 
them. 160 As a result, since the establishment of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, 
the police began to take charge of the prosecution on behalf of victims in a regular way 
until 1985. 161 However, this was not in principle the public prosecution. The police 
m Steve Uglow. 'Independent Prosecutions' (1984) II Journal of Law and Society 233, 233. 
IS2 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007),321. 
IS3 uglow op. cit.; Robin M. White. 'Investigators and Prosecutors or, Desperately Seeking Scotland: Re-
formulation of the 'Philips Principle" (2006) 69(2) Modem Law Review 143, 147. 
IS4 Sanders and Young op. cit. 321. 
ISS Uglow op. cit. 234. 
IS6 Steve Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), 188. 
IS7 ibid. 
IS8 Professor Uglow stated that 'To be effective, substance had to be given to the values of neutrality, 
universality and equality. In that context, the nineteenth century should have witnessed the right of private 
rrosecution withering away and a public prosecution service taking its place.' See ibid. 
59 Those changes include the emergence of congested urban population and the increase in crimes. More 
effective system of law enforcement was critical to deal with crimes. In the 18th century, in London, 
organised groups of private agents known as thief takers, appeared. See Yue Ma. 'Exploring the Origins of 
Public Prosecution' (2008) 18(2) International Criminal Justice Review 190, 194. 
160 White states that 'during the nineteenth century, the burden was largely passed to the 'new police', 
who commenced prosecution as well as investigation'. See White op. cit. 147; Sanders and Young op. cit. 
321. 
161 Fionda op. cit. 14 (Professor Fionda stated that 'The police were designated the first public 
prosecutors in 1829, rathe,r more circums~ntially than deliberately, due to the absence of a suitable 
alternative public agency. ); Uglow op. CIt. 189 (Professor Uglow suggested that 'It was the success of the 
'new' police that must have contributed to the decline of the private prosecutor and the still birth of any 
public successor. All too easily the police were seen not only as investigators but also as prosecutors. '); 
Ma op. cit. 194. 
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officers initiated prosecution as a private individual who was interested in retaining law 
and order rather than a public servant. 162 
Fifty years after the emergence of the police prosecutors, the first formal public 
prosecution agency, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), was created by the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1879.163 The role of the DPP was to 'institute, undertake or 
carryon such proceedings and to give such advice or assistance to chief officers of 
police, clerks to the justices and other persons, as may be directed in a special case by 
the Attorney-General.' 164 Yet, the DPP only took up a small number of prosecutions of 
criminal cases. The vast majority of prosecutions were still conducted by the police 
prosecutors. 165 
There was no unified system for the police prosecution. The police who 'were 
responsible for initiating criminal prosecutions and bringing cases to court' developed 
the prosecution system in their own way.166 For example, in the 1970s 31 of the 43 
police forces had created their own prosecution departments while the rest employed 
. fi f 1" d . 167 Th 'bl prIvate lrms 0 so lCltors to con uct prosecutions. ere was an ostensl e 
separation of investigation and prosecution, but the prosecuting solicitors generally 
conducted the prosecution depending on the decisions taken by the police. 
The prosecution by the police created an unclear border between the investigation 
and prosecution. 168 Such a functional mixture, as Philips put it, caused problems such as 
the prosecutions of evidentiary weak cases or 'overcharging' because police 
involvement restricted the prosecutor's role as a filter to screen the results of the 
investigation. 169 Sanders and Young illustrated this situation as follows: 170 
162 Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England (Oxford University Press, London 1960) 118, 
13-14. 
163 Fionda op. cit. 14. 
164 Prosecution of Offences Act 1979 s 2; Mansfield and Peay argued that 'The essential functions of the 
office have not altered substantially in the ensuing 100 years.' See Graham Mansfield, Jill Peay and 
University of Oxford. Centre for Criminological Research, The Director of Public Prosecutions: 
principles and practices for the Crown Prosecutor: an inquiry carried out at the Centre for 
Criminological Research, University of Oxford (Tavistock, London; New York 1987) 246, 8. 
165 Devlin op. cit. 20-21 (Devlin stated that 'The Director's cases amount only to about 8 per cent. of the 
total number of prosecutions for indictable offences. Another 4 per cent is accounted for by prosecutions 
brought by some public bodies, such as the Post Office, who handle their own cases and by those brought 
b~ private individuals. The remaining 88 per cent are police prosecutions.') 
I Nicola Padfield, Text and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process (4th edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford; New York 2008) 536, 162. 
167 ibid; For the process of development, see Devlin op. cit. 21; Steve Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd edn 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), 189. 
168 John R. Spencer, 'The English system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European 
Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press,2002) 142, 152. 
169 Sir Cyril Phillips, 'The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: Report' HMSO (Cmnd 8092, 
London), para 6.27. 
170 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 
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If the police insisted on prosecuting a weak case to further their crime control goals, or bring 
more serious charges than were warranted by the evidence ('overcharging'), there was little or 
nothing the prosecutor could do about it. 
The modern public prosecution system, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), was 
created by the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. 171 This set up an independent public 
prosecution system in order to improve efficiency and protect the interests of the 
defendants by separating the prosecution from investigation and preserving the filtering 
role of the prosecutors. 
There are two salient features of the organisation and development of the CPS. First, 
unlike the structure of the police, the CPS was organised on a centralised national 
basis. l72 All 42 areas are directly answerable to the DPP whose role is to provide 
national guidelines and procedures in order to intervene in difficult or complex cases, to 
appoint and supervise personnel and to manage resources. 173 Despite this centralised 
hierarchical organisation, the CPS has operational independence from the 
government. 174 However, the CPS is accountable to the national government through 
the Attorney General rather than to local government. Consequently, the issue of 
autonomy of the crown prosecutor has been often a matter of debate. 175 
2007),322. 
171 For more details on those discussions, see Justice. 'The Prosecution Process in England and Wales' 
(1970) Crim L R 668; Henry Fisher, Report of an Inquiry into the circumstances leading to the trial of 
three persons on charges arising out of the death of Maxwell Confail and the fire at 27 Doggett Road. 
London SE6 (HCP 90) (HMSO, London 1977); Phillips op. cit. 
\72 The police are structured on a local basis. There are 43 local police forces, in each of which the chief 
constable and the local Police Authority share the responsibility for them. With regard to the political 
responsibility, the home secretary issue them regular guidance. However, slhe does not have the power to 
~ive them orders. See Spencer op. cit. 150. 
73 U glow op. cit. 190; Those areas were originally designed as 31 in 1985. But, they were reduced to 13 
in 1992 and reorganised as 42 areas in 1999. For more details on this development, see lain Glidewell, 
'The Review of the Crown Prosecution Service' The Stationery Office (Cm 3960, London). 
174 Terence Daintith and Alan C. Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure. Autonomy. and 
Internal Control (Oxford University Press, 1999),222 (Daintith and Page argue that the Attorney General 
has the right to appoint the DPP, but hislher role is 'one of statutory superintendence rather than 
hierarchical authority on the usual Departmental pattern.'); Sanders and Young op. cit. 373. 
175 For the discussions before the establishment of the CPS, see Phillips op. cit. paras 7.23, 7.25-7.37; 
Steve Uglow. 'Independent Prosecutions' (1984) 11 Journal of Law and Society 233, 242; Home 
OfficelLaw Officers' Department, 'An Independent Prosecution Service For England and Wales' HMSO 
(Cmnd 9074, London) paras 9,10. After foundation of the CPS, there were discussions about its structure. 
See lain Glidewell, 'The Review of the Crown Prosecution Service' The Stationery Office (Cm 3960, 
London) summary of the report part 1 para 5; Andrew Ashworth. 'Review of the Crown Prosecution 
Service' (1998) Crim L R 517; Francis 1. Pakes. 'The Positioning of the Prosecution Service in the 
Netherlands and England and Wales: Lessons from One Extreme to Another' (1999) 21 (2) Liverpool Law 
Rev 261. 
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Secondly, it was the police that initiated a prosecution even though the CPS could 
make an independent assessment. The Phillips committee suggested that the police had 
the power to open the criminal procedure because they were 'the first decision maker' 
on the street and their discretion should not be limited. 176 However, such discretion to 
initiate prosecutions was significantly changed by the statutory charging scheme based 
on the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 177 This reform was rooted in the Auld committee 
report which suggested the initiation of the prosecution by the CPS. The Auld 
committee considered the cause of the 'prolonged and disjointed nature' of criminal 
proceedings as 'the 'over-charging' by the police and failure by the Crown Prosecution 
Service to remedy it at early stage.' 178 In particular, the committee draw attention to 
'the police charge': 
Much of the problem is due to the fact that the police, not the Crown Prosecution Service, 
initiate prosecutions. The police charge. The Crown Prosecution Service reviews the charge 
after the event; and, in doing so, it applies a more stringent test than that of the police. 179 
As a consequence of the statutory charging scheme, the prosecuting procedure became 
independent from the investigation of the police. At present, the CPS is responsible for 
not only maintaining prosecutions, but also making decisions whether to initiate 
. . 1 d' 180 cnmma procee mgs. 
To sum up, the prose~ution of crime had been conducted de facto by the police 
before the emergency of the modern public prosecution system. However, this system 
was ineffective to protect the rights of the defendants because it did not have an 
objective regime to screen the investigation. Thus, the CPS was established to achieve 
an independent filter to review the police investigation. 
2.6. Discussion 
While each country has developed its own prosecution system depending on different 
176 Phillips op. cit. para 6.31. 
177 Ian D. Brownlee. 'The Statutory Charging Scheme in England and Wales: Towards a Unified 
Prosecution System?' (2004) Crim L R 896,896. 
178 Robin Auld and Great Britain. Lord Chancellor'S Dept, The Review of the Criminal Courts of England 
and Wales: a Report (Stationery Office, London 200 I) 686, ch 10 para 35. 
179 ibid ch 10 para 37. 
180 The power to initiate prosecutions began to shift to the CPS in Kent and West Yorkshire on 17th April 
2004. This process was completed in April 2006. See The Crown Prosecution Service. 'First phase of 
Statutory Charging goes live a year ahead of schedule' 
<http://www.cps.gov.uklnews/pressreleases/II806/index.html> accessed 26 April 20 II. 
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historical, political and cultural contexts, two distinctive features can be noted in 
relation to all of them. 
First, as seen in France and the USA, the public prosecution system was created for 
the effective crime control. As crimes began to be considered as an object that the state 
must control, the traditional private prosecution system was regarded to be incompatible 
with such a goal. As a result, the public prosecution took the place of the system of 
private prosecution. This trend is also seen in Japan where public support for crime 
control, led to an increase in prosecutorial powers until 1945. The role of the public 
prosecution service is closely associated with Packer's ideas of crime control. 
Second, the separation of the functions is another important factor in establishing 
independent public prosecution systems. This feature is more closely associated with 
Packer's notions of due process. The establishment of the CPS in England & Wales and 
the German public prosecution system are examples. In England and Wales, both 
investigation and prosecution were de facto conducted by the police. However, this 
meant the lack of a significant filter to screen the investigation. In the end, the English 
criminal proceedings established an independent public prosecution service to separate 
the prosecution from investigation. 
The German public prosecution system was also established to secure the objectivity 
of the criminal procedure. Before the introduction of the public prosecution system, the 
inquisitorial judge had the combined functions of the prosecution and judgement. 
However, the system could not preserve judicial neutrality and to overcome this 
drawback, investigating judges were abolished and the independent public prosecution 
system was adopted. The objectivity of the public prosecutors was then encapsulated in 
the code. As the prosecutors also may lose the neutrality by being involved in the 
preliminary investigation, the German code of criminal procedure has required the 
prosecutor to have 'ajudge-like impartiality' from the outset. 181 
In short, the public prosecution systems have been in general created to carry out 
two, perhaps conflicting, roles. Prosecutors playa role in controlling crimes by charging 
criminal offenders on behalf of victims but they also have a duty to protect the 
defendant's rights as an objective filter between the investigation and judgement. Due to 
this role, they are often called as a quasi-judicial officer. 
181 John H. Langbein. 'Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany' (1974) 41(3) The University of 
Chicago Law Review 439,449. 
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3. The General Role of the Public Prosecutors 
Before moving on to the specific functions of the prosecution service, this part briefly 
examines the general role of the public prosecutors in different criminal proceedings. In 
the fact finding process, the prosecutors, as discussed in Chapter 3, are normally 
required to have 'prosecutorial neutrality', which is often called the 'quasi-judicial role' 
and have a duty to act impartially while conducting their duties. 182 
As the protection of the defendant's rights may be seen as no less important than the 
effective crime control, many jurisdictions have emphasised such a role of the 
prosecutors. However, there seems to be differences in the precise manner in which 
such a quasi-judicial role appears as each criminal justice system has distinctive legal 
cultures. 183 In many jurisdictions, the prosecutor is regarded as an important officer 
who has a duty to 'uphold not merely the letter of the criminal law but also those legal 
values which belong to fundamental human rights.' 184 
In Korea, the quasi-judicial role of the prosecutors is not provided for in the statutes 
or rules. The prosecutor's status of 'a representative of the public interests' is interpreted 
as the reason why they have a duty to be objective while carrying out their missions. 18s 
However, this is not good enough to maintain the neutrality of the prosecutor as a quasi-
judicial officer. Thus, the damage caused to defendants by the loss of the prosecutor's 
objectivity occasionally needs to be remedied by tort law. 186 This may be useful 
because it helps to guarantee the prosecutorial neutrality. 
The Japanese, as in Korea, regard the public prosecutors as a quasi-judicial 
officer. 187 In particular, as Koyama described, the trust of the people in the prosecution 
service is based on such a role: 
It has always been believed that there is little criminal defence work, especially at the stage 
of investigation, owing to "proper and precise" investigation and high confession and 
conviction rates. This belief is based on confidence in the integrity of public prosecutors 
182 Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J 
Crim Law 197,216; Andrew Ashworth. 'Developments in the Public Prosecutor's Office in England and 
Wales' (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 257, 281-282.; Bruce A. 
Green and Fred C. Zacharias. 'Prosecutorial Neutrality' (2004) Wis L Rev 837. 
183 John D. Jackson. 'The Effect of Legal Culture and Proof in Decisions to Prosecute' (2004) 3(2) Law, 
Probability and Risk 109, 112. 
184 Ashworth op. cit. 281-282. 
18S Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 103. 
186 2001 DA 23447 (2002) 152 Panre Gongbo 753 (Korean Supreme Court). 
187 A. Didrick Castberg. 'Prosecutorial Independence in Japan' (1997) 16 UCLA Pac.Basin LJ 38, 43. 
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who conduct reinvestigations and exercise wide discretion in deciding whether to prosecute 
as "quasi-judicial" officers. 188 
The Japanese prosecutors have both 'quasi-judicial and executive' roles. 189 However, 
there is again no provision in the statutes to guarantee the prosecutorial objectivity. In 
theory, tort actions against the prosecutors may be a method to force them to act 
. • 11 190 Impartla y. 
The German code of criminal procedure, unlike the Korean and Japanese, 
specifically provides the quasi-judicial role of the public prosecutors. Accordingly, they 
have a duty to seek out not only incriminating, but also exonerating evidence. 191 In 
addition, they can appeal against court decisions in order to protect the benefits of the 
accused. 192 Due to such a role, the prosecutors are regarded not as a party to the 
proceedings, but as 'a neutral representative of the state.' 193 Goldstein and Marcus 
described the development ofthe prosecutor's status as follows: 
The relative lack of judicial control and the independence of police and prosecutors are 
reconciled with inquisitorial theory by resort to fictions. The public prosecutors in France 
and Italy are treated as part of the judiciary, and their investigations are considered to be 
conducted in their "judicial" capacity. Similarly, the abolition of the examining magistrate 
188 Masaki Koyama, 'The Public Prosecutor, Criminal Law and the Rights of Accused in Japan: Yet to 
Strike a Balance?' in Stuart S. Nagel (ed), Handbook of Global Legal Policy (CRC, 2000) 39, 43; As 
Haley argued, the public trust in judges, the police, and prosecutors is very high in Japan: 'Public opinion 
polls routinely reveal judges along with the police and prosecutors to enjoy the highest levels of public 
trust. The degree of public confidence in the courts in Japan is especially notable in comparison with 
other civic and government institutions, and other countries, including the United States. Newspaper polls, 
for example, routinely show that trust of the courts in Japan is second only to the procuracy and police. In 
one relatively recent Yomiuri Newspaper poll trust in the judiciary was three times as great as trust in 
religious institutions or the self-defense forces, and five times greater than for the Diet, more than seven 
times greater than for offices of the national government. The Prime Minister ranked last. Trust in the 
courts in the United States, however, was less than half the Japanese level and ranked below all religious 
institutions and all political branches except national government offices.' See John O. Haley, 'The 
Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and the Public Trust' in Daniel H. Foote (ed), Law in 
Ja.pan: A Turning Point (Univ of Washington Pr, 2008) 99, 127 (Emphasis added). 
18 Castberg op. cit. 43. 
190 Yasutoshi Tamura. 'Prosecutorial Immunity in Criminal Proceedings in Japan: A Comparative Study' 
(1993) 1 Willamette Bull.Int'l L.& Pol'y 45, 50-51. (In particular, as Tamura put it, such misconducts 
bringing about tort actions mainly stem from the investigative function of the public prosecutors.) 
191 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code [Strafprozej3ordnungJ (1987) s 
160 (2) 
192 ibid s 296 (2) 'The public prosecution office may also make use of [the remedies admissible against 
court decisions] for the accused's benefit.' <http://www.iuscomp.orglglalstatutes/StPO.htm#Il>. 
193 Kuk Cho. "'Procedural weakness" of German Criminal Justice and its Unique Exclusionary Rules 
based on the Right of Personality' (2001) 15(1) Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 1,5.; 
Rodolphe Juy-Birmann, 'The German system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), 
European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 292, 300. 
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in Germany has been explained not as an attempt to replace a judicious magistrate with a 
partial prosecutor, but rather as based on the assumption that the prosecutor can conduct as 
impartial-as "judicial"- an investigation as a member of the judiciary. 194 
The quasi-judicial role of the prosecutors in Germany was developed to make up for the 
elimination of the inquisitorial judges who took up the prosecution and trial. The 
prosecutors had been required to act impartially on behalf of the inquisitorial judges. 
In France, the task of the public prosecutors is to prove the guilt of the defendant. 
However, they can demand not only the conviction of the accused and penalty, but also 
the acquittal or dispensation of the penalty.195 The code of criminal procedure provides 
implicitly the objectivity of the prosecutors by requiring them act 'to the ends of 
justice' .196 Yet, it does not specify particular duties of the prosecutor as a quasi-judicial 
officer. 
In the USA, such a quasi-judicial role has been explicitly provided in the Standards 
of Criminal Justice (SCJ) of American Bar Association. According to the standard 3 -1.2 
of the SCJ, the public prosecutors have a duty 'to seek justice, not merely to convict' as 
a minister of justice. 197 In particular, with respect to the disclosure of evidence, the 
public prosecutors ought not to avoid deliberately pursuit of exonerating evidence even 
if such evidence damages the prosecution of cases and aids the accused. 198 This duty 
was confirmed by the judgement of the US Supreme Court in Berger: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all, and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not 
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that gUilt shall not escape 
or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so. 
194 Abraham S. Goldstein and Martin Marcus. 'The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial 
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany' (1977) 87 Yale LJ 240, 249 (Emphasis added). 
195 Valerie Dervieux, 'The French system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European 
Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 218, 246. 
196 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code of Criminal Procedure (2000) art 458 'The 
district prosecutor makes, in the name of the law, such written and oral submissions as he considers 
af,propriate to the ends of justice. '(Emphasis added). 
1 7 American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3rd 
edn ABA, New York 1993) Standard 3-1.2 (The Function of the Prosecutor) '(a) The office of prosecutor 
is charged with responsibility for prosecutions in its jurisdiction. (b) The prosecutor is an administrator of 
justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court; the prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the 
performance of his or her functions. (c) The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to 
convict.' 
198 ibid Standard 3-3.11 (Disclosure of evidence by the prosecutor) 
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But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his 
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is 
to use every legitimate means to bring about ajust one.'99 
The US Supreme Court placed emphasis on the impartiality of the public prosecutors, 
whose fundamental role is not only to win a case, but also to seek justice as a servant of 
the law. 
In England and Wales, the neutrality of the prosecution service has been regarded as 
an important value because the prosecutorial objectivity is one of the main concerns to 
create the CPS.200 Such a quasi-judicial role is encapsulated in the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors: 
Prosecutors must be fair, independent and objective. They must not let any personal views 
about the ethnic or national origin, gender, disability, age, religion or belief, political views, 
sexual orientation, or gender identity of the suspect, victim or any witness influence their 
decisions. Neither must prosecutors be affected by improper or undue pressure from any 
source. Prosecutors must always act in the interests of justice and not solely for the purpose 
b 
. . .. 201 
of 0 tammg a convIctIOn. 
Accordingly, the public prosecutors must be fair and objective both when they review 
the investigations and when they make a decision to charge the offenders. Furthermore, 
their prosecutions ought to be based on the 'interests of justice' rather than 'improper 
pressure' to make them pursue the conviction. 
In short, each criminal justice system has different descriptions and methods to 
maintain the quasi-judicial role of the prosecutors. Nevertheless, this role is regarded as 
a general duty of the prosecutors. 202 Prosecutorial neutrality is one of the most 
199 Berger v United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78 (The U.S. Supreme Court), 88. 
200 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 203-204.; Sanders and Young op. cit. 334 (Sanders and Young 
argued that 'the CPS is ... supposed to be act as a neutral truth seeking "Minister of Justice".') 
201 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 2010 para 2.4. 
202 The impartiality was agreed as one of the standards for the duties of the prosecutors by the 
International Association of Prosecutors in 1999. See International Association of Prosecutors, Standards 
of professional responsibility and statement of the essential duties and rights of prosecutors (lAP, 1999) 
para 3 'Prosecutors shall perform their duties without fear, favour or prejudice. In particular they shall: 
carry out their functions impartially; remain unaffected by individual or sectional interests and public or 
media pressures and shall have regard only to the public interest; act with objectivity; have regard to alI 
relevant circumstances, irrespective of whether they are to the advantage or disadvantage of the suspect; 
in accordance with local law or the requirements of a fair trial, seek to ensure that all necessary and 
reasonable enquiries are made and the result disclosed, whether that points towards the gUilt or the 
innocence of the suspect; always search for the truth and assist the court to arrive at the truth and to do 
justice between the community, the victim and the accused according to law and the dictates of fairness. ' 
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important elements to sustain a public prosecution system, and thus the various 
functions of the public prosecutors should be compatible with such a general duty. 
4. Investigative Function of Prosecution Service 
In theory, investigation is a separate function from prosecution. The prosecutors begin 
their work by reviewing the investigation after receiving the case from the police and 
make a decision whether to proceed with the prosecution. Under these circumstances, 
the prosecution service does not seem to be involved in the investigation. However, as 
Professor U glow suggested, in practice, it is almost impossible to divide both functions 
completely.203 The investigative function of the prosecutors can be divided into two 
categories depending on the extent of their involvement in the investigation: 
'supervision or advice on the police investigation' and 'direct investigation on their own 
initiative.' In this part, based on those two concepts, the investigative function of 
prosecution service in different jurisdictions is explored. 
As suggested above, in some criminal justice systems, the public prosecutors 
directly investigate cases or supervise police investigation whereas in other jurisdictions, 
the police merely seek advice from the prosecutors who consult the police. But in both 
circumstances, the public prosecutors can be regarded as playing an investigative role. 
However, there are two main differences between jurisdictions, firstly in the relationship 
between the police and prosecutors and secondly the involvement of the prosecutors 
into the investigation. 
The first is based on Damaska's structures of authority, which identifies two models: 
the coordinate and the hierarchical. 204 We can identify distinctive decision making 
processes between the police and prosecutors. In the coordinate model, independent 
decision making is regarded as an important value.20S Thus, the relationship between 
the police and prosecutors is organised on a coordinate structure.206 As a consequence, 
203 Steve Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), 190. As a consequence, the 
police prosecution or prosecutorial investigation can take place in the criminal proceedings. For the 
details on the police prosecution, see above pt 2; Stephanie Beck. 'Under Investigation: A Review of 
police Prosecutions in New Zealand's Summary Jurisdiction' (2006) 12 Auckland University Law Review 
ISO; Van Alstyne, W. Scott Jr. 'The District Attorney-A Historical Puzzle' (l9S2) Wis.L.Rev. 12S, 126-127. 
204 Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 
480. 
20S ibid S09; John D. Jackson. 'The Effect of Legal Culture and Proof in Decisions to Prosecute' (2004) 
3(2) Law, Probability and Risk 109, 116. 
206 Damaska stated that the aim of this structure is to reach 'the decision most appropriate to the 
circumstances of each case.' See Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal 
Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 480,S09. 
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there seems no room for direct prosecutorial supervision of the police investigation. 
Instead, the public prosecutors work on the basis of 'advice and counsel. ,207 By contrast, 
in the hierarchical model, the police and prosecutors are organised into a hierarchy, as in 
most continental jurisdictions. Thus, police investigations are mostly supervised by 
208 prosecutors. 
The second difference reflects the degree of involvement of the public prosecutors in 
the investigation: the investigative and the adjudicative.209 The investigative approach 
of the prosecutors, as Jackson suggested, is to 'form a judgement about the guilt of the 
accused' before making a decision to prosecute.210 Thus, in this model, the evidence is 
generally investigated thoroughly before charging by the prosecutors.211 
On the contrary, in the adjudicative approach, the decision to prosecute is based 
upon an objective assessment of the evidence presented by the police. 212 If the 
prosecutors conclude that there is sufficient evidence, they charge the suspects even 
though they do not necessarily have a belief in guilt. Worboys who emphasised the 
adjudicative approach argued that 'such a personal belief in the guilt or innocence of an 
accused is generally held to be an impediment to fairness and objectivity in reaching the 
. . ..th· ,213 deCISIon to prosecute or to contmue WI a prosecutIon. 
Taken together, the role of public prosecutors and their relationship with the police 
can be effectively explored through a mixture of such contrasting models: 'coordinate & 
adjudicative', 'coordinate & investigative', 'hierarchical & adjudicative', and 
'hierarchical & investigative' .2 14 
4.1. The Coordinate and Adjudicative Model 
In this model, the prosecutors place emphasis on adjudication rather than investigation, 
207 Ken Macdonald. 'Building a Modem Prosecuting Authority' (2008) 22(1) International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology 7, 14. (Ken Macdonald QC, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, 
described the role of the prosecutors with respect to the police investigation as follows: 'public 
prosecutors have moved into police stations, to work side by side with investigators, giving advice and 
counsel when it is necessary. Sometimes they help the police to design operations. ') (Emphasis added) 
208 Jackson op. cit. 116. 
209 ibid 117, Glanville Williams. 'Letting off the Guilty and Prosecuting the Innocent' (1985) Crim L R 
115, and P. Worboys. 'Convicting the Right Person on the Right Evidence' (1985) Crim L R 764. 
210 Jackson op. cit. 
211 ibid. 
212 Worboys op. cit. 
213 ibid 764. 
214 Those four models were suggested by Jackson to 'identify a range of contrasting ideal types of 
prosecutorial assessment of evidence.' See Jackson op. cit. 116-124. In this study, the investigative 
function of the public prosecutors and their relation with the police will be discussed with reference to the 
basic structure of those models. 
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and their relationship with the police is coordinate. The CPS in England and Wales 
represent this model. 
The English criminal justice system considers the objectivity of the public 
prosecutors as one of the important values. Thus, the role of the public prosecutor in the 
investigation has been limited to 'an evaluative one assessing the sufficiency of 
evidence' rather than an investigative forming belief in the guilt before the tria1.21S Such 
a role has been established from the outset of the CPS based on the recognition of the 
Royal Commission: 
A police officer who carries out an investigation, inevitably and properly, forms a view as 
to the gUilt of the suspect. Having done so, without any kind of improper motive, he may be 
inclined to shut his mind to other evidence telling against the gUilt of the suspect or to 
overestimate the strength of the evidence he has assembled.216 
The independent public prosecution service was established in order to screen any 
biases that the police may have. 217 Jackson argues that such emphasis on the 
prosecutorial objectivity leads the crown prosecutors to concentrate on the adjudication 
rather than on the investigation.21s Needless to say, the prosecutors do not have the 
power and resources to directly investigate criminal cases. 
F or a similar reason, the public prosecutors do not have the authority to supervise 
the police. As a consequence, their relationship with the police is one of equality, on a 
coordinate basis.219 With respect to this, the Royal Commission stated as follows: 
[W]e do not consider it appropriate for the CPS to supervise police officers in the 
investigation ... serious confusion of roles would be likely to result to no good purpose if 
the CPS, whose task is to assess the results of investigations in terms of the prospects of 
prosecution to conviction for the offence involved, were to direct investigations themselves. 
2\S ibid 118. 
216 Sir Cyril Phillips, 'The Roy~l Commission on Criminal Procedure: Report' HMSO (Cmnd 8092, 
London) para 6.24. 
217 See above pt 2 'The Development of the Modem Public Prosecution Service'. 
218 Jackson op. cit. 118. This prosecutor's position can be noted in Northern Ireland. The DPP for 
Northern Ireland states the challenges of the new prosecution service: 'It is the duty of the Chief 
Constable to investigate offences and to furnish evidence and information t9 the Director. It is the duty of 
the Director to consider the evidence and information and where he thinks proper to undertake criminal 
proceedings. Involvement of members of my staff in investigations would lessen or appear to lessen the 
capacity of the prosecuting service t%rm the properly impartial judgement which is required in the 
decision whether or not to prosecute.' See ibid 119 (Emphasis added). 
219 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 3 (2) 'It shall be duty of the Director (e) to give, to such extent as he 
considers appropriate, advice to police forces on all matters relating to criminal offences.' 
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Such a step would also remove accountability in this area from the police, with whom it 
most naturally belongs. Although, therefore, the CPS must be in a position to advise on the 
evidence that is required if the case is to go forward to trial, it should not be in the position 
of supervising the gathering of the evidence.22o 
The crown prosecutors do not supervise the investigation but instead advise on 
evidential aspects of individual cases. This ensures the objectivity of the public 
prosecutors and acts as an important filter. The system places great weight on the 
adjudicative role rather than investigative. Such a role may limit the effectiveness of 
their supervisory role. 
4.2. The Coordinate and Investigative Model 
Even though the relationship between the police and prosecutors is based on the 
coordination, the public prosecutors can become actively involved in the investigation 
through two different ways: 'the dynamic of the particular relationship', as in the US, or 
d· . .. b t . J 221 the lTect Investigation y prosecu ors, as In apan. 
First, in the USA, the relationship between the police and prosecutors is based on a 
coordinate model rather than a hierarchical one.222 The criminal procedure does not 
authorise the hierarchical supervision by the prosecutors,223 and instead the Standards 
for Criminal Justice defines their function as an 'advisor' to the investigation of the 
police.224 However, in such a relationship, the public prosecutors do not emphasise their 
adjudicative role, as with the CPS in England and Wales, but rather become involved in 
the investigation.225 Jackson described this circumstance as follows: 
220 Walter G. Runciman, 'The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Report' HMSO (Cm 2263, London) 
ch 2 para 67. Along with those two reasons, the Royal Commission noted the competency of the 
prosecutor as a supervisor of the investigation: 'It is the responsibility of the police to investigate crime. 
There is no reason to believe that another service, whose members are recruited and promoted for their 
legal skills and experience, would be more proficient at investigating crime or at supervising and 
monitoring investigations conducted by those specifically trained for the purpose.' 
221 Jackson op. cit. 120. 
222 Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 
480, 511-521. 
223 Jackson op. cit. 120 (Jackson argued that 'although the prosecutors are involved in the investigations 
of the police, "prosecutorial control" is by no means guaranteed' in the USA.) 
224 American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3rd 
edn ABA, New York 1993) Standard 3-2.7 '(Relations with Police) (a) The prosecutor should provide 
legal advice to the police concerning police functions and duties in criminal matters. (b) The prosecutor 
should cooperate with police in providing the services of the prosecutor's staff to aid in training police in 
the performance of their function in accordance with law.' 
22S Little stated that 'Public prosecutors in this country [the USA] have increasingly become involved in 
the investigative stages of criminal matters during the 20th century. ' See Rory K. Little. 'Proportionality 
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Prosecutors in the United States expressed bewildennent at how prosecutors in England and 
Wales and Northern Ireland could maintain such a rigid separation between investigation 
and prosecution. To them part of the function of prosecution was to ensure that a case was 
properly investigated and prepared and this required a degree of control over investigation. 
It was acknowledged, however, that within a coordinate structure of decision-making, the 
prosecutor does not enjoy complete control over the direction of investigations. 226 
Notwithstanding this, public prosecutors do not have an investigative role in all criminal 
cases?27 Their investigative role is mainly limited to the particular cases which require 
'investigative strategy and action' before any prosecution such as organised crime, 
. . . fr d 228 pubhc corruptIon or senous au. 
In particular, the federal prosecutors, who are called 'the US attorneys,' occasionally 
investigate crimes themselves. Rudolph Giuliani, the former Mayor of the New York 
City, is an example to show the investigation of the federal prosecutors in the USA. He 
worked as the US attorney for the Southern District of New York and mainly dealt with 
the investigations of the white-collar and organised crimes.229 As Nelken and Levi put it, 
some of federal prosecutors 'are looking for political advancement, and the pursuit of 
high-publicity cases, including white collar crime and corruption, is an expected part of 
their self-glorifying role.' 230 This end has a part to play in leading the federal 
prosecutors to investigate criminal cases on their own initiatives. 231 However, as 
Johnson stated, such direct involvements in the investigation is an exception to the US 
rule?32 
as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role' (1999) 68 Fordham Law Review 723, 
724. Such involvements can be noted in the judgements of the court. See Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 
US 409 (The U.S. Supreme Court), 430-431 and Burns v. Reed(1991) 500 US 478 (The U.S. Supreme 
Court), 487-496. Langbein suggested that 'The public prosecutor in Anglo-American criminal procedure 
perfonns two primary functions. One is investigatorial - evidence gathering - and this has no firm border 
with the higher levels of the policing function.' See John H. Langbein. 'The Origins of Public Prosecution 
at Common Law' (1973) 17(4) The American Journal of Legal History 313, 313. 
226 Jackson op. cit. 119-120. 
227 Little op. cit. 728. 
228 ibid. 
229 David Nelken and Michael Levi. 'The Corruption of Politics and the Politics of Corruption: An 
Overview' (1996) Journal of Law and Society 1, 11. 
230 ibid. 
231 The duty of the US attorney is the prosecution of offences rather than investigation. See The U.S., The 
Constitution (1787) Title 28 s 547 (Duties). 
232 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Studies on law and 
social control, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2002), 52. (Johnson argues that the direct 
investigations by prosecutors 'are exceptions to the U.S. rule. Unlike Japan, in the American offices ... 
prosecutors conduct few interviews (especially prior to the charge decision) and even fewer 
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In preparation for trial, prosecutors often take additional investigative measures even 
in 'reactive investigative settings, where the crime is identified and the perpetrator is in 
custody. ,233 Even if the number of cases where the prosecutors play an investigative 
role is not large, such a role of the prosecutors, as Little put it, has been considered 
significant due to its impact. 234 However, such involvement of the prosecutors in 
investigation has limitations. The US Supreme Court clarified that the investigative role 
of the prosecutors had to be closely associated with the judicial process in order to 
secure the 'absolute immunity' of the prosecutorial decisions?35 
Second, Japanese criminal proceedings show hybrid features. 236 In principle, the 
relationship between the police and prosecutors is based on a coordinate structure.237 In 
general, the public prosecutors cannot direct the police investigation, but rather give 
advice on the criminal cases. However, article 193 of the Japanese Code of Criminal 
Procedure (JCCP) partially allows public prosecutors to supervise the police when they 
conduct their own investigation.238 As a result, the police have primary responsibility 
for the investigation without prosecutorial supervision, whereas the public prosecutors 
can conduct a complementary investigation of the cases which are sent to them by the 
police after the primary investigation.239 To conduct this complementary investigation, 
interrogations. ') Along with the federal prosecutors, the district attorney occasionally investigate cases 
themselves. 
233 Little op. cit. 728. 
234 Little argued that 'The involvement of prosecuting attorneys in the investigative function is valuable, 
because intrusive investigative decisions are not left solely to law enforcement personnel. Prosecutors, 
due to their training, experience, and temperament, can provide a healthy brake on non-lawyer 
enforcement personnel. Moreover, as lawyers, prosecutors are subject to ethical regulation and bar 
discipline, checks on discretion that are unavailable for regulating non-lawyers law enforcement agents.' 
See ibid 729. 
235 Burns v. Reed(1991) 500 U S 478 (The U.S. Supreme Court), 495 (The US Supreme Court held that 
'The United States argues that giving legal advice is related to a prosecutor's roles in screening cases for 
prosecution and in safeguarding the fairness of the criminal judicial process ... That argument, however, 
proves too much. Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely 
investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to 
prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive. Rather, as in Imbler, we 
inquire whether the prosecutor's actions are closely associated with the judicial process. Indeed, we 
implicitly rejected the United States' argument in Mitchell, supra, where we held that the Attorney 
General was not absolutely immune from liability for authorizing a warrantless wiretap. Even though the 
wiretap was arguably related to a potential prosecution, we found that the Attorney General "was not 
acting in a prosecutorial capacity," and thus was not entitled to the immunity recognized in Imbler. ') 
236 Dammer et al. op. cit. 93. 
237 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Japan, Code of Criminal Procedure (Act no. /3/) (1948) art 192 'There 
shall be mutual cooperation and coordination on the part of public prosecutors and the Prefectural Public 
Safety Commission and judicial police officials regarding the investigation.' 
<http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detaiV?printID=&ky=lineal+descendant&re-02&page-l& 
vm=02> 
238 ibid art 193 (3) 'A public prosecutor may, when it is necessary for the prosecutor himlherself to 
investigate an offense, issue orders to judicial police officials and have them assist in the investigation.' 
239 Johnson op. cit. 52; Dong Hee Lee op. cit. 737, Jong Gu Kim op. cit. 364; Most criminal cases 
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the prosecutor can call on and supervise the police. But in practice such an investigation 
is conducted by the prosecutors themselves.24o 
Unlike other systems, the public prosecutor's offices in Japan have their own 
investigative unitS.241 At present, in thirteen out of fifty prosecutor's offices, the public 
prosecutors conduct investigations of corruption, organised crime and white-collar 
crimes.242 In particular, most criminal enquires into high profile corruption are initiated 
by the public prosecutors rather than by the police.243 Japanese prosecutors are involved 
vigorously in such investigations because, as Castberg stated, they in general require 
sufficient evidence before charging: 
One of the great fears of Japanese prosecutors is that a suspect will destroy evidence, so 
many initial investigations, especially in corruption cases, are made secretly to gather 
sufficient evidence for a search warrant and an arrest warrant so that the suspect may be 
detained long enough for prosecutors to seize all relevant evidence and use that evidence to 
bring about an indictment.244 
Accordingly, as Johnson described, 'front-line prosecutors spend most of their work 
time (perhaps 60 per cent) investigating cases.' 245 The prosecutors try to elicit 
'confessions directly, by interrogating suspects,' and more often interview them 'to 
confirm the details of confessions by the police. ,246 That is to say, the Japanese criminal 
proceedings place much emphasis on the investigative role of the prosecution service.247 
investigated by the police must be sent to the prosecutor's office because only the prosecutors have the 
authority to end the cases. For more details, see pt 5 'Discretion at the Pre-Trial Stage'. 
240 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Japan, Code of Criminal Procedure (Act no. 13/) (1948) art 193 (3). 
However, with regard to the interpretation of this provision, the police and the prosecutors have different 
opinions, which lead to the friction between them. Johnson described this situation thus: 'Police tend to 
interpret [this provision] as referring only to investigations the prosecutors have independently initiated ... , 
while prosecutors construe them more broadly to cover all investigations, whether initiated by prosecutors 
or by police ... These disagreements were especially strong in the first two decades or so after the new 
CCP was enacted in 1947.' Yet, such dispute is still intense. See Johnson op. cit. 53. 
241 Castberg op. cit. 53 n 66; Marcia E. Goodman. 'Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Japan' (1986) 5 UCLA Pac.Basin LJ 16,22. 
242 Prior to 1998, the investigation units existed only in three public prosecutor's offices - Tokyo, Osaka, 
and Nagoya. However, in August of 1998, the new investigation units were established in ten prosecutor's 
offices such as Kyoto and Kobe etc. See Dong Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 715; Goodman op. cit. 22. 
243 Castberg op. cit. 74 (According to Castberg, 'In 1993, for example, the Special Investigation 
Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's office initiated 15 cases, only one of which was sent 
to them by the police.'); In 2001, 7,691 suspects, which are 0.4 per cent of all suspects, were investigated 
in their special investigative units of the public prosecutor's offices. See Dong Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 772. 
244 Castberg op. cit. 45-46. 
24S Johnson op. cit. 52. 
246 ibid 126; For the impact of confession in Japan, see pt 6 'The Influence of the Prosecutors upon the 
Trial' . 
247 Castberg op. cit. 71. 
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However, this circumstance, as a former judge of the Osaka High Court argued, has 
a part to play in weakening the whole adjudicative process: 'Criminal trials - and in 
particular the fact-finding that lies at the heart of trials - are conducted in closed rooms 
by the investigators. Many court proceedings are merely "formal ceremony" and "empty 
't 1" ,248 n ua . 
In short, in the USA and Japan, the relationship between the police and prosecutors 
is structured on a coordinate basis. But the rigid separation between the investigation 
and prosecution, apparent in England and Wales, is less obvious. Rather, in both 
jurisdictions, the prosecutors' investigative role is regarded as more important than their 
adjudicative. In particular, the Japanese prosecutors seem to be more strongly involved 
in the investigation than their counterparts in the USA, conducting extensive 
investigations with their own resources and legal authorities. 
4.3. The Hierarchical and Adjudicative Model 
Unlike the common law traditions, the continental criminal justice systems are based on 
a hierarchical structure.249 The French criminal procedure is a representative of such a 
tradition. 25o The prosecutors have an authority to supervise the investigation by the 
police and the relationship between the police and prosecutors is structured on a 
hierarchical basis.2sl 
However, the French criminal procedure leads public prosecutors to concentrate on 
the adjudicative role rather than the investigative.2s2 This is because of the impact of the 
role of investigating judge Uuge d'instruction]. 253 In the French procedure, 
investigations are categorised into three groups. Firstly, the investigations of serious 
248 Takeo Ishimatsu, 'Are Criminal Defendants in Japan Truly Receiving Trials by Judges?' in Daniel H. 
Foote (tr), Law in Japan (1989) 143 cited from Johnson op. cit. 126. 
249 Damaska op. cit. 487. Damaska defmed the features of the continental criminal procedure as follows: 
'the strong tendency to arrive at uniform policies through the centralization of authority; the rigorously 
hierarchical ordering of agencies participating in the administration of justice; the preference for precise 
and rigid normative directives over more flexible standards; and, fmally, the great importance accorded 
official documentation.' 
250 See pt 1 'Introduction' and pt 2 'The Development of the Modem Public Prosecution Systems' 
251 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code of Criminal Procedure (2000) art 38 
'Judicial police officers and agents are placed under the supervision of the prosecutor general. He may 
instruct them to collect any information he considers useful for the proper administration of justice.' art 
41 'The district prosecutor institutes or causes to be taken any step necessary for the discovery and 
prosecution of violati~n~ of the crimi~al !a~. :0 this e?d, he directs !he .activity of the judicial police 
officers and agents wlthm the area ofJuTlsdlctlon of hIS court. The district prosecutor supervises police 
custody measures. He visits the places where persons are held whenever he considers this to be necessary 
and at least once every year ... ' 
252 Jackson op. cit. 120-124. 
253 ibid. 
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crimes are mostly conducted by the investigating judges. 254 Secondly, there is an 
investigation of flagrant offences.25s Those investigations are mainly conducted by the 
police. 256 Finally, the investigation of criminal cases, other than serious or flagrant 
matters, is carried out by the police under the supervision of the public prosecutors. 
These latter are often called the preliminary investigations.2S7 
Even if there is a difference in the extent of their contribution, public prosecutors 
become involved in all kinds of investigations. However, their role is relatively 
passive?58 For instance, in relation to serious offences, the main role of the prosecutors 
is to pass the cases to the investigating judges although the prosecutors can detennine 
the limits of the investigation.2s9 Such investigations are conducted by the police under 
the supervision of the investigating judges.26o In the cases of preliminary and flagrant 
investigations, the prosecutorial role is mainly to approve the measures taken by the 
police.261 Jackson states that the prosecutor's role in the investigation is to review the 
police investigation in a bureaucratic way 'with considerable reliance placed on written 
evidence and authenticity of fonn,' and consequently this makes the French prosecutors 
as 'an adjudicator of the dossier submitted by the police' rather than 'an active 
. . t fth ~ t ,262 mvestlga or 0 e lac s. 
254 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal Procedure (2000) art 79 'A 
preliminary judicial investigation is compulsory where a felony has been committed. In the absence of 
special provisions, it is optional for misdemeanours. It may also be initiated for petty offences if it is 
requested by the district prosecutor ... ' For more details on the investigating judge, see arts 79-190; 
Valerie Dervieux, 'The French system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European 
Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 218, 237. 
m Flagrant offences in France include: the offence is 'actually being committed or has just been 
committed, or 'shortly after the act, the suspect is denounced by public outcry, or is found in possession 
of objects, with traces or evidence, indicating that he took part in the crime or delit'.' See ibid 234; Bruno 
Aubusson de Cavarlay, 'The Prosecution Service Function within the French Criminal Justice System' in 
J6rg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise 
o~ Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2006) 185-205, 201. 
26 Dervieux op. cit. 234; Cavarlay op. cit. 201. 
257 ibid; Dervieux op. cit. 234-235. 
258 Jackson op. cit. 121. 
259 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal Procedure (2000) art 80 'The 
investigating judge may only investigate in accordance with a submission made by the district prosecutor. 
The prosecution submission may be made against a named or unnamed person. Where an offence not 
covered by the prosecution submissions is brought to the knowledge of the investigating judge, he must 
communicate forthwith to the district prosecutor the complaints or the official records which establish its 
existence ... '; Dervieux defined the role of the prosecutor in relation to the investigation of the judges as 
follows: 'If the offence is a crime, the procureur de la Republique calls in thejuge d'instruction by means 
ofa formal request asking him to investigate the precise facts.' See Dervieux op. cit. 237; Jackson op. cit. 
121 
260 Cavarlay op. cit. 20 I. 
261 The examples of approvals as to the preliminary investigations are extending the period of custody, 
securing scientific reports, requiring attendance for questioning, and etc. See French Code of Criminal 
Procedure op. cit. arts 75,77, and 78. For the flagrant offences, see arts 54, 56, and 63. 
262 Jackson op. cit. 121. 
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It is the investigating judges, rather than the prosecutors, who play the significant 
role in the investigation. 263 They can take any investigative steps to discover the 
truth. 264 Unlike the prosecutor whose role is 'oversight and accountability', the 
investigating judges have the authority to conduct a personal inquiry.26s However, as 
they have professional backgrounds as a judge and limited resources, they generally 
delegate the investigative powers to the police, and most investigation actions are taken 
by the police under the direction of the investigating judges.266 
This hierarchical and adjudicative model can equally apply to the German public 
prosecution system although it does not have the investigating judges.267 In theory, the 
German public prosecutors are regarded as the 'ruler of the investigative stage', whereas 
the police have been considered as 'an organ serving the public prosecution service.'268 
Thus, the relationship between the police and prosecutors is structured on a hierarchical 
basis?69 However, in practice most offences are investigated by the police without the 
supervision of the prosecutors. 270 Only for a small number of serious cases do the 
prosecutors involve themselves at an early stage. This is because certain investigative 
b . d d th· .. 271 measures must e carne un er elr supervlSlon. 
However, the German prosecutors are also more adjudicative rather than 
investigative because of two main features. First, evidential sufficiency, as Professor 
Fionda has stated, is the governing criterion in the prosecution of crimes since the 
'legality principle' leads the prosecutors to file an indictment in almost all cases without 
263 Jackson stated that 'The examining magistrate is apt to take a more investigative role than the 
continental prosecutor.' See ibid 122. 
264 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code of Criminal Procedure (2000) art 81 'The 
investigating judge undertakes in accordance with the law any investigative step he deems useful for the 
discovery of the truth. He seeks out evidence of innocence as well as guilt.' 
265 Jackson op. cit. 122. 
266 Jacqueline Hodgson. 'The Police, the Prosecutor and the Juge D'Instruction: Judicial Supervision in 
France, Theory and Practice' (2001) 41(2) Br J Criminol342, 352; Jackson op. cit. 123. 
267 The German criminal procedure abolished the investigating magistrate who conducted serious 
investigations actively. See above pt 2.3 'The German System'. 
268 Beatrix Elsner and Julia Peters, 'The Prosecution Service Function within the German Criminal Justice 
System' in J~rg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice 
Systems (Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2006) 207,227. 
269 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code [StrafprozefJordnungJ (1987) art 
161 'For the purpose indicated in the foregoing section the public prosecution office may request 
information from all public authorities and may make investigations of any kind, either itself or through 
the authorities and officials in the police force. The authorities and officials in the police force shall be 
obliged to comply with the request or order of the public prosecution office.' (Emphasis added) 
270 Elsner and Peters suggested that 'Nowadays the PPS is not the 'ruler of the investigative stage' in 
most cases. In relation to less serious or mass crimes this role has long been assumed by the police. They 
carry out investigations independently and only when these are finished the file is passed on the PPS.' 
Elsner and Peters op. cit. 227-228. 
271 ibid. 
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exerclsmg discretion. 272 All offences of the criminal code in principle must be 
prosecuted and proven in courts rather than, as in Japan and Korea, being decided in the 
office of the prosecutors. 273 Similarly, the discretionary powers of the German 
prosecutors at the investigation stage, as Goldstein and Marcus discussed, are mainly 
'exercised by finding the evidence insufficient, by concluding too casually that 
witnesses are not credible.' 274 Consequently, the compulsory prosecution of crimes 
leads the prosecutors to be more interested in their adjudicative role than their 
investigative. 
Second, 'the aggressive inquisitorial role' of the judges also guides the prosecutors 
to place emphasis on adjudication.275 In the German criminal procedure, it is the judges 
that have a duty to seek the truth in a case.276 Thus, they can 'form an inner conviction 
without being bound by the statements recorded at the hearing. ,277 All offences with 
sufficient evidence should be prosecuted, and they must be dealt with in court by the 
judges.278 The inquisitorial judges have a main role to play in criminal process. As a 
consequence, the public prosecutors have no choice but to focus on their adjudicative 
role. 
In particular, the public prosecutors in Germany and France do not have their own 
investigative units to directly carry out investigations.279 Investigations are conducted 
by the police and the prosecutors supervise.28o In other words, the prosecutors have a 
statutory power to investigate cases but their roles are limited to the supervision of the 
investigation and trial work. 
272 Fionda op. cit. 135. 
273 ibid. 
274 Abraham S. Goldstein and Martin Marcus. 'The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial 
Slsstems: France, Italy, and Germany' (1977) 87 Yale LJ 240, 275. 
2 s ibid 248 (Goldstein and Marcus stated that 'The police and prosecutor prepare the dossier in Germany, 
and judicial supervision is preserved only through the aggressive inquisitorial role assigned to the trial 
judge, who is expected to bring out all the "objective facts".') 
276 This duty of the judges stems from the 'principle of investigation or factual truth' guiding the criminal 
process in relation to evidence, which gives the judges the obligation to find the truth of a case. See 
Rodolphe ]uy-Birmann, 'The German system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), 
European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 292, 309. 
277 ibid (Juy-Birmann described that 'the [German] judges at trial hears the parties and himself collects 
the elements of evidence likely to influence his decision. ') 
278 Fionda op. cit. 135. 
279 Marianne Wade, 'The Power to Decide - Prosecutorial Control, Diversion and Punishment in 
European Criminal Justice Systems Today' in Jijrg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise of Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (Springer, Berlin; 
Heidelberg 2006) 27, 41 (Wade stated that 'It is not difficult to imagine this legal PPS superiority being 
hampered by reality. After all police services have more specific investigative competence and the PPS is 
dependent upon the police to carry out investigative actions in all of the countries studied [England & 
Wales, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden]; no PPS has an own investigative unit 
and it is the police who are 'on the ground', doing the work') 
280 ibid. 
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Such circumstances may be explained in two aspects. Firstly, the public prosecutors 
do not have sufficient resources to investigate cases themselves on their own 
initiatives. 281 Most resources of the prosecutor's office go to carrying out their 
adjudicative role, and they have to depend on the police forces in order to accomplish 
their investigative role.282 Secondly, the prosecutors themselves regard the investigation 
as the role of the police rather than that of the prosecution service.283 The supervision 
and review of the police investigations are considered more important than the direct 
involvement in the investigations?84 The prosecutors regard their roles as a legal expert 
as significant. As Jackson put it, 'If resources playa considerable part in constraining 
prosecutors' activities, professional ideology would, nevertheless, seem to playa part as 
well.,285 
Taken together, both French and German public prosecutors have the authority to 
direct police investigations. Nevertheless, they do not become over-involved in the 
investigation due to some systematic limitations: in France the investigating judges have 
a role to play in investigating the serious crimes and the public prosecutors are mainly 
in charge of the trial work whereas in Germany, the prosecutors do not in principle have 
the discretionary power not to charge. 286 Thus, most serious crimes must be prosecuted, 
and the trial judges take charge of finding the truth in court. In particular, the 
prosecution services do not have their own investigative units due to the lack of 
resources and professional ideology as a legal expert. 
4.4. The Hierarchical and Investigative Model 
In this model, prosecutors direct the investigation of the police on a hierarchical basis 
and form a belief in guilt of the suspects before charging. The Korean system of public 
prosecution is a typical example of this model. The Korean prosecutors, as their 
281 ibid; Sven Reckewerth. 'The Role of the Prosecution in Genoan Criminal Procedure' (1998) 7 Tilburg 
Foreign L.Rev. 65, 70. 
282 See above pt 4.3 'The Hierarchical and Adjudicative Model'. 
283 Hodgson suggested a difference in the professional ideology thus: 'As one procureur ... put it: "There 
is a part of (the police's) work that I cannot evaluate. I can only talk of their role in the legal procedure, 
how they report on the telephone. We inhabit different worlds. They do not know the world of judges and 
I do not know the world of nightclubs." This comment was echoed by a senior police officer ... , who said, 
when asked about relations with the parquet: "Our work is different. They are in their offices and we are 
outside on the ground".' See Jacqueline Hodgson. 'The Police, the Prosecutor and the Juge D'Instruction: 
Judicial Supervision in France, Theory and Practice' (2001)41(2) Br J Criminol342, 352. 
284 Wade op. cit. 40 (Wade stated that 'In civilian systems ... the PPS is traditionally considered to have a 
controlling role in the investigative stage. ') 
285 Jackson op. cit. 115. 
286 The prosecutors can become involved in the enquiry by the investigating judges. However, most 
investigative measures are decided by the investigating judges. 
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counterparts in German, are often called 'a ruler of the investigation'. 287 Almost all 
criminal offences are investigated by the police under the supervision of the 
prosecutors.288 The relationship between the police and prosecutors, as in France and 
Germany, is structured on a hierarchical basis. 
However, the Korean prosecution service does not have the limits to the 
prosecutorial involvement which have been seen in the French and German proceedings. 
In other words, the Korean criminal justice system does not have the investigating 
judges who deal with the investigations of serious crimes in France. Serious crimes are 
investigated by the police under the supervision of the prosecutors. 289 Indeed, 
supervision occurs from an early stage because, as in Germany, most coercive measures 
can be taken only on the authority of the prosecutors. 290 In addition, pro secutori al 
discretion is not limited as it is in Germany.291 
The prosecutors carry out thorough investigation until when they are certain about 
the guilt of the suspects.292 The investigative role of the Korean prosecutors is similar to 
that of their counterparts in Japan. In both jurisdictions, the prosecutors investigate a 
crime themselves after receiving the files from the police to make a decision to 
charge.293 However, there are three main differences between the Japanese and Korean 
system. 
Firstly, the Korean prosecutors have the power to direct all investigations of the 
police. However, their counterparts in Japan cannot intervene in the police investigation 
until the police investigation ends and the case is sent to their office.294 
Secondly, unlike in Korea, the investigative dossiers written by the police and those 
written by prosecutors have the same evidentiary impact at the trial. The police 
interview documents as well as the prosecutorial are accepted into evidence in courts. 
As Johnson argued, the investigation by the prosecutors is 'to confirm the details of 
287 Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seoul 2008), 99-102. 
28S The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act {Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 196 (Judicial Police Officers) '(I) Investigators, police 
administrative officials, police superintendents, police captains or police lieutenants shall investigate 
crimes as judicial police officers under instructions of a public prosecutor.' (Emphasis added) 
289 The Korean prosecutors can investigate crimes with their own resources. In practice, most 
investigations of serious crimes are conducted by the prosecutors. 
290 Dong Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 778-779. 
291 KCPA art 247 (Principle of Discretionary Indictment) 'A public prosecutor may decide not to institute 
a ublic prosecution, considering the matters under Article 51 of the Criminal Act. ' 
29f Young-Chul Kim. 'The Effective System of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution in Korea' (2003) 
60 UNAFEI Annual Report For 2001 and Resource Material Series 77-93,85-86 
293 In Japan and Korea, the prosecutors have their own resources to carry out investigations without the 
support from the police.. . 
294 Under this circumstance, the police can seek out adVice from the prosecutors. See David T. Johnson, 
The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Studies on law and social control, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York 2002), 53. 
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confessions gained by the police, filling in holes, and painting over problems, and, in 
the argot insiders employ, wiping police butts as necessary. ,295 
However, in Korea, as noted in detail in Chapter 6, there is a significant difference in 
the admissibility of the investigative dossiers. Those written by the prosecutors have 
much more impact on the trial than those written by the police. Thus, unlike their 
counterparts in Japan, the Korean prosecutors must interview the suspects to obtain 
confessions and record these in their own dossiers. As a result, this impact of the 
prosecutors' dossiers has led them to concentrate on their investigative role rather than 
th d· d' . 296 e a ~u lcatlve. 
Finally, all the Korean public prosecutor's offices, unlike other jurisdictions, have 
their own investigative units. Japanese prosecutors have their own investigative units 
but only thirteen out of fifty prosecutor's offices have the special departments for 
investigation.297 In Korea; even headquarters which are called the Supreme Prosecutor's 
Office have special investigative units operating on instructions from the attorney 
general. 298 Furthermore investigations, unlike in Japan, are not limited to particular 
crimes such as corruption and organised crime, but instead, are carried out for almost all 
kinds of offences. 
Taken together, the prosecutors' relationship with the police and their main role in 
the criminal proceedings, as seen in Table 5.1, can be categorised into four groups. 














Note. '" In the USA, France and Germany, the public prosecutors are in charge of the investigative role by 
becoming involved in the police investigation. However, they have a different relationship with the police, 
e.g. in the USA, the prosecutors can only give advice and consult the police, whereas in Germany and 
France, they have a power to supervise. There seems to be a discrepancy in the extent to intervene in the 
police investigations. Thus, although the US prosecutors place emphasis on the investigative role, they do 
29' ibid 126. 
296 Jong Gu Kim op. cit. 529. 
297 See ch 3. 
298 Dong Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 774-775. 
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not have necessarily more intensified investigative role than the German and French. 
5. Discretion at the Pre-Trial Stage 
In the pre-trial procedures, public prosecutors exercise considerable discretion which 
makes them 'one of the most powerful officials in the government.,299 Generally, they 
make decisions whether or not to charge and what to charge.30o In addition, in the 
English and US systems, decisions whether or on what terms to enter into plea bargains 
are taken by the prosecutors.301 This goes even further in Korea where only the public 
prosecutors decide whether or not to initiate the investigation of crimes.302 
These decisions by prosecutors, as Ashworth and Redmayne illustrated, 'are 
characterized by discretion rather than by binding rules.' 303 Hawkins described 
discretion in the criminal proceedings as follows: 
Discretion arising from a number of sources suffuses the processes of law enforcement and 
regulation. Discretion is plastic, shaped and given form to some extent by the institutions of 
law and legal arrangements and more substantially by decision-makers' framing behaviour. 
Systems of formal rules, for all their appearance of precision and specificity, work in only 
imprecise ways. ... The legal system is not neatly carved up by smoothly functioning 
institutional arrangements, but in reality, as a loosely coupled set of subsystems, is much 
more messy, with internal inefficiencies and conflicts. Those enforcing rules may seek to 
attain the broad aim of a legal mandate in general terms, but the specific question of whether 
and how a particular rule applies in a particular circumstance will inevitably be reserved for, 
or assumed within, the discretion of the legal actor concemed.
304 
299 Bennett L. Gershman. 'The New Prosecutors' (1991) 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 393, 405; James Vorenberg. 
'Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power' (1980) 94 Harv L Rev 1521, 1555 (Vorenberg stated that 
'Giving prosecutors the power to invoke or deny punishment at their discretion raises the prospect that 
society's most fundamental sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously. ') and for the 
restrictions on discretion of the prosecution service in the USA, see ibid 1537-1545; Angela J. Davis, 
Arbitrary justice: The power of the American prosecutor (Oxford University Press, 2007), 8 (Davis 
argued that 'since prosecutors are widely recognized as the most powerful officials in the criminal justice 
system, arguably they should be held more accountable than other officials, not less. However, for reasons 
that are not entirely clear, the judiciary, the legislature, and the general public have given prosecutors a 
pass.') 
~oo Vorenberg op. cit. 1525. 
301 ibid. 
302 See ch 3. 
303 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 75. 
304 Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2002), 424-425. 
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In criminal proceedings, discretion plays a significant role in supplementing as statutes 
cannot provide for every circumstance. However, the extent or type of discretion is 
different depending on the systems of criminal justice. 
5.1. Discretion to Drop the Case at the Investigation Stage 
At the investigation stage, the discretion to conclude a case is exercised by the police 
and prosecutors. After the police finish an investigation, the case is sent to the 
prosecutor's office for review and prosecution. This process, as Wade described, is a 
'defining moment' for the prosecutors since it determines the workload of the 
• • 305 Wh h l' h t d" d prosecution service. ere t e po Ice ave au onomous Iscretion to rop cases, the 
prosecutors only have a duty to review those cases already filtered by the police. As a 
result, the more discretion the police have, the less workload the prosecutors have to 
deal with. As noted in Elsner's comparative study of 'police case-ending possibilities 
I 
within criminal investigations', many systems of criminal justice give the police legal or 
de facto discretion to end cases which has the effect of reducing the workload of the 
. • 306 
prosecution service. 
Such discretion of the police can be observed extensively in the English and United 
States systems. Fundamentally, as the police are responsible for the investigation, they 
are given the authority by implication to initiate an investigation, to review it and to 
discontinue without referring to the prosecution service.307 The police decide which 
cases have sufficient evidence for a successful prosecution, and only those cases are 
sent to the prosecutor's office. 
Maximum Police Discretion (England & Wales and the USA) 
In England and Wales, the police not only drop the cases by applying the evidentiary 
sufficiency test, but they also conclude investigations by considering the public 
interest.308 Police discretion can be categorised into three groups. First, the police may 
make a decision to take no further action. As Ashworth and Redmayne stated, this 
305 Wade op. cit. 52 
306 Beatrix Elsner, Paul Smit and Josef Zila. 'Police Case-Ending Possibilities within Criminal 
Investigations' (2008) 14(2-3) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 11, 192-195 (The 
discretion of the police in this study includes: selective hand-over and simple drop of cases, public 
interest drop, disposal, sanction, and prosecution.) 
307 Wade op. cit. 53; Elsner et a1. op. cit. 191-192; Dong Hee Lee et a1. op. cit. 582. 
308 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 148-150. 
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measure is taken mostly for cases in which there is insufficient evidence. However, 
although there is sufficient evidence, the police can take this action where 'the 
defendant has already been sentenced to custody, or indicates a willingness to have the 
offence 'taken into consideration' in sentencing for another crime, or the offender is 
very young, or the offence is non-serious' or etc. Second, the police may give an 
infonnal warning to the minor offenders, e.g. motorists violating traffic laws may be 
given such a warning.309 Finally, the police give a 'simple caution' to an offender.31o 
This simple caution can be applied to most criminal cases311 under certain conditions: 
[T]he suspect made a clear and reliable admission of the offence either verbally or in writing 
... ; there is a realistic prospect of conviction if the offender were to be prosecuted in line with 
the Code for Crown Prosecutors ... [e.g.] ... A clear, reliable admission of the offence, 
corroborated by some other material and significant evidential fact will be sufficient evidence 
to provide a realistic prospect of conviction; it [is] in the public interest to use a simple 
caution as the means of disposal ... Officers should take into account the public interest 
factors set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors, "The Full Code Test", in particular the 
seriousness of the offence; the suspect [is] 18 years of age or older at the time the caution is to 
be administered ... Where a suspect is under 18, a Reprimand or Warning would be the 
equivalent disposal, as per the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; a simple caution is appropriate 
to the offence and the offender.312 
The simple caution of the police is different from the infonnal warnings because it is 
generally exercised by a senior officer in unifonn at a police station.313 In addition, the 
cautions are recorded and disclosed to the court in the statement of antecedents. Adult 
cautions had no legislative basis until Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which 
introduced a statutory scheme of conditional cautions (discussed below).314 With 
respect to the police, Professor Uglow stated that two filters exist in the English 
criminal proceedings: 'the police as a preliminary filter, removing cases from the 
conveyer-belt of justice, by decisions either to take no further action or to caution. The 
CPS acts as a second filter using their power to discontinue prosecutions' .315 
Similarly, in the USA, the police themselves can detennine the cases to be sent to 
the prosecutor's office depending on the result of the evidentiary sufficiency test 
irrespective of the severity of offences. Yet, unlike their counterparts in England and 
309 ibid. 
310 This simple caution had been known as 'formal caution' before Home Office Circular 30/2005. 
However, it was renamed to distinguish it from the 'conditional caution'. See Home Office, Simple 
cautioning of adult offenders (circular 016 1 2008, Office for Criminal Justice Reform (OCJR), Policy and 
Process, London 2008) para 2. 
311 However, the simple caution is mainly used for minor offences. Only exceptionally, it can be used to 
deal with serious offences. See ibid para 3. 
312 ibid para 9. 
313 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 149. 
314 ibid. 
315 Steve Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), 196. 
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Wales, they have relatively little discretion concerning the offences with sufficient 
evidence since they generally have the obligation to invoke criminal proceedings.316 
This difference arises from the distinctive legal culture in the USA. Traditionally, the 
US criminal law assumes that 'police encounter criminals, no matter what the gravity of 
their offences must arrest them and produce them in court. ,317 Beale suggests that as the 
United States legal tradition has placed emphasis on the punitive justice, restorative 
justice allowing such diversion of a case has developed relatively slowly in there. 3 IS 
Minimal Police Discretion (Germany and Korea) 
In contrast, in Germany and Korea, all cases investigated by the police must be sent to 
the prosecutor's office without exception.319 As the investigation is entirely controlled 
by the prosecution service, only they can make a decision not to invoke the criminal 
process.320 There is no room for the discretion of the police. 
This has an impact on diversion as in these jurisdictions any form of police diversion 
is not generally permitted. In Germany, police take part in prosecutorial diversion 
schemes regarding juveniles. Even this is comparatively restricted due to the principle 
of compulsory prosecution. 321 The German prosecutors have little discretion not to 
charge where there is sufficient evidence.322 In this sense, Germany is different from 
316 George stated that 'screening, diversion, and infonnal resolution of criminal matters in the United 
States are not fonnalised by law, and experimental programs have been sporadic and at the local level. ' 
See B. J. George. 'Screening, Diversion and Mediation in the United States' (1984) 29 NYL Sch.L.Rev. I, 
1. 
317 ibid 2. 
318 Sara S. Beale. 'Still Tough on Crime-Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States' (2003) 
Utah L.Rev. 413,413. 
319 Marianne Wade, 'The Power to Decide - Prosecutorial Control, Diversion and Punishment in 
European Criminal Justice Systems Today' in JOrg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise of Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (Springer, Berlin; 
Heidelberg 2006) 27,53; Dong'Hee Lee and others, Investigation Systems: A Comparative Study 
[Bigyosusajedoron] (Pakyoungsa, Seoul 2004), 742-746; Ordinance 665 of the Ministry of Justice for the 
duties of the Judicial Police Officer 2009 partially amended on 29 May 2009 art 54; In Korea, the police 
do not have the discretion to drop the cases, but instead, they can file an indictment of minor offences. 
This discretion is accounted for in pt 5.2 'The Decision to Charge' 
320 Beatrix Elsner, Paul Smit and Josef Zila. 'Police Case-Ending Possibilities within Criminal 
Investigations' (2008) 14(2-3) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research II, 193-196 (Elsner 
stated that 'In Germany, which has the most restricted Police of all study countries, there is no legal 
provision for a Police drop. ') 
~21 Wolfgang Heinz, 'Diversion in Gennan Juvenile Justice: Its Practice, Impact, and Penal Policy 
Implications' in GUnter Albrecht and Wolfgang Ludwig-Mayerhofer (eds), Diversion and Informal Social 
Control (Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 160. 
322 Heinz stated that' In the Gennan system of criminal justice the only diversionary strategies which are 
possible are those which use the procedural possibilities for the public prosecutor to halt the prosecution 
during the pretrial examinati~n ... or during ~e ~al b~ the judge. Of particular relevance are the 
provisions relating to the haltmg of prosecutIOn m sections 45 and 47 of the Juvenile Justice Act' See ibid, 
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Korea where there is no such principle and the Korean prosecutors exercise more 
extensive discretion.323 
Hybrid Police Discretion (France and Japan) 
Unlike those four jurisdictions, the French and Japanese systems show hybrid features. 
In both jurisdictions, in principle, reviewing and ending the criminal cases is within the 
authority of the prosecution service. However, other legal parties such as the police or 
investigating judges are able to end the investigations of certain crimes. In France, the 
police can conclude the investigation concerning minor cases, where there is either no 
sufficient evidence or no known offender.324 In addition, the police can decide not to 
invoke criminal proceedings on the basis of the public interest test. 325 However, the 
French police do not have the authority to discontinue in serious criminal matters. In 
such cases, it is the investigating judges who make the decision. 326 As they are in 
charge of the investigations, they have the authority to end an investigation or to refer 
the cases to the prosecutor's office.327 In France, as in England and the United States, 
there are two filters to screen cases with the police and investigating judge as the first 
filter, and the prosecutor acts as the second.328 
In Japan, the public prosecutors mainly control the power to conclude investigations. 
The police must send criminal cases to the prosecutor's office when they complete the 
investigation.329 However, with respect to some minor crimes, the Japanese code of 
criminal procedure gives the police the authority to end investigations without referring 
160. 
323 See pt 5.3 'Discretion at the Prosecution Stage'. 
324 The drops based on insufficient evidence are regulated by law, whereas there is no legal provision to 
end the investigations with unknown offenders. However, in practice, such decisions are made by the 
police without the supervision from prosecutors. See Wade op. cit. 53 table 10 nn d, h. 
~2S ibid. 
326 Dong Hee Lee et at. op. cit. lSI. 
327 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal Procedure (2000) arts 175-
184, e.g., art 175 paras 3, 4 'The investigating judge sends the case file to the district prosecutor ... The 
latter sends his submissions within one month if a person under judicial examination is detained, and 
within three months in other cases. The investigating judge who does not receive the prosecution's 
submissions within the prescribed time limit may make the closing order.' 
328 However, with regard to the investigations of serious crimes, the role of the prosecutors as a filter can 
be relatively limited when compared with their counterparts in England & Wales and the USA as the final 
decision on the prosecution is made by the investigating judges. See ibid art 175 and Dong Hee Lee et at. 
op. cit. 151. 
319 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Japan, Code o/Criminal Procedure (Act no. 13/) (1948) art 246 para I 
'Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the judicial police official shall, when he/she has conducted 
the investigation of an offense, send the case together Wlth the documents and articles of evidence to a 
public prosecutor promptly.' 
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them to the prosecution service.33o As a consequence, the investigation of minor crimes 
can be concluded by the police without the intervention of the prosecutors.331 However, 
serious cases must be sent to the prosecutor's office, and in such cases only the 
prosecutors have the authority to decide not to invoke criminal proceedings. 
As would be expected, the decision to conclude investigations, as shown in Table 5.2, 
is closely related to the relative investigative powers of the police and prosecutors. For 
instance, in England & Wales and the USA, where the police have the autonomy to 
conduct investigations, they can conclude the criminal cases. In contrast, in German and 
Korea, where the prosecutors are considered as the 'ruler of the investigation', all 
criminal cases must be referred to the prosecutors and only they can make a decision on 
the conclusion of the investigation. However, as seen in France and Japan, in order to 
reduce the workload of the prosecution service, the investigations of minor crimes are in 
general may be discontinued by the police themselves.332 




Discretion to Drop the Cases 
Separated 




England and Wales c 
Monopolised 
By the Prosecutors 
Germany 
Korea 
Note. a The investigation of serious crime is reviewed and ended only by the prosecutors 
b In France, the investigation of minor offences is reviewed and concluded by the police as well as 
prosecutors, and with regard to the serious offences, the investigating judges as well as the prosecutors 
review and end the investigations. 
c Apart from evidentiary sufficiency test, the police have the power to drop the cases by considering 
public interest. 
330 ibid art 246 para 2 'provided, however, that this shall not apply to cases which have been specially 
designated by a public prosecutor.' (Emphasis added) 
331 In Japan, the number of cases ended by the police occupies about 24 per cent of the total. See Dong 
Hee Lee et a1. op. cit. 743-744. 
332 Elsner et a1. suggested that 'in almost all countries, ways have been found to either legally or factually 
reduce PPS [Public Prosecution Service] workload by giving Police some sort of case-ending decisions.' 
See Elsner op. cit. 191-192. 
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S.2. The Decision to Charge 
Charging is one of the fundamental functions of the prosecution service. When the 
prosecutors receive the cases from the police or, as in Korea and Japan, finish their own 
investigations, their first duty is to review the result of investigations and decide 
whether or not to charge the suspect. 333 As Professor U glow put it, the charge can be 
defined as a 'beginning of the legal process against the accused. ,334 In addition to such 
'quasi-legal status' of charging, it has a part to play in highlighting 'the obscurity of the 
boundaries between and the responsibilities of' the police, the public prosecutors and 
the judges.33s 
The power to charge is exercised in different ways in different systems even though 
it is generally regarded as one of the main functions of the prosecutors. For instance, in 
some jurisdictions, only public prosecutors initiate and conduct prosecutions. But in 
most jurisdictions, other legal actors such as victims or regulatory agencies can initiate 
prosecution. Even in these jurisdictions, such prosecutions are regarded as an exception 
to the rule of public prosecution and can be categorised into three types: prosecution by 
private individuals, by regulatory agencies and by the police. 
S.2.1. Charges filed by Private Individuals or Other Agencies 
In England and Wales, the USA, France, and Germany, private individuals and 
regulatory agencies have the legal authority to prosecute crimes.336 First, the right of the 
private citizen to prosecute has a role to play in achieving the accountability of the 
criminal justice system. 337 Victims or their families who are dissatisfied with the 
decisions of the public prosecutors not to charge have the power to prosecute the 
offenders themselves [An example was the Stephen Lawrence prosecution - although 
that collapsed].338 There is, however, a difference in the frequency of the private 
333 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 159. 
334 Uglow op. cit. 185. 
m ibid. 
336 Wade op. cit. 65; Abraham S. Goldstein. 'Defming the Role of the victim in Criminal Prosecution' 
(1982) 52 Miss.~J 515, 5?8 (Goldstein stated that ?1tough the p~blic ~rose~ut?r now controls the 
charging power m the UOlted States, remnants ofpnvate prosecution still eXIst. ); Rodolphe Juy-Birmann, 
'The Gennan system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European Criminal 
Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 292, 301-303; Valerie Dervieux, 'The French system' in 
Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 218,226-227. 
337 Sanders and Young op. cit. 379. 
338 ibid. 
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prosecution between these jurisdictions. 339 In contrast, the Japanese and Korean 
systems do not allow a citizen to file an indictment. 
Second, regulatory agencies can carry out prosecutions of relevant offences without 
referring the cases to the prosecution service. In England and Wales, substantial 
numbers of prosecutions are conducted by various agencies.34o For instance, the Health 
and Safety Executive prosecutes offences in relation to death, injury, and ill-health to 
those at work. In addition, other agencies such as the Environment Agency, HM 
Revenue and Customs, the Television Licensing Authority, the Department for Work 
and Pensions, the Financial Services Agency, the Department for Business and the 
Serious Fraud Office deal with their own prosecutions.341 
Such prosecutions can also be seen in the United States, France and Germany 
although there are obviously differences in the number of agencies, which have these 
powers. 342 For instance, in the USA, the federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as some state agencies 
such as California's air pollution control agency can decide whether to charge, which 
helps avoid the delay caused by proceeding through the prosecution service. 343 
Germany also permits some administrative bodies to initiate prosecutions for certain 
crimes. 344 For instance, the departments dealing with 'quasi-administrative fines 
[Ordnungswidrigkeiten]' have the authority to charge and to impose fixed penalties.345 
In France, the authority to charge has been regarded as a separate power rather than the 
monopoly of the prosecution service. 346 Accordingly, private individuals and the 
administrative bodies have the power to initiate prosecutions. 347 For instance, the 
339 Marianne Wade, 'The Power to Decide - Prosecutorial Control, Diversion and Punishment in 
European Criminal Justice Systems Today' in JOrg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise 0/ Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (Springer, Berlin; 
Heidelberg 2006) 27,65. 
340 Sanders and Young op. cit. 360. 
341 ibid. 
342 In the USA, 'minor offences may be prosecuted directly by victims or by regulatory agencies serving 
as proxy victims' in a few jurisdictions. See Abraham S. Goldstein. 'Defining the Role of the victim in 
Criminal Prosecution' (1982) 52 Miss.LJ 515,558. 
343 Eugene Bardach and RobertA. Kagan, Going by the book: The problem o/regulatory 
unreasonableness (Transaction Pub, New Brunswick 2002), 52 (These regulatory agencies have also 'the 
power to impose sanctions directly, without having to go to court and convince a judge that the penalty is 
warranted. ') 
344 John A. E. Vervaele and Andre Klip, European Cooperation between Tax, Customs and Judicial 
Authorities: The Netherlands, England and Wales, France and Germany (Kluwer Law Inti, 2002), 139-
140' German Administrative Offences Act art 35. 
345 Rodolphe Juy-Birmann, 'The German system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), 
European Criminal Procedur~ (Cambridge Univ~rsity Press, ~0~2) 292,301. 
346 Robert Vouin. 'The ProtectIon of the Accused m French CrImInal Procedure' (1956) 5(01) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 7-13. 
347 ibid 12-13 (Vouin suggested that 'Companies, professional bodies [including administrative] and 
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Ministry of Water and Forestry can carry out the prosecution of offences regarding 
forestry, hunting or fishing. In such cases, the civil servant in the ministry serves as a 
prosecutor for the criminal proceedings.348 In contrast to these jurisdictions, in Korea, 
prosecution by private individuals and regulatory agencies is not allowed. 
5.2.2. The Police Prosecution 
As well as private and agency prosecutions, prosecutions by the police can be found in 
the English, US, French, and German criminal procedure. In England and Wales, in 
principle, the decision to charge is made by the prosecution service.349 Yet, with regard 
to certain minor cases, the police can decide to charge without referring to crown 
prosecutors. Those offences are arranged by the guidance of the Director of the Public 
Prosecutions and at present most minor offences are prosecuted by the police.3so Prior 
to 1986, the police also presented the case in court but this will now be done by the CPS. 
In France, if the offences are crimes [contraventions] of Classes 1-4, the police may 
initiate prosecution and have a duty to notify the accused. 35 1 The German police also 
have the power to commence proceedings for some minor offences. For instance, if the 
offender violates the rules of the traffic laws, this case will be generally investigated and 
prosecuted by the police.352 In the United Sates, in principle, most cases are charged by 
associations, like private individuals may also commence the civil action before the criminal jurisdiction, 
and so automatically set in motion the public action, on brining the case before either the trial court or the 
examining magistrate. '); Dervieux op. cit. 226-227 (Dervieux stated that' A number of special laws allow 
certain state officials to take official notice of certain specified offences that they create. '); Dong Hee Lee 
et aI. op. cit. 115; Jong Gu Kim op. cit. 292. 
348 Dervieux op. cit. 
349 Director of the Public Prosecutions, The Director's Guidance on Charging (3rd edn The Prosecution 
Team, 2007) para 3.1 'Crown Prosecutors will be responsible for the decision to charge and the specifying 
or drafting of the charges in all indictable only, either way or summary offences where a Custody Officer 
determines that the Threshold Test is met in any case, except for those offences specified in this Guidance 
which may be charged or cautioned by the police without reference to a Crown Prosecutor.' 
350 ibid para 3.3 '(i) Any offence under the Road Traffic Acts or any other offence arising from the 
presence of a motor vehi~le, trailer, or pedal cycle on a road or other public place ... (~i) Any offence of 
absconding under the Ball Act 1976 and any offence contrary to Section 5 of the Pubhc Order Act 1986 
and any offence under the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, the Vagrancy 
Act 1824, the Street Offences Act 1959, under Section 91 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, Section 12 of 
the Licensing Act 1872, any offence under any bylaw and any summary offence punishable on conviction 
with a term of imprisonment of 3 months or less ... ' 
351 Dervieux op. cit. 236; JOrg-Martin Jehle, Paul Smit and Josef Zila. 'The Public Prosecutor as Key-
Player: Prosecutorial Case-Ending Decisions' (2008) 14(2) European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research 161, 169 (Jehle et at. stated that 'ordonnances penales 1-4 classe are imposed by police and 
controlled by police court. In case of contraventions 5th classe (including more serious traffic offences and 
minor assaults) also the imposition ofan ordennance penale is possible, but here the PPS is the central 
figure.'); Dong Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 50 (Professor Tak-Su Kim stated that 'crimes of classe I are mainly 
dealt with by the administrative fine without a trial.') 
352 Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay and et aI., 'Dealing with Various offence Types in Different Criminal 
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the public prosecutors. However, in some urban areas, the public prosecutors generally 
deal with the serious cases, whereas minor cases can be prosecuted by the police, 
although relying on the instructions from the public prosecutors.353 
Korean law also allows the police to prosecute minor offences. In principle, the 
KCPA gives the prosecution service exclusive authority to charge which is called 'the 
monopoly of prosecution' [Kisodo/geom].354 However, there is one exception to this 
principle, which is called 'police prosecution [Jukgu!simpanchunggu].,35S Rather than 
the public prosecutors, the chief of the police station charges the offenders and 
maintains the prosecution with respect to some minor offences which are punishable by 
fines of not more than KRW 200,000 (approximately equal to GBP 100) or detention for 
less than thirty days.356 In 2009, 76,753 suspects were charged by the police under this 
procedure and those prosecutions occupied six per cent of all charged persons.357 
Unlike those jurisdictions, in Japan, the power to charge is monopolised by the 
prosecution service without exception. 358 The Japanese law does not allow the 
prosecutions of private individuals, regulatory agencies or the police.359 Under these 
circumstances, the judges can only examine a case on the basis of an indictment filed by 
the public prosecutors. 360 As a result, the Japanese public prosecutors, as Johnson 
suggested, have more power than their counterparts in almost any other democratic 
Justice Systems - Case Examples' in JOrg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise 0/ Prosecutorial Power Across Europe (Springer, Berlin; 
Heidelberg 2006) 127-148, 128. 
m Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure (Hornbook series, 3rd edn 
West Group, st. Paul, Minn. 2000) 1409, 14 quoted in Dong Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 543-544. 
354 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 246. 
355 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 802-809. 
356 Speedy Trial Procedure Act [Jeukkyeolsimpan Jeolchabeop] 1957 partially amended on 21 December 
2007 No. 8730 art 2 (According to article 14, the defendant is entitled to request a formal trial if the 
defendant is not satisfied with the judgment in the speedy trial) Translated by Professor Cho, see Kuk Cho. 
'The Unfmished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' (2002) 30(3) 
Denver J Int Law Policy 381. 
m Korean Supreme Court, Judicial Yearbook [Sabeopyungam] (KSC, Seoul) published 2010 pt 13; 
Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, The Annual Report of the Public Prosecutors' Office in 2009 
[Keomchalyeongam] (KSPO, Seoul 2010), 490; Professor Ho-Jung Lee stated that 'the exception seems 
to be insignificant as most prosecutions of criminal cases are conducted by the public prosecutors.' See 
Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) Seo-
Kang Law Journal 43 n 1. . . . . . . . 
m There may be a sole but mSlgmficant exceptIon ill the Japanese cnmmal procedure, which is known as 
'analogical institution of prosecution thr~u~judicial action.' However, this exception seems to play an 
insignificant role in the process because It IS rarely used. For example, from 1949 to 1990 only sixteen 
cases are prosecuted through this procedure. See Johnson op. cit. 37 n 25 and Masaki Koyama, 'The 
Public Prosecutor, Criminal Law and the Rights of Accused in Japan: Yet to Strike a Balance?' in Stuart S. 
Nagel (ed), Handbook o/Global Legal Policy (CRC, 2000) 39, 46. 
359 Johnson op. cit. 37. 
360 ibid. 
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countries.361 
As we have seen, the power to charge is concentrated on the prosecution service.362 
However, as seen in Table 5.3, some systems open up additional channels for 
prosecution by private individuals, regulatory agencies or the police. This has its part to 
play in increasing the accountability of the prosecution service.363 




















Note. • In those jurisdictions, it is difficult to obtain statistics in relation to the prosecutions as they are 
conducted by various channels. As a result, between four jurisdictions, the extent of the prosecutions 
conducted by other legal actors than the prosecution service may be hardly compared with each other. 
5.3. Discretion at the Prosecution Stage 
The public prosecutors make a decision on the nature of the charge. In addition, they 
can either decide not to file an indictment or impose a penal order rather than stand 
361 Johnson suggested the South Korean system as one of the main exceptions to this argument. See ibid. 
362 In most countries ofOECD, 'In principle, the public prosecutor's office is empowered to bring cases 
to court, while investigative bodies are not. However, some countries make a different distinction ... They 
are prosecuted by the police in case of minor offences and by the state prosecution in case of serious 
offences in the same way as other criminal offences.' See Janos Bert6k, Trust in Government: Ethics 
Measures in OECD Countries (OECD, 2000), 62. 
363 Van Aaken et al. stated that various methods to separate the power of the prosecutors to charge the 
offenders can be interpreted as an important element to increase their accountability. See Anne Van Aaken. 
Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt. 'Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence 
Using a New Indicator' (2008) ~ESifo Wo~kin~ Paper No. 2245, 10 and Anne Van Aaken, Eli Salzberger 
and Stefan Voigt. 'The ProsecutIOn ofPubhc Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the 
Executive Branch-A Conceptual Framework' (2004) 15(3) Constitutional Political Economy 261. 270. 
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trial. 364 Such discretion can make a difference to the perceived status of the public 
prosecution services. Jehle and others stated such a difference thus: 
[L]arge proportions of mass crimes are not brought before court, but are ended at earlier 
stages of the criminal justice system with the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) as the key 
player in terms of selection and diversion of criminal cases. However, this selective function 
ofPPS differs from country to country according to its legal status and competences.36' 
Criminal justice systems provide the public prosecutors with different types of 
discretion reflecting the context and culture within which they operate. In general, 
however, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion seeks to reduce the workload of the 
. . al urt 366 cnmm co s. 
5.3.1. Summary Prosecution for Penal Order 
The 'penal order proceedings' are as significant an indicator demonstrating that 
discretionary power as is the decision to prosecute. The penal order procedure can be 
defined as 'proceedings ending with a formal conviction and sanction, but without an 
oral hearing at courts l~vel. ,367 In general, such punishment is formally decided by the 
courts based upon the indictments which are filed by the prosecutors. Yet, such a 
judgement can 'functionally be understood as a prosecution service decision which is 
checked and approved by the court.'368 As the courts routinely accept those proposals 
without particular modification, the prosecutors predetermine effectively the court's 
d .. d t 369 eClslon an sen ence. 
364 Wade op. cit. 60-82; Gershman described those roles of the prosecutors as folIows: 'The prosecutor 
decides whether or not to bring criminal charges; who to charge; what charges to bring; whether a 
defendant will stand trial, plead guilty, or enter a correctional program in lieu of criminal charges; and 
whether to confer immunity from prosecution. The prosecutor effectively has the power to invoke or deny 
punishment, and in those jurisdictions that authorize capital punishment, the power IiteralIy over life and 
death.' See Bennett L. Gershman. 'The New Prosecutors' (1991) S3 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 393, 40S n 74. 
365 JOrg-Martin Jehle, Paul Smit and Josef Zila. 'The Public Prosecutor as Key-Player: Prosecutorial 
Case-Ending Decisions' (2008) 14(2) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 161, 161-162. 
366 ibid 178 (Jehle et al. stated that 'criminal justice systems in Europe present complex structures that 
tend to cope with a high workload by finding ways for diversion. creating vents at police and prosecution 
level and establishing simplifYing and shortcutting procedures. The range and nature of case-ending 
decisions falling into the mandate of PPS differ from country to country. They have to be evaluated in the 
whole context of equivalent forms of diversionary and discretionary strategies in the respective European 
countries. ') (Emphasis added) 
367 ibid 168. 
368 ibid 169. 
369 ibid (Jehle et al. argued that the public prosecutor 'proposes the sentence, which can be only be 
accepted by the court; otherwise, it has to reject the whole penal order proceedings. ') 
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Such penal order proceedings do not exist in the English and United States systems. 
However, elsewhere, many cases are dealt with through the procedure. For instance, in 
Korea, 1,154,522 penal orders were imposed on defendants (47.5 per cent of all 
convictions) in 2001.370 In the same year, the Japanese system dealt with 852,613 penal 
order proceedings (33.4 per cent of all offenders). 371 Those orders also play an 
important part in German and French criminal procedure even though the number of 
disposals is smaller than in Korea and Japan.372 
However, there are some differences in the procedure between those jurisdictions. In 
France, public prosecutors propose a particular penalty to the court for petty crimes.373 
The courts impose the penalty proposed unless they think the order inappropriate.374 
The defendant can appeal against such a decision within thirty days.375 
In Germany, the procedure [Stratbefehlsverfarhren] applies to some crimes which 
are punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to one year.376 The procedure is similar 
to the French, but the period to appeal against the decision of the court is shorter than in 
France.377 In addition, unlike the French, the German prosecutors do not need to send 
the files to the court, but instead a short written explanation is sufficient.378 The Korean 
system of penal order was established with reference to the procedure in Germany.379 
However, unlike the German, the offences for penal order proceedings are limited to 
crimes which are punishable by a fine.380 The offenders can appeal against the penal 
d ·th· d 381 or er WI In seven ays. 
The Japanese public prosecutors also deal with petty crimes through the penal order 
310 Dong Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 745. 
311 ibid. 
372 In Germany and France, 623,051 (20 %) and 159,180 (9 %) penal orders were respectively imposed 
on the offenders in 2004. See JOrg-Martin Jehle, Paul Smit and Josef Zita. 'The Public Prosecutor as Key-
Player: Prosecutorial Case-Ending Decisions' (2008) 14(2) European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research 161, 167 fig 2. 
373 The contraventions of 1-5 class can be punished by the penal order. However, the penal orders of 1-5 
class are imposed by police and controlled by police court. The offences of 5th class are dealt with by the 
public prosecutors. See ibid 169. 
~74 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal Procedure (2000) art 525; 
Valerie Dervieux, 'The French system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European 
Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 218, 245 
315 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal Procedure (2000) art 527. 
316 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code (Stra/prozeftordnung] (1987) s 
407; Rodolphe Juy-Birmann, 'The Ge~an syst~m' i~ Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), 
European Criminal Procedures (Cambndg~ Umverslty Press, 2002) 292, 316. 
311 German Criminal Procedure Code op. CIt. s 410. 
318 Jehle et al. op. cit. 169. 
379 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 794. 
380 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act {Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 448 (1). 
381 ibid art 4S 1. 
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procedure. However, the Japanese procedure, unlike other countries, requires the 
prosecutors to receive prior consent from defendants before applying for the order. 382 
Except for this, it does differ from other systems. The offenders, as in Germany, can 
have fourteen days to appeal against the decision.383 
5.3.2. The Decision not to Prosecute 
Along with the decisions to charge, the public prosecutors exercise considerable 
discretion in relation to the decisions not to initiate a prosecution. This discretionary 
power can be expanded considerably when they decide not to prosecute by taking the 
'public interest' into account.384 
With respect to the decisions not to charge or to discontinue, the prosecutor in 
general must consider two criteria. The first rule is sufficiency of evidence. It should be 
wrong for a person to be prosecuted with insufficient evidence?8S The criminal process 
requires the public prosecutor to review the investigations and drop the cases, where 
there is insufficient evidence. This is the main reason for most jurisdictions to establish 
d .. 386 H th . I' . d b an indepen ent prosecutton servIce. owever, e prosecutor IS Imlte y the 
principle of legality and thus does not exercise much discretion as to the evidentiary 
ffi . t t 387 su lClency es. 
On the other hand, the public prosecutors can decline to prosecute some offences 
even if they have sufficient evidence for a successful prosecution. This standard, as 
termed in England and Wales, can be called 'public interest. ,388 This term, as Jehle and 
others argued, 'might not fit easily all systems, but it is used to describe the PPS [public 
prosecution service] balancing the interest in going to court with other factors relevant 
to the good of society.' 389 The decision not to prosecute based on consideration of 
public interest factors may be seen as an exception to the principle of legality. The 
prosecutors can choose not to bring the cases to court after considering non-evidential 
382 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Japan, Code o/Criminal Procedure (Act no. 131) (1948) art 461-2 
383 ibid art 465(1). 
384 Jehle et at. op. cit. 173 (Jehle, Smit, and Zila stated that 'Two forms of ending public prosecution refer 
to a true discretionary power of PPS: because of lacking public interest or on policy reasons. The question 
as to what criteria form the basis for public interest or policy related decisions is a complex one with a 
variety of answers. ') 
38S Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 178. 
386 For the details on the establishment of the independent prosecution service, see pt 2 'The 
Development of the Modem Public Prosecution Systems' (The English System) 
387 Jehle et at. op. cit. 165. 
388 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 2010 paras 4.10-4.20. 
389 Jehle et at. op. cit. 173. 
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and non-legal factors.
390 
Thus, in England and Wales, the discretion is provided for in 
the Code of Crown Prosecutors: 
Assessing the public interest is not simply a matter of adding up the number of factors on 
each side and seeing which side has the greater number. Each case must be considered on 
its own facts and on its own merits. Prosecutors must decide the importance of each public 
interest factor in the circumstances of each case and go on to make an overall assessment. It 
is quite possible that one factor alone may outweigh a number of other factors which tend 
in the opposite direction. Although there may be public interest factors tending against 
prosecution in a particular case, prosecutors should consider whether nonetheless a 
prosecution should go ahead and for those factors to be put to the court for consideration 
when sentence is passed.391 
The English system requires the prosecutors to bring the cases to the court unless there 
are public interest reasons against prosecution. 
All jurisdictions in this study allow the public prosecutors not to bring the cases to 
the court on the basis of public interest criteria. This discretion is generally regulated by 
either law or guidelines.392 In England and Wales, as seen above, the Code of Crown 
Prosecutors provides various standards for the public interest test. 393 In France and 
Germany, the guidelines for the public interest test are generally issued at a regional or 
local level although, in Germany, the main regulations are national ministerial 
guidelines. 394 In the USA, such discretion of the public prosecutors is provided in the 
Standards of Criminal Justice which allow public prosecutors to decline to prosecute 'in 
some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest. ,395 
This discretionary power plays a considerable role in Japanese and Korean criminal 
proceedings. Both systems provide for such discretion by law. In Japan, article 248 of 
390 ibid; Regarding non-evidential factors, Lafave suggested five common situations where the public 
prosecutors decline to prosecute typically: '(a) When the victim has expressed a desire that the offender 
not be prosecuted ... (b) When the costs of prosecution would be excessive, considering the nature of the 
violation .... ( c) When the mere fact of prosecution would, in the prosecutor's judgment, cause undue harm 
to the offender ... (d) When the offender, ifnot prosecuted, will likely aid in achieving other enforcement 
goals ... ( e) When the "harm" done by the offender can be corrected without prosecution. ' See Wayne R. 
Lafave. 'The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States' (1970) 18(3) The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 532, 534-535. 
391 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 2010 para 4.13 (Emphasis added) In addition to this provision, 
paragraphs 4.16 and 4.17 describe specifically the factors for public interest test. 
~92 Jehle et at. op. cit. 173. 
393 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 2010 paras 4.10-4.20. 
394 Jehle et at. op. cit. 
395 American Bar Association, Standardsfor Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3rd 
edn ABA, New York 1993) standard 3-3.9 [Discretion in the charging decision). 
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the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that 'Where prosecution is deemed 
unnecessary owing to the character, age, environment, gravity of the offense, 
circumstances or situation after the offense, prosecution need not be instituted. ,396 The 
Japanese law allows public prosecutors to take into account the propriety of the 
prosecution. This is similar to Korea which also provides discretion in the KCPA, which 
is very similar to article 248 of Japanese code of criminal procedure: 
A public prosecutor may decide not to institute a public prosecution, considering the 
matters under Article 51 of the Criminal Ace97 : (1) The age, character and conduct, 
intelligence and environment of the offender; (2) Offender's relation to the victim; (3) The 
motive for the commission of the crime, the means and the result; (4) Circumstance after 
the commission of the crime.398 
This allows prosecutors to decide not to prosecute, having taken into account a number 
of elements relevant to sentencing.399 As such, they act as if they are the sentencing 
judge. 
5.3.3. Conditional Disposals 
Often public prosecutors can dismiss cases, but attach conditions to the offender such as 
participation in a rehabilitation programme or reparation.
4oo 
For instance, in England 
and Wales, the public prosecutors can choose the conditional caution in lieu of the 
prosecution of offences.401 The public prosecutors can administer this to a person 18 or 
over who has admitted guilt. 402 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires five elements 
for this conditional caution: 
The first requirement is that the authorised person has evidence that the offender has 
committed an offence. The second requirement is that a relevant prosecutor decides - (a) 
that there is sufficient evidence to charge the offender with the offence, and (b) that a 
396 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Japan, Code o/Criminal Procedure (Act no. J 3 J) (1948). 
397 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act (Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 247. . 
398 They are conditions which shall be taken into account when the judges determine the punishment. See 
Criminal Act [Hyungbeop] 1953 partially amended on 29 July 2005 No.7623 art 51. 
399 Kuk Cho. 'The Ongoing Reconstruction of the Korean Criminal Justice System' (2006) 5(1) Santa 
Clara Journal oflntemational Law 100, 113. 
400 Jehle et al. op. cit. 174; Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 149. 
40\ Criminal Justice Act 2003 ss 22-27. 
402 ibid s 22 [Conditional Cautions]. 
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conditional caution should be given to the offender in respect of the offence. The third 
requirement is that the offender admits to the authorised person that he committed the 
offence. The fourth requirement is that the authorised person explains the effect of the 
conditional caution to the offender and warns him that failure to comply with any of the 
conditions attached to the caution may result in his being prosecuted for the offence. The 
fifth requirement is that the offender signs a document which contains (a) details of the 
offence, (b) an admission by him that he committed the offence, (c) his consent to being 
given the conditional caution, and (d) the conditions attached to the caution.403 
Similarly, in Germany, the public prosecutors can decide not to charge offenders 
who have committed less serious crimes but impose conditions upon them.404 The 
German code of criminal procedure, as in England and Wales, requires certain criteria: 
(I) [Making] a certain contribution towards reparation for damage caused by the offense, (2) 
[paying] a sum of money to a non-profIt-making institution or to the Treasury, (3) 
[performing) some other service of a non-profit-making nature, (4) [complying] with duties 
to pay maintenance at a certain level, or (5) [participating) in a seminar pursuant [in some 
circumstances] 40S 
However, unlike the English, the German prosecutors need the consent from the court as 
well as from the defendants in order to forego a public trial. Those conditional disposals 
fall 'al d" 406 generally occupy five per cent 0 prosecuton eClSlons. 
The French system also allows public prosecutors not to file a charge but to impose 
certain conditions on the offender. Those conditions can be separated into two groups -
'low degree of offender involvement' and 'significant involvement of the offender and 
the public prosecutors' .407 The former includes several conditions: 'giving the victim 
compensation, setting an illegal situation straight, or showing that one is trying to 
improve one's social or occupational situation,' whereas in the latter, the offenders are 
403 ibid s 23 [Five requirements]. 
404 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code {StrafprozejJordnung] (1987) s 
153a (1). 
405 ibid. 
406 Beatrix Elsner and Julia Peters, 'The Prosecution Service Function within the German Criminal Justice 
System' in JOrg-Martin !ehle ~d Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice 
Svstems (Springer, Berlm; HeIdelberg 2006) 207,223. 
"467 Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay, 'The Prosecution Service Function within the French Criminal Justice 
System' in JOrg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice 
Systems: The Rise of Prose cut oria I Power Across Europe (Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2006) 185-205, 
193-195. 
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generally required to do 'penal mediation' for adults or 'reparation' for juveniles.40B 
In the USA, the public prosecutors can generally decide not to prosecute and impose 
conditions on the offenders although there may be some differences between 
jurisdictions.409 For instance, in San Diego and New Orleans, about seven per cent of 
all decisions not to prosecute are conditional disposals, which mostly require the 
offenders to take part in diversion programmes.410 
In Korea, conditional disposal is more strictly applied than in other jurisdictions. 
The Korean criminal proceedings only permit the prosecutors to deal with juvenile 
offenders by way of conditional disposa1.411 Therefore, the prosecutors may require 
juvenile offenders to participate in the diversion programmes.412 
In Japan, unlike the French, German and Korean, public prosecutors do not have the 
discretion to deal with the cases by conditional disposals. Even when they dispose of 
juvenile offences, they send the offenders to the family court when there is evidence of 
an offence rather than, as in other jurisdictions, end the cases by conditional 
disposals. 413 The Japanese criminal procedure provides prosecutors with extensive 
discretion 'to divert offenders for the criminal process by not instituting formal charges,' 
but does not allow them to impose certain conditions on the offenders in lieu of 
• 414 
prosecution. 
5.4. The Statistical Comparison of Discretion 
As is apparent, at the pre-trial stage in most jurisdictions, public prosecutors exercise 
considerable discretion. There are differences in procedure, which are not necessarily 
apparent through simple comparison. Thus, statistical analysis has been often used to 
compare the different discretionary powers ofprosecutors.41S This following discussion 
aims to compare prosecutorial discretion at the pre-trial stage on this basis. Unlike other 
408 ibid 193-194. 
409 George F. Cole and Christopher E. Smith, The American System o/Criminal Justice (12th edn 
Wadsworth, Belmont 2010) 692, 372. 
410 ibid. 
411 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 353. . 
412 Juvenile Act [Sonyunbeop] 1958 partially amended on 21 December 2007 No.8722 art 49-3 
413 Elmer H. Johnson and Carol H. Johnson, Linking community and corrections in Japan (Southern 
Illinois Univ Pr, 2000), 162; Dong Hee Lee et al. op. cit. 631-638; Japanese Juvenile Act 1948 No. 168 art 
42. 
414 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way 0/ Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Studies on law and 
social control, Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2002),37. 
415 Jehle et al. op. cit. ; Marianne Wade, 'The Power to Decide - Prosecutorial Control, Diversion and 
Punishment in European Criminal Justice Systems Today' in JOrg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), 
Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems: The Rise 0/ Prosecutorial Power Across Europe 
(Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2006) 27. 
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studies which have mainly dealt with prosecutorial discretion, this study also looks at 
police discretion. Such a comparison indicates not only the differences in police and 
prosecutorial discretion between six jurisdictions, but also the relationship between the 
police and prosecutors. The statistical analysis shows the great variety of decisions 
taken by prosecution service and the police in the pre-trial procedure.416 
5.4.1. Data collection 
To conduct this study, various statistics were collected from each jurisdiction. In Korea, 
the annual reports of the public prosecutor's office gave the information about those 
criminal cases which were managed by the prosecution service. 417 However, those 
reports did not include the information about police prosecutions which was the only 
discretion exercised by the police in Korea. Such statistics were obtained in the Judicial 
Statistics Reports which were published by the Supreme COurt.418 
The Japanese statistics on prosecutorial decisions were obtained in the white paper 
on crime published by the Ministry of Justice.419 The information on the discretion of 
the police was collected from the criminal statistics which were annually published by 
the Japanese Police Agency.420 This information included the number of minor cases 
which were dropped by the police based upon the public interest test. This was the only 
discretion that the Japanese police could conduct under the guidelines of the 
421 prosecutors. 
In England and Wales, the Ministry of Justice annually publishes criminal statistics, 
which have most of the information on the disposals by the police and prosecution 
service. 422 This statistical information included police cautions, formal warnings, 
penalty notices for disorder, and discontinued cases by the prosecutors.423 However, it 
416 Jehle et a1. op. cit. 168 (In this study, they compared the statistics oftive systems of public prosecution 
in Europe to examine the different functions of the public prosecutors). 
417 Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, The Annual Report of the Public Prosecutors' Office in 2007 
fKeomchalyeongamJ (KSPO, SeouI2008), 490-491. 
~i8 Korean Supreme Court, 'Judicial Statistics in 2007 [Sabeopyeongam)' KSC (Seoul) s 13 Police 
Prosecution. 
419 The Japanese Ministry of Justice, White Paper on Crime (MOJ, 2006) pt 2 ch 2 s 3. 
420 The Japanese National Police Agency, Criminal Statistics in 2005 (JNPA, Tokyo 2006) translated by 
Susumu Togashi. 
421 See above pt 5.1 'Discretion at the Investigation Stage' 
422 Ministry of Justice, 'Criminal Statistics in 2007' Office for Criminal Justice Reform (London) 
423 In 2007, all offences were 4,951,000. Of them, 1,374,000 offences were detected by the police, 
whereas the others were dropped. Among the detected offences, 363,000 cautions were issued and 
127,300 reprimands and fmal warnings were given to the juveniles by the police. In addition, 207,500 
penalty notices for disorder were issued, and 98,300 formal warnings for cannabis possession were given 
to the offenders. On the other hand, 673,000 offences were charged or summonsed. Among them, 100,000 
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did not include information about conditional cautions.424 This was obtained from a 
report on conditional cautioning published by the Office for the Criminal Justice 
Reform.42s 
In the USA, every state has different standards and practices for prosecution of 
crimes.426 The statistical information on prosecution practices in all states is difficult to 
obtain.427 Thus, the cases handled by the federal prosecutors, who were called the 'U.S. 
Attorney', were used rather than by the state prosecutors.428 In respect to the discretion 
of the police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation provided the statistics on the cases 
dealt with by the 13,760 agencies in the USA.429 Even though this information did not 
include the in-depth statistics on individual agency, the general practice of the law 
enforcements in relation tQ charging or dropping cases could be shown.43o 
Finally, the statistical information on the German and French system of public 
prosecution was obtained in Jehle's study which included most of the information which 
cases were discontinued by the discretion of the crown prosecutors. See ibid 11-40. 
424 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 149-150; Jehle et a1. op. cit. 174 (However, Jehle et a1. seem to 
overlook that the public prosecutors in England and Wales can make a decision on the conditional 
cautions. They stated that 'In England and Wales it is a power formally held by the police (cautioning, 
cautioning plus etc.). ') 
42$ Francis Habgood and Robert Stevenson, Conditional Cautioning Update (Office for Criminal Justice 
Reform, London September 2007), 4. 
426 For instance, with regard to the prosecution of felony, 54 per cent of cases are dropped by the 
prosecutors due to the insufficif;nt evidence in San Diego, whereas in New Orleans, such cases occupy 38 
per cent. In addition, the drop of cases caused by the public interest test may be different depending on 
jurisdictions: San Diego (9%); Manhattan (4%). See George F. Cole and Christopher E. Smith, The 
American System o/Criminal Justice (12th edn Wadsworth, Belmont 2010) 692, 297. 
427 Although the sourcebook of criminal justice statistics provides various statistical information, such 
information is limited to some fields. For example, the statistics on the prosecution of crimes in the state 
criminal proceedings may give information mainly related to the felony, and moreover, may not present 
details on the reasons not to prosecute some offences. See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics. 'Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics' <htU>:llwww.albany.edu/sourcebooklindex.html> 
428 ibid Table 5.7 2006. 
429 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 'Crime in the United States in 2006' 
<htU>:llwww.fbLgov/ucr/cius2006/dataltable25.html> accessed 15 January 2010 Table 25 Per cent of 
Offences Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means. 
430 In 2006, 69.5 per cent are dropped by the police, and 30.5 per cent of case are cleared and moved to 
the next stage in the criminal procedure. Such cleared cases by the police include a number of factors: 'In 
the UCR Program, a law enforcement agency reports that an offense is cleared by arrest, or solved for 
crime reporting purposes, when all of the following conditions have been met for at least one person: 
Arrested, Charged with the commission of the offense, Turned over to the court for prosecution (whether 
following arrest, court summons, or law enforcement notice).' Or 'In certain situations, elements beyond 
law enforcement's control prevent the agency from arresting and formally charging the offender. When 
this occurs, the agency can ... clear the offense exceptionally. Law enforcement agencies must meet all of 
the following conditions in order to clear an offense by exceptional means. The agency must have: 
Identified the offender; Gathered enough evidence to support an arrest, make a charge, and turn over the 
offender to the court for prosecution; Identified the offender's exact location so that the suspect could be 
taken into custody immediately; Encountered a circumstance outside the control of law enforcement that 
prohibits the agency from arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender.' See ibid table 25 Overview 
and Clearances. 
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was necessary for the analysis.431 However, the study did not provide the statistical 
information on police discretion. These statistics were obtained in the Aubusson de 
Cavarlay's study.432 However, even there the information did not necessarily include all 
in-depth statistics relating to police discretion. The study illustrated as follows: 
'Some cases go no further than the police docket, which is now being computerized, and 
which contains a day-to-day listing of those interventions and demands which do not 
immediately lead to the writing for a police report ... This register mostly contains 
information on facts that do not constitute offences, but for some entries it is really a sort of 
preliminary to a police report of an offence, for which there may not be any follow-up. It is 
impossible to measure the number of those cases. ,433 
However, unlike the French, in Germany, all cases dealt with by the police are sent to 
the prosecutor's office due to the principle of legality.434 Therefore, there are no official 
statistics on the cases terminated by the police. Elsner and Peters stated that 'German 
criminal procedure does not include an option for the police to end the cases 
independently. The police role ... ends with its function as an investigative agency 
controlled by PPS instructions. ,435 
Most of the statistical information for this study was produced between 2004 and 
2007. As the statistics on the police discretion was quite difficult to obtain, the statistical 
information on the decisions of the French police was used exceptionally even though 
they were produced before 2004 fiscal year. With respect to this data collection, there 
are three limitations. 
First, regarding the decisions of the federal investigative authorities in the USA, I 
used estimated statistics by depending on the 'clearance rate', which could reflect the 
decisions of all United States investigative agencies since there are no specific statistics 
on them. Thus, there may be a difference between the statistical information and real 
practice. 
Second, even if the statistics, as in England and Wales, include precise disposals by 
the police, those figures do not necessarily reflect the definite discretion exercised by 
431 Jehle et a1. op. cit. 167. 
432 Cavarlay op. cit. 188-189. 
433 ibid 198-199. 
434 See above pt 5.1 'Discretion to Drop the Case at the Investigation Stage'. 
435 Elsner and Peters op. cit. 22~; Elsner, Smit, and Zila indicated that only 'Some guidelines exist in 
several federal states giving the police the competence to prepare a PPS disposal. ' See Beatrix Elsner, 
Paul Smit and Josef Zila. 'Police Case-Ending Possibilities within Criminal Investigations' (2008) 14(2-3) 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research II, 195 n 16. 
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the police and prosecutors. For instance, the English police, in theory, drop the cases by 
exercising diverse discretion without the intervention of the public prosecutors. 
However, after the statutory charging scheme, the public prosecutor are involved in the 
decision making process by the police through consultation.436 In this circumstance, 
even though it would be very difficult to measure the involvement of the prosecutors in 
the police decision, it must be true that the prosecution service has an impact and the 
statistical information cannot show this influence. 
Finally, as the statistics on the decisions of the French police and prosecutors were 
produced in different fiscal years, they may not accurately reflect the difference in the 
practices. The statistics on the prosecutorial decisions in France was generated in 2005. 
However the decisions of the police, which were compared to the prosecutorial 
decisions, were made in 2002. In other words, there may be a discrepancy caused by the 
statistics produced in different time. 
Due to these limitations, the statistical information is indicative and may not show 
precisely the discretion of the legal professionals in the criminal process. Nevertheless, 
this statistical analysis can reveal the general trend which reflects the discretion of the 
police and prosecution service in each system of criminal justice. 
5.4.2. Methods 
From previous parts, six categories were chosen for a comparison of the discretion at 
the pre-trial stage: 
(1) Cases concluded by the police 
(2) Cases dropped by the public prosecutors due to insufficient evidence 
(3) Cases dropped by the public prosecutors not in public interest 
(4) Cases dropped by the public prosecutors by selecting conditional disposals 
(5) Summary prosecution for penal orders 
(6) Formal prosecution 
Among those categories, police discretion was not separated into subgroups since it is, 
unlike prosecutorial discretion, permitted in a limited way in most jurisdictions. 
436 Sanders and Young op. cit. 332 (Sanders and Young stated that 'Under the statutory charging scheme, 
prosecutors are now based in police stations so that they can make prosecution decisions as speedily as 
custody officers did hitherto, and with the advantage of being able to discuss cases with the investigating 
officers. When decisions need to be taken "out of hours", officers can call "CPS Direct" -a call-centre-
style service headed by a Chief Crown Prosecutor. ') 
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The numbers of decisions by the police and public prosecutors, which are 
compatible with those categories, were collected from each jurisdiction. However, a 
number of statistics may be incompatible with those categories. For instance, the annual 
reports of the CPS present the number of discontinuances of prosecutions rather than 
separated information for category (2) and (3).437 Thus, in this circumstance, the 
number of decisions not to prosecute by evidential sufficiency and public interest tests 
was replaced by the overall number of discontinuances. 
As might be expected, each system of public prosecution does not have all 
categories. For instance, in Korea, conditional disposals began to be made in 2008. 
Therefore the number of conditional disposals was not included in the statistics for this 
study.438 In this instance, such a category was excluded from the comparison. This kind 
of exclusion can be observed in the category of summary prosecution for penal orders 
since the English and United States systems do not have this procedure.439 As this study 
aims to explore the overall discretionary powers of the public prosecution services, 
those limitations may not have any significant effect on the comparison. 
Finally, each category was divided by the total number of decisions at the pre-trial 
stage. Then, the percentage of each category was compared with each other. For 
instance, in one jurisdiction, the public prosecutors may bring fifty per cent of cases to 
the court for a formal trial whereas in another jurisdiction, such a portion can be ten per 
cent which means most cases are dealt with by the prosecutors or the police. As a result, 
such a difference may indicate a different level of discretion of the prosecution service 
and the police in the criminal proceedings.44o 
5.4.3. Results 
The discretion of the prosecutors, as seen in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.4, are significantly 
437 The Crown Prosecution Service, Annual Report and Resource Accounts: For the period April 2006 _ 
March 2007 (HMSO, London July 2007), 86 (This report defined the discontinuances as follows: 
'Consideration of the evidence and of the public interest may lead the CPS to discontinue proceedings at 
any time before the start of the trial. The figures include both cases discontinued in advance of the hearing 
and those withdrawn at court. ') 
438 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 353. 
439 See above pt 5.3.1 'Summary Prosecution for Penal Order'. 
440 Jehle, Smit, and Zila accounted for such different discretion of the public prosecutors by giving 
examples of Poland and other European countries: 'There are countries (e.g. Poland) in which the 
prosecuting authority has neither the di~cretion to drop ~ case n?r th~ a~ility to imp?se 
conditions/sanctions upon an offender; 10 accordance WIth a strict prmclple of legahty the prosecuting 
authority merely has the function ofpre~aring a case for. court. He~e '" all cases have to be brought 
before a court. In many European countrIes the prosecutmg authorJty doesn't only drop cases in 
accordance with the principle of legality but additionally has discretion whether or not to prosecute.' See 
Jehle et al. op. cit. 165. 
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different from each other depending on the systems of criminal justice. 






England and Wales 
-100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
• Cases Concluded by the Police 
• Cases Dropped by the PP (Insufficient Evidence) 
• Cases Dropped by the PP (Lack of Public Interest) 
• Cases Dropped-by the PP (Conditional Disposa ls) 
• Simple Prosecution for Penal Order 
• Formal Prosecution for a Trial 
Note In the England & Wales and the USA, as seen in Table 5.4, there were no separated statistic on 
dropped cases by insufficient evidence and lack of public interest. Thus I respectively included the 
discontinued cases by the English or US prosecutors in the red category - the cases dropped by 
insufficient evidence. In the English system, the police can exercise considerable discretion such a police 
cautions, warnings and penalty notices for disorder. 441 In Germany almost all decisions by the 
prosecutors are reviewed by the judges and occasionally need consent.
442 
441 For details on those statistics, see Table 5.4 
442 See below pt 7 ' The Accountability of the Public Prosecution Service '; In respect to such limitations 
to the prosecutorial discretion, Pizzi stated thus: ' A German prosecutor's discretion with respect to the 
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Table 5.4 Details on discretion at the pre-trial stage 
Police Public Prosecutor's Courts 
Discretion Discretion Decisions 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Concluded by Dropped by Dropped Conditional Summary Formal 
the Police 
Subtotal 
Insufficient by Lack of Disposals Prosecution Prosecution 
Evidence Public for Penal for a Trial 
Interest Order 
England 4,371,522 a 101,578 100,000 b 1,578 nla 404,855 
and Wales 89.6% 2.1% 2.1% 0.03% 8.3% 
The USA 372,408 82,343 82,343 c nla 81,088 
69.5% 15.4% 15.4% 15.1% 
France 151,000 1,209,543 407,451 325,192 317,720 159,180 532,279 
8.0% 63.9% 21.5% 17.2% 16.8% 8.4% 28.1% 
Germany nla 2,693,276 1,312,495 505,125 252,635 623,021 382,286 
87.6% 42.7% 16.4% 8.2% 20.3% 12.4% 
Japan 121,265 177,617 73,028 988,473 nla 716,116 146,352 
5.9% 86.9% 3.6% 48.3% 35.0% 7.2% 
Korea 49,967 2,286,533 893,491 331,456 nla d 1,061,586 155,704 
2.0% 91.7% 35.9% 13.3% 42.6% 6.2% 
Note. a Various disposals by the police are included in this figure: the cases dropped due to insufficient 
evidence - 3,577,000 (73.3%); police cautions - 361,422 (7.4%)443; reprimands and final warnings-given 
to the juveniles - 127,300 (2.6%); penalty notices for disorder - 207,500 (4.3%); and formal warnings for 
cannabis possession - 98,300 (2.0%); b This figure includes both (2) and (3) which are discontinued by 
crown prosecutors; C This figure includes the transfers, dismissals other than by court, pre-trial diversions 
and proceedings suspended indefmitely by court; d The conditional disposal has been made since 2008. 
Thus, this analysis did not include the information on such a measure. 
decision whether or not to file criminal charges is more limited in comparison to United States 
prosecutors.' See William T. Pizzi. 'Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The 
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform' (1993) 54 Ohio St.LJ 1325, 1332. 
443 This figure was calculated by excluding conditional cautions (1,578) by prosecutors from all cautions 
(363,000) issued in 2007. 
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In England and the US, the police play a main role in deciding the sufficiency of 
evidence. A large number of cases, which have insufficient evidence, are dropped based 
on the decisions taken by the police. Of all offences, those cases occupy respectively 
seventy-three per cent in the England & Wales and sixty-nine per cent in the USA. 
Particularly, in the English system, the police not only drop the cases depending on 
evidentiary sufficiency, but they can also give cautions to adults (7.4%), reprimands and 
final warnings to juveniles (2.6%), penalty notices for disorder (4.3%) and formal 
warnings for cannabis possession (2.0%). In other words, 89.6 per cent of cases are 
concluded by the police. On the other hand, very few (2.1 per cent) cases are dropped 
by prosecutors in England and 15.4 per cent in the USA. 
In contrast, in Korea and Japan, about ninety per cent of cases are concluded by the 
decisions of the public prosecutors. In particular, in Korea, around ninety-two per cent 
of cases are concluded by the decisions of the public prosecutors. However, there is a 
difference in the main method used. Where the Japanese prosecutors drop most cases 
(48.3%) based upon the public interest test, their counterparts in Korea end the cases by 
relying on mostly summary prosecution for penal orders (42.6%). In both systems, the 
number of cases, which can be concluded by the police, is very small: two per cent in 
Korea and five per cent in:Japan. 
In France, along with the cases discontinued as a result of insufficient evidence 
(21.5%), public prosecutors do not bring cases to court on grounds of public interest 
(17.2%) or by using conditional disposals (16.8%) and summary prosecutions for penal 
orders (8.4%). The cases brought to the court, unlike the Korean and Japanese, are over 
twenty-eight per cent of all offences. But nearly two thirds of cases (63.9%) are 
concluded by the public prosecutors. Unlike the Korean and Japanese, in the French 
system of criminal justice, the police deal with a significant number of cases (8%) using 
their own discretion. 
Germany, as in France, allows prosecutors to dispose of a large number of cases on 
the basis of their discretion. This amounts to about eighty-seven per cent of all offences. 
Apart from the cases dropped due to insufficient evidence, the. cases concluded by 
prosecutorial discretion take about fifty per cent of all cases. However, unlike other 
jurisdictions, there are no cases, which can be concluded by the police. Subsequently, 
almost all cases are, in theory, reviewed and concluded by the public prosecutors.444 
444 See pt 5.1 'Discretion to Drop the Cases at the Investigation Stage'. 
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5.4.4. Discussion 
At this pre-trial stage, public prosecutors can conclude the cases by exerclsmg 
considerable discretion. However, such discretion is different depending on the 
jurisdiction. These differences demonstrate distinctive prosecutorial roles. Based upon 
findings above, I would propose four models of the prosecutorial role at this stage: 
supplementary filter, key filter, benevolent paternalist and monopolist. 
First, in the English, US and French systems, the public prosecution service acts as a 
'supplementary filter.' In England and the USA, the police review cases as a gatekeeper 
before any prosecutorial review. As a result, a large number of cases are initially 
discontinued by the police. Then, the prosecution service acts as a supplementary filter. 
As Professor Uglow stated, in the English and US criminal process, two filters exist in 
order to prevent innocent suspects from being charged and convicted.445 
In particular, in England, the police drop cases by considering not simply evidentiary 
sufficiency, but also public interest. Thus, prosecutors have relatively less discretion. 
The discretion of the polic"e is more extensive than in the USA. In addition, the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors not only provides specific conditions for the public interest test,446 
but it emphasises that such factors can be taken into account at sentencing in the trial 
rather than requiring pre-trial decisions by prosecutors.447 As a result, the English law 
does not allow the prosecution to have extensive discretion, but requires them to serve 
as a supplementary filter. 
In France, the role of preliminary filter is assigned not only to the police, but also to 
the investigating judge. Minor offences are firstly dropped by the police, and serious 
crimes, where there is no sufficient evidence, are discontinued by the investigating 
judges. Then, those filtered cases are reviewed again by the public prosecutors. In other 
words, the French system of criminal justice does not permit the prosecution service to 
monopolise the pre-trial stage, but tries to separate the discretion and leads the police 
and the judges to be involved more actively in the pre-trial process. 
The second model is illustrated by Germany where the prosecution service acts as a 
'key filter'. In Germany, all cases can, in theory, be concluded only by the public 
445 Steve Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), 195-196 (Professor Uglow 
stated that 'the police as a preliminary filter, removing cases from the conveyer-belt of justice, by 
decisions either to take no further action or to caution. The CPS acts as a second filter using their power 
to discontinue prosecutions. ') 
446 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 2010 paras 4.16 - 4.l7. 
447 ibid para 4.l3. 'Although there may The Code for Crown Prosecutors be public interest factors 
tending against prosecution in a particular case, prosecutors should consider whether nonetheless a 
prosecution should go ahead and for those factors to be put to the court for consideration when sentence is 
passed.' 
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prosecutors at the pre-trial stage as the police do not have discretion to discontinue. 
Nevertheless, the function of the German prosecutors, unlike their counterparts in Korea, 
can be defined as a filter rather than monopolist because most prosecutorial decisions 
are, as we shall see below in Part 7, monitored by the court. Furthermore, cases where 
there is sufficient evidence cannot be discontinued by the prosecutors due to the 
principle of compulsory prosecution. In other words, the prosecution service simply 
serves as a filter, albeit a key one to screen the cases. 
An example of the third model is Japan where the prosecution service can be 
described as 'benevolent paternalist' .448 The Japanese law provides public prosecutors 
with considerable discretion. Unlike their counterparts in Germany, about ninety per 
cent of cases are concluded by the public prosecutors without intervention from the 
COurt.449 In particular, most cases are dropped based on application of the public interest 
test. The concept of public interest is interpreted more broadly than in other jurisdictions. 
Prosecutors will often refuse to file an indictment where they regard the prosecution as 
inappropriate considering the circumstances of the offence and the offender, even where 
the offender has confessed and there is ample evidence.45o This leads to the description 
of Japanese prosecutors acting as a benevolent paternalist. 
However, they do not monopolise pre-trial procedure and in general cannot 
intervene in the police investigation. After the police finish the investigation, the 
prosecutors can direct the police to conduct supplementary investigations or may 
conduct investigation with their own units. However, unlike in Korea, these units are 
only installed in some offices rather than in all branches. In other words, investigations 
by the prosecutors are limited. Moreover, the prosecutorial decisions to charge, as we 
shall see in Part 7, are controlled by an independent committee consisting of citizens. 
By use of their considerable discretion, prosecutors discontinue a large number of cases. 
Nevertheless, the system of criminal justice does not allow the prosecutors to 
448 Foote described the Japanese system of criminal justice as 'benevolent paternalism': 'The Japanese 
criminal-justice system is benevolent in that its goal is to achieve reformation and reintegration into 
society through lenient sanctions tailored to the offender's particular circumstances. The system is 
paternalism in that it allows substantial discretion to the state in both gathering and using information 
about the offender and the offense.' In this model, it is the public prosecutor who plays a considerable 
benevolent discretion. Thus, I propose that the Japanese public prosecutor acts as a benevolent paternalist. 
For more benevolent paternalism, see Foote op. cit. 
449 Such substantial discretion has helped the Japanese criminal justice system to be described as the 
'paradise for a prosecutor,' 'the prosecutor kingdom.' See Johnson op. cit. 21- 22 (Johnson identified five 
key contexts to facilitate prosecuti~n in Japan: 'prose~~tors confront little serious crime, carry light 
case loads, are insulated from public demands and polltlcal pressure, benefit from enabling laws of 
criminal procedure that confer extensive powers to investigate crimes and dispose of cases, and try cases 
before judges instead of juries. ') 
450 West op. cit. 689-690 
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monopolise the procedure. 
The final model is the 'monopolist', which is exemplified by the Korean prosecution 
service where over ninety per cent of criminal cases are concluded as a result of 
decisions by the prosecution. In addition to this, all investigations are conducted either 
by the police under the supervision of the prosecutors or by the prosecutors themselves 
utilising their own investigation units. Furthermore, as we shall discuss in Part 7, 
prosecutorial decisions in general are not reviewed by either the court or any 
independent body. Thus, if the prosecutor decides to charge or not to charge a suspect, 
there is no independent filter to screen the prosecutorial decisions before the trial. Such 
a monopoly has led the Korean criminal procedure to be described as the 'prosecutorial 
.. t ,451 Justice sys em. 
To summarise, the public prosecution service plays a filtering role. There are 
differences through the enabling statutes, their relationship with the police and the 
existence of investigating judges. Two countries stand out. In Japan, the public 
prosecutor does not simply filter cases, but they also have the right to 'forgive' the 
offenders by considering various conditions as if they were quasi-judges. This is a quite 
unique feature which is not observed in other jurisdictions. The Korean prosecutors, 
however, have the most considerable powers among six systems. They monopolise 
whole pre-trial process. Furthermore, their decisions are hardly reviewed and disputed. 
This statistical comparative study of discretion has a major limitation. Plea-
bargaining is significant element contributing to the discretion of the prosecution 
service in England and the USA. 452 However, we do not find this in the other countries 
in this study. A further complication is the difficulty in distinguishing between 
convictions based on guilty pleas in the English as well as US systems and the 
judgements of guilty based on confessions in the other jurisdictions. Due to those 
difficulties, this study did not taken into account such discretion, but further 
comparative research on the guilty plea should provide new insight into the 
prosecutorial discretion. 
451 Kuk Cho. 'The Unfmished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization South Korea' 
(2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377, 385-386. 
452 In the English and US systems, the prosecutors have the authority to give concessions to the 
defendants such as charging with a lesser offence or reducing charges given that they plead gUilty. For 
further discussion about guilty pleas, see Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, Criminal 
Justice (4th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010), 438-498; Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 264; 
Lafave op. cit. 532 (Lafave stated that 'One of the most striking features of the United States system of 
criminal justice is the broad range of largely uncontrolled discretion exercised by the prosecutor. 
Particularly noteworthy are these kinds of discretionary decisions: (I) the decision not to prosecute an 
individual notwithstanding sufficient evidence to meet the legal requirements for commencing a 
prosecution; and (2) the decisio~ to ,tender concessions to a charged individual on the condition that he 
pleads guilty rather than stand trIal. ) 
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6. The Influence of the Prosecutors upon the Trial 
As well as their impact on pre-trial decisions, the powers of the prosecutors can have an 
influence on the decisions by the trial courts. For instance, public prosecutors can 
recommend a sentence to the trial judge and this plays a significant role in the final 
outcome.453 
Such powers have been often discussed in comparative studies. For instance, in 
order to assess the sentencing roles of the prosecutors, Professor Fionda analysed 
several elements in her study of 'public prosecutors and discretion. ,454 She explored the 
process of choosing the mode of trial, the charges, the power to recommend a sentence 
and the ways to appeal against judgements.455 In Damaska's study of 'structures of 
authority and comparative criminal procedure' , he did not explore directly the 
prosecutorial impact on a trial. 456 However, his work on both the scope of the 
sentencing power of the judges and the importance of official documents in the criminal 
procedures are closely related to the role of the prosecution in sentencing.4s7 
This part is divided into two sections. The first considers prosecutorial powers which 
influence verdict and sentence by recommending as well as appealing. Secondly, the 
important element in the Korean criminal proceedings, namely the impact of the 
investigative dossier on a trial, is discussed in comparison to the other jurisdictions. A 
common thread is that these influences, as noted by Damaska, may be different 
depending on the legal traditions, namely the common law, civil law, and hybrid 
458 systems. 
6.1. The Elements Influencing the Outcomes of a Trial 
The trial is an important stage of the criminal process and is central to any evaluation of 
the Korean prosecution service. Two elements are considered: recommending a sentence 
. . d· t 11 t 459 and appealIng agamst ver lC s as we as sen ences. 
m Seech 3. 
4'4 Fionda op. cit. 
m ibid 41-57, 146-151. 
4'6 Damaska op. cit. 
m ibid 487-521. 
m ibid. 
4'9 As noted in Professor Fionda's study, a choice of mode of trial and charges can have an indirect 
impact on the judgements. Howeve~, tho.se ele~ents are already discussed in the part of prosecutorial 
discretion. Thus, they are excluded 10 thiS section. 
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The English and United States Systems 
In the English crown court, the jury is only concerned with making a decision on guilt 
or innocence and not with sentence.460 Nor do prosecutors have any statutory authority 
to recommend a sentence. 461 The decision on a sentence is within the exclusive 
authority of the judges.462 In tenns of sentencing, the Code for Crown Prosecutors 
describes the role of the prosecutors as follows: 
Sentencing is a decision for the court, but prosecutors have a duty to offer assistance to the 
sentencing court in reaching its decision as to the appropriate sentence by drawing the court's 
attention to the following factors: a) any aggravating or mitigating factors disclosed by the 
prosecution case; b) any Victim Personal Statement; c) where appropriate, evidence of the 
impact of the offending on a community; d) any statutory provisions, sentencing guidelines, 
or guideline cases which may assist; and e) any relevant statutory provisions relating to 
ancillary orders (such as anti-social behaviour orders).463 
The prosecutors provide the judges with infonnation which is helpful to the decision 
rather than directly recommending a sentence. The reason to prohibit such a 
prosecutorial recommendation, as Professor Fionda stated, is to both avoid 'undue 
influence over judicial decisions' and enable 'judges to remain autonomous in their 
field.,464 
This is also the case in the US. However, in relation to plea bargaining, prosecutorial 
recommendation for sentencing is pennitted. 465 The law does not provide general 
authority to recommend a sentence, but in the case of a plea bargain, gives the 
prosecutors the right to agree a sentence with a defendant. 466 In theory, the judges are 
460 John R. Spencer, 'The English system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European 
Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 142,212-213. 
461 Fionda op. cit. 41; Spencer op. cit. 212-213. 
462 ibid. 
463 The Code for Crown Prosecutors 2010 s II Prosecutor's Role in Sentencing. 
464 Fionda op. cit. 45; Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Reform (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) 
465 Albert W. Alschuler. 'The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I' (1976) 76 Colum L Rev 1059, 
1063-1064. (Alschuler stated that 'on the basis of a second sample of 1000 cases, that three of the ten 
judges who then sat in felony cases followed the prosecutor's recommendation in 100% of the cases that 
came before them; one other judge followed the prosecutor's recommendation in 99% of his cases, two in 
98%, one in 96%, one in 92%, and one-Judge Sam W. Davis-in 88%. ') 
466 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 2008 Rule 11 Pleas ( c) Plea Agreement Procedure (1) In General. 
'An attorney for the government and the defendant's attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, 
may discuss and reach a plea agreement. ... If the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to either a 
charged offense or a lesser ~r related.offense, the ple~ agreement may specify that an attorney for the 
government will: (A) not bnng, or Will m~ve to dismiSS, other charges; (8) recommend, or agree not to 
oppose the defendant s request, that a particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate or that a 
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not subject to the recommendation from the prosecutors.467 Therefore, they can impose 
a sentence either more severe or more lenient than the sentence offered by the 
prosecutors.468 However, as Alschuler argued, 'prosecutorial sentence recommendations 
are so universally followed that their effect is virtually indistinguishable from that of 
judicial promises of specific sentences. ,469 
In addition, the English and ~erican prosecutors, in principle, are not entitled to 
appeal against acquittals. Such limitation is not applied only to the prosecutors, but the 
defendants also, as Damaska put it, have comparatively severe limits as to the grounds 
on which to challenge the decision.47o Neither defendant nor prosecutors can dispute the 
findings of fact, unlike many civil law systems.471 With respect to this limited scope of 
appeal, Damaska said: 
Even when error can be appealed, direct reconsideration of the adjudication, as in the 
continental system, is not involved [in common law systems]. Following the pattern quite 
understandable in the setting of the jury trial with its inscrutable general verdict, what is 
actually reviewed is the propriety of the material submitted to the decision-maker for decision, 
rather than his "correct" use of the material. In light of foregoing it is not at all surprising that 
particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does 
not apply (such a recommendation or request does not bind the court); or (C) agree that a specific 
sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a 
recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement). ' (Emphasis added) 
However, the English law requires judges to consider the discount of sentence rather than gives the 
prosecutors the right to recommend a sentence. See s 144 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 '(I) In 
determining what sentence to pass on an offender who has pleaded gUilty to an offence in proceedings 
before that or another court, a court must take into account- . (a) the stage in the proceedings for the 
offence at which the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty, and (b) the circumstances in which 
this indication was given.' 
467 ibid Rule 11 (3) Judicial Consideration ofa Plea Agreement. '(A) To the extent the plea agreement is 
of the type specified in Rule II(c) (1) (A) or (C) the court may accept the agreement, reject ii, or defer a 
decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.' (Emphasis added). 
468 Albert W. Alschuler. 'The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I' (1976) 76 Colum L Rev 1059, 
1062. 
469 ibid 1107. 
470 Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (I 974) 84 Yale LJ 
480,514-515. 
471 ibid; Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 360 (Ashworth and Redmayne suggested that 'Where 
prosecutors do have appeal rights, as in the magistrates' co~rt, ~es~ tend to be.restricted so as to allow 
appeals on points of law, r~ther than challenges to fact-fmdmg .. ); .FlOnda ?p. CIt. 46-51 (Professor Fionda 
stated that' A new power gIVen to the prosecutors under the Cnmmal JustIce Act 1988, s. 36, has given 
them a direct influence over the sentence given by a court. Section 36 allows the prosecution to appeal 
against an 'unduly lenient sentence'. Under this power, the Attorney-General may refer cases of indictable 
offences to the Court of Appeal for review of a sentence he thinks is too low.') 
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the right to appeal is not nearly so important in [common law systems] ... as it is in 
continental systems, and that it is generally not accorded constitutional stature.472 
The legal tradition based on the jury trial makes the prosecutorial power to appeal less 
important in the common law than in the continental systems. 
However, the English law has allowed appeals on points of law since section 36 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1972 with the system of the 'attorney general's reference' 
although this does not affect the acquittal. They may also appeal under the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, against an unduly lenient sentence. A further extension came with the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 gives the public prosecutors the ways to appeal acquittals 
based on factual grounds and to obtain a fresh trial. 473 This challenge is regarded as an 
exception to the double jeopardy principle.474 
Unlike the English, the US system still prohibits the public prosecutors from 
challenging acquittals. Th~ US Supreme Court, in Kepner v. United States, held that the 
government may not appeal an acquittal.47s Prior to this judgement, the general rule 
against appeal of the prosecutors was established in Ball v. United States holding: 
The Constitution of the United States, in the Fifth Amendment, declares, "nor shall any 
person be subject to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The prohibition is not against 
being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy; and the accused, whether 
convicted or acquitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial.476 
47Z Damaska op. cit. 515. 
473 Criminal Justice Act 2003 Part 10 Retrial For Serious Offences s 75 Cases that may be retried '(1) 
This Part applies where a person has been acquitted of a qualifying offence in proceedings (a) on 
indictment in England and Wales, (b) on appeal against a conviction, verdict or rmding in proceedings on 
indictment in England and Wales, or (c) on appeal from a decision on such an appeal ... • s 76 
Application to Court of Appeal '(1) A prosecutor may apply to the Court of Appeal for an order (a) 
quashing a person's acquittal in proceedings within section 75(1), and (b) ordering him to be retried for 
the qualifying offence .. .' s 78 New and compelling evidence '(I) The requirements of this section are met 
if there is new and compelling evidence against the acquitted person in relation to the qualifying offence. 
(2) Evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted (nor, if 
those were appeal proceedings, in earlier proceedings to which the appeal related) ... • 
474 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 360 (Ashworth and Redmayne stated that 'The traditional double 
jeopardy principle meant that jury acquittals we.re final, as were ~cquittals b~ the magistrates once the 
appeals process was over .... In 1996 an exceptl~n to the double ~eopardy pnnciple was introduced, 
allowing an acquittal to be quashed and a new trial to take place 10 cases where the acquittal is found to 
be 'tainted' by the commission ofan 'administration of justice offence involving interference with or 
intimidation of a juror or witness' .... The Criminal Justice Act 2003 goes much further. It creates a 'fresh 
evidence' exception to the double jeopardy principle.') 
475 Kepner v United States (1904) 195 U.S. 100 (The U.S. Supreme Court) 
476 United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S. 662 (The U.S. Supreme Court), 669. 
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Due to those decisions, the right to appeal against acquittals is, in principle, not allowed 
in the United States criminal proceedings. Therefore, as Khanna stated, in the USA, 
there seem to be 'asymmetric appeal rights' referring to 'the fact that criminal 
defendants may appeal convictions, but prosecutors have highly attenuated rights to 
appeal acquittals. ,477 This 'absolute' ban on prosecutorial appeals of acquittals permits 
only two exceptions.478 First, the US criminal procedure allows the public prosecutor to 
appeal against an acquittal where such an appeal does not lead to a retria1.479 Second, 
when the defendants bribe a juror or the judge, the public prosecutor has the right to 
appeal against acquittal. In those circumstances, the initial trial is not regarded as 
jeopardy for the defendant. 480 In short, the English and US systems permit the 
prosecutorial rights to appeal against judgments only in a limited way. 
The French and German Systems 
The French and German prosecutors, unlike the English and United States, have the 
authority to recommend a sentence to the trial judge.481 This recommendation does not 
formally bind or restrict the decisions of the courts, but rather, has a part to play in 
guiding sentences because the judges often give a lesser sentence than that 
recommended. 482 This practice does not attract much attention, since such a 
recommendation has no binding effect in law. However, the recommendation of the 
prosecutor, as Professor Fionda suggested, may play a significant role: 'a 
recommendation of sentence provides the judge with guidance about the sentencing 
477 Vikramaditya S. Khanna. 'Double Jeopardy's Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purpose Do They 
Serve' (2002) 82 B V L Rev 341, 342-343. 
478 ibid 350. 
479 United States v. Wilson (1975) 420 V.S. 332 (The V.S. Supreme Court), 335-353 (In this case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held: 'When a trial judge rules in favor of the defendant after a guilty verdict has been 
entered by the trier of fact, the Government may appeal from that ruling without contravening the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. (a) That Clause protects against Government appeals only where there is a danger of 
subjecting the defendant to a second trial for the same offense, and hence such protection does not attach 
to a trial judge's post-verdict correction of an error of law which would not grant the prosecution a new 
trial or subject the defendant to .multiple prosecutions. (b) Here, the District Court's ruling in respondent's 
favor could be disposed of on appeal without subjecting him to a second trial at the Government's behest. 
If he prevails on appeal, the matter will become fmal, and the Government will not be permitted to bring a 
second prosecution for the same offense, whereas, if he loses, the case must return to the District Court 
for disposition of his remaining motions.') 
480 Vikramaditya S. Khanna. 'Double Jeopardy's Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purpose Do They 
Serve' (2002) 82 B V L Rev 341, 351; The People of the State of Illinois v. Aleman (1996) 281 Ill. App. 3d 
991 (Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sec~nd I?ivision), 625 (In this case, the court made a 
ruling that 'That jeopardy cannot attach to proceedmgs mfected with fraud or collusion is ineluctable. ') 
481 Marianne Wade, Paul Smit and Bruno Aubusson de Cavarlay. 'Prosecution Role Where Courts Decide 
Cases' (2008) 14(2-3) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research II, 137; Fionda op. cit. 148-
149. 
482 Wade et al. op. cit. 137. 
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legislation and the prosecutor can make an informed suggestion since he or she may 
know more about the accused than the judge, who will only have seen the offender in 
court. ,483 
In addition to recommending a sentence, the French and German prosecutors, have 
the power to appeal against verdict and sentence.484 As Khanna and Rizzolli put it, in 
France and Germany, symmetrical appeal powers between the government and 
defendants are the dominant rule. 48S Since prosecutors can appeal against both 
acquittals and convictions, the German prosecutors have wider appeal rights than the 
defendants, who appeal against convictions although in limited circumstances can file 
an appeal against an acquittal.486 Further, the prosecutor can appeal against sentence.487 
As a quasi-judicial officer they have a duty to protect the defendants and can appeal not 
only when the sentence is considered too lenient, but also when they think it is too 
488 severe. 
In France, the decisions by Indicting Chambers, Courts of Appeal, Correctional and 
Police Courts, and Assize Courts Gury-like trial) can be appealed equally by both the 
prosecutors and defendants.489 However, the initial trial acquittal by the Assize Court 
cannot be overturned by ~ appeal, but instead, such an appeal has a role to play in 
I 'fy' th I 490 can mg e aw. 
483 Fionda op. cit. 149. 
484 Wade et a1. op. cit.; Beatrix Elsner and Julia Peters, 'The Prosecution Service Function within the 
German Criminal Justice System' in JOrg-Martin Jehle and Marianne Wade (eds), Coping with 
Overloaded Criminal Justice Systems (Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2006) 207,213; Federal Ministry of 
Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code [Strafprozeftordnung] (1987) s 296 '(1) Both the public 
prosecution office and the accused shall be entitled to file the remedies admissible against court decisions. 
(2) The public prosecution office may also make use ofthem for the accused's benefit'; Jong Gu Kim, The 
Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 148-150. 
48f Vikramaditya S. Khanna. 'How does Double Jeopardy Help Defendants?' (2001) Discussion Paper no. 
315, 14 (Khanna indicated that in addition to the French and German, in Italy, Spain, Argentina, the 
Russian Federation, China, and Japan, the government may have the power to appeal acquittals); Matteo 
Rizzolli. 'Why Public Prosecutors Cannot Appeal Acquittals' (2008) JEL Classifications K4 Working 
Paper Series, 9. 
486 Khanna op. cit. 14 n 60. 
487 Fionda op. cit. 151. 
488 ibid. 
489 Khanna op. cit. 15 n 61. 
490 ibid; Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 
2004), 148-150; Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code of Criminal Procedure (2000) 
art 380-1 'Decisions by the assize court in the first instance imposing convictions may be appealed from 
as provided for by the present chapter. This ~ppeal ~s bro.ught before another assize court, nominated by 
the criminal chamber of the Court of CassatIOn. This asSize court proceeds to re-examine the case 
according to the terms and the conditions set out in chapters II to VII of the present title. 
The court rules without the presence of jurors in the following cases: 1) Where the accused, 
committed to the assize court solely for a misdemeanour related to a felony, is the only appellant; 2) 
Where the appeal from the public prosecutor's office against a conviction of an acquittal concerns a 
misdemeanour related to a felony, and no appeal has been lodged against the felony conviction.' 
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In short, the German and French prosecutors, unlike their English and United States 
counterparts, have extensive rights of appeal. Damaska sees this difference in the light 
of the 'centrifugal tendency' of the continental countries: 
There are in the continental judicial systems two decisive weapons to cope with centrifugal 
tendencies in administering criminal justice. One is the comprehensive and widely used 
system of appeals ... As befits a system in which decisions of subordinates are supervised by 
those closer to the center of power, appellate review was from its inception conceived as a 
comprehensive device that permitted, at least at the first level of review, a complete 
reconsideration of the case. Thus criminal appeal in all modem continental systems implies a 
review not only of alleged legal error, but also of factual findings and even the punishment 
imposed. Nor is it surprising, in light of centuries of tradition, that appellate review gradually 
became associated with fairness in the administration of justice. Indeed, in modem 
continental countries, the. "right of appeal" is usually elevated to the constitutional level. The 
appellate process is made very inexpensive, and is not risky for the parties. In large classes of 
criminal cases even supreme courts can be reached as a matter of right through the 
mechanism of appeals. 491 
Appellate reVIew is one of the important methods to secure the uniformity in the 
centralised criminal procedures and judicial decisions should be subject to 
reconsideration. Consequently, the finality of a trial and execution of judgment have to 
be postponed until the normal means of review have been exhausted.492 
The Japanese and Korean Systems 
Japanese and Korean prosecutors, as in France and Germany, have the right to 
recommend a sentence to the judge and appeal against acquittals. Such a 
recommendation has a direct influence upon the decisions of the court.493 The sentence 
recommendations by the Korean prosecutor and their impact in guiding the judge's 
decision have been already discussed in Chapter 3. 
491 Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 
480,488-490. 
492 ibid 491. 
493 Koichi Hamai and Tom Ellis. 'Genbatsuka: Growing Penal Populism and the Changing Role of Public 
Prosecutors in Japan?' (2008) 33 Japanese Journal of Sociological Criminology 67, 77 (Hamai and Ellis 
suggested that 'it is important to note here thatju~ges appear to offer little in the way of effective 
gatekeeping in Japan, such that pros~cutors re?I~m the powerful primary determinant of the outcome of 
criminal justice processes, both outSide and wlthm the court process. ') 
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In Japan, a formal trial can begin with the prosecutor's recommendation for sentence. 
As Hamai and Ellis describe, 'If they consider that the case is very serious and the 
offender deserves imprisonment, they will process the case for a formal trial with a 
recommendation that the court considers a custodial sentence. ,494 However, in general, 
the Japanese prosecutors, as their counterparts in Korea, only recommend a sentence 
during the final argument. 495 Such a recommendation guides the judgement of the 
courts. For example, 'suspended prison sentences are generally indicated by a 
prosecutor's recommendation of less than 3 years imprisonment. In such cases, judges 
are highly likely to sentence the offender to a suspended prison sentence. ,496 Regarding 
the significance of prosecutor's recommendation in Japan, Hamai and Ellis illustrated it 
thus: 
About 7% of the offenders processed through the public prosecutor's office, are currently then 
committed for formal trial, and 99.9% of these are convicted, with many receiving a custodial 
sentence ... It is fairly clear then, that once offenders are committed for a formal trial, the 
guilty verdict is almost certain, and the trial is a formality ... it is important to note here that 
judges appear to offer little in the way of effective gatekeeping in Japan, such that prosecutors 
remain the powerful primary determinant of the outcome of criminal justice processes, both 
outside and within the court process.497 
Despite this, there may be cases in which the requests of the prosecutors are not met, e.g. 
a lenient sentence or even a finding of not guilty. In those instances, 'it is almost certain 
that the prosecutor will appeal against this loss of face and ask for the intervention of 
th al urt 
,498 
e appe co s. 
With regard to the right to appeal against judicial decisions, Korean and Japanese 
laws, as in France and German, provide the prosecutors with as wide a latitude as the 
defence. The Korean and Japanese prosecutors can appeal twice: once to the High 
Courts and finally to the Supreme COurt.499 Yet, there is a difference in the appeals to 
the Supreme Court between the Japanese and Korean systems. In Japan, the appeals to 
the Supreme Court are permitted only on the basis of points of law. In other words, the 
494 ibid 75. 
495 Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 457. 
496 Hamai and Ellis op. cit. 77. 
497 ibid (Emphasis added) 
498 ibid; Such appeals, as Johnson put it, are more favourable to the prosecutors than the defendants: 'in 
the ten years between 1982 and 1991, prosecutors reversed an average of75 percent of the cases they 
appealed to the High Courts, while defendants succeeded in less than 17 percent of their appeals.' See 
Johnson op. cit. 41-42. 
499 ibid; Jae-Sang Lee op. cit. 689-723. 
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prosecutors can appeal in cases where the decision of the lower court contradicts the 
Constitution or Supreme Court precedent. soo On the other hand, in Korea, the 
prosecutor and defendant can appeal to the Supreme Court against findings on grounds 
of either fact or law. In other words, wider appeals are allowed in the Korean criminal 
procedure. SOl 
To sum up, most jurisdictions give the prosecution the right to recommend a 
sentence and appeal. However, in the English and US jurisdictions, such rights are 
considered as an exception to the principles such as double jeopardy. In contrast, the 
French, German, Japanese and Korean laws, in principle, give the prosecutors 
considerable leeway. Thus, in these systems, the public prosecutors can exercise almost 
the same appeal rights as the defendants. 
6.2. The Impact of the Dossier in the Criminal Trials 
The right to recommend a sentence and the power to appeal against the decisions of the 
courts are important elements which have prosecutorial impact on the verdict and 
sentence of the court. However, in the Korean system of criminal justice, as noted in 
Chapter 6, the investigative dossiers written by the public prosecutors tend to exert even 
more influence upon the judicial decisions than the other factors. Criminal trials are 
conducted based on the dossiers, and the statements in the dossiers are used as 
significant evidence to prove the guilt of defendants. 
Dossiers also play an important role in the continental systems. Damaska stated that 
'Implicit in the ubiquitous hierarchical control of the continental machinery of criminal 
justice is the importance of documentation. ,S02 For effective review by superiors, all 
activities of the legal actors must be recorded in the dossiers. 503 Most of this 
'00 Johnson op. cit. 41. 
501 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act {Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 383 'An appeal may be lodged against a judgment in the 
original instance rendered by the High Court for the following grounds: <Amended by Act No. 70S, Sep. 
1, 1961; Act No. 1500, Dec. 13, 1953> 1. In cases where there has been a violation of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Korea, Acts, Ordinances or regulations which have affected a decision of the court; 2. In 
cases where punishment is abolished or changed, or general amnesty has been proclaimed after a decision 
of the court has been rendered; 3. In cases where there is a reason to request for a review; and 4. 
Regarding those cases for which punishment of death, a life term or an imprisonment or imprisonment 
without labor for more than ten years has been imposed, when the judgment attached was affected by 
grave mistake of the fact or when the amount of the punishment is extremely improper.'; Jae-Sang Lee op. 
cit. 740. 
502 Damaska op. cit. 506. 
'03 ibid. 
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documentation ends up in the file, and is used as important source for examination at 
trial. 504 
In the French and German systems, the main function of the prosecutor is 'to control 
the investigation of any reported crime, to assemble a complete and balanced file or 
'dossier' that would contain the results of that investigation, and to file appropriate 
criminal charges if the evidence shows that a crime has been committed. ,sos Preparing a 
dossier for a trial is regarded as one of the main roles of the prosecutors. 
The dossier is not only used to review the decisions of the prosecutors, but it also 
plays an important role in the trial process. 506 Once the public prosecutors file an 
indictment, the dossiers are sent to the trial judges.507 On the basis of the investigative 
dossiers, the judges make a decision 'which witnesses will testify and who will conduct 
the bulk of questioning of those witnesses during the trial.' 508 Furthermore, the trial 
judge, as Damaska put it, ·'studies the file in advance of trial' and many important parts 
of the dossiers may be used as evidence in COurt.
509 
Due to this, the French and German 
prosecutors place more emphasis on preparing dossiers than on examining witnesses at 
trial.510 As a result, their main task is to ensure that the investigative dossier includes all 
relevant evidence as to the case as well as information on the background of the 
'04 ibid 506-507; Mirjan Damaska. 'Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study' (1972) 121 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506, 519 
(Damaska stated that 'evidence which has not been brought out during trial may not be used in arriving at 
the decision. Evidentiary matedal contained in the dossier technically does not constitute evidence, 
although it does in fact influence the presiding judge and, through him, other members of the adjudicating 
panel. But, even disregarding actual practice, once evidence contained in the dossier has been brought out 
(by reading out summaries of interrogation or in some other way), it may legally be used for substantive 
Pou,rposes. ') .. d d' Pr . I D' , . th U 't d S Th L" f 3( William T. PIZZI. 'Un erstan 109 osecutona Iscretlon 10 e me tates: e lmlts 0 
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform' (1993) 54 Ohio St.LJ 1325,1332 
(Emphasis added); John H. Langbein. 'Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany' (1974) 41 (3) 
The University of Chicago Law Review 439, 446-448. 
'06 Abraham S. Goldstein. 'Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal 
Procedure' (1973) 26 Stan.L.Rev. 1009, 1018-1019; Richard S. Frase. 'Comparative Criminal Justice as a 
Guide to American Law Reform: How do the French do it, how can we find out, and why should we care' 
(}990) 78 Calif Law Rev 539, 608. 
S07 Richard S. Frase and Thomas Weigend, 'German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions' (1995) 18 Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review 317, 342 (Frase and Weigend illustrated that 'German trials are conducted by the presiding 
judge", the court is responsible for gathering all the evidence necessary to 'determine the truth'. '); 
Goldstein op. cit. 1019. 
'08 Pizzi op. cit. 1334. 
'09 Mirjan Damaska. 'Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure' (1974) 84 Yale LJ 
480 507; In addition to the judges, 'the accused may gain an overall picture of the evidence gathered only 
by ;tudying the dossier.' See Valerie Dervieux, 'The French system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. 
S~encer. (eds),. European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 218, 265. 
,. PiZZI op. Cit. 1350. 
182 
Chapter 5 The Functions o/the Public Prosecution Service: A Comparative Study 
defendant. SlI In France and Germany, the investigative dossier 'constitutes the 
backbone of the criminal proceedings.'Sl2 
However, the decisions by presiding judges are not based only on the written file. 
Although important facts are included in the dossier, unless they are brought out in court, 
such evidence cannot be used in arriving at the decision due to the 'principle of 
. d' , SI3 lInme lacy. 
Unlike the French and German systems, in the English and US criminal procedures, 
official documentation recorded in the pre-trial stage is regarded as relatively 
insignificant.Sl4 The adversarial trial is based on admissible evidence adduced through 
the witness box.SIS Professor Uglow described this paradigm as follows: 
[T]he presentation of infonnation (evidence), the argument and the decision all take place 
within a trial which is separated, geographically, chronologically and fonnally, from all the 
previous events such as the police investigation, the review of the evidence by the prosecution, 
or any preliminary hearings before judges or magistrates. It is only the infonnation which is 
given in evidence at the trial itself which can fonn the basis .of any decision. The judge, in 
common with the jury and the spectators in the public gallery, will be hearing the evidence for 
the first time.'16 
In the English and US systems there is greater reliance on oral testimony and no real 
counterpart of the investigative dossiers in France and Germany. S 17 Much of the Anglo-
American law of evidence has been created to regulate the use of documentary evidence 
in cOurtS.SI8 Damaska argued that 'Summaries of testimony or of visits to the scene of 
crime, for example, assume the character of lifeless bureaucratic residues of reality, 
'II ibid. 
m Damaska op. cit. 507. 
m ibid 506; Frase and Weigend op. cit. 343 (Frase and Weigend suggested that the principle of 
immediacy, which refers to a preference of oral over written proof, is the most important rule of trial 
evidence.); Dervieux op. cit. 233; Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal 
Procedure (2000) art 427 para 2 'The judge may only base his decision on evidence which was submitted 
in the course of the hearing and adversarially discussed before him.' 
514 Damaska op. cit. 521 (Damaska noted that 'The autonomous manner of exercising authority that is so 
characteristic of the Anglo-United States machinery of criminal justice must inevitably decrease the 
importance of official documentation. ') 
SIS Steve Uglow, Evidence: Text and Materials (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 802, 5-6. 
516 ibid 6. 
SI7 Damaska op. cit. 521; However, adjudications do not necessarily rely on oral statements. See 
Goldstein op. cit. 1020-1021. 
518 Damaska op. cit. 521; Frase and Weigend op. cit. 342 (Frase and Weigend stated that 'Because of the 
court's overriding responsibility for detennining the truth, rules of trial evidence are less strict in 
Germany than in the United States. ') 
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always defective, often spurious, and therefore such evidence is normally inadmissible 
at trial. ,519 
However, in Korea and Japan, trials are conducted based on investigative dossiers. 
First of all, the Japanese law permits prosecutors and the police to compose a summary 
of the suspects' statements. Such statements in the dossier are mostly admitted as 
evidence in courts without the need for oral evidence. The burden is on defendants to 
prove the unreliability of the accounts. 520 Due to such provisions in the code of criminal 
procedure, Japanese trials rely heavily on the dossiers prepared by the police and 
prosecutors. 521 As Foote stated, 'the trial consists primarily of confirming the results of 
the investigation as reported in this file. ,522 
Johnson described the investigative dossier as 'prosecutor essays': 'they are 
analytical and interpretive compositions written from a limited personal standpoint, and 
they are efforts to persuade judges of a particular point of view ... [However] the 
pressure to produce persuasive compositions can compel prosecutors (and the police) to 
fabricate or distort the content [of the investigative dossiers].'523 A murder case in the 
19905 illustrates well this situation in Japan: 
The investigating prosecutor had three years' experience and only a handful of colleagues in 
his small, rural office. He was bound by law to make the charge decision by a certain Friday. 
His boss - the branch chief - demanded a punctiliously detailed dossier. A few days before 
the charging deadline the prosecutor got the suspect to sign a statement making incriminating 
"9 Damaska op. cit. 521. 
'20 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Japan, Code a/Criminal Procedure (Act no. 13/) (1948) art 322 (1) 'A 
written statement made by the accused or a written statement recording the statement of the accused and 
which has hislher signature and seal affixed by himlher may be used as evidence, when the statement 
contains an admission of a disadvantageous/act, or is made under circumstances that afford special 
credibility; provided, however, that even if the admission is not a confession, a document which contains 
an admission of a disadvantageous fact may not be used as evidence when there is doubt about it being 
voluntary ... ' (Emphasis added) 
m The investigative dossier includes statements not only of suspects, but also of witnesses. In addition, 
both of them are admissible at trials. See ibid art 321 'A written statement made by a person other than the 
accused, or a written statement recording the statement of that person and with the signature or the seal 
affixed by that person may be used as evidence only in the following circumstances ... '; Dong Hee Lee et 
a1. op. cit. 718-719; Johnson op. cit. 248. 
'22 Daniel H. Foote. 'The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice' (1992) 80 Cal.L.Rev. 317, 
338-339 (Foote noted that '[t]his prosecutorial dominance has led to widespread characterizations of 
Japan's criminal justice. s~ste~ as "prosecutorialjust~ce." (k~ns~tsu~anshi?o) and "trial by dossier" 
(chcusho saiban). And It IS thiS /lSP~C~ o~ Japanese cnm~al Justice 10 partlc~lar th.at Judge Ishimatsu was 
focusing on when he asserted that cnmmal defendants 10 Japan do not receive trials by judges.' In 
Ishimatsu's view, "criminal trials ... are conducted in closed rooms by the investigators, and the 
proceedings in open court are merely a formal ceremony [to conftrm the conclusions of the 
investigators]". ') 
'23 Johnson op. cit. 248. 
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but incomplete admission of guilt. ... [T]he branch chief judged the statement inadequate. 
"What are you going to do if the case ends in acquittal?" bellowed the boss. "Or is that just 
fme with you?" After his harangue the chief xeroxed the dossier and edited his copy to read as 
desired. He then instructed his subordinate to remove the defective pages from the original 
and insert the designated changes. The prosecutor returned to his office and, with the aid of 
his assistant, did as instructed, reluctantly but illegally incorporating alterations in the text 
without gaining the consent of the suspect whose statement this ostensibly was. The 
prosecutors got their conviction. Some time later the branch chief pressured the same 
prosecutor to fabricate parts of another dossier. This time the prosecutor resigned, choosing to 
become a private attorney rather than face another discomfiting diJemma.'24 
Not only does this case identify the process of preparing investigative dossiers and their 
impact on the outcomes of a trial, but it also indicates the problems that can occur in 
proceedings heavily reliant on the dossier. 
The situation in Korea is very similar to the one in Japan. The public prosecutors 
and the police have the statutory authority to draft the statements of the suspects and 
witnesses. 525 Such investigative dossiers are accepted into evidence at trials under 
certain conditions. 526 As in Japan, the judge conducts a trial on the basis of 
investigation dossiers. The statements recorded in the document, as noted in detail in 
Chapter 6, are subject to very little scrutiny and yet play a considerable role in 
determining guilt of defendants. Due to this practice, the Korean criminal trials are often 
criticised as 'Jo-Seo Jae-Pan' which means the trial depending on dossier without 
hearings. 
In Korea, the procedures in preparing dossiers are similar to the Japanese. However, 
there is a significant difference in their impact. In Japan, the dossier composed by the 
prosecutors is treated similarly to that of the police.527 All investigative dossiers are 
524 ibid 248-249. 
S2S The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) arts 200, 221. 
526 ibid art 312 (1) 'A protocol in which the public prosecutor recorded a statement of a defendant when 
the defendant was at the stage of suspect is ,admissible as evidence, only if it was prepared in compliance 
with the due process and proper method, the defendant admits in his pleading in a preparatory hearing or 
a trial that its contents are the same as he stated, and it is proved that the statement recorded in the 
protocol was made in a particularly reliable state.' (3) 'A protocol prepared by any investigative 
institution other than a public prosecutor for examination of a suspect is admissible as evidence, only if it 
was prepared in compliance with the due proce.ss :md proper ~ethod and the defendant, who was the 
suspect at the time, or his defense counsel admits Its contents m a preparatory hearing or a trial.' 
(Emphasis added) . . . 
527 Dong Hee Lee and others, InvestIgatIOn Systems: A ComparatIve Study [Bigyosusajedoron] 
(pakyoungsa,SeouI2004),718. 
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admissible as evidence under the same conditions. 528 However, in Korea, the 
prosecutor's dossiers are readily accepted into evidence unlike those by the police.529 
Defendants have substantial difficulty in refuting the statements included in the 
'd . 530 prosecutor s OSSlers. 
In the English and United States systems, the files detailing the investigation 
dossiers have no part to play in the proceedings as the trials are mainly based on oral 
testimony in hearings in open court. By contrast, documents are regarded as one of the 
most important elements in the French and German systems. However, they restrict the 
trials based solely on the dossiers, but instead, require all evidence to be examined in 
the open courts. Unlike those jurisdictions, the trials in Japan and Korea are mostly 
conducted on the basis of investigation dossiers. In particular, the Korean law provides 
for very little scrutiny of the prosecutor's documents, in particular the interview records, 
with the consequence that the dossier has a very powerful evidentiary impact which 
effectively determines the verdict. 
7. Accountability of the Public Prosecution Service 
Prosecutors in general conduct various functions based on extensive discretion. Such 
discretion, as Bibas argued, has the potential for abuse because 'prosecution is low-
visibility process about which the public has poor information and little right to 
participate.'531 Discretionary powers mean that prosecutors to 'have great leeway to 
abuse their powers and indulge their self interests, biases, or arbitrariness.' 532 Thus, 
every jurisdiction establishes accountability mechanisms to check that discretion and to 
guarantee that the public prosecutors carry out their functions and powers properly. 533 
528 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Japan, Code of Criminal Procedure (Act no. 131) (1948) art 321 para I 
subparas 2, 3. 
529 For further discussion, see ch 6. 
530 Dong-Woon Shin stated that 'if there is a confession in the interview records written by the public 
prosecutor, it is almost impossible to expect ajudgement of acquittal' See Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Refonn 
of the Korean Public Prosecution' (1988) 29(2) Seoul Law Journal 39, 55. 
m Stephanos Bibas. 'Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability' (2008) 157 U Pa L 
Rev 959,961; Stephanos Bibas. 'Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure' (2006) 81 NYUL 
Rev. 911, 923-931 (Bibas noted that 'Criminal justice outsiders see the system quite differently. Much of 
the criminal justice system is hidden from their view ... Prosecutors rarely explain publicly why they 
have declined prosecution, pursued felony charges, or bargained away imprisonment.' . 
532 Stephanos Bibas op. cit. (2008) 961. . 
533 Hans-Jorg Albrecht. 'Criminal Prosecution: Developments, Trends and Open Questions in the Federal 
Republic of Gennany' (2000) 8 Europe~ .Journal of ~rime, Criminal La~ and Criminal Justice 245, 254 
(Albrecht noted that 'control and supervISIon of. public pros~cutors certatnly are necessary insofar as the 
legal substance is concerned and as regards the unplementatlon of prosecution policies which must be 
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By use of such mechanisms, transparency can be increased. As a result, the rights of 
individuals can be protected ensuring discretion not to be abused. 534 As Sanders and 
Young stated, 'Accountability is needed in order to ensure the appropriateness for the 
enforcement policy of any agency which employs discretion on the basis of the agency's 
. . d k' I ,535 own cntena an wor mg ru es. 
There are several methods to achieve accountability of the prosecution service, as 
seen in Professor Fionda's comparative study.536 Even though each system has placed 
emphasis on a different method, guaranteeing accountability has been regarded 
important in most jurisdictions. 537 This part explores prosecutorial accountability in 
each jurisdiction. However, the political accountability of the public prosecution service 
to the Parliament is not discussed since this is common to all and is regarded as a 
fundamental mechanism to control the agencies of the government. 538 As a 
consequence, four aspects will be examined: the internal accountability of the 
prosecution service, judicial review, accountability to the victims, and the independent 
schemes. 
7.1. The English System 
In England and Wales, the decisions of the public prosecutors are generally controlled 
by the internal hierarchy and the courts. Furthermore, decisions not to prosecute can be 
challenged, albeit rarely, by private prosecution. In particular, the criminal justice 
system has an independent inspectorate to assess the performance of the prosecution 
based upon discretion. '); Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 76 (Ashworth and Redmayne argued that 
'Methods of accountability should include proper scrutiny of general policies, rules, and! or guidelines for 
decision making; active supervision of practice; avenues for challenging decisions; and openness rather 
than secrecy at key stages. ') 
$34 ibid 77; For further discussion about the importance of accountability of the prosecution service, see 
Julia Fionda and Andrew Ashworth. 'The New Code for Crown Prosecutors: Part I: Prosecution, 
Accountability and the Public Interest' (1994) (Dec) Criminal Law Review 894. 
m Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007),372. 
$36 Julia Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study ([Oxford monographs on 
criminal law and criminal justice], Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 1995) 
268 
'37 Professor Fionda illustrated the accountability in the four jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland, 
Netherland, and Germany. See ibid 60-62,89-91, 124-128, 160-162. 
'38 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 201; Fionda op. cit. 60; Susanne Walther. 'The Position and Structure 
of the Prosecutor's Office in the United States' (2000) 8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 283, 285-286; Dervieux op. cit. 224; Elsner and Peters op. cit. 207-208; Johnson op. cit. 
119-120; Ho Jung Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 
9(2) Seo-Kang Law Journal 43, 62-63. 
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service.539 
First, prosecutors are internally accountable to their superiors, and such lines of 
management and accountability extend to the Director of the Public Prosecutions (DPP), 
who is in charge of the service. In turn, the DPP is answerable to the Attomey-
General. 540 The Attorney-General has the ministerial and political responsibility and 
issues the general policies for the public prosecutors. However, with respect to the 
decisions of individual cases, they do not give instructions to the public prosecutors.54 ) 
Second, prosecutor's decisions are controlled by the court in individual cases.542 In 
the English criminal procedure, the courts play an active role in reviewing prosecutorial 
discretion.543 The House of Lords held that a decision to prosecute can be reviewed by 
the court if there is 'any claim of dishonesty, bad faith or other exceptional 
circumstance. ,544 In addition to such a review on the decision to charge, the courts have 
displayed willingness to check the decisions not to prosecute. The courts can review not 
only the individual decisions to decline prosecutions,545 but also a general policy not to 
file indictments of certain classes of offences, e.g. non-prosecution of all thefts with a 
value below £100.546 However, the English system has not developed either a formal 
judicial appeal procedure or a formal internal appeals process dealing with the decisions 
of the prosecutors, which are considered unfair, unlawful, or improper by an interested 
party.547 Nevertheless, as Professor Fionda put it, 'the existing common law procedures 
539 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 201. 
540 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 s 2 'The Director of Public Prosecutions (1) The Director of Public 
Prosecutions shall be appointed by the Attorney General.' And s 3 'Functions of the Director (1) The 
Director shall discharge his functions under this or any other enactment under the superintendence of the 
Attorney GeneraL'; Nicola Padfield, Text and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process (4th edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York 2008) 536, 169; Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 20 I. 
541 ibid. 
542 Spencer op. cit. 209 (Spencer stated that 'in principle, the decision to prosecute (or refrain from 
prosecuting) is one that is open to the courts to control by means of judicial review. ') 
~3 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 202. 
544 Regina v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] 2 A C 326 (HL); Ashworth and Redmayne noted that 
'The presumption [of this case] is that, if a prosecution cannot be challenged either on these grounds or 
under the doctrine of abuse of process, it should go ahead and the court should be allowed to decide the 
case on its merits.' See Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 203. 
545 Regina v Director of Public Prosecutions Ex p. Manning [2001] Q B 330 (HL) (In this case, the 
Divisional Court quashed the public prosecutor's decision not to prosecute and held that 'although the 
court would exercise its power of review sparingly, the standard should not be set so high as to deprive an 
aggrieved citizen of his only effective remedy'); Regina (B) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] I W 
L R 2072 (QB) (The court, allowing the claim for judicial review, made a ruling that 'when applying the 
evidential test ... the prosecutor should not apply a purely predictive approach based on past experience 
of similar cases but should adopt a merits-based approach, imagining himself to be the fact-finder and 
asking himself whether on balance the evidence was sufficient to merit a conviction taking into account 
what he knew about the defence case. ') 
S46 Regina v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. Ex parte Blaclcburn [1968) 2 Q B 118 (QB) 
547 Fionda op. cit. 61. 
188 
Chapter 5 The Functions of the Public Prosecution Service: A Comparative Study 
of judicial review, whereby the decisions of any public body can be judged for fairness 
and reasonableness, may well provide the necessary framework of a system of 
accountability necessary for the expansion of the prosecutor's role. ,548 
Third, the right of private prosecution may also secure the accountability of the 
public prosecution service to the victims. 549 As stated earlier, the English criminal 
proceedings permit the private individuals to prosecute offenders. Thus, if the public 
prosecutor declines to prosecute certain offences, citizens can bring the offender to the 
COurt.550 
Finally, there is an independent inspectorate for the crown prosecution service, Her 
Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI). The HMCPSI is in 
charge of the independent inspection and assessment of the activities of the prosecution 
service. 55) On the basis of such operations, it can contribute to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the CPS.552 For instance, in 2008, the HMCPSI undertook the reviews of 
the new charging arrangements, which was the first independent assessment of the 
scheme.5s3 In addition, 'the role and contribution of the CPS to the safeguarding of 
children,' 'Victim and witness experiences in the criminal justice system,' or 'thematic 
review of the duties of disclosure of unused material undertaken by the CPS' are 
examples of reviews conducted by the HMCPSI.
5S4 
In short, in England and Wales, the decisions by the public prosecutors are 
controlled by the internal hierarchy even though the extent of that control is different 
from those in the continental systems. S55 In addition, the courts and independent 
inspectorate playa significant role in holding the prosecution service to account. 
7.2. The United States System 
In the USA, the decisions of the prosecutors are less controlled by internal hierarchy. 
Rather, the decisions to prosecute are reviewed not only by the court through the 
preliminary hearings, but also by the citizens through the grand jury system. In addition, 
'48 ibid. 
549 Sanders and Young op. cit. 379. 
550 ibid 379-380. 
m HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, Assuring Justice: HM Chief Inspector of the Crown 
Prosecution Service Annual Report 2008-2009 (The Stationary Office, London 2009), 17. 
552 ibid. "3 ibid 48 (For instance, the report noted that 'The evidence ... showed that police at the operational 
level valued early input from the Crown Prosecution Service and that there were extensive softer benefits 
from closer collaboration between the police and prosecutors. ') 
554 ibid 35-52. . 
", Damaska op. cit. 483-523. 
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the decisions not to prosecute are checked by citizen complaints or private prosecution. 
First, US public prosecutors are internally accountable to the Attorney-General even 
though they exercise extensive autonomy. The public prosecutors are separated into two 
groups: state and federal public prosecutors, who are respectively called the 'District 
Attorneys' and the 'U.S. Attorneys'. These public prosecutors have different types of 
accountability. First of all, the state prosecutor's offices are headed by the state attorney-
general. 556 However, the local prosecutors enjoy considerable autonomy rather than 
being controlled by the hierarchy. Mostly, the attorney general of the state deals with 
criminal appeals and other post-conviction proceedings.557 In addition, the prosecutors 
are mostly elected by the local community. SS8 Thus, on the state level, the public 
prosecutors are mainly accountable to the public rather than to their superiors. 559 
Unlike most state prosecutors, the federal prosecutors are appointed by the 
government rather than elected by the public. Therefore, their decisions are more 
subject to their superiors than the state prosecutors. The federal prosecutors are directed 
by the Attorney-General who is the head of the Ministry of Justice. Not only does the 
Attorney-General lay down general guidelines but they also issue specific directions for 
individual cases. Nevertheless, the federal prosecutors are still regarded as exercising 
substantial autonomy and discretion. 560 
Second, the US prosecutors, as in England and Wales, are accountable to the courts. 
However, unlike the active role of the English courts, the United States judges may play 
a relatively passive role in reviewing the decisions of the public prosecutors. S61 The 
courts check prosecutorial discretion by controlling coercive measures e.g., the judges 
are in charge of issuing warrants for arrest or search and review any request from the 
prosecutors. 562 The decisions by the prosecutors to subpoena persons who testify or to 
556 Susanne Walther. 'The Position and Structure of the Prosecutor's Office in the United States' (2000) 8 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 283, 285. 
55? ibid. 
558 Apart from New Jersey and Connecticut, in most states the public prosecutors are elected by the 
public. See Vue Ma. 'Exploring the Orig~s of Public Prosecution' (2008) 1.8(2) International Cr~minal 
Justice Review 190,202; For more details on the development of the electIve status of the pubhc 
prosecutors in the U.S., see above pt 2.4 'The United States system'. 
~S9 Walther stated that 'the United States Prosecutor's Office could be characterized as a "public servant" 
concept, implying the idea of service for and loyalty towards the people, i.e., the local community that she 
or he represents.' See Walther op. cit. 285. 
560 ibid. 
561 Ma noted that' Despite the recognized judicial power to constrain prosecutorial excesses, the United 
States judiciary has traditionally played a passive role in providing supervision over the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.' See Vue Ma. 'Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining in the United States, 
France, Germany, and Italy: A Comparative Perspective' (2002) 12 International Criminal Justice Review 
22 45 and Abraham S. Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Guilty Plea 
(L~uisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1981) 
562 Walther op. cit. 286. 
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produce evidence are also reviewed by the COurtS. 563 The judges also have the authority 
to review the decisions to prosecute through 'preliminary hearings'. Before the decision 
to prosecute, the magistrate confirms whether or not criminal charges have sufficient 
evidence.564 However, as Kuckes suggested, 'a judge may not question the wisdom of 
prosecution, but simply assess its legal sufficiency. ,565 Therefore, where the magistrate 
decides that the evidence presented by the prosecutor demonstrates probable cause to 
believe that the defendant committed a crime, the case can move on to the next stage for 
• 566 prosecutIOn. 
Third, following the decision of the magistrate in a preliminary hearing, most felony 
cases with probable cause for prosecution are sent to the 'grand jury' which is another 
filter to review the decisions to prosecute.567 Goldstein stated that 'The grand jury is 
unquestionably the most celebrated of the pre-trial screening devices. Originally 
conceived as an extension of the royal authority over the citizen, it reached its greatest 
glory as a barrier against the state, refusing to indict for crime where the evidence was 
th I . th· I ,568 Th d . . inadequate or e aw creatmg e cnme unpopu ar. e gran JUry consIsts of a 
group of lay jurors who review criminal cases and approve a charge. 569 In order to 
secure the approval of grand jury, the prosecutors submit evidence to prove that there is 
. b . t 'al 570 suffiCIent cause to nng a suspect 0 tn . 
Finally, the US criminal proceedings allow the citizens to complain or file an 
indictment of crimes. 571 Such private prosecutions play a role in checking the 
563 Along with those functions, the court has the authority to penn it the withdrawal of the prosecution 
upon the request of the prosecutors. See ibid. 
564 Niki Kuckes. 'The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal 
Grand Jury' (2006) 94 Georgetown Law J 1265, 1279. 
565 ibid; However, unlike the grand jury as we shall below, this judicial review may be conducted based 
on adversary examination, which is substantial to protect the right of the defendants. See ibid 1282 
(Kuckes noted that 'Grand jury indictment also eliminates the defendant's more substantial right to an 
adversary preliminary examination, at which the judicial magistrate reviews the government's evidence 
for probable cause. Taking advantage of this doctrine, federal prosecutors routinely time grand jury 
indictments so as to bypass the adversary preliminary hearing, even though some courts have frowned 
upon this practice. ') 
566 ibid 1279. 
567 The U.S., The Constitution (1787) Amendment 5 'No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.' 
(Emphasis added) 
S68 Abraham S. Goldstein. 'The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure' 
(1959) 69 Yale LJ 1149, 1170. 
'69 Walther op. cit. 286. 
570 ibid. 
571 American Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3rd 
edn ABA, New York 1993) standard 3-3.4 (d) 'Where the law penn its a citizen to complain directly to a 
judicial officer or the grand jury, the citizen complainant should be required to present the complaint for 
prior approval to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor's action or recommendation thereon should be 
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prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute offences. In particular, as LaFave put it, 
prosecutorial discretion is controlled effectively 'by exposing the prosecutor's 
nonenforcement decisions to the public' because they are the electorate to vote for 
them.572 
In short, due to their elected status, US prosecutors exercise considerable discretion, 
but they also enjoy much autonomy free from internal or external accountability. 
However, their decisions to prosecute are generally reviewed by judges and citizens 
who have the right of private prosecution. 
7.3. The French System 
In France, prosecutorial discretion is controlled basically by superiors in the hierarchy. 
In addition, the prosecutor is accountable to judges and to victims by providing them 
with the right to screen the prosecutorial decisions. 
First of all, hierarchical supervision plays the main role in controlling the 
prosecutorial discretion. French prosecutors perform their functions within a 
bureaucratic hierarchy, which is headed by the Minister of Justice.573 In particular, they 
have a statutory duty to follow any written instruction from their superiors.574 Therefore, 
decisions by prosecutors can be modified by this hierarchical review.575 By use of this 
mechanism, prosecution policies may be enforced consistently across the service.576 In 
addition, this hierarchical and bureaucratic control may contribute to preserve 
democratic accountability of the prosecution service 577 but, as seen in the Hodgson's 
empirical study, the French prosecutors argue that this hierarchical control is 
inappropriate to guarantee the independence of prosecutors: 
I personally agree that there is no reason for the Minister to intervene. I am responsible for 
communicated to the judicial officer or grand jury. '; Walther op. cit. 287. 
m Wayne R. Lafave. 'The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States' (1970) 18(3) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 532, 539. 
573 Richard S. Frase. 'Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How do the 
French do it, how can we fmd out, and why should we care' (1990) 78 Calif Law Rev 539, 559. 
574 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal Procedure (2000) art 33 'The 
ublic prosecutor is bound to make written submissions in conformity with the instructions ... ' 
f" However, as Frase stated, '[t]he French apparently recognize the problems of judicial administration 
that would arise if individual prosecutorial decisions were always subject to reversal by superiors. Thus, 
although the chief prosecutor for each co~ may b~ discipline~ for his or her decisions, the decisions 
themselves may not be reversed by superiors even If they are directly contrary to written orders.' See 
Frase op. cit. 559-560. . "6 ibid; Jacqueline Hodgson. 'Hierarchy, Bureaucracy, and Ideology in French Criminal Justice: Some 
Empirical Observations' (2002) 29(2) Journal of Law and Society 227, 228. 
m ibid. 
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my own decisions and they are regulated by the court and can even be challenged by the 
victim if they decide to act. It does not seem evident that my actions must be justified to the 
hierarchy of the procureur general and the Minister of Justice. $78 
This argument shows a tension between hierarchical accountability and independence of 
th 
. 579 e servIce. 
Second, prosecutorial decisions to file felony charges are strictly reviewed by the 
court, particularly by investigating judges and the indicting chamber. 580 The 
investigating judges have the authority to review the sufficiency of evidence and the 
propriety of charges. S8l They not only dismiss cases for insufficient evidence,582 but 
also reduce the level of charges to delit or contraventions583 when they conclude that 
the charges are inappropriate. 584 In this latter instance, such cases are sent to the 
correctional or police court based on the decisions by the investigating judges. 585 
Once the investigating judges conclude that the offence may constitute a felony and 
sufficient evidence supports the charge of felony, the case is transferred to the indicting 
chamber which consists of three judges.586 The indicting chamber, which is entitled to 
order a dismissal or a prosecution on lesser charges, also plays a role in reviewing the 
decisions to prosecute before trial. 587 After the examination, a decree of indictment is 
issued by the chamber if the charge of felony is regarded as appr.opriate. 588 However, 
those judicial screenings are limited to the felony cases. The prosecution of delits and 
contraventions are determined by prosecutors without judicial review. S89 
578 ibid 238-239. 
579 ibid (Hodgson noted that the public prosecutors 'agreed that the hierarchical control of the Minister of 
Justice should be weakened, though most were insufficiently senior to have felt its effects in practice to 
any significant extent. ') 
580 Frase op. cit. 625. 
581 ibid. 
58l In 1980, the investigating judges dismissed 20 per cent of cases referred to them because of 
insufficient evidence. See Geraldine S. Moohr. 'Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons 
from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model' (2004) 8(1) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 
165,202. 
583 The de/it and contraventions are less significant offences than felony in the French criminal code, 
which are respectively tried in the correctional court and instance tribunal. See Abraham S. Goldstein and 
Martin Marcus. 'The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial Systems: France, Italy, and 
Germany' (1977) 87 Yale LJ 240, 250-251 and Pieter Verrest. 'French Public Prosecution Service' (2000) 
8 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 210, 213. 
584 Frase op. cit. 625. 
SIS ibid. 
586 Moohr op. cit. 202. 
587 ibid; However, Frase argued that 'the indicting chamber almost always approves the felony charges 
recommended by the examining magistrate.' See Frase op. cit. 625 n 462. 
588 ibid 625. 
589 Goldstein and Marcus noted that 'For delits, which are punishable by imprisonment for two months to 
five years and are triable in the Correctional Court, the prosecutor has discretion to order a judicial 
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Finally, the public prosecutors, as their counterparts in England and the USA, are 
accountable to the victims. But, unlike common law countries, victims are able to join 
the prosecution as a party.590 In addition, they can appeal against decisions not to 
prosecute to the prosecutor's superiors or to the COurtS.591 Frase suggests that although 
the role of the victim is limited in practice, it 'seems as a useful check on actual or 
perceived abuses of the discretion to decline prosecution. ,592 
In short, the French criminal proceedings employ various filters to review the 
prosecutorial discretion such as an internal check by superiors, judicial reviews by 
investigating judges as well as indicting chamber, and an external check by citizens. 
7.4. The German System 
In Germany, public prosecutors are mainly accountable to the court on the basis of the 
principle of compulsory prosecution. In addition, German law provides citizens with the 
power to appeal against prosecutorial decisions, which can contribute to the 
accountability of the prosecution service. 
First, the principle of legality plays a significant role in constraining the discretion of 
prosecutors. 593 While the service monopolise the prosecution of crime, there is also the 
mandatory obligation to charge on the prosecutors. As a result, the prosecutors, in 
principle, must file an indictment for all offences which have sufficient evidence for a 
successful prosecution. 594 Fundamentally they do not have the discretion not to 
prosecute on grounds of the public interest. 
The court, as Albrecht put it, 'actually has assumed that the public prosecutor is 
obliged to prosecute a case if uniform and persistent superior court decisions have ruled 
that certain behaviour is punishable behaviour.'s9s Goldstein and Marcus stated: 'the 
judiciary must play a central role in assuring that the Code is properly applied: only 
examination, but he rarely does so.' See Goldstein and Marcus op. cit. 250. 
590 Frase op. cit. 616. . 
591 ibid; Matti Joutsen. 'Listenmg to the victim: The victim's role in European criminal justice systems' 
(1987)34 Wayne L Rev 95, 110. 
'92 Frase op. cit. 
593 Goldstein and Marcus op. cit. 247 (Goldstein and Marcus stated that 'the principle of legality ... 
makes prosecution compulsory and discretion in charging impermissible unless specifically authorized by 
statutes. ') 
'94 However, as Juy-Birmann put it, this principle is mainly applied to a certain level of offences: 'a 
development linked to the growth of petty and moderate crime ... has gradually replaced the principle of 
legality with that of discretion to prosecute ... Thus, in various areas, the public prosecutor can decide to 
drop the charges absolutely, or drop them subject to conditions.' See Rodolphe Juy-Birmann, 'The 
German system' in Mireille Delmas-Marty and John R. Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) 292, 309. 
595 Albrecht op. cit. 254. 
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judges are sufficiently impartial to be entirely trusted with its enforcement.' 596 For 
similar reasons, judges also review decisions to charge through preliminary hearings. 597 
Unless there is sufficient reason to file an indictment, they can dismiss the application 
by prosecutors.598 
Second, the decisions by prosecutors are internally reviewed and controlled by the 
superiors.599 For instance, regarding important cases, at least three public prosecutors in 
the hierarchy will be involved in the decision: 'the public prosecutor to whom the case 
is assigned, the head of the department and finally the head of the public prosecutor's 
office.,600 Thus, in theory, the German prosecutors are subject to greater control by 
superiors than in the English and United States systems where there is no provision to 
force the public prosecutors to follow instructions from above. 601 However, this 
subordination of the prosecutors should not infringe on the principle of compulsory 
prosecution. Therefore, the public prosecutors are obliged to file an indictment based on 
the principle of legality even if the superior instructs them not to prosecute certain 
crimes. 602 
Finally, citizens have a part to play in controlling the discretion of the prosecutors by 
conducting private prosecutions or by requesting judicial or departmental review. First, 
the citizens themselves can bring the offenders to trial although private prosecution 
applies only to a narrow class of misdemeanours· and has other limitations. 603 The 
private prosecution is, as Langbein stated, 'mostly designed to protect private dignitary 
and property interests.' 604 However, it can play an important role in diminishing the 
'significance of the power of the public prosecutor.,60S 
596 Goldstein and Marcus op. cit. 247. 
'97 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code (StrafprozefJordnung] (1987) s 
173 
'98 ibid ss 174, 175. 
599 German Criminal Procedure Code op. cit. s 146 'The officials of the public prosecution office must 
comply with the official instructions of their superiors.' s 147 'The right of supervision and direction shall 
lie with: (1) the Federal Minister of Justice in respect of the Federal Prosecutor General and the federal 
prosecutors; (2) the Land agency for the administration of justice in respect of all the officials of the 
public prosecution office of the Land concerned; (3) the highest-ranking official of the public prosecution 
office at the higher regional courts and the regional courts in respect of all the officials of the public 
c:;,0secution office of the given courts district.'; Jong Gu Kim op. cit. 321. 
Albrecht op. cit. 254. 
601 Goldstein and Marcus op. cit. 247. 
602 Juy-Birmann op. cit. 299. 
603 German Criminal Procedure Code op. cit. s 374 [Admissibility; Persons Entitled to Prosecute] '(I) An 
aggrieved party may bring a private prosecution in respect of the following offenses without needing to 
have recourse to the public prosecution office first: 1. trespass ... ; 2. defamation ... ; 3. violation ... ; 4. 
bodily injury ... ; 5. threat ... ; Sa. taking or offering a bribe in business transactions ... ; 6. criminal 
damage to property ... ' etc. 
604 Langbein op. cit. 461. 
605 ibid 462. 
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Second, the citizen has the right to request the court to review the prosecutorial 
decision not to file a charge.606 Upon the application, the courts begin to examine the 
cases. If they conclude that the decision not to prosecute is inappropriate, they may 
order the prosecution service to file an indictment.607 However, this right is not given to 
all citizens. Only victims can apply for the judicial review. 608 In addition, this judicial 
review is limited to certain decisions.609 Notwithstanding such limitation, this remedy is, 
as Langbein identified, 'constitute significant controls over and deterrents against abuse 
·al th . ,610 of prosecuton au onty. 
Finally, the citizen can institute a departmental complaint against non-prosecution 
decisions, which is called Dienstaufsichtbeschwerde. 611 This is not provided by the 
code of criminal procedure but by German administrative law which provides the 
citizens with the right to file a complaint concerning the neglect of duty or abuse of 
power by public employees. 612 This mechanism also can be exercised to check 
prosecutorial decisions. 613 However, unlike judicial review, it has limitation that the 
. .. 11 d t db· 614 revIew IS mterna y con uc e y supenors. 
In short, the German criminal procedure controls the prosecutorial discretion by the 
principle of compulsory prosecution. In addition, although it is limited to certain 
decisions, the victims have the right to apply for the judicial review which can 
independently screen decisions not to prosecute. 
7.5. The Japanese System 
The discretion of the Japanese prosecutors, as in other jurisdictions, is controlled by 
internal and external mechanisms. First of all, all decisions by prosecutors are in 
principle reviewed by superiors before making a decision on either prosecution or non-
606 German Criminal Procedure Code op. cit. s 172 (2) 'The applicant may, within one month of receipt 
of notification, apply for a court decision in respect of the dismissal of the complaint by the superior 
official of the public prosecution office ... ' 
607 ibid s 175. 
608 ibid s 172 (I). 
609 The cases dismissed based on sections 153 and 153a of the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure may not be appealed by the victims. See Albrecht op. cit. 248 and German Criminal 
Procedure Code op. cit. s 172 (2) para 2; Langbein op. cit. 464. 
610 ibid 463. 
611 ibid 465-466; Albrecht op. cit. 248 (However, Albrecht stated that this internal procedure of complaint 
'is used very rarely and, moreover, does not lead to successful interventions of crime victims. ') 
612 Langbein op. cit. 466. 
613 ibid. 
614 However, Langbein argued that because of the hierarchical structure of the prosecutorial corps, 
'German legal academics tend to believe that the risk of a dienstaufs;chtbeshcwerde is a greater deterrent 
to prosecutorial malpractice than the possibility of Uudicial review].' See ibid. 
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. f' 615 S h hi h' al prosecutlOn 0 cnmes. uc erarc IC checks are relatively uncommon in England 
and the USA, but ubiquitous in Japan.616 The Japanese public prosecutors regard the 
review by superiors as far more important than the external controls.617 One Japanese 
prosecutor described such a hierarchical review as follows: 
It is often said that Japan has a three-layered court system, made up of District Courts, High 
Courts, and the Supreme Court. Actually it has four, if you include the kessai review [of the 
superiors] at the pre-charge stage. Kessaikan [superior] should allow cases to go to trial 
only if they are 100 percent sure they will result in conviction. If there is any doubt 
whatsoever, the kessaikan should not let it proceed further. Japan's acquittal rate is low not 
because judges fail to do their jobs or because trials are unfair to the accused, but because 
prosecutors act like judges at the kessai stage, and because frontline prosecutors have 
internalized the kessai standards themselves.618 
The internal controls are mainly exercised by three methods, namely standards, 
audits and consultations.619 Through those schemes, the prosecutor's offices can secure 
consistency nationwide.62o Firstly, the standards give prosecutors the internal guidelines 
which they have to rely on. They must consider not only the presumptions underlying 
those standards, but also prior charging decisions based on such guidelines. Secondly, a 
sample of uncharged cases is reviewed by after-the-fact audits [Kamsa].621 Mostly, the 
superiors try to check the propriety of non-prosecution decisions through the audits. 
Finally, the Japanese prosecutors must have the approval of superiors in order to make a 
decision on the prosecution. This process is called 'Kessai' [consultation] system.622 
Johnson states that in the consultation system, the superior plays four main functions: 
'As manager he makes sure like cases are treated alike. As teacher he instructs operators 
about how to conduct their work. As teammate he provides practical help and moral 
support in difficult cases. And as judge he reviews the adequacy of the evidence.' 623 
In addition to the internal control, the Japanese criminal justice system has two main 
615 West op. cit. 692 (West noted that 'Prosecutor's offices are pyramidic in structure, and decisions by 
individual prosecutors must be approved by superiors.') 
616 Johnson op. cit. 225; Damaska op. cit. 483-523. 
617 Johnson op. cit. 225. 
618 ibid 226 (Emphasis added). 
619 ibid 225. 
620 West op. cit. 692; Johnson op. cit. 225. 
621 ibid. 
622 ibid (Johnson stated that' in order to dispose of a case by making a charge decision and sentence 
recommendation, a prosecutor ordinarily must gain the approval or two or three superiors.') 
623 ibid 225-226. 
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external control schemes: the 'prosecution review commission' and the 'analogical 
institution of prosecution.' The prosecution review commissions are lay advisory bodies 
which respectively consist of eleven citizens.624 The main role of the commission is to 
review the decisions of the prosecutors not to file an indictment, and all over the 
country there are 207 prosecution review commissions performing such a role.62s 
With respect to the non-prosecution decisions, the victims or their proxies can apply 
for a commission hearing. 626 In particular, the commissions can conduct an 
investigation on their own initiative.627 Through those investigations, they can draw a 
conclusion on the propriety of prosecutorial discretion. Once they conclude that the 
decision not to prosecute is inappropriate, they have the authority to recommend that the 
prosecution service file an indictment or reconsider the decisions not to charge. 628 
However, as such recommendations are advisory, the prosecutors, in theory, are not 
bound by the conclusions of the Prosecution Review Commissions.629 Nevertheless, as 
West put it, 'commissions impose a social check on prosecutorial power' because 'No 
prosecutor wants to see his name pasted across the front page in a negative fashion, the 
sure result of ignoring a prosecution review commission in a case on which the public 
•• ,630 
has strong OpInlOns. 
Finally, the Japanese courts, as in Germany, can review the decisions not to 
prosecute based on the request by victims. This is called 'analogical institution of 
prosecution' [Fushimpan seikyu]. 631 By use of this scheme, the victim can appeal 
directly to the court which can order the prosecution of offences.632 Such a prosecution 
is carried out by the special prosecutor who is appointed by the court.633 However, this 
mechanism does not apply to all offences. Those injured by an abuse of official 
authority can be protected by this process.634 
624 West op. cit. 697; Johnson op. cit. 222. 
62' Such reviewable cases accommodate most decisions in relation to the non-prosecution, e.g. the drops 
by evidence sufficiency test and public interest test including the suspension of prosecution. See West op. 
cit. 697 n 70; Johnson op. cit. 222-223. 
626 West op. cit. 697. 
627 To conduct such an investigation, the commissions can summon witnesses for examination, question 
the prosecutor, and ask for expert advice. See ibid 697-698. 
628 ibid 698; Johnson op. cit. 223. 
629 ibid (Johnson noted that 'These recommendations are merely advisory. Prosecutors can ignore them, 
and usually they do.'); In 1994, 1,691 cases were dealt with by the prosecution review commissions. 
Among them, 209 cases were recommended for prosecution by the commissions. However, only 28 per 
cent of those cases were charged by the prosecutors according to the recommendation. See A. Didrick 
Castberg. 'Prosecutorial Independence in Japan' (1997) 16 UCLA Pac.Basin LJ 38,61-62. 
630 West op. cit. 703. 
631 Johnson op. cit. 223. 
632 West op. cit. 693. 
633 ibid 694. 
634 Johnson op. cit. 223. 
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In short, the prosecutorial discretion in Japan is controlled mainly by hierarchical 
superiors. However, there is an important system to monitor non-prosecution decisions 
by providing the citizens with the authority to review prosecutorial discretion, which is 
called 'prosecution review commission'. In addition, the courts can play a role in 
screening the decisions of the prosecutors although their reviews are fundamentally 
limited to a small number of offences. 
7.6. The Korean System 
The decisions by prosecutors in Korea are mostly reviewed by the superiors in the 
hierarchy. There is no independent authority to check the prosecutorial discretion except 
for the court which, as we have seen, plays a passive role in reviewing the prosecutor's 
decisions. 
First, the Korean criminal procedure, as in France, Germany and Japan, requires the 
prosecutors to follow the instructions from superiors.
635 
This restriction not only 
contributes to the conformity of prosecutorial policies nationwide, but it also plays a 
role in checking the discretion of the prosecutors.636 However, unlike the French, the 
superiors in Korean system do not need to use written instructions. Most hierarchical 
supervisions are conducted by word of mouth.
637 
Second, the victims, as in Germany and Japan, can request for the review by the 
court in relation to the prosecutor's decisions not to charge.
638 
Prior to 2008, this 
authority had been, as in Japan, limited to certain crimes.639 However, the reform of the 
Korean criminal procedure in 2007 abolished such limitation. Under the new legislation, 
the victims are entitled to request judicial review with regard to all offences.
64o 
Apart from these internal controls and adjudicative reviews, the Korean system of 
criminal justice, unlike in other jurisdictions, does not have an independent mechanism 
635 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act {Geomchalcheongbeop} partially 
amended on 21 December 2007 No. 8717 (1949) art 7 (1) 'A public prosecutor shall follow the direction 
and supervision by his superiors with respect to prosecutorial affairs.' 
636 Ho Jung Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) 
Seo-Kang Law Journal 43, 56-63. 
637 ibid. 
638 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop} partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 260 'A person ... may, ifhe receives a notice of non-
prosecution from the publ~c prosecutor, .fi1e.a ~et~ti~n for adjudication to find whether such disposition is 
properly made with the HIgh Court havmg JUrisdIction over the venue where the district public 
prosecutor's office to which the public prosecutor belong is situated.' 
~39 Ho Jung Lee op. cit. 43, 65. 
640 However, such a scheme may not be regarded as good enough to screen the prosecutorial decisions. 
For further discussion, see ch 7. 
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to screen the prosecutorial discretion. For instance, the French criminal procedure has 
investigating judges and indicting chambers to review the decisions to charge. Similarly, 
the US prosecutor's decision to charge a felony is screened through the preliminary 
hearings by the court and grand jury. In Japan, unlike in France and the USA, the 
criminal procedure does not have mechanisms to review the decisions to file an 
indictment. Rather, it has an independent commission to reconsider non-prosecution 
decisions. 
In England and Wales, there seems to be no scheme to review the individual 
decisions by prosecutors. However, the general policies are laid down by the DPP. In 
addition, the courts playa relatively active role in screening the prosecutor's decisions. 
This judicial role can also be noted in German system of criminal justice where the 
prosecutors exercise relatively limited powers due to the principle of compulsory 
prosecution. Fm:tdamentally, all decisions to prosecute are reviewed by the court. 
Moreover, the prosecutorial decisions not to charge based upon the public interest test 
must be approved by judges.641 
The differences between five jurisdictions, as seen in Table 5.5, can be readily 
observed through the comparison of various schemes. 
641 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Gennany, Criminal Procedure Code [StrafprozefJordnung] (1987) s 
153 '(1) Ifa less serious criminal offense is the subject of the proceedings, the public prosecution office 
may dispense with prosecution with th~ .ap~roval ?fthe court compe~ent/or the opening o/the main 
proceedings if the perpetrator's culpability IS conSidered to be of a mmor nature and there is no public 
interest in the prosecution. The approval of the court shall be not required in the case of a less serious 
criminal offense which is not subject to an increased minimum penalty and where the consequences 
ensuing from the offense are minimal.' (Emphasis added) 
200 
Chapt~r 5 The Functions of the Public Prosecution Service: A Comparative Study 
Table 5.5 The methods to achieve accountability of the prosecution service 
Review by the Court 
Internal Private 
Independent 
Decisions Decisions Reviewing 
Check a Prosecution b 
to Charge Not to System' 
Charge 
England and • • • • Wales 
The USA • • • • 
France • • • • 
Gennany • • • • 
Japan • • • 
Korea • • 
Nole. • This internal check is based on the statutory duty of the public prosecutors to follow the 
instructions from the superiors in the hierarchy; b For the details on private prosecution, see part 5.2.1 
'The Decision to Charge'; , The HMCPSI in England and Wales may independently assess the policies of 
the public prosecution service. However, both the 'Grand Jury' in the USA and the 'Prosecution Review 
commissions' in Japan deal with the individual decisions of the prosecutors. 
8. Conclusion 
The prosecution service has various functions. These functions and their related powers 
are very different between systems of criminal justice as each system has its own legal 
tradition and culture. Nevertheless, several trends, which are applicable to most 
jurisdictions, can be noted between the representative systems. 
Firstly, prosecutors become involved in the criminal investigation by either giving 
advice to the police or directing them. Yet, their main role is to file an indictment of 
offences, and in courts, to prove the guilt of the defendants as a party. More importantly, 
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although prosecutors become involved in the police investigation, they do not carry out 
directly an investigation of crime. 
Secondly, the authority to charge is not monopolised by the prosecution service in 
most jurisdictions. Other authorities including private individuals are entitled to charge 
the offenders. In addition, the decisions to charge are mostly reviewed by the courts. 
Thirdly, in the continental systems as well as in Korea and Japan, the prosecutors 
have the authority to appeal an acquittal and recommend a sentence to the judge. By use 
of those powers, the prosecutors can have an influence upon a sentence. In particular, 
the pre-trial dossiers prepared by the prosecutors playa significant role at trials in those 
systems. However, most systems place an emphasis on the statements in open court 
rather than those in the dossiers. 
Finally, each system tries to secure the accountability of the public prosecution 
service by establishing various mechanisms including the courts, which review 
prosecutorial discretion. 
However, the roles, discretion, and accountability of the Korean prosecution service 
do not correspond to such international standards. The wide ranging powers and 
functions of the Korean prosecutor over the whole of the criminal justice system means 
that they can be convincingly described as 'monopolist'. Their role is very different 
from that in other representative systems. In particular, direct investigation with the 
prosecutors' own investigation units are very distinctive features of the Korean criminal 
justice system. Exceptionally, the Japanese prosecution service has its own investigation 
units. However, they are installed only in some offices, and moreover, their 
investigations are limited to certain crimes such as high profile corruption and organised 
crimes. In addition, there is, unlike in Korea, no difference in the evidentiary impact of 
the interviews recorded by the police and prosecutors. 
In England and Wales, the USA, Germany, Japan, and France, the role of 
prosecution service is more limited to prosecution itself. The various powers and 
discretion over investigation and prosecution are exercised by a number of different 
bodies rather than monopolised by the prosecutors. In particular, most prosecution 
services focus their attention on reviewing rather than repeating the police investigation. 
Similarly, prosecutorial decisions are also screened, either by citizens, judges, or 
independent reviewing mechanism. In this regard, the prosecutorial role in the 
representative systems can be classified as a 'filter'. 
The police, as a gate keeper, play a filtering role. Cases where there is insufficient 
evidence for the prosecution will be discontinued by the police. The prosecution screens 
the continuing cases as a second filter. Between the jurisdictions, there are differences, 
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e.g. in France, investigating judges have a filtering role in serious criminal cases and in 
Germany, the prosecution service acts as a key filter rather than a supplementary filter. 
Each system puts prosecutorial decisions under scrutiny of courts, citizens, or 
independent monitoring mechanisms. 
In short, the ideal role of public prosecutors is to screen the results of investigations 
as an objective filter. This comparative study proposes such a combined model to 
indicate the direction in which the prosecution services should be developed. Based on 
the ideal model and unique features of the Korean prosecution service, various 
suggestions can be given for adjusting the prosecutorial roles. As a result, this study, 
along with the theoretical framework, provides another significant tool to analyse and 
critique the roles, duties, discretion, and accountability of the prosecution service. In the 
subsequent chapters, several impacts on the criminal proceedings are explored which 
are caused by the dominant position of the prosecution service in Korea. 
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Chapter 6 The Prosecutor's Interview with Suspects 
1. Introduction 
Korean criminal trials, as briefly discussed in Chapter 2, have been often called 'Jo-Seo 
Joe-Pan' i.e. trials heavily depending on the investigation dosser written by prosecutor. 1 
The judges do no more than confirm evidence in the prosecutorial documents. 2 
Particularly, interview reports playa crucial role in determining the conviction as they 
provide the courts with a confession, which is often referred to as the most potent of 
weapons for the prosecution and which develops other evidence against the accused. 3 
As we have seen, in Korea, the prosecutors as well as the police directly question the 
suspects. The results of prosecutorial interview are recorded in the documents, and then, 
presented to the court. The Korean Criminal Procedure Act (KCPA) allows these 
prosecutorial interview reports to be accepted into evidence regardless of defendant's 
statements in court: 
1 A protocol in which the public prosecutor recorded a statement of a defendant when the 
defendant was at the stage of suspect is admissible as evidence, only if it was prepared in 
compliance with the due process and proper method, the defendant admits in his pleading 
in a preparatory hearing or a trial that its contents are the same as he stated, and it is proved 
that the statement recorded in the protocol was made in a particularly reliable state. 
2 Notwithstanding paragraph I, if the defendant denies the authenticity in formation of the 
protocol, it is admissible as evidence, only when it is proved by a video-recorded product or 
I Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (IV): From 14th to 27th Conference' 
PCJR (Seoul January 2005) 267. 
2 ibid 337. 
3 Mike McConville and John Baldwin. 'The Role oflnterrogation in Crime Discovery and Conviction' 
(1982) 22(~) Br J.CriminoI165, 1~~ (~cConville and ~aldwin s.tated that 'A confession is ~ prized piece 
of prosecution eVidence because, If It IS not challenged m court, It can be the most potent eVidence against 
the accused and, as we have noted earlier, it is frequently decisive to the outcome of the case. '); John 
Baldwin. 'Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth or Proof?' (1993) 33(3)ibid325 (Baldwin 
stated that' A confession may obviate the need for further enquiry and, more fundamentally, it can 
provide an alternative to ,investi~ation itself: '); yvayne T. Westling. 'Something is Rotten in the 
Interrogation Room: Let s Try VIdeo Oversight (2000) 34 J Marshall L Rev 537, 546 (According to 
Westling, a survey found that '61 % of prosecutors identified confessions as "essential" or "important" for 
conviction. '). 
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any other objective means that the statement recorded in the protocol is the same as the 
defendant stated and was made in a particularly reliable state. 
3 A protocol prepared by any investigative institution other than a public prosecutor for 
examination of a suspect is admissible as evidence, only if it was prepared in compliance 
with the due process and proper method and the defendant, who was the suspect at the time, 
or his defence counsel admits its contents in a preparatory hearing or a trial.4 
In the prosecutorial interview report, the signature of the suspect itself proves the 
contents of prosecutorial investigative records. S Therefore, unless there is a particular 
procedural problem such as a violation of the right to silence or the right to legal 
counsel, the statements in the documents are admitted into evidence.6 By contrast, as 
seen paragraph 3 of article 312 above, the police investigative documents cannot be 
admitted as evidence unless they are confirmed by the defendants in court regardless of 
the existence of a signature. 7 
The courts rarely question the prosecutorial interview documents, and as a result, 
they are routinely accepted into evidence.8 Surprisingly, from the establishment of 
KCPA in 1954 to 1995, such reliance on the prosecutorial records has been quashed 
only in four cases.9 As a result, the preliminary investigation phase, specifically what 
conducted by prosecutors, serves as a central plank of criminal proceedings. 
This chapter aims to explore the reliability of such prosecutorial interview 
documents and the problems caused by criminal trials depending on them so heavily. 
First, I will briefly examine the general function of the investigative interview. Then, the 
necessity to regulate interrogations is discussed. Third, I will investigate unanticipated 
consequences resulting from the Korean measure which was created to safeguard 
suspects against inappropriate interviewing methods by the police. Finally, a number of 
safeguards to both increase the reliability of investigative interview and amend the 
4 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [HyungsasosongbeopJ partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 312 (Protocol Prepared by Public Prosecutor or judicial Police 
Officer). 
, Kyung Ock Ahn. 'The Admissibility of Police Interrogation Documents: A Comparative Study' (2009) 
25 Journal of Public Security [Chian-Nonchong] 101, 119-120 
6 ibid 119-120 
7 ibid 124; Dong Kwon Son. 'A Trial based on the Statements in Court and the Reform of the Pre-Trial 
Investigation' (2008) 30 Journal of Korean Public Safety and Criminal Justice [Kongan Hangjung 
Hakhoebo] 80,97-98; The emphases in the article of CPA were added by the author. 
8 Ahn op. cit. 112-113 (He suggests that the cases whose statements of defendants are challenged and 
rejected in courts are .very rare.) .. ,. 
9 Presidential CommIttee on the JudiCial Reform, Committee Report (IV): From 14th to 27th Conference' 
PCJR (Seoul January 2005), 341. 
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distortions in the criminal process will be explored. 
Before moving on, an important proviso is in order. Due to surprising absence of 
research on prosecutorial interview records. many of the conclusions of this chapter are 
supported by reference to studies on police questioning. Such a limitation is a natural 
outcome because the prosecutorial investigation, as seen in Chapter 5, is a distinctive 
feature in the Korean criminal justice system. However, as we shall see below, since 
there is no significant difference between the police and prosecutorial questioning in 
terms of methods and contents, the conclusions of this study would not be considerably 
affected. 
2. The Function of the Investigative Interview 
The interview with suspects has been regarded as one of the key investigative practices 
which can elicit confessions, provide incriminatory evidence, and generate information 
pertaining to the other offences. lo It can indicate, for instance, the evidence of intent 
and motive, knowledge of accomplices, and extent of involvement. I I This point is well 
illustrated by the statements of the prosecutors whom I interviewed: 
[PP5-/C] The only person who exactly knows what's happened is the offender. If he 
doesn't say anything, nobody can get the fact. Indeed, it's not easy to find a fact even 
though the suspect says something. However, unless he confesses, we can't help but to rely 
on assumption. So the confession and interrogation is very important. 12 
[PP3-IS2] If there's no confession, it's very difficult to resolve the case. Without the 
confession, we can't remove concerns about the certainty. In other words, I can't exclude 
the possibility that there must be facts that I don't know. So, through the interrogation, I try 
to get admissions and confessions from the suspects. 
10 James W. Williams. 'Interrogating Justice: A Critical Analysis of the Police Interrogation and Its Role 
in the Criminal Justice Process' (2000) 42(2) Can J Criminol209, 214-215; Richard A. Leo. 'Police 
Interrogation and Social Control' (1994) 3 Social and Legal Studies 93,99. 
II ibid 99. 
12 Similarly, McConville and Baldwin illustrated that 'the justifications for police questioning do not rest 
solely upon success in obtaining confessions; interrogations are said to serve other purposes. 
Interrogations may be helpful to the police, for example, in obtaining evidence from a suspect about his 
accomplices, in the gathering of criminal" intelligence," in recovering stolen property, and in clearing the 
books of undetected offences.' See Mike McConville and John Baldwin. 'The Role of Interrogation in 
Crime Discovery and Conviction' (1982) 22(2) Br J Criminol165, 166-167. 
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The function of the interview can be explained in two aspects: reconstructing the 
crime and building a case. Firstly, interviews with suspects, victims, and witnesses are 
an essential aspect of investigative agencies for reconstructing offences. 13 A number of 
researchers have conceived them as a social process relying on the interpretative work 
and social interactions of individual investigators under conditions of autonomy and low 
visibility.14 Interviews, as McConville and others suggested, are 'social encounters 
fashioned to confirm and legitimate a police narrative.' IS 
In particular, the crucial part of the process of reconstruction is 'the reconciliation of 
any lingering ambiguities with the official account of the event.' 16 Hence, the contents 
of interview reports, as Walton stated, 'must be neither puzzling vague nor confusingly 
ambiguous and must be interpreted as accurately as possible.' 17 However, in this 
process, the suspect's viewpoint can be either ignored or incorporated into the 
investigator's accounts. 18 One prosecutor talked about the simplification of the 
suspect's statements as follows: 
[PP5-IC] Five-hour interview with a suspect is documented as a five-page interview report. 
Mostly, simplified accounts are recorded in the prosecutorial interview dossiers. Indeed, 
this process can cause a problem. However, once the suspect agrees with the statements in 
the interview report, there should be no problem at all. All participants in trials are happy 
with the result. 
The ambiguities and complexities of life events, as Williams illustrated, are rendered 
'into stabilized, organizationally supported narratives that offer clear lines of 
organizational action.' 19 The investigator's account is supported by this reorganising 
13 Mike McConville, Andrew Sanders and Roger Leng. The Case for the Prosecution: Police Suspects 
and the Construction of Criminality (Routledge. London 1991) 227.327; James W. Williams. 
'Interrogating Justice: A Critical Analysis of the Police Interrogation and Its Role in the Criminal Justice 
Process' (2000) 42(2) Can J Criminol209. 215. 
14 Peter K. Manning. Symbolic Communication: Signifying Calls and the Police Response (The MIT 
press, 1988), 141 (Manning emphasised the function of interpretation in policing: 'The salience ofa given 
bit can shift as external events 'intrude' into message analysis and interpretation. Furthermore. it is clear 
that the matter of priorities and internal message analysis are closely related, for policing is a practical art. 
The aim of interpretation is to act. '); McConville et aI., op. cit.; James W. Williams, op. cit.; Richard A. 
Leo and Kimberly D. Richman. 'Mandate the Electronic Recording of Police Interrogations' (2007) 6(4) 
Criminology and Public Policy 791; Petter Gottschalk, Knowledge Management Systems in Law 
Enforcement: Technologies and Techniques (IGl Global, 2007). 
15 McConville et al. op. cit. 327. 
16 Williams op. cit. 216. 
17 Douglas Walton. 'The Interrogation as a Type of Dialogue' (2003) 35(12) Journal of pragmatics 1771, 
1775. . ' . . 
18 McConville et al. op. CIt. 76-77; WIIhams op. CIt. 216. 
19 ibid217. 
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process, in which the investigators articulate the case in their own words rather than 
suspects'. 
The second function of investigative interviews is to construct a case. Through the 
interview, the investigators have the opportunity to confirm their previous suspicions 
about a case.20 As Baldwin stated, the investigative interview is, as a rule, designed to 
construct proof based on suspicions: 
It is evident, therefore, that the idea that police interviewing is, or is becoming, a neutral or 
objective search for truth cannot be sustained, because any interview inevitably involves 
exploring with a suspect the details of allegations within a framework of the points that 
might at a later date need to be proved. Instead of a search for truth, it is much more 
realistic to see interviews as mechanisms directed towards the 'construction of proof' .21 
Hence, investigators tend to reproduce the events through the manipulation of the 
suspect's understanding of his actions. Often, they systematically exclude competing 
accounts. 22 Williams described such a tendency as a 'self-fulfilling prophesy': 
investigators 'reinforce their commitments to a series of accounts which they 
themselves have constructed in accordance with the routine demands and structures of 
th 
. k ,23 elf wor . 
Through the interviews, reasonable doubt can be resolved.24 In the criminal process, 
investigators take charge of constructing as strong a case as possible against the 
defendant. The law does not require them to establish the truth of the matter, but instead 
makes them prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 2S 
In short, through the reconstruction of the suspect's statements, investigators can 
translate the complexities and ambiguities of daily life into the codified accounts 
creating a foundation for the subsequent treatment of suspects. At the same time, the 
investigators try to construct a case which the suspects are transformed into defendants 
and processed through the system of criminal justice.26 In this respect, the investigative 
20 Mike McConville and John Baldwin. 'The Role of Interrogation in Crime Discovery and Conviction' 
(1982) 22(2) Br J Criminol165 170; M~Convill~ et al. op. cit. 77 (Mc~onvi1le et al. illustrated that 'It is 
routine police work not to follow up eVidence raised by an accused which may support a defence. '); John 
Baldwin. 'Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth or Proof?' (1993) 33(3) Br J Crimi no I 325, 
340-344. 
21 ibid 327. 
22 Williams op. cit. 219. 
23 ibid. 
24 McConville and Baldwin op. cit. 170. 
2S ibid. 
26 Williams op. cit. 219-220. 
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interview has a considerable part to play in determining the outcomes. McConville and 
Baldwin illustrated such a significant role of interview thus: 
As the police have become more professionalised, so they have acquired much greater 
control of the prosecution; and as this has happened, so the really crucial exchanges in the 
criminal process have shifted from courts into police interrogation rooms. It is these 
exchanges that, in a majority of cases, colour what happens at later stages in the criminal 
process. Indeed, often they determine the outcome of cases at trial. Questioning provides 
information classifiable in legally defined ways, resolves doubts, is administratively 
efficient and fulfils certain psychological needs. Questioning has come to dominate police 
work and, as a result, police perceptions of reality have come to dominate the criminal 
27 process. 
The investigative interview contributes to case construction, and subsequently, has 
a considerable effect on the outcome of trials. Hence, the implications of 
interview recording methods and strategies have been regarded as important 
featmes for the principles offaimess and due process.28 
3. Regulation of the Investigative Interview 
Confessions are occasionally unreliable. Miscarriages of justice cases show that 
interrogation is one of the significant elements leading to unreliable confessions.29 For 
instance, as we shall see later, fom juveniles were found guilty of murder at the first 
instance in Korea because of wrongful confessions by coercion.3o For an effective 
27 McConville and Baldwin op. cit. 174; Similarly, Baldwin stated that 'It has now become something of 
a truism to observe that, in most criminal cases, the crucial stage is the interview at the police station, for 
it is at that stage that a suspect's fate is as a rule sealed.' See Baldwin op. cit. 326. 
28 McConville and Baldwin op. cit.; McConville et al. op. cit.; Baldwin op. cit.; David J. Smith. 'Case 
Construction and the Goals of Criminal Process' (1997) 37(3) Br J Criminol 319; Wayne T. Westling. 
'Something is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let's Try Video Oversight' (2000) 34 J Marshall L Rev 
537' Thomas P. Sullivan. 'Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins' (2005) 95(3) 
Jou~al of Criminal Law and Criminology 1127; Giulio Illuminati. 'Frustrated Tum to Adversarial 
Procedure in Italy (Italian Criminal Procedure Code of 1988), The' (2005) 4 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 567; Richard A. Leo and Kimberly D. Richman. 'Mandate the Electronic 
Recording of Police Interrogations' (2007) 6(4) Criminology and Public Policy 791; David Dixon. 
'Interrogating Myths. A Comparative Study of Practices, Research, and Regulation' (2010) University of 
New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 40 
29 Clive Walker and Keir Starmer (eds), Miscarriages of Justice: A Review of Justice in Error (Oxford 
University Press 1999). 
30 See n 84 below. 
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interview, investigators strategically employ various techniques to control actions and 
attitudes of suspects. According to McConville and others' study, the suspect's accounts 
are largely translated, simplified, and often ignored by the investigators: 
The interview is not designed to elicit the suspect's own account of the incident, rather the 
suspect is invited to accede to the officer's view of the case. Where the suspect asserts 
innocence or introduces evidence which would support a defence, this is generally 
ignored.31 
The investigator's ability is measured by their capability to exercise psychological and 
behavioural control over a suspect and eventually to obtain confessions and 
admissions. 32 Toward this end, investigators apply psychological strategies to 
manipulate the suspect's emotions and attitudes leading them to be 'almost powerless in 
stopping the flow of information. ,33 The suspect is in general shaped, coaxed, cajoled, 
tricked or simply persuaded into confessing.34 Under these circumstances, as Professor 
Uglowargued, 'even non-vulnerable people are also likely to make admissions which 
are not true, not realising that once a statement had been made, there is great difficulty 
. t"t ,35 m retrac mg 1 • 
3.1. False Confessions 
The Korean law, unlike in England and Wales, does not have a specific definition for 
confession or false confession. In the English criminal procedure, a confession is 
defined as 'any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it, whether 
made to a person in authority or not and whether made in words or otherwise.,36 By 
31 McConville et al. op. cit. 77. 
32 Richard A. Leo. 'Police Interrogation and Social Control' (1994) 3 Social and Legal Studies 93, 100. 
33 Robert F. Royal and Steven R. Schutt, The Gentle Art of Interviewing and Interrogation: A 
Professional Manual and Guide (Prentice-Hall, 1976) quoted in Richard A. Leo. 'Police Interrogation and 
Social Control' (1994) 3 Social and Legal Studies 93, 100; Steve Uglow, Evidence: Text and Materials 
(2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 802, 148. 
34 Leo op. cit. 100. 
35 Steve Uglow, Evidence: Text and Materials (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 802, 148. 
36 police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) s. 82; Given the deleterious consequences, it is 
remarkable that suspects make a confession during the investigative interview. Various theoretical models 
have been suggested to explain why people confess to crimes. For more details on these models, see E. 
Linden Hilgendorf and Barrie Irving, 'A Decision-making Model of Confessions' in Sally M. L1oyd-
Bostock (ed), Psychology in Legal Contexts. Applications and Limitations (MacMillan, London 1981) 
67-84 (Irving and Hilgendorf present a conceptual model for understanding criminal confessions. Based 
on their two studies, they suggest that when suspects are interviewed they become involved in a 
complicated and demanding decision-making process); Brian C. Jayne, 'The psychological principles of 
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means of interview, investigators elicit confessions not only from perpetrators, but also 
from innocent people.37 The confessions from innocent people can be identified as a 
false confession, which is any 'detailed admission to a criminal act that the confessor 
either did not commit or is, in fact, ignorant of having committed .• 38 
The frequency of false confessions is not well known because, as Kassin and 
Gudjonsson argued, many of them are discovered before trials, are not reported by the 
investigative agencies, and are not publicised by the media.39 Therefore, the known 
cases of false confession, in particular being induced by investigative interview, as 
Drizin and Leo suggested, represent 'only the tip of a much larger iceberg. ,40 
A number of empirical studies have indicated the frequency and grounds of false 
confessions. For instance, in the studies of Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson on the frequency 
of false confessions, twelve per cent of surveyed inmates in Icelandic prison described 
that they had made a false confession at some time in their lives.41 In terms of reasons 
of false confessions, they found that the most frequently mentioned reason (51 %) was to 
escape from the pressure during the investigative interview.42 Given the influence of 
investigative interview and vulnerabilities of the suspect, a false confession may be one 
of the unavoidable results being induced by the interrogation.43 
criminal interrogation' in Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid and Joseph P. Buckley (eds), Crimina/Interrogation 
and ConfessiOns (3rd edn Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore 1986) 327 (Focusing on the Reid techniques, 
Jayne offers an informative model describing an investigative interview as a psychological process to 
undo a denial, which is a kind of presumed equivalent of deception); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The 
Psychology of Interrogations and ConfeSSiOns: A Handbook (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2003). 124-128 
(Based on a cognitive-behavioural perspective, Gudjonsson proposes that a particular relationship 
between the suspect, the environment, and significant others within the environment leads to confessions.) 
37 Fred E. Inbau and others, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (4th edn Jones & Bartlett Learning, 
2004),411 (Inbau et al. stated that 'There is no question that interrogations have resulted in false 
confessions from innocent suspects. However, the reported incidence of false confessions varies widely. ') 
38 Richard J. Of she and Richard A. Leo. 'The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and 
Classification of True and False Confessions' (1997) 16 STUDIES IN LAW POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
189,240. 
39 Saul M. Kassin and Gisli H. Gudjonsson. 'The Psychology of Confessions' (2004) 5(2) Psychological 
Science in the Public Interest 33, 48. 
40 StevenA. Drizin and Richard A. Leo. 'The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World' 
(2004) 82 N C Law Rev 891, 9~1. 
41 Gisli H. Gudjonsson and Jon F. Sigurdsson. 'How Frequently do False Confessions Occur? An 
Empirical Study among Prison Inmates' (1994) 1(1) Psychology, Crime & Law 21; Jon F. Sigurdsson and 
Gisli H. Gudjonsson. 'The Psychological Characteristics of 'False Confessors': A Study among Icelandic 
Prison Inmates and Juvenile Offenders' (1996) 20(3) Personality and Individual Differences 321, 324. 
42 ibid 324. 
43 For more detailed information on false confessions and case examples, see Saul M. Kassin and 
Lawrence S. Wrightsman, 'Confession evidence' in Saul M. Kassin and Lawrence S. Wrightsman (eds), 
The psychology of evidence and trial procedure (Sage Beverly Hills, CA, 1985) 67; Saul M. Kassin. 'The 
Psychology ofConfessio~ Evidence' (199:) 52(3) Am Psychol221, ~24-227; Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The 
Psychology of Interrogations. a~d ConfeSSIOns:' A Handbook (~ohn Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2003), 193-197; 
Fred E. Inbau and others, Crlmmal InterrogatIOn and COnfesSIOns (4th edn Jones & Bartlett Learning, 
2004),411-447. 
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3.2. Regulatory Safeguards 
False confessions may lead to wrongful convictions. In particular, unreliable statements 
being induced by coercive interrogation can decrease the reliability of the investigative 
interview itself even though it is one of the most important activities of the law 
enforcements. Indeed, this has led to the establishment in many jurisdictions of 
procedural safeguards for the appropriate protection of the defendant's rights.44 With 
respect to the interrogation, certain guidelines and procedures are regarded as important 
safeguards against investigator's impropriety, false confessions, and wrongful 
convictions.4s For instance, in England and Wales, the investigative interview process 
and confession evidence are largely regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (PACE) and accompanying Codes ofPractice.46 
The Codes give several guidelines to the investigators in terms of procedures and the 
proper treatment of suspects. Firstly, Code C states the issues of the fitness to be 
interviewed by providing guidance on the detention, treatment and questioning of 
persons.47 The key safeguards being provided in Code C include:48 
1. Whenever a person is interviewed they must be informed of the nature of the offence, or 
further offence [11.1] 
2. [T]he interviewer should remind the suspect of their entitlement to free legal advice [11.2] 
3. A juvenile or person who is mentally disordered or otherwise mentally vulnerable must 
not be interviewed regarding their involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal 
offence or offences, or asked to provide or sign a written statement under caution or record 
of interview, in the absence of the appropriate adult [11.15] 
4. [I]n any period of 24 hours a detainee must be allowed a continuous period of at least 8 
hours for rest, free from questioning, travel or any interruption in connection with the 
investigation concerned [12.2] 
Moreover, the introduction of a new Code of Practice on Tape Recording in 1988 (Code 
44 In addition to procedural safeguards such as guidelines for interviewing, constitutional safeguards are 
regarded as the basis for protecting defence. See Welsh S. White. 'False Confessions and the Constitution: 
Safeguards against Untrustworthy Confessions' (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law 
Review 105. 
45 Gudjonsson op. cit. 24-25. 
46 police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60); Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of 
Practice C 2008. 
47 ibid; Saul M. Kassin and others. 'Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations' 
(2010) 34(1) Law Hum Behav 3, 13. 
48 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice C 2008. 
212 
Chapter 6 The Prosecutor s interview with Suspects 
E) has led all interviews concerning indictable and either-way cases to be tape-recorded 
on a mandatory basis.49 There is also provision for visual recording of interviews, 
which was established by s.76 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. so 
In particular, the right to counsel during the interrogation seems to be considered as 
one of the most significant measures in many countries. For instance, in France, a 
number of safeguards are administered in order to protect the suspects against false 
confessions. S 1 These measures are mainly carried out by the police. Various rights of 
the suspects must be informed immediately after detention. These rights include as 
following: 'to see a doctor within three hours; to see a lawyer for 30 minutes "without 
delay"; and to be informed of the nature of the offence in connection with which she is 
being detained. ,52 In particular, after the first meeting with counsel, the suspects may 
have additional assistance from the counsel after 20 hours and 36 hours if the detention 
is extended.s3 Indeed, the police must inform the counsel of the nature of the suspect's 
offence. However, the defence counsel can neither participate in the interrogation nor 
have access to the dossier of evidence. S4 
In addition to the right to counsel, the police officer, who is in charge of the 
detention, must record not only the duration of custody, but also interview times, rest 
periods, and meal times during the interrogation. ss Finally, the results of the interview 
with the suspect and witnesses must be written down by the police. Indeed, the contents 
of this report must be confirmed by the interviewees. S6 Unlike in England and Wales, 
most interviews are not electronically recorded in France. However, the interviews with 
juveniles must be visually recorded by law since June 2001.57 
For another example, in Germany, the safeguards against false confession reSUlting 
49 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice E 2010; Steve U glow, Evidence: Text and 
Materials (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 802, 158; Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, 
Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007),241. 
50 This visual recording is not mandatory and applies only to investigations of serious crimes on the basis 
of Code F. See Uglow op. cit. 159; Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice F 2010 para 
3.1. 
51 In this section the safeguards only in France and Germany are briefly introduced because a broad 
comparative study will be conducted in chapter 8. 
52 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal Procedure (2000), art 63 
quoted in Jacqueline Hodgson. 'The detention and interrogation of suspects in police custody in France' 
(2004) 1(2) European Journal of Criminology 163, 173. 
S3 ibid. 
54 ibid; Yue Ma. 'A Comparative View of the Law ofInterrogation' (2007) 17(1) International Criminal 
Justice Review 5, 15 (Accordingly, the confessions being obtained by the police after failing to grant 
a propriate access to counsel have been excluded at the lower courts.) 
51' Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code o/Criminal Procedure (2000), arts 64, 65. 
56 Jacqueline Hodgson. 'The detention and interrogation of suspects in police custody in France' (2004) 
1(2) European Journal ofCrimjnology 163, 173. 
57 ibid 173 n 21. 
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from coercive interrogation are mainly based upon the assistance of the counsel and the 
exclusionary rule. Firstly, as in other jurisdictions, the suspects must be informed of a 
number of rights prior to formal interviews. The German law requires the police to 
inform the suspects of the nature of the accused offence and their rights to silence and 
counsel. 58 The suspects also have an opportunity to explain away any suspicion against 
them. In addition, they have the right to demand the police and prosecutors to preserve 
the exculpatory evidence. These rights must be informed by the police. 59 
Secondly, suspects may consult with counsel at the pre-trial stage.60 Once suspects 
want to seek counsel, the police must make a reasonable effort to find an appropriate 
lawyer. 61 However, the scope of counsel's participation in the interrogation differs 
depending on the interviewers. In Germany, in addition to the police, the prosecutors as 
well as the judges can interview the suspects before the trial. When a prosecutor or a 
judge questions a suspect, defence counsel can be present during the interview. 
However, if the suspect is questioned by the police, defence counsel cannot participate 
in the interrogation. In this instance, the suspect can consult with the counsel prior to the 
interrogation. 
Finally, section 136a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure provides the 
mandatory exclusion of confessions obtained by 'mistreatment, exhaustion, bodily 
invasion, administration of drugs, torture, deception, hypnosis, illegal compulsion or 
threat, and illegal promises or measures that may interfere with a person's mental 
ability. ,62 Thus, in case that the police use the prohibited methods, the confession is 
excluded by the court although the police can prove that such a confession was 
voluntarily made by the suspect.
63 
To sum up, because of the possibility that the statements of the suspects can be 
manipulated during the interrogation, various procedural safeguards have been 
established in each jurisdiction. Generally, most systems try to protect the suspects 
against false confessions by preserving the suspect's basic rights such as right to silence 
and to see counsel. In particular, the assistance of the defence counsel is regarded as a 
fundamental requirement to protect the suspect during the interrogation. In addition, the 
S8 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozej3ordnungJ (1987), s 
136. 
S9 ibid s 136. 
60 ibid s 137. 
61 Vue Ma. 'A Comparative View of the Law ofInterrogation' (2007) 17(1) International Criminal Justice 
Review 5, 16-17. 
62 ibid. 
63 Kuk Cho. "'Procedural weakness" of German Criminal Justice and its Unique Exclusionary Rules 
based on the Right of Personality' (2001) 15(1) Temple International and Comparative Law Journal I, 12-
13. 
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time for interrogation is limited by regulations, and during the interview, the police are 
required to provide the suspects with proper rests and meals. Furthermore, mandatory 
electronic recordings of interview sessions are either wholly or partially articulated by 
law. 
Unlike those measures, the drafters of KCPA introduced an extraordinary safeguard 
that can be rarely observed in other jurisdictions.64 In order to prevent 'third degree' 
tactics by the police, they made, as seen in Chapter 3, a considerable difference between 
prosecutorial and police documents as to whether the documents can be admissible into 
'd 65 eVl ence. 
4. Intended and Unintended Consequences 
In Korea, the power to investigate and interview was given to prosecutors under article 
312 of the KCPA. The Korean legislators did not have sufficient time to consider the 
various consequences of this because they had to establish a legal system in a short time 
after colonial period and the Korean War. In addition, as Professor Shin argued, long-
term interests were probably ignored in order to secure short-term interests, i.e. social 
control and efficiency.66 It may be argued that this measure has had 'unanticipated 
consequences' in the Korean criminal justice system.
67 
According to Merton, unanticipated outcomes generally result from ignorance, error, 
and immediate interests overriding long-term interests.68 Particularly, in the criminal 
process, consequences of the new legislation are very difficult to anticipate because, as 
Houston and others noted, 'The criminal justice organization does not exist in the 
vacuum.,69 Because events and individuals constantly have an impact on the process, 
even well-intended laws often have unintended outcomes.
70 
64 See ch 5. 
65 For more details on 'third degree tactics', see Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American 
Justice (Harvard Univ Pr, 2008). 
66 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the Law of Evidence' 
(2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132, 113. 
67 The concept of 'unanticipated consequences' was popularised by Robert K. Merton. See Robert K. 
Merton. 'The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action' (1936) 1 (6) Am Sociol Rev 894 
68 ibid 898-902. 
69 James Houston, Phillip B. Bridgmon and William W. Parsons, Criminal Justice and the Policy Process 
(University Press of America, Lanham; Plymouth 2008), 119-120. 
70 ibid; William W. Schwarzer and Russell R. Wheeler. 'On the Federalization of the Administration of 
Civil and Criminal Justice' (1994) 23 Stetson L.Rev. 651, 667; Similarly, Bottoms illustrated that in 
England and Wales, 'The widespread use of suspended sentences in place offmes and probation, and the 
magistrates' tendency to impose longer sentences when suspending, were not legislatively intended.' See 
Anthony E. Bottoms. 'The Suspended Sentence in England, 1967-1978' (1981) 21(1) Br J Criminoll, 8; 
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Those consequences in the Korean criminal process can be readily noted. 
Prosecutors directly interview suspects, victims and witnesses in most indictable cases. 
In general, they interrogate on the basis of confessions that the suspects already made 
before the police. 71 This interview is principally conducted by the prosecutors 
themselves with the participation of one other member of staff in their office and 
without electronic recording.72 A number of commentators have made the point that 
this process is both to confirm the suspect's accounts at the police station and to 
incorporate them into a prosecutorial record, which the prosecutors use in order to file 
an indictment, and which is usually accepted as conclusive evidence forming the basis 
of a conviction. 73 
In short, those activities have gradually helped transform the prosecution service 
into an investigative agency. As one judge stated, no prosecution service seems to exist 
in the Korean system of criminal justice. Rather, two agencies - prosecution service and 
the police - may work together on the investigation. It may be suggested that this is a 
functional deformity which leads to a number of consequential distortions in the 
criminal process. 
4.1. Waste of Resources - Double Interviewing Structure 
The first consequence is a waste of resources resulting from the double-interviewing 
system. Having been interviewed by the police, suspects are mostly questioned once 
Margaret Howard. 'The Law of Unintended Consequences' (2006) 31 S III ULJ 451, 451 (Howard 
described simply the law of unintended consequences as 'actions have unforeseen effects. '); Roger I. 
Roots. 'When Laws Backfire' (2004) 47(II)Am Behav Sci 1376, 1378 (Roots suggested that 'The 
unintended consequences of public policy haunt virtually every legal enactment.') 
71 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the Law of Evidence' 
(2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Joumall07-132, 118; Dong Hee Lee. 'The Reality ofInterrogation and its 
Remedy' (2003) 20(1) Journal of Korean Criminal Law [Hyungsabeop Yeonku) 219, 243; Woong Hyuk 
Lee. 'The Analysis of Multiple Organizational Outcome of the Public Prosecution Service' (2006) 15( 1 ) 
Korean Journal of Public Administration 3, 29; Kyung Ock Ahn. 'The Admissibility of Police 
Interrogation Documents: A Comparative Study' (2009) 25 Journal of Public Security [Chian-Nonchong) 
101,124-125. 
72 Professor Lee argued that 'given the structure of the interrogation room and participants in the process, 
the prosecutorial interview is more closed than the police interrogation. In particular, the prosecutors' 
offices have special interrogation rooms, which are totally separated from outside without mandatory 
electronic recordings. Subsequently, in 2002, torture could be carried out by the investigators in the 
prosecutors' office in Seoul and one of the suspects was killed.' See Dong Hee Lee op. cit. 242-243; 
According to the Woong Hyuk Lee's survey, 46.5 per cent of respondents who experienced prosecutorial 
interview stated that the interrogation process is much closed. Only 17.7 per cent of respondents 
disagreed with this item. See Woong Hyuk Lee op. cit. 21. 
73 Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. 118 (Professor Shin described that that 'the routinized prosecutorial 
interviews after police questioning are one of the distinctive features in the Korean criminal process.'); 
Dong Hee Lee op. cit. 243; Woong Hyuk Lee op. cit. 29; Kyung Ock Ahn op. cit. 124-125. 
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again by the prosecutors.74 As discussed above, the interview records written by the 
prosecutors do not generally have new facts different from those the police 
discovered.7s One judge said that except for 'less typos' in the prosecutorial documents, 
there is no major difference between the prosecutorial and police interview records: 
[J2-IMJ The prosecutorial interview records are almost same as the police documents. The 
prosecutors repeatedly take a note of the accounts of suspects, which already existed in the 
police interview documents .... The only difference between those two interview records is 
that the prosecutorial documents have less typos. 
This inefficient double-interviewing scheme stems from article 312 of the KCPA. The 
confessions in the police records are easily retracted by defendants. Therefore, the 
defendants being aware of this provision often withdraw the confessions, which they 
made in the police station, at trials. For the prosecutors, the most effective method to 
overcome this situation is to preserve those confessions in their records.76 Subsequently, 
the different evidentiary impact causes an inefficient double-interviewing system.77 
This inefficient structure, indeed, causes considerable workload for the prosecution 
service. Most prosecutors whom I interviewed pointed to such difficulty: 
[PP3-IS2] We have to work a lot. I usually come to work before 8 o'clock, and then, read a 
few pages of newspapers. After drinking a cup of coffee, I have to read a lot of documents 
tiled up on my desk all day long. Moreover, I have to direct the interviews with the suspects, 
witnesses, and victims. To be honest, I can't interview all the suspects by myself although 
all interview reports are written by my name. Many interviews are carried out by the staff. 
Then, after dinner from 7 P.M., I begin to write a report whether or not to charge the 
suspects on the basis of the interview results conducted during the day time. In fact, there is 
too much workload for the prosecutors. 
[PP3-RC] For me, the workload is one of the biggest stressful factors. The prosecutors 
should focus their attentions on every case. There is no case which is insignificant. In order 
74 Dong-Woon Shin op. cit. 118. . 
" See above n 73 and the accompanymg text. 
76 Dong-Woon Shin op. cit.. . .. 
71 Woong Hyuk Lee. 'The AnalYSIS of MultIple OrganIzatIOnal Outcome of the Public Prosecution 
Service' (2006) 15( I) Korean Journal of Public Administration 3, 29 (Professor Lee stated that 'No 
benefit can be achieved from the double-interviewing structure. The prosecutors just confinn the facts 
being already found by the police. New rmdings are rarely discovered by the prosecutorial interview. 
Subsequently, this structure leads to the loss of money and time. ') 
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to charge, we have to confmn every statement of the suspect. I didn't have time to read 
newspapers in the morning. I had been always chased by time (felt pressured by lack of 
time). 
[PP2-RR] There are too many cases for the prosecutors to deal with. I think too much 
workload is the most stressful factor for the prosecutors. In order to deal with all the cases 
assigned to me, I always have to work even at night time. 
This increase of workload was anticipated during the discussion about the establishment 
of article 312 in 1954. The Lee Sung-Man government (1948-1960) rejected such a 
draft of a prosposed law. The government argued that 'the strong evidentiary impact of 
the prosecutorial interview documents will cause a repetition of unnecessary interviews 
and considerable workload to the prosecution service.' 78 However, the legislators 
passed the KCPA without any amendment. 
The workload might be considered as a prosecutor's duty although it could cause a 
waste of resources.79 However, it also wastes the time of interviewees, both suspects 
and witnesses. Suspects often complain about repetitive interrogation by prosecutors: 
[P05-/S) One day when I fmished the interview with a suspect, she asked me about the 
forward process. So, I told her that she would be interviewed by the prosecutor once again 
in order to confirm and record the statements. All of a sudden, she was angry at me. Then 
she said, "I will get any punishment because I know what I did wrong. But, I don't have 
time to go to the prosecutor's office again. Today, I couldn't open my store because I had to 
come here. I can't do so any more. Why should I be interviewed again? I've already said 
everything" ... After this incident, I had an opportunity to meet her again. So, I asked her 
what happened after the interview. She said that, as I had told her, she had to go the 
prosecutor's office again because the prosecutor had kept asking her to come. Then, she 
answered to the same questions as I had already done. Finally, she got a heavy fine. 
In other words, repetitive interviewing by the prosecution service plays a role in causing 
inconvenience not only to the prosecutors, but also to the citizens. 80 
11 Jun Young Mun, The Establishment o/the Court and Prosecution Service in Korea (Yuksa Bypyung Sa, 
Seoul 2010) 976, 862. 
79 ibid. 
80 Kyung Ock Ahn. 'The Admissibility of Police Interrogation Documents: A Comparative Study' (2009) 
25 Journal of Public Security [Chian-Nonch~ng] 101, 167; Hak-Bae Kim, 'The Reasonable Reallocation 
of the Investigative Powers between ~e PolIc~ and Prosecutors: The Perspective of the Police' in 
Supreme Prosecutors' Office and NatIOnal PolIce Agency (eds), Public Hearing/or Allocating 
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4.2. The Acceptance of the Inten'iew Record 
The second consequence is that reliable fact-finding is restricted by a prosecutor's 
written records. Judges cannot make informed decisions as to whether to admit 
confessions into evidence and what weight to put on them. Unlike electronic recordings, 
the documents provide judges with incomplete information to determine whether the 
prosecutors employed coercive methods or extracted an involuntary and unreliable 
confession. As Leo stated, wrongful convictions are in general based on interview 
documents rather than tape-recording or audio-visual. 81 In the interview documents, the 
accounts of disputants are 'incomplete, selective, and potentially biased about what 
occurred.'82 The written interview, as seen above in Part 2, is law enforcement's 
. f' t I 83 version 0 mstan rep ay. 
Thus the interview reports, summarised and interpreted by prosecutors, cannot be 
appropriately reviewed by the courts. The judges do not have sufficient information to 
determine the propriety of investigation process or to challenge the evidence being 
provided by the prosecutors. One trial judge whom I interviewed pointed out such a 
difficulty: 
[J3-/S] In case the defendant states differently from the contents in the interview documents 
written by prosecutors, I try to detennine whether the interview records are reliable. 
However, it's very difficult for the judges to refute the statement in the prosecutorial 
interview documents. So, the statements in courts are mostly ignored. Only in case the 
defendant's arguments are strongly supported by other evidence, we can reject the 
Investigative Powers in Korea (SPO; NPA, Seoul 2005) 2, 17. 
81 Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Harvard Univ Pr, 2008), 298; In many 
false confession cases, the confessions, as Drizin and Leo argued, have been deemed voluntary by the 
trial judges. As the judges have found that the confessions to be reliable evidence of guilt, most false 
confessions have led to wrongful convictions. See Steven A. Drizin and Richard A. Leo. 'The Problem of 
False Confessions in the Post-DNA World' (2004) 82 N C Law Rev 891. 
82 Leo op. cit. 297. 
83 Thomas P. Sullivan. 'Police Experiences with Recording Custodial Interrogations' (2004) 88(3) 
Judicature 132, 133 (Unlike written records, electronic recordings was described as 'an incontestable 
instant replay': 'Experienced officers from several hundred departments described contemporaneous 
electronic recordings of complete custodial interviews as a powerful law enforcement tool- an 
incontestable 'instant replay'.'); Indeed, untruthful allegations and faulty recollections can draw attentions 
from relevant parties in the proceedings. Suspects may falsely accuse the prosecutors offailing to infonn 
them of legal rights such as the right to legal counselor using coercive tactics. In contrast, prosecutors, as 
we shall see below in the case examples, may make false claims about the suspect's behaviour and 
accounts. See James H. Barnes and Noah Webster, Police Interrogation: Tape Recording (Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 8, HMSO, London 1980),2 (Barnes and Webster 
citing Hyde Committee illustrat.ed that 'Tape-re~ording would de~er, if not prevent, the use of any unfair 
questioning methods by the pohc~. Conv~rsely, It would reduce, If not remove, the risk of untrue and 
unfair allegations being made agamst pohce officers responsible for conducting interviews. ') 
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prosecutorial documents. Otherwise, it's almost impossible ... 
Judges have difficulty in rejecting confessions being made in the pre-trial process. 
This is shown in the recent case of four juveniles wrongfully convicted at the first 
instance: 
The juveniles denied the murder at the beginning of the interrogation by the prosecutor. 
However, all of them made confessions before the prosecutor. As the defence counsel 
argued, the prosecutor often made the defendants wait in the interrogation room for several 
hours without interviewing them. In addition,· only a part of the interviews, in which the 
defendants confessed to the crime, were visually recorded by the prosecutor. Moreover, 
notwithstanding the vulnerabilities of the defendants who are all juveniles and homeless, 
they were interrogated without the participation of their parents, let alone defence counsel. 
We have considered all those factors. Nevertheless, we cannot fmd a reasonable ground to 
exclude the confessions that they made in the prosecutor's interview room. 84 
The defendants were found guilty solely on the basis of the confessions before the 
prosecutor. The interviews were conducted without the participation of appropriate 
adults although all defendants were vulnerable street living, homeless juveniles. In 
addition, there was no other evidence except for the confessions. However, even under 
these circumstances, the judges did not question the reliability of the confessions. The 
court, as we shall see in detail in the case examples below, did not have sufficient 
information to challenge the prosecutorial interview documents because the documents 
provide them with only limited knowledge skewed toward the views of prosecutors. 
Furthermore, the trial judges are required to provide written reasons in verdicts in order 
to justify their suspicion about the reliability of confessions. 85 However, such a 
. If . th' d 86 requirement ltse constrams e JU ge. 
In addition the judges tend to place more trust on the prosecutorial interview records 
than on the defendant's statements in court. All five judges whom I interviewed told that 
the statements in the prosecutorial documents are very trustworthy: 
84 2008 KOHAP 45.64. 73.ll7 (2008) 16 July 2008 (Suwon District Court). 
85 KCPA, art 325. 
86 Herbst illustrated that requiring a written justifications impose serious constraints upon a decision 
making. See Karl P. Herbst. 'The Chinese Criminal Process: Revolutionary Ideology and Human Rights' 
30 stanford Law Rev 469, 485; Michele Panzavolta. 'Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian 
Struggle for an Accusatorial Criminal Law System' (2004) 30 North Carolina Journal of International 
Law and Commercial Regulation 577,592. 
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[J2-RSl The reliability of the interrogation documents being prepared by the prosecutors is 
generally over 80%. I don't think this is good. But, we mostly trust the prosecutorial reports. 
In practice, about 80 to 90 % of them are trustworthy. Therefore, the confessions in the 
prosecutorial interrogation reports are rarely quashed. 
[J3-IS] Largely, I tend to trust the prosecutorial dossiers. But, recently the prosecutors use 
the interrogation documents in order to maintain their powers. I'm worried about such a 
situation. 
[J2-IM] There're lots of people who lie in court although I warn them of perjury. Many of 
the accused and witnesses tend to make unreasonable statements. Nowadays, the judges try 
to place the emphasis on the statements in court. However, many judges including me put 
more trust on the statements in the prosecutorial reports than those in court. 
Subsequently, statements in the prosecutor's interrogation room are considered to be 
more important than those in open court. 87 The Korean criminal courts, as the 
presidential committee suggested, only confirm confessions and evidence obtained by 
the prosecutors. 88 In these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
defendant's right to an open trial is merely a nominal right and not a right in practice. 
Taken together, written documents provide the courts with insufficient information 
on the confessions. Prosecutors do not record confessions literally. Instead, they make a 
summary statement abridging and re-organising the suspect's testimony. This method of 
constructing a case enables the prosecutors to create 'closely-knit and logically 
consistent accounts which judges may find difficult to resist. ,89 Moreover, the judges 
mostly put more trust on the statements in the prosecutorial documents than those in the 
open courts. As a result, a trial based on such insufficient information cannot guarantee 
truth-finding. Instead, the facts being constructed by the prosecutors come to be 
regarded as the truth through the confirmation of the court. 
87 Kyung Ock Ahn. 'The Admissibility of Police Interrogation Documents: A Comparative Study' (2009) 
25 Journal of Public Security [Chian-Nonchong] 101, 164 (Professor Ahn illustrated that 'the 
admissibility of prosecutorial interview documents into evidence leads the outcome of trials to be 
manipulated by the prosecutors. ') 
88 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (IV): From 14th to 27th 
Conference' PCJR (Seoul January 2005), 267. 
89 Daniel H. Foote. 'Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan' (1991) 21 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 415, 455. As seen in Chapter 8, the Korean and Japanese systems of 
criminal justice have a large number of similarities, in particular in terms of evidentiary impact of 
interview documents. 
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4.3. Regulating the Prosecutor's Interview 
The final consequence is that the prosecutors themselves often use unethical 
interrogative tactics, e.g. threats and torture, in order to extract a confession from the 
suspect. In most jurisdictions, the prosecutors playa quasi-judicial role as a significant 
filter to monitor police investigation including inappropriate interviewing methods.9o 
However, in Korea, the risk of abuse by prosecutors themselves cannot be properly 
controlled as there are weaknesses in interviewing practices. 
According to the survey conducted by the Korean presidential committee on human 
rights, 17.2 per cent (N= 116) of the suspects indicated that they had experienced threats 
during the prosecutorial interrogation. In addition, 12.3 per cent (N=83) of respondents 
reported that they were forced to give false confessions or admissions. In particular, 2.3 
per cent (N=16) of suspects experienced physical violence.91 
Clearly, unethical methods are not rare during interview, particularly in a closed 
interrogation room without a proper monitoring mechanism such as electronic 
recordings. It should be noted that such interview tactics are also still used by the police 
although their interview records are not accepted into evidence in court.92 
Interview documents provide only limited information and because of this, judges 
oversee the prosecutors' behaviour. This also prevents third parties from monitoring the 
prosecutor's practices.93 The power resulting from this interviewing process, as Drizin 
90 For more details on the quasi-judicial and filtering role, see ch 3, 6 and 8. 
91 Presidential Committee on Human Rights, A Survey on the Infringement on Human Rights During the 
Investigation (PCHR, Seoul 2003), 101-109. 
92 In 2010, four police officers were arrested on the suspicion of torture during the interrogation, and 
found guilty at the court. See 2010 GOHAP 331 (2010) 48 Kakgong 30 December 2010 (Seoul Southern 
District Court); Jeong Min Mok. 'Four Police Officers Found Guilty of Torture' Kyung-Hyang (30 
December 2010); Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the 
Law of Evidence' (2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132, 117 (Professor Shin stated that 
'notwithstanding article 312 [of the KCPA), the police often use improper tactics during the interrogation 
in order to obtain confessions because they are necessary to detain suspects. For the police officers, this 
goal is more important than to prove the gUilt of the defendants in court.'). 
In addition to this reason, both the prosecutorial repetitive interviewing and supervising over the 
police investigation als~, as seen in the int~rviews with police o~cers, ha~e an impact on the coercive 
interrogation by the pohce: [P04-ISJ] Pohce officers try to obtam confeSSIOns from the suspects because 
such confessions just move on to the prosecutor's desk. For example, the prosecutor's questions are like 
this: "Is the statement true that you've talked to the officer?" In other words, the confessions before the 
officers are just given to the judge as evidence through the prosecution service; [P05-IS) In order to send 
the cases to the prosecutors' office, we need to have a confession. Otherwise the prosecutors don't accept 
the files. So, the prosecutors require us to obtain admissions; [P04-IS2] Confession is necessary to get the 
warrant for detention of the suspects .... When the suspect doesn't talk at all, it's really difficult to finish 
the case. If I were a defence lawyer, I would tell my client not to say anything before the police or 
prosecutors. 
~3 Welsh S. White. 'False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards against Untrustworthy 
Confessions' (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 105, 153. 
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and Reich noted, can be effectively checked by more detailed knowledge about the 
interrogation: 
Knowledge would empower [third parties] to become more informed about current 
problematic tactics, and then to clarify and develop more specific rules ... , in turn giving 
.. , clearer guidance on where the line for acceptable behavior is drawn.94 
Indeed, due to the lack of information on the interrogation process, trial judges, the 
appellate courts and executives cannot conduct any systematic oversight of prosecutor's 
• •• 95 
actlvltles. 
4.3.1. Weaknesses in Interview Practices 
Article 312 of the KCPA has mainly contributed the self-incriminating statements before 
the prosecutors to be accepted into evidence.96 This evidentiary impact leads the 
prosecutors into seeking a confession from the suspects. As a result, this tendency may 
often tempt the prosecqtors to use inappropriate interviewing methods. This is 
exacerbated by a number of elements, which are favourable to the investigation 
authorities than to the suspects: 
• Secrecy and Abridged Documents 
• Length of Detention 
• Lack of Disclosure 
Firstly, prosecutorial interviews, as discussed earlier, are conducted in a relatively 
secret way. Although prosecutorial interviews are recorded, this does not eliminate the 
secrecy of the interrogation room. Prosecutorial interviews are conducted in a closed 
room by the prosecutor simply with the participation of the one or two members of staff. 
The interview is not recorded by electronic methods on a mandatory basis. 
Under these circumstances, the interrogation process cannot be effectively 
monitored even by internal methods.97 As seen above in the accounts of one prosecutor, 
94 Steven A. Drizin and Marissa 1. Reich. 'Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need For Mandatory 
Recording of Police Interrogations to accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions' 
(2004) 52 Drake L.Rev. 619, 628. 
9' Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Harvard Univ Pr, 2008), 299. 
96 As seen in n 92 above, it has failed to restrict inappropriate interview methods by the police. 
97 Sanders described such coercive powers of the investigators as follows: 'ifthreats and isolation do not 
work-try covert taping of the suspect's conversations with a co-suspect, solicitor or member of the 
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a five-hour interrogation is often swnmarised into a five-page document. These 
abridged records cannot precisely show what occurred in the prosecutor's room for five 
hours. In particular, abuses such as torture, threats, and inducements will not be· 
monitored at all in the prosecutor's well-organised essay although such tactics are still 
used: 
[DL2-IS2] Many important statements had been missed out of the prosecutorial documents. 
In the homeless girl case,98 fortunately, I could confmn those facts by overseeing visual 
recordings, which were presented by the prosecutors to prove confessions. Because of the 
leading questions, all statements in the records were completely constructed for a 
conviction. Those facts could be easily found through the video recordings. But, none of 
them were noted in the documents .... While defending this case, I came to recognise one 
very serious problem. Interview documents should be one of the most objective information 
for the judgement. However, they're recorded differently from the real facts. According to 
the prosecutor's intention, important information for proving innocence is removed from 
the documents on purpose. Questions of the prosecutor sometimes become the answers of 
the suspects in the dossiers. 
Indeed, such secrecy undermines the privilege against self-incrimination. The courts, 
as seen above, are not provided with the factual evidence that is necessary to determine 
whether statements were voluntary or results of coercion. In order to give accurate 
judgements with respect to voluntariness, the courts would need a complete verbatim 
record of investigative interview. However, the prosecutorial documents present mostly 
summarised, selected, and re-organised statements.99 Hence, the courts cannot properly 
regulate the interview process. As a result, the suspect's priVilege against self-
incrimination, as we shall see in the case examples below, cannot be guaranteed 
1 100 proper y. 
family. Or how about deceiving the suspect into thinking there is more evidence than there really is or that 
his story had been undermined by a co-suspect? Or into thinking that family and friends will be arrested if 
he or she does not 'cough'? Empathy is another good tactic-many suspects are ready to be befriended by 
[ an investigator] if they are isolated and scared.' See Andrew Sanders, 'Can Coercive Powers be 
Effectively Controlled or Regulated?: The Case for Anchored Pluralism' in Ed Cape and Richard Young 
(eds), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Past, Present and Future (Hart 
Pub., Oxford; Portland, Oregon 2008) 45, 58. 
98 See n 129 below. 
99 Pofessor Uglow stated that in the UK, summaries made by the police are used, but they can be checked 
with audio recordings. Steve Uglow, Comments at the Supervision Meeting (2nd December 2011); 
Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Harvard Univ Pr, 2008), 299. 
100 Leo illustrated that 'modem interrogation methods are sophisticated and powerful; designed for the 
guilty, they invariably lead to some false confessions and wrongful convictions when misapplied to the 
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Secondly, the lengthy detention period in the Korean system increases the inequality 
of arms between the defence and prosecutors. 101 Social and physical isolation, as 
Hilgendorf and Irving suggested, are regarded as potentially powerful influences: 'The 
situation of physical confinement by the police supports and facilitates [the] pressures 
and the effect becomes more pronounced the longer the total period of detention in 
1· t d ,102 po Ice cus 0 y. 
In Korea, the prosecutors can detain suspects generally up to 480 hours for 
investigation which include interrogation. 103 Detention can be extended up to 960 hours 
for the investigations of crimes against the security of the state. 104 This is employed as 
an important method to elicit confessions. lOS In this regard, the powers of prosecutors 
are much greater than their counterparts in other jurisdictions. For instance, in England 
and Wales, it is the police who make use of detention for investigation. However, they 
should not hold the suspects for more than 96 hours according to the provisions of 
PACE. I06 Similarly, the French code of criminal procedure, as the English, specifically 
provides the duration of the custody by the police. 107 In principle, the police can detain 
innocent.' See ibid 308-309. 
101 The manipulation of statements is generally facilitated by a different level of power between 
investigators and suspects: [P03-IS/] 'Interrogations are conducted under the pretty unequal relationship 
between investigators and suspects. So, the statements of suspects are easily manipulated by the intention 
of the investigators. Probably, most detectives know this fact'; [DL2-IS2] 'The power of the state must be 
enormous. The vulnerable populations can be easily hurt by such a power. In reality, like the boys in my 
case, the damage resulting from the manipulation of interview records is mainly given to the vulnerable 
people. I'm certain if there had been their parents beside them, the boys wouldn't have confessed the 
crime that they didn't commit. They couldn't be the counterpart of the prosecutor at all. ... Only the 
socially weak persons should face such a dangerous situation. ' 
102 E. Linden Hilgendorf and Barrie Irving, 'A Decision-making Model of Confessions' in Sally M. 
Lloyd-Bostock (ed), Psychology in Legal Contexts. ApplicatiOns and Limitations (MacMillan, London 
1981) 67-84, 81 quoted from Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A 
Handbook (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2003),122. . 
103 See The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially 
amended on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 203 '(Detention Period by Public Prosecutor) Ifa 
public prosecutor. detains a ~usp~ct or ~c~ives a s~s~ect from a ~udicial police office~, the suspect shall be 
released if a pubhc prosecution IS not mstltuted wlthm ten days, and art 205 (ExtenSion of Detention 
Period) '(I) A judge ofa district court may, where it is deemed that there is a good reason to continue the 
investigation, extend the period. prescribed in Article 203, upon request of a public prosecutor, and only 
one such extension shall be granted to the extent not exceeding ten days. ' 
104 State Security Act [Kukgaboanbeop] 1948 partially amended on 13 December 1997 No.5454 art 19 
105 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (Ill): From I st to 13th Conference' 
PCJR (Seoul May 2004), 21. 
106 police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) ss 41-43; Steve U glow op. cit. 152-153 (In terms of the 
development of regulation .on the du!ation o~ d~tention, Professor U glow stated that 'The courts sought to 
limit the police powers of mterrogatlon and lnslsted that a suspect should be taken before a magistrate 
with all speed, normally within 24 hours. Eventually, it was the judges themselves who took the initiative 
to resolve this uncertainty by issuing the judges' Rules in 1912 to regulate police procedure over the 
treatment of detained persons .... The modern law is contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 which codifies pre-trial procedures. ') 
107 Ministry of Justice and John R. Spencer (trs), France, Code of Criminal Procedure (2000) art 77 'The 
225 
Chapter 6 The Prosecutor :so Interview with Suspects 
the suspects for up to twenty-four hours. 108 However, with the approval of the 
prosecutor or investigating judges, such duration can be extended up to forty-eight 
hours. In relation to the crimes of terrorism or drugs, the suspects can be held for up to 
96 hourS. 109 In Germany, the code of criminal procedure requires that the defendant 
detained by a warrant should be brought to the court 'without delay.' 110 Judges examine 
the accused without delay following the arrest and not later than on the following day. 
The suspects arrested by the police without a warrant also should be examined by the 
judges in the same way as the detainees with a warrant. III 
The long period of detention in the Korean system increases the vulnerability of 
suspects, so that they may be coerced to confess to crimes that they did not commit. 
Extending the period of detention has been used as a means of extracting confessions. I 12 
Limit of detention would be a means of safeguarding suspects against coercive 
. . ta t' 113 mterrogatlon c ICS. 
The final factor which may exacerbate the abuse of interviewing tactics is a lack of 
schemes to guarantee the disclosure of evidence. For a fair trial, the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence is one of the most essential elements. However, the Korean 
system of criminal justice, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, does not have an effective 
scheme to guarantee disclosure. The prosecutor's written interview records may not 
preserve exculpatory evidence discovered during the interrogation. 
The narratives of interview records, as seen above in Part 2, are created mainly to 
highlight the suspect's guilt. Therefore, mitigating facts and circumstances are mostly 
judicial police officer may keep at his disposal for the requirements of the inquiry any person against 
whom there are one or more plausible reasons to suspect that he has committed or attempted to commit an 
offence. He infonns the district prosecutor of this when the police custody begins. The person under 
police custody may not be kept more than twenty-four hours. Before the twenty-four hours have expired 
the district prosecutor may extend the police custody by a further period not exceeding twenty-four hours.' 
(Emphasis added). 
108 ibid. 
109 Dong Hee Lee and others, Investigation Systems: A Comparative Study {BigyosusajedoronJ 
(pakyoungsa,SeouI2004),92-93. 
110 Federal Ministry of Justice (tr), Germany, Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozejjordnungj (1987) s 
115. 
111 ibid s 163c (Duration of Custody and Judicial Review) 
112 Steve Uglow, Evidence: Text and Materials (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 802, 152 
(Professor Uglow stated that "~'he considerab~e uncertainty, not to. say hostili~, with which ... judges 
regarded police powers to detam and to questIOn suspects led to divergent attitudes towards statements 
made to the police while in police custody, with some judges happy to admit such statements as evidence 
while others excluded them. ') 
113 ibid 152; Ed Cape and Richard Young (eds), Regulating Policing: The Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 Past, Present and Future (Hart Pub., Oxford; Portland, Oregon 2008) 74, 9 (Cape and Young 
illustrated that 'the length of detention is a source of great anxiety for suspects. ' Therefore, as Edward 
described, 'The client's fIrst conce~s are always about ancillary matters, primarily about the period for 
which they will be detained and lettmg others know where they are.') 
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excluded from the record. 114 Such discarded evidence can be important exculpatory 
evidence necessary for the defendant to prove his innocence: 
[DL2-IS2] In the video recordings, one boy had strongly refused to confess to murder for 40 
minutes. He cried that "I never did that. I'm really innocent. I was in Sung-Nam [another 
city in Kyunggi of Korea] when the girl was killed. I have nothing to do with this murder. 
Please help me to prove that I wasn't at the crime scene." But those accounts weren't 
recorded in the interview documents at all. Instead, in the prosecutorial documents, the 
prosecutor wrote only that "he refused to admit the crime for 10 minutes." There's no 
specific statement which can prove the suspect's innocence. .... On the basis of this 
statement in the video recordings, I easily found witnesses who had seen the suspect at 
Sung-Nam, as he argued. 
As Leo suggested, this leads to 'failure to preserve the most important evidence to 
achieve a fair and accurate trial outcome.' lIS 
In conclusion, there are three serious weaknesses in current interview practices: the 
secrecy of interviewing practices relyin on abridged documents, the lengthy period of 
detention of the suspects, and a lack of schemes for the disclosure of exonerating 
evidence. 
4.3.2. Abuses of Interviewing Methods: Case exam pies 
It can be argued that the Korean criminal justice system does not adequately monitor 
prosecutorial interviews, especially. given the lack of electronic or even verbatim 
recording. 116 The case examples are rare which indicate abuse. However, a number of 
cases have been published. 
114 Mike McConville and John Baldwin. 'The Role of Interrogation in Crime Discovery and Conviction' 
(1982) 22(2) Br J Criminol 165, 170 (McConville and Baldwin stated that 'for practical purposes, what 
the police offer in the way of evidence is a clear, coherent and compelling account directed towards 
establishing the guilt of the defendant. ... Conflicts in the stories of witnesses (or in those of multiple 
defendants) must, so far as is possible, be resolved or reconciled. Indeed, witnesses who might provide a 
contrary picture are rarely even named in the prosecution case') 
II' Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Harvard Univ Pr, 2008), 300; Arne F. 
soldwedel. 'Testing Japan's Convictions: The Lay Judge System and the Rights of Criminal Defendants' 
41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1417, 1465 (Soldwedel stated that by use of electronic 
recordings, 'investigators could no longer discard evidence that does not confonn to their theories about 
the truth of their cases. This would make more exculpatory evidence available to defense counsel ... Any 
exculpatory evidence gleaned during inten:ogatio~ w~uld be in~tantly 'discovered' when the tapes are 
reviewed by defense counsel. Moreover, vldeotapmg mterrogatlons would preclude any such evidence 
from being discarded by investigators. ') 
116 See n 4 above. 
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The first tragic affair took place in 2002 when a suspect was tortured to death during 
the interrogation in the Seoul Central Prosecutors' Office. I 17 This suspect was arrested 
on suspicion of murder on 25th October. The investigative interview began 9 P.M. on the 
same day. One prosecutor and two members of staff were present. However, the suspect 
did not confess. The interviewers including a prosecutor began to use physical violence 
against him. The judgement described the situation as follows: 
The interrogators kicked the suspect's groin and treaded on his fleshy insider of the thigh. 
They in tum battered the suspect and tortured him in order to obtain a confession. These 
tortures continued to be. used all night until 8:00 in the morning on 26th when the suspect 
showed some health problems. However, they did not look after him. They made him lie 
down on the bed in the interrogation room without particular care until 12:41 in the 
afternoon when his condition was significantly aggravated. Then, they moved him to the 
hospital. However, in the end, he was dead because oftorture at 7:45 P.M. on 26th October 
2002. 118 
If the prosecutor had elicited a confession, he would have succeeded in obtaining a 
conviction, and subsequently, received an award from the Prosecutor General. 119 
However, rather than 'warm congratulations', he was charged and found guilty of 
manslaughter. 120 
After this incident, the Supreme Prosecutors' Office announced a number of 
measures to prohibit coercive interrogation.121 These measures include the participation 
of defence counsel during the interrogation and prohibition of the interrogation after 
midnight. However, as we shall see later, these are regarded as insufficient measures to 
protect the suspects as the prosecutors can readily limit the participation of the defence 
1122 counse. 
The second case was revealed to the public by the electronic recording. However, 
such a recording was not . conducted by the prosecutors. Rather, it was secretly carried 
out by the suspect. In 2006, there was an illegal lobbying scandal surrounding the 
117 2292005 DO 945 (2005) Panre Gongbo 26 May 2005 1092 (Korean Supreme Court); 2006 NA 6/873 
(2007) 5 April 2007 (Seoul High Court); Chang Hyung Lee. 'Zealous Chase' Mae-II Financial (2 
November 2002). 
118 229 2005 DO 945 (2005) Panre Gongbo 26 May 2005 1092 (Korean Supreme Court). 
119 Chang Hyun An. 'Probability Caught the Prosecution' Hankyoreh 2/ (14 November 2002). 
120 For more details on the atmosphere in the prosecutor's office with respect to the conviction, see ch 7. 
121 Sang Lok Lee. 'The Participation of the Defence Counsel during the Prosecutorial Interrogation' 
Dong-Ah I/-bo (15 November 2002) 
122 See nn 160, 187 below and accompanying texts. 
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nation's largest multi-level marketing firm, JU GrOUp.123 In relation to this case, 
Prosecutor-general stated that 'the scandal involving JU Group could become the 
"biggest fraud case in history" and ordered prosecutors to expand their investigation.'124 
But on 5th February 2007, one suspect of this case argued that the public prosecutor had 
forced him to lie during the interrogation. In particular, he provided the media with an 
audio tape recording the investigative interview process in the prosecutor's room. 12S 
The prosecutor used threats and inducements: 126 
[Prosecutor] Will you make a confession that I want to have? Clearly. 
[Suspect] If the defendant proves my false testimony, I will get a punishment. 
[Prosecutor] There's no way to prove your perjury. 
[Suspect] Do you want me to lie? 
[Prosecutor] Lie here. And lie in court. 
[Suspect] That's not a good way, Prosecutor? 
[Prosecutor] Now, I'm very upset. Please let me know a good method. Just sacrifice you. 
This deal isn't a loss to you. Instead, it's a loss to me. I'm just requiring you to 
help me to convict Jung-Wha Kang and Jae-Sung Lee [who was the high rank 
public servant working at the Presidential Office]. 
[Suspect] How long will you recommend a sentence for me? 
[Prosecutor] Two years. 
[Suspect] Is it lenient? 
[Prosecutor] Do you want me to recommend one year and to ask for suspension of 
execution? Minimum is one year. It's better for you to be punished with a minor 
offence because you're involved in many other offences. 
[Suspect] ..... . 
[Prosecutor] For your confession, I think you need to be more pressed. Uh? Do you want 
me to use another method in order to make you confess? I can do that. But I'm 
worried that our relationship will be damaged... Investigation is difficult. .. 
difficult ..... J27 
123 2008 DO 2300 (2008) 12 June 2008 (Korean Supreme Court); 2007 DO 6012 (2007) 11 October 2007 
(Korean Supreme Court). 
124 Annie I. Bang. 'politicians Linked to JU Lobbying Scandal' Korea Herald (30 Nevember 2006). 
12S SU Young Hong. 'Investigating Prosecutor's Threat to Obtain Confession' Dong-Ah J1-bo (6 February 
2007); Chul Won Kang. 'Investigating Prosecutor in JU Case Force a Suspect to Lie' Han-Kook I/-Bo (6 
February 2007). 
126 Min Su Kang. 'Prosecutor Demanding Perjury' Korean Broadcasting System (6 February 2007); Chang 
Suk Kim. 'Is It a Misconduct of Only One Prosecutor?' (2007) 648 Hankyoreh 21. 
127 Such interrogation tactics occasionally cause a mental problem of suspects. In 2004, a female suspect 
experienced mental disorder because of the coercive interrogation by the prosecutor in a very similar 
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The prosecutor used these methods in order to obtain the conviction of a high-profile 
public servant because such a conviction, as Jong-Gu Kim noted, could give the 
prosecutor a good reputation. 128 As an acknowledgement for the false confession and 
testimony, he promised to reduce a sentence and not to charge other offences. 
In the final case, four juveniles (three 15-year-olds and one 18-year-old), who had 
been charged on the suspicion of murder and confessed by coercion, found not guilty at 
the Supreme COurt. 129 This is very important in the Korean criminal justice, which can 
be compared to Confait case in the UK. 130 The murder case had not been investigated 
by the police. From the beginning, the prosecution service conducted an investigation 
with its own investigative units. The prosecutor had arrested the juveniles, interviewed 
them and placed them in custody for 20 days before the formal charge. 131 All of them 
were convicted of murder at the first trial.132 I interviewed one of the defence counsel 
who stated that the decision was based on interview documents including statements 
which were the result of direct manipulation: 
[DL2-IS2] At the first trial, all four juveniles were convicted of murder. The judges never 
minded visual recordings and didn't even watch them even though they were presented as 
supporting evidence by the prosecutor. 133 The trial had been based only on the interview 
situation to this example. The medical record employed as significant evidence to prove innocence of 
defendants described the suspect's condition as following: '[Suspect] I couldn't sleep because the 
prosecutor's face kept coming across my mind. [Doctor ~ Medical Recordj After she was coerced to make 
a false confession ... she lost her consciousness twice. Since then, she has shown some symptoms of 
mental disorder. For example, she does scarcely recognise her family, relatives and friends. [Doctor s 
Medical Recordj She stated that "the interrogation by the prosecutor is unfair, and I want to prove my 
innocence by killing myself'.' See 2004 DO 711 (2004) 13 May 2004 (Korean Supreme Court); 2004 NO 
1409 (2004) 14 January 2004 (Seoul High Court); the fear that the suspects experience during the 
prosecutorial interrogation can be observed in an interview recently published. In a well-known case in 
Korea, a female suspect, Jung Ah Shin, illustrated the prosecutorial power in terms of interrogation thus: 
'Prosecutorial interrogation was too scary for me. My pants got wet during the second interview session.' 
See Hun Kang. 'Interview with Jung Ah Shin' Chosun lI-Bo (15 January 2011). 
128 Jong-Gu Kim stated that prosecutors can achieve a good reputation when they investigate and convict 
high-profile public servants. See Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd 
edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 531. 
129 This case is called 'Suwon Homeless Girl Murder Case.' see 2009 DO 1/51 (2010) 22 July 2010 
(Korean Supreme ~ourt); 200~ NO 1914 (2009) 2~ J~u~ 2009 (Seoul High Court). The defendants 
were found not guilty at the High Court (appellate JUrIsdiction). But the prosecutors appealed against the 
decision. The case moved to the Supreme Court. 
130 Henry Fisher, Report of an Inquiry into the circumstances leading to the trial afthree persons on 
charges arising out of the death of Maxwell Confait and thefire at 27 Doggett Road. London SE6 (HCP 
90) (HMSO, London 1977) . 
131 Kyung Tae Kim. 'Juveniles Charged With Murder ofSuwon Homeless Girl' fun-Hap News (30 
January 2008) 
132 For the details on the judgement, see n 84 above and accompanying text. 
133 For further discussion about electronic recordings and a relevant provision of the KCPA, see n 134 
230 
Chapter 6 The Prosecutor:r Interview with Suspects 
documents written by the prosecutor. All defendants confessed to the crime and a stream of 
plot was well matched with the confessions. In fact, at first, I thought they murdered the 
girl because the interview documents were too perfect. ... But, almost all statements were 
manipulated by the prosecutor. For example, the prosecutor asked one of the suspects as 
follows: "Do you remember steps, buildings or a small garden in the school where the 
crime occurred?" The suspect answered to the question "Probably, a small garden". But in 
the interview documents, the question and answer were recorded as follows: "When and 
where did you strike the girl? 1 don't remember exactly, but there was a small garden." In 
addition, when it comes to the method of striking, the prosecutor asked the suspect "he [one 
of the suspects] said that he hit the girl like this. Is this right?" But such a question was 
recorded in the documents as an answer: "I hit the girl like this". 
Defence counsel told me that even he had been certain about the conviction when he 
simply reviewed the interview records because every statement in the documents was 
very clearly organised to prove the defendants' guilt. However, it emerged that in 
addition to manipulation of statements, a number of threats and inducements were used 
in order to elicit confessions from these vulnerable suspects: 
[DL2-1S2] In my case, the prosecutor had used various threats and inducements in order to 
get confessions. For example, the prosecutor told one of the juveniles, who didn't confess 
to the crime, as follows: "Do you know the Nam-Young case? Gang members killed people 
by knives. I investigated the case. In this case, one of gang-members got a 10 years' 
imprisonment sentence, which was the heaviest among the defendants. But he got released 
on probation. Don't you know the probation?" Then, he showed the statutes to the boy and 
explained very kindly: "Instead of murder, you will be charged with a lesser offence. Then, 
you will be able to be released on probation. So, you don't need to worry" In the end, he 
got the confession from the boy. P!p1icularly, the prosecutor made the boy relaxed by 
indicating video camera: "Do you think I' m lying to you? Look at the video camera. Our 
conversations have been all video-recorded." ... I'm really worried about the suspects being 
interrogated. These awful incidents took place under video camera. But, most suspects are 
interrogated without audio or video recordings. Now, I can imagine what is happening in 
the interrogation room. 
Without legal advice or parental support, the juveniles made false confessions in order 
to escape from the harsh interrogation: 
below. 
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[DL2-IS2] Confession is a pretty scary thing. Notwithstanding a number of conflicting 
evidence, four juveniles were convicted of murder only by the confessions at the first trial. 
., .. I asked them why they confessed to murder. They said there was no alternative. There 
was no person to help them. Apart from the confession, they couldn't find another method 
to get out ". 
Fortunately, defence counsel were able to discover the conflicting statements and the 
manipulation of interview documents by viewing the partially recorded video tapes, 
which had been voluntarily presented to the court by the prosecutor to supplement the 
confessions of the defendants. 134 In the end, they proved the unreliability of the 
confessions by indicating exculpatory evidence and inappropriate interrogation tactics. 
As this defence counsel emphasised, 'if there had not been the electronic recording, the 
juveniles would had been convicted even at the Supreme Court because there was no 
method to prove the unreliability of the prosecutorial interview documents'. 
These cases show the lack of adequate mechanisms to screen the interviewing 
methods being used by the prosecutors. Consequently, nobody knows what occurred 
behind the closed door until the abuses of interviewing methods are often revealed 
unintentionally. Suspects have been tortured, threatened, and induced to make self-
incriminating statements. On other occasions, their statements have been manipulated 
into admissions by the prosecutors. 
A number of prosecutors have argued that 'such an abuse is the extraordinary one, 
which was conducted by an overzealous prosecutor. Accordingly, those cases should not 
be generalized.' I3S However, such abuses, as Professor Shin argued, 'are not incidents, 
which happened by accident, but inevitable consequences being originated from the 
structural fallacy by article 312 of the KCP A. ' 136 
5. Recommendations for Safeguards 
134 At present, the electronic recording is not mandatory in Korea. Rather, as seen in this case, prosecutors 
can record the interview and provide the court with the recordings as supplementary evidence to their 
interview documents. See n 4 above and accompanying text; Kuk Cho. 'The 2007 Revision of the Korean 
Criminal Procedure Code' (2008) 8 Journal of Korean Law 1,8. 
m Jung Youn Jeon, Sun Hyuk Lee and Na Mu Go. 'Coercing a Suspect to Lie. The Fault of One 
Prosecutor?' Hanlcyoreh (7 February 2007). 
136 Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Legal System and the Revision of the Law of Evidence' 
(2006) 47(1) Seoul Law Journal 107-132, 117. 
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Article 312 of the KCPA may protect against police abuse but has not played a 
significant role in safeguarding the defendants from the prosecutor's coercive interviews. 
The prosecution service has turned into an investigation agency employing 
inappropriate interviewing tactics. In particular, the abuses of interview methods have 
been exacerbated by a number of factors such as the lengthy detention period, the 
secrecy of the interrogation, and a lack of mechanisms for disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence. Unanticipated distortions have taken place in the Korean criminal justice 
system. In order to resolve those problems, a number of methods must be carefully 
considered which can increase the transparency of the interrogation practices, reduce the 
impact of coercive interrogative tactics, and protect vulnerable defendants. 137 
5.1. Guaranteeing the Right to Counsel 
To prevent inappropriate interrogation methods, opening up the interrogation process is 
one of the significant steps. This measure, as seen earlier in the examples of the English, 
French, and German systems, can be achieved by guaranteeing the right to counsel 
during the interrogation. 
In Korea, defence counsel are allowed in theory to participate in the investigative 
interview with suspects. 138 However, the defence counsel rarely takes part in the 
interrogation. As noted in Table 6.1, only 0.02 per cent of the criminal cases, suspects 
have legal advice during the prosecutor's interview. In the face of the fact that 
prosecutors occasionally use inappropriate and coercive methods to elicit confessions, 
and furthermore, the interview results virtually determines the verdicts as well as 
sentences, this statistical information shows conclusively that the interrogation process 
cannot be monitored by the defence counsel. There are three aspects to this issue. 
Firstly, the scarcity of defence counsel and the high cost of legal advice cause that 
the assistance from lawyers is not affordable to most suspects.
139 
137 Bernard Weisberg. 'Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View' (1961) 52( I) The 
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 21, 44. 
138 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act {Hyungsasosongbeop} partially amended 
on 2 I December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 243-2 (Defense Counsel's Participation) (I) • A public 
prosecutor or a judicial police officer shall, upon receiving an application from a suspect, his defense 
counsel, legal representative, spouse, lineal relative, or sibling, allow the defense counsel to have an 
interview with the suspect, or shall allow the defense counsel to participate in the interrogation of the 
suspect, unless there is ~y ~ustifiable reason 0t?~rwise.' . . 
139 In Korea, one lawyer IS In charge of 6,903 citizens. This figure IS much more than in other major 
criminal justice systems: 278 in the UK, 263 in the USA, 901 in France, and 459 in Germany. See 
National Assembly Research Service, Republic of Korea in 2008: A Statistical Comparison (Korean 
National Assembly, Seoul 2008) In this study, the number of people and attorney was calculated based on 
the statistics in 2006. 
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Table 6.1 Number of cases of defence counsel's participation in the prosecutor's interrogation 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Criminal Cases· 1,914,979 2,057,194 1,845,316 1,809,624 1,948,306 
Participation of 
Defence Counsel 
112 158 303 367 541 
Percentage 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 
Note. • This figure refers to the number of cases being concluded by the prosecution service. Source: 
Young Tae Kwon. 'Unwarranted Right to Defence Counsel' The Law TImes (January 2009) 
Nevertheless, free legal advice, which is given to the suspects, is very limited. 14o As a 
result, most suspects are interrogated by the police and prosecutors without any legal 
advice from the lawyers. 141 
Secondly, article 243-2 of the KCPA permits the prosecutors to extensively restrict 
the lawyer's participation in the interrogation. The conditions under which the counsel's 
participation is limited are not specifically articulated. The prosecutors are entitled to 
prohibit the participation of defence counsel in questioning only if there are 'justifiable 
reasons' .142 Thus, the suspect's right to counsel is restricted by the extensive discretion 
of the police and prosecutors. 143 Furthermore, during the interview, the defence counsel 
cannot give the advice to the suspects without interrogator's approval. I44 Subsequently, 
as one defence counsel described it, the lawyers in general just sit down behind the 
suspects and listen to the interview as if they are 'pictures on the wall' .145 
Finally, the defence counsel themselves are reluctant to take part in the interview. 
They may not feel the necessity to take part in the police interview as the statements in 
140 KCPA arts 33, 214-2, 282. 
141 Professor Cho described free legal advice as 'a good-looking decoration' see Kuk Cho. 'The 
Prevention of Inappropriate Interrogation Methods' (Seoul 14th October 2010) quoted in Young Tae 
K won. 'The Conference for the Prevention of Inappropriate Interrogation Methods' The Law Times (18th 
October 2010). 
142 See 138 above. 
143 One defence counsel illustrated that 'the investigative agencies may extensively use the condition in 
order to limit the participation of defence counsel.' See ibid 'Unwarranted Right to Defence Counsel' 
(20th January 2009). 
144 KCPA art 243-2 para (3) 'The defense counsel who participates in the interrogation may make a 
statement on his opinion after interrogation: Provided, that the counsel may raise an objection regarding 
any unfair interrogation manner even in the middle of the interrogation, and may also make a statement, 
subject to art approval of the public prosecutor or the judicial police officer.' 
145 Young Tae Kwon. 'Unwarranted Right to Defence Counsel' The Law Times (20th January 2009) 
(Similarly, another counsel stated that 'it is very diffi~ult to interv~ne be~ause in most cases the 
prosecutors do not allow the defence counsel to prOVIde legal adVIce durmg the interrogation. ') 
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the police station can be easily rejected in COurt. 146 Moreover, the lawyer tends to place 
more emphasis on preparing documents for the courts than on participating in interview. 
As Professor Ho Joong Lee has said, 'the defence counsel may regard requesting 
leniency in sentencing as the most significant activity for themselves. They simply 
focus on the results. Therefore, the participation in the interrogation seems to be 
considered as inefficient and unproductive.' 147 Consequently, the participation in the 
interrogation is often regarded as a waste of resources even though it is one of the 
essential measures to protect the suspect. 
Taken together, under the current system, the right to counsel does not act as a 
proper safeguard. Therefore, a number of reforms should be considered for the suspects 
to be protected by their constitutional right to counsel at the pre-trial stage. First of all, 
the provisions, which are currently favourable to the investigation authorities, should be 
revised to increase the participation of the defence counsel. For instance, the lawyer 
needs to give the suspects legal advice during the interrogation irrespective of approval 
from the interviewers. In addition, such participation should not be limited and specific 
conditions must be provided in the statutes in order to prevent the lawyer's participation 
being arbitrarily restricted. Finally, the suspects should be entitled free legal advice 
before and during their interviews with the police and prosecutors. The pre-trial 
investigation process is as significant as the trial because the results of investigation 
generally have such an impact on the trial. 148 This is particularly so in the Korean 
system where the outcomes of trials are mostly determined based on prosecutorial 
documents written at the pre-trial stage, that the right to counsel may be more important 
in the interview process than in courts. 
5.2. Electronic Recording Interviews with Suspects 
One commonly used method is electronic recordings of interview. This will protect the 
suspects both from giving false confessions and from being sentenced on the basis of 
poorly informed judgements. First of all, audio and visual recording leads the 
interviewers to be aware that their interviewing methods will be closely scrutinised. 
Therefore, they will avoid inappropriate tactics, which may result in censure or 
146 Ho Joong Lee. 'Criminal Procedure and Related Human Rights' (2006) 19 Hanyang Law Journal 45. 
54. 
147 ibid; One counsel who is working in Seoul stated that 'For the participation in the interrogation. which 
generally takes eight hours, we have to miss many things. In terms of finance. such an activity is not 
helpful.' See Young Tae Kwon. 'Unwarranted Right to Defence Counsel' The Law Times (20th January 
2009). 
148 Ho Joong Lee op. cit. 48. 
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exclusion of evidence. 149 
In addition, this enables the courts to make more informed judgement by indicating 
what occurred during the interrogation. Slobogin argued that 'when an interrogation is 
not taped, in contrast, objective analysis of voluntariness can never occur. In short, 
failure to tape an interrogation is failure to preserve evidence which is crucial to 
determining the outcome oftrlal,.lso This is supported by Roberts and Zuckerman: 
Before the days of tape-recording, in circumstances where most or all of the information 
about the interrogation came from presumptively biased sources, the courts were bound to 
have great difficulty in ascertaining what really transpired in the interview-room in order to 
assess the reliability of a custodial confession. IS I 
The Suwon homeless girl murder case in Korea, discussed above, is a good example 
indicating that video recordings of all or part of the interviews can play a significant 
role in helping the trial judges to observe whether or not the confessions were false. 152 
Furthermore, this audio-video recording does not jeopardise any legitimate law 
enforcement interest. As Barness and Webster observed, electronic recording of 
interview helps law enforcement agencies: 
[A] routine system of the recording of police interrogations can provide the means of 
strengthening police interrogation evidence while helping to ensure that the rights of 
suspects are safeguarded.
ls3 
Consequently, electronic recording can be a safeguard providing protection against the 
admission of false confessions. At the same time, this safeguard can give the significant 
benefits to the law enforcement by reinforcing the results of interviews. 154 
In particular, this safeguard may also resolve distortions in the Korean criminal 
justice system. The electronic recordings of an interview conducted by the police can be 
more reliable than the interview document written by the prosecutor. These methods can 
increase the transparency of the interview process, which leads, as Weisberg argued, to 
149 Welsh S. White. 'False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards against Untrustworthy 
Confessions' (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 105, 154. 
ISO Christopher Slobogin. 'Toward Taping' (2003) 1(1) Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 309, 318. 
lSI Paul Roberts and Adrian A. S. Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2004), 400. 
IS2 See the texts accompanying nn 129-134 above. 
IS3 James H. Barnes and Noah Webster, Police Interrogation: Tape Recording (Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure Research Study No.8, HMSO, London 1980) para 6.21. 
IS4 ibid para 6.21; Welsh S. White. 'False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards against 
Untrustworthy Confessions' (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 105, ISS. 
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public distrust: 
[T]he most unique feature of [investigative] questioning is its characteristic secrecy. It is 
secrecy which creates the risk of abuses, which by keeping the record incomplete makes the 
rules about coercion vague and difficult to apply, which inhibits the development of clear 
rules to govern ... interrogation and which contributes to public distrust of the [law 
enforcements]. "5 
The police interviews can also be monitored by third parties such as supervision officers, 
lawyers, prosecutors, or external commissions. This supervising mechanism, as 
McConville and Morrell stated, will ensure 'that suspects are fairly treated and that 
evidence of alleged confession is based on something more than the bare word of the 
interrogator's. ,IS6 Consequently, the police can conduct an investigation independently 
and the prosecution service can monitor that investigation. 
However, electronic recording itself, as a number of commentators pointed out, is 
not a perfect safeguard. IS? Although what is tape-recorded may be accurate, as Sanders 
and Young illustrated, 'it may none the less be unreliable when suspects are induced to 
confess, are subjected to oppressive pressure or have words put into their mouths. Not 
only these things sometimes happen on tape and with a lawyer present, but they also 
happen before or between interviews.,ISS Hence, the system of criminal justice, as we 
shall see below, needs more procedural safeguards to protect the suspects. 
155 Bernard Weisberg. 'Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View' (1961) 52( 1) The 
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science 21, 44. 
156 Mike McConville and Philip Morrell. 'Recording the Interrogation: Have the Police Got It Taped?' 
(1983) Criminal Law Review 158, 162. 
m ibid (McConville and Morrell argued that police-citizen encounters must be taped in their entirety. 
Otherwise, interrogations will continue to take place in secret albeit interviews are taped.); Stephen 
Moston and Geoffrey M. Stephenson, The Questioning and Interviewing of Suspects Outside the Police 
Station (Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 22, HMSO, London 1993),47 
(Accordin~ to Moston and Stephenson,. '~nco~t:rs outside .the pol.ice station. are ~p~rtant for . 
understandmg why suspects make admissions mSlde the pohce statIOn. Interviews mSlde the pohce station, 
either recorded on audio or video tape, contain only one part of the relevant exchanges between the 
suspect and police officers. '); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A 
Handbook (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2003), 22 (Gudjonsson stated that 'The failure to record all 
interrogation sessions makes it difficult, ifnot possible, to retrospectively evaluate the entire process (e.g. 
what was said and done by the interrogator to break down resistance and obtain a confession. '); Steve 
Uglow, Evidence: Text and Materials (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 802, 172-186; Andrew 
Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 240-243. 
158 ibid. 
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5.3. Limiting the Length of Interrogation 
In the Korean criminal process, the prosecutors can generally detain a suspect up to 480 
hours, during which they can interview the suspect without particular limitations. I S9 
Only the interviews conducted after midnight have been prohibited by the rules of 
Ministry of Justice. 160 The lengthy interview has been considered as one of the 
important tactics to extract confessions: 
[J3-ISJ The prosecutors try to lead suspects to make self-incriminating admissions by using 
detention, threats and inducements. Because of the detention and repetitious interviews, the 
suspects get depressed and discouraged. The hopeless suspects tend to confess to crimes 
according to the prosecutor's intention. The prosecutors interview the suspects for 10 or 20 
sessions in order to get confessions from custodial suspects, and then, record only a very 
small part of whole interviews in their documents. 
Lengthy and repetitive questioning increases psychological control over the suspect, and 
as the process raises the anxiety level of suspects, can lead to false confessions. 161 
As a number of empirical studies indicated, the length of interview is closely 
associated with the likelihood of producing false confessions even when the 
interviewees have normal intelligence:62 For the suspect who is subject to a lengthy 
\S9 In particular, this detention can be extended up to 960 hours for the investigations of crimes against 
the security of the state. See n 104 above. 
160 However, notwithstanding this limitation, the prosecutors can keep conducting interviews after 
midnight with the permission of a designated prosecutor when those are necessary for the investigation. 
See The Rule for the Protection of Human Rights During the Investigation 2006 Instruction of the 
Ministry of Justice 556 art 40. 
161 Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Harvard Univ Pr,2008), 113. 
162 Welsh S. White. 'False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards against Untrustworthy 
Confessions' (1997) 32 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 105 129-131, 143-145; Gisli H. 
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and ConfessiOns: A Handbook (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 
2003), 151 (Based on his empirical studies, Gudjonsson found that 'There was also a significant 
relationship between the length of the interrogation and the number of tactics used, on the one hand, and 
the number of confessions obtained, on the other. Therefore, the more time and effort the detective puts 
into the interrogation process, the greater the likelihood that a confession will be elicited. '); Steven A. 
Drizin and RichardA. Leo. 'The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World' (2004) 82 N C 
Law Rev 891, 948 (Drizin and Leo illustrated that 'More than 80% of the false confessors were 
interrogated for more than six hours, and. 50% o~t!te false confessors were interrogated for more than 
twelve hours .... These figures are espeCially strikmg when they are compared to studies of routine police 
interrogations in America, which suggest t!tat more than 90% of normal interrogations last less than two 
hours. These figures supports the observations of many researchers that interrogation-induced false 
confessions tend to be correlated with lengthy interrogations in which the innocent suspect's resistance is 
wom down, coercive techniques are used, and the suspect is made to feel hopeless, regardless of his 
innocence.') 
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interview, the process may be perceived as something akin to torture. 163 The Buddhist 
temple murder case in the USA is well known not only because of its notorious 
execution-style murder, in which nine people were shot after being forced to lie on the 
floor of a Buddhist temple, but also because of relentless interrogation. One suspect 
whose name is Bruce compared the investigative interview to 'when [he] went in for 
surgery': 164 
Bruce's interrogation began at 2:30 A.M. on September 12, three hours after his arrest. ... 
The interrogators took a break at 4:30 A.M. At 5:00 A.M., they took Bruce to a property 
room, showing him photographs of the victims ... Over the next seven hours, Bruce was 
continually questioned by two officers. According to the officers sometime after 12: 1 0 P.M., 
Bruce stopped protesting his innocence and merely stated that he did not "remember what 
happened .... At 3:15 P.M., after almost thirteen hours of intermittent interrogation, Bruce 
began incriminating himself. Over the next two hours, he gave a detailed [false) confession 
to the killings. 165 
Similarly, in the 'Cardiff Three' case of the UK, three suspects were sentenced to life 
imprisonment because of false confessions in 1990. Of the suspects, Miller who had a 
mental age of eleven confessed to the muder after lengthy and oppressive police 
questioning. He denied involvement in a murder well over 300 times. But he was finally 
-"_1 d" 166 persuaded to make li:USe a mIssIons. 
Under such circumstances, suspects make admissions because the increased length 
of interrogation deepens their sense of resignation and despair. 167 This lengthy and 
pressured interrogation, as Gudjonsson noted, significantly leads to an increased risk of 
_~. 168 
false COllleSSlOns. 
To combat this, in England and Wales, a number of provisions have been established 
in the PACE and Code of Practice C: 
Interviewing may take place over the 36-hour period (or up to four days, for indictable 
offences ... ) of compulsory detention. PACE Code of Practice C provides for this 
163 White op. cit. 143. 
164 Roger Parloff. 'False Confessions' (1993) Am Law, 60 quoted from White op. cit. 
165 ibid 129-130. However, before the trial, investigators arrested two other suspects by tracing the 
weapons used in killings. Subsequent investigation indicated that Bruce and other three suspects were not 
involved in this murder case. 
166 R v Miller, Paris and Abdullahi, Court of Appeal, official transcript, 16 December 1992. 
167 Leo op. cit. 135-137. 
168 Gudjonsson op. cit. 173. 
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interrogation to take place under reasonable conditions, specifying adequate breaks for rest 
and refreshment (paras 12.2 and 12.8), adequate heating, lighting and ventilation in the 
interview room (paras 12.4) and allowing the presence of a legal advisor (if requested). 
Code C also requires the custody officer to assess whether the detainee is fit to be 
interviewed ... (para 12.3):69 
For the protection of the suspect, the Korean criminal justice system should set up 
procedural safeguards, which will limit the length of time during which suspects can be 
detained and interrogated without being formally charged and can provide suspects with 
. b . . 170 suffiCient rest etween mtervlews. 
5.4. Prohibiting Inducements 
In most jurisdictions, inappropriate interrogation methods are mainly regulated by the 
courts, which can exclude involuntary or coerced confessions. 171 In general, much 
attention has been paid to physical tactics, e.g. torture, deprivation of food or sleep, 
lengthy interview leading to exhaustion or fatigue, and threats of physical violence. l72 
However, promises of leniency, whether they are explicit or implicit, should be also 
monitored by the courts because they are, as Of she and Leo stated, another primary 
cause of false confessions in the modem era. 173 
Such inducements, as Alschuler has suggested, can lead the suspect to regard a 
confession as in his best interests. 174 If the offer is tempting - e.g. a promise that the 
suspect will not face a charge of current offences if he names a high profile public 
servant to whom he gave a bribe, the suspect, as we shall see below, might believe that 
it would be in his interests for him to falsely confess to crime that he did not commit. 175 
In addition, vulnerable suspects often give false confessions, as was seen in Suwon 
homeless girl murder case, with lesser charges when they believe the investigators will 
frame them in the end despite their rejection of the accusations. 176 In particular, when 
169 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007),247. For more detailed information on these provisions, see Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (c. 60) ss 41-43 and Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice C 2008 paras 12.2 -
12.8. 
170 Gudjonsson op. cit. 25; Sanders and Young op. cit. 247. 
171 ibid 249; White op. cit. 145-153. 
172 Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Harvard Univ Pr, 2008), 309. 
173 Richard J. Of she and Richard A. Leo. 'The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational 
Action' (1997) 74(4) Denver Univ Law Rev 979, 1051-1096. 
174 Albert W. Alschuler. 'Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining' (1968) 36 U.ChLL.Rev. 50,61-62. 
175 See n 182 below. 
176 White op. cit. 151. 
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the suspect has been held a long time in custody, promises from the prosecutors may be 
'too great to ignore and too difficult to assess.,1?7 
Thus, in England and Wales, the offering of inducements has been implicitly 
prohibited by the PACE Code of Practice C: 
[N]o interviewer shall indicate, except to answer a direct question, what action will be 
taken by the police if the person being questioned answers questions, makes a statement or 
refuses to do either. If the person asks directly what action will be taken if they answer 
questions, make a statement or refuse to do either, the interviewer may inform them what 
action the police propose to take provided that action is itself proper and warranted. 178 
The KCPA does not have such a specific provision. Instead, article 309 of KCPA 
provides that the confessions being induced by fraud or other similar methods during 
the interview shall not be admitted as evidence. 179 Based on this provision, in particular 
'other similar methods', the courts have ocassionally excluded confessions obtained as a 
result of the prosecutor's promises. These inducements to confess include the 
. . h d . hrn t 180 h' ·th I ffi 181 d . f dimmls e punlS en , c argmg WI a esser 0 ence, an non-prosecutIon 0 
ffi 182 some 0 ences. 
Under these circumstances, the prosecution service has proposed that the Korean 
criminal process should adopt a new system to give benefits to the suspects who 
voluntarily confess during the investigative interview, i.e. a Korean version of the 'plea 
bargaining' . 183 This proposal has been considered as an important issue in the reform of 
the Korean criminal process. 184 The prosecutors have argued that this scheme is 
necessary in order to investigate corruption, gang crimes, and complicated financial 
offences. 18S 
177 397 Brady v. United States of America (1970) 384 U.S. 742 (The U.S. Supreme Court), 754. 
178 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice C 2008 para 11.5. 
179 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) s 309 'Confession ofa defendant extracted by torture, violence, 
threat or after prolonged arrest or detention, or which is suspected to have been made involuntarily by 
means of fraud or other methods. shall not be admitted as evidence of guilt. ' 
180 87 DO 3 17 (1987) 801 Panre Gongbo 846 (Korean Supreme Court); ibid 85 DO 2 I 82 (1986) 769 282. 
181 ibid 83 DO 2782 (1984)731 1053. 
182 ibid 2000 DO 5701 (2002) 159 1720. 
183 Haeng Sem Kim. 'A Brief Review on the Prosecution's Attempt to Adopt Foreign Judicial Systems and 
New Types of Crimes' (2010) 43 Democratic Legal Studies [Minju Beophak] 317, 345; The National 
Assembly Committee on Legislation and Judiciary, A Theoretical Study of the Reform of the Prosecution 
Service (KNA, Seoul 2010), 148-149;No Seop Park. 'The Adoption of Plea Bargaining in Korea' (2008) 
20(1) Journal of Korean Criminal Law [Hyungsabeop Yeonku] 115, 115-116. 
184 ibid 115-116; Haeng Sem Kim op. cit. 345. 
185 The National Assembly Committee on Legislation and Judiciary, A Theoretical Study of the Reform of 
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However, such a proposal will further increase the prosecutorial power in the 
interrogation room by permitting the prosecutors to offer suspect inducements without 
limit, and consequently, increase the inequality between the prosecutors and the 
suspects. It is likely to bring about a rise in both the false confessions and wrongful 
convictions. In addition, if the plea bargaining is introduced in Korea, sentences as well 
as verdicts will be determined mostly by the prosecutors. The trial may be reduced to a 
meaningless process simply to confirm prosecutorial decisions. Particularly, as those 
decisions are made in the prosecutor's closed room, the right to an open trial cannot be 
d 186 properly protecte . 
It is essential that the prosecutor's promises of leniency to induce confessions be 
carefully reviewed by the court. At present, the trials are mainly based on the 
prosecutor's interview documents. The suspects are generally detained for a lengthy 
period for interrogation. The whole interrogation is carried out in the prosecutor's 
closed room without prop~r electronic recordings. Furthermore, the defence counsel do 
not participate in the interrogation and such participation is also often restricted by the 
prosecutors.187 Under these circumstances, if the prosecutors are legally permitted to 
provide the promises of leniency, the justice could not be guaranteed in the Korean 
criminal process. 
5.5. Protecting Vulnerable Interviewees 
Some types of individuals - i.e. the mentally handicapped, learning difficulties, and 
juveniles - need special protection because of their vulnerabilities to the pressures of 
interviews. 188 Empirical evidence has indicated that those people have unusual 
propensity to take on board suggestions from interrogators. 189 In other words, 
the Prosecution Service (KNA, Seoul 2010), 148; Haeng Sem Kim op. cit. 345. 
186 ibid 349-351. 
187 Hang Sem Kim stated that 'during the interrogation, most suspects do not have the assistance of 
defence lawyers in Korea. In particular, there are many limitations to their participation in questioning 
process.' See ibid 350; Ho Joong Lee. 'Criminal Procedure and Related Human Rights' (2006) 19 
Hanyang Law Journal 45, 49-54. 
188 Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook (John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd, 2003), 259-265 (In particular, according to Gudjonsson, 'The majority (64%) of the false 
confessors claimed to have made the false confession when under the age of 21, with the peak (51 %) 
being in the age group 16-20. This suggests that factors associated with youth make people particularly 
vulnerable to making false confessions.', 177); Steve U glow, Evidence: Text and Materials (2nd edn 
Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 802 182-183; Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice 
(3rd edn Oxford University Pr~ss, Oxford 2007) 172-175; Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and 
American Justice (Harvard Umv Pr, 2008), 312. 
189 White op. cit. 142; Gudjonsson, op. cit.; Steven A. Drizin and Richard A. Leo. 'The Problem of False 
Confessions in the Post-DNA World' (2004) 82 N C Law Rev 891. 
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vulnerable populations tend to give involuntary or unreliable statements readily due to 
the influence of coercion or inducement. 190 Thus, for the purpose of minimising such a 
risk, the criminal process needs to set up special safeguards, as seen in the PACE Code 
of Practice C: 
Although juveniles or people who are mentally disordered or otherwise mentally vulnerable 
are often capable of providing reliable evidence, they may, without knowing or wishing to 
do so, be particularly prone in certain circumstances to provide information that may be 
unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating. Special care should always be taken when 
questioning such a person, and the appropriate adult should be involved if there is any 
doubt about a person's age, mental state or capacity. Because of the risk of unreliable 
evidence it is also important to obtain corroboration of any facts admitted whenever 
possible. 191 
With vulnerable persons, one of the most important safeguards is the presence of 
appropriate adults. Appropriate adults generally playa role in advising the person being 
questioned and in observing whether or not the interview is being conducted properly 
and fairly. 192 
In Korea, the guardians and parents can be present at the interview by the request of 
the interviewees by considering the age, gender, nationality, or any other aspect of the 
suspect. 193 However, the prosecutors do not have the obligation to inform them of such 
a right. In addition, the prosecutor can exclude appropriate adults on the basis of the 
efficiency of investigation.194 Consequently, vulnerable suspects are often interviewed 
in the absence of their parents. 195 Indeed, under these circumstances, coercive tactics 
190 ibid 963-974. 
191 police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice C 2008 para II C (Emphasis added by the 
author) 
192 ibid para 1l.17. 
193 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act {Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 2 I December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 244-5 'A public prosecutor or a judicial police officer may, if a 
suspect under interrogation falls under ~y .ofthe follow~g subparagraphs, allow a person who has a 
reliable relationship with the suspect to Sit m company with the suspect, ex officio or upon receiving a 
tition from the suspect or his legal representative ... ' 
1: ibid art 244-5; The Rule for the Protection of Human Rights During the Investigation 2006 Instruction 
of the Ministry of Justice 556 art 37. 
19' As seen above, four suspects were all juveniles in Suwon homeless girl murder case. However, all of 
them were interrogated by the prosecutor in absence of appropriate adults including defence counsel. See 
n 129 above; In Taek Lim. 'Fa~se C~nfessions from V~lnerable Juvenil~s' (2010) (833) Hankyoreh 21 (In 
this Kwang-Myung case, twoJuven~les - one of them IS mentally handicapped - had been interviewed 
without the participation of appropnate adults and confessed to thefts that they did not commit.) 
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and inducements have led the suspects to give false confessions. 196 One defence 
counsel who had experienced such a case emphasised the importance of appropriate 
adults during the investigative interview: 
[DL2-IS2] Do you think it's possible for the juveniles to give false confessions in the 
presence of their parents? They wouldn't do so, ifthere're their parents beside them during 
the interview. They know their parents will protect them from the police and prosecutors. 
But, in my case, they confessed to murder they didn't commit. All of them were juveniles. 
Furthermore, they were all poor children. Most of them didn't have parents whom they 
could rely on. They told me that there was no one who helped them during the frightening 
interrogation. 
In order to protect the vulnerable in the interrogation room, a provIsion for 
guaranteeing the mandatory presence of appropriate adults should be established, as in 
PACECodeC: 
Ajuvenile or person who is mentally disordered or otherwise mentally vulnerable must not 
be interviewed regarding their involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal offence 
or offences, or asked to provide or sign a written statement under caution or record of 
interview, in the absence of the appropriate adult. 197 
The appropriate adult can give advice to the vulnerable person and monitor the 
interviewing process. In general, parents, guardians, social workers, or psychiatrists can 
. d It 198 act as appropnate a u s. 
However, mere presence is not sufficient to protect the vulnerable suspect. 199 
196 See nn 129 and 195 above. 
197 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Code of Practice C 2008 para 11.15 (For urgent interviews, a 
number ()f exceptions are articulated in the Code C - i.e. paragraphs 11.1, 11.18 to 20) 
198 PACE Code C of Practice specifically articulated the scope of appropriate adults: 'The appropriate 
adult' means, in the case of a: (a) juvenile: (i) the parent, guardian or, if the juvenile is in local authority 
or voluntary organisation care, or is otherwise being looked after under the Children Act 1989, a person 
representing that au.thority or organisation; (ii) a so.cial worke~ of a local authority; (iii) failing these, 
some other responsIble adult aged 18 or over who IS not a pohce officer or employed by the police. (b) 
person who is mentally disordered or mentally vulnerable: '" (iv) a relative, guardian or other person 
responsible for their care or custody;.(v) someo~e experienced in dealing with mentally disordered or 
mentally vulnerable people but who IS not a pohce officer or employed by the police; (vi) failing these, 
some other responsible adult aged 18 or over who is not a police officer or employed by the police. ' See 
ibid para 1.7. 
199 Hodgson and Pearce & Gudjo~s~on stated that ~~ ~ere pres~nce ~f an appropriate adult may playa 
role only in adding a degree oflegltlmacy and credlblhty to the mtervlew process at court. See Gisli H. 
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 
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Appropriate adults need to clearly understand their roles.2oo They must know what kind 
of advice they need to provide and how they can evaluate the fairness of interview.2°1 
In order to do so, specific guidelines and training courses for appropriate adults should 
be set up.202 In addition, they need to be allowed to privately consult with the detainee 
at any time?03 This may help the vulnerable to realise their legal rights, to understand 
questions from investigators, and to give consistent answers. 204 Subsequently, 
appropriate adults can ensure that the investigative interview is conducted properly and 
fairly. 
6. Conclusion 
The interview is one of the most important investigative stages as it contributes to both 
reorganise the investigator's statements of the accused offence and construct a case on 
the basis of the accounts from the suspects, witnesses, and victims. In particular, for the 
purpose of constructing a case, obtaining a confession is regarded as a significant factor. 
The stress on obtaining a confession can lead interviewers to resort to various 
interrogative methods ranging from torture to trickery. However, while such tactics can 
produce reliable confessions, they lead to untrustworthy self-incriminating statements 
leading to wrongful convictions. 
False confessions resulting from the pressure of the interrogation have become one 
of the main concerns in the criminal justice systems because miscarriages of justice play 
a role in reducing the public trust in the criminal process. Thus, each jurisdiction has set 
up procedural safeguards to protect the suspects against false confessions. The drafters 
of the KCPA also realised this problem. However, their method was different from other 
jurisdictions, permitting the prosecutor's interview records to be accepted as 
presumptive evidence with the aim of controlling coercive questioning tactics by the 
police. 
2003),262; Jacqueline Hodgson. 'Vulnerable Suspects and the Appropriate Adult' (1997) Crim. L. R. 785, 
795. 
200 In tenns of passive role ofappropriate adults, Sanders and Young illustrated that 'Many appropriate 
adults misunderstand what is happening, fail to realise how an apparently innocent series of questions and 
answers can be incriminating, and are just as intimidated as the suspects.' See Andrew Sanders and 
Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 174. 
201 Gudjonsson op. cit. 262. 
202 For the role confusion of untrained social workers acting as an appropriate adult, see Jacqueline 
Hodgson. 'Vulnerable Suspects and the Appropriate Adult' (1997) Crim. L. R. 785, 791. 
203 PACE Code of Practice C 2008 para 3.18. 
204 Gudjonsson op. cit. 
245 
Chapter 6 The Prosecutor s Interview with Suspects 
However, this attempt failed as it led to coercive methods being used in the 
prosecutor's interview. Prosecutors' written interview records cannot help to regulate 
this as they provide the court with quite limited and skewed information. The courts 
tend to accept prosecutorial interview records without particular questioning. At the 
same time, this lack of transparency has prevented practices in the interrogation room 
from being appropriately monitored by the third parties. In addition, such attempt has 
caused a number of structural deformities: role ambiguity between the prosecution 
service and the police, a lack of sense of ownership of the police in investigation, and an 
inefficient double interviewing structure. 
The Korean criminal justice system should amend the evidentiary impact of the 
prosecutorial interview records. Instead, it should establish a number of appropriate 
safeguards to protect the suspects against false confessions. Firstly, the right to counsel 
should be guaranteed at the pre-trial stage. The defence counsel can playa major role in 
safeguarding the suspects by monitoring the interrogation process and providing 
appropriate legal advice. Secondly, electronic recordings would bring about significant 
benefits to the Korean system. Interviews being recorded by the police can be closely 
scrutinised by the prosecutors as well as the courts, and selectively admitted into 
evidence. The courts can make an informed judgement and the prosecution service may 
play a role in filtering the police investigation. However, as the increased role of 
defence counsel and the electronic recording are not perfect methods to protect the 
suspects, the system should be set up additional safeguards such as the limitation to the 
length of interrogation, prohibition of inducements, and the protection of the vulnerable 
suspects. 
Due to unanticipated distortions in the criminal process, the current Korean system 
of criminal justice has encountered difficulties in making progress in terms of protecting 
human rights and while at the same time maintaining efficiency. The right to a fair trial 
is just an expression in law, not in practice. In order to move forward to a more 
developed stage which guarantees the right to a fair trial, the Korean law must address 
these issues. 
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Chapter 7 The Prosecutorial Investigation and Its 
Impacts 
1. Introduction 
The focus in the Korean criminal justice system on the interview by the prosecutors 
does not only limit the defendant's right to a fair trial, but it also, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, transforms the prosecution service into an investigation agency. As a result. 
the investigation and prosecution are conducted by one actor in Korea. Prosecutors. who 
are in charge of the prosecution, investigate the crime. This chapter explores the impact 
of the prosecutorial investigation. 
The functional overlap, as discussed in Chapter 1, tends to emphasise crime control 
values in Korea. The prosecutor's role increases efficiency as it builds a factory 
conveyer belt without significant obstacles. However, considering the due process 
model, such prosecutorial involvement can cause three problems. I Firstly, the 
prosecutors' direct involvement in investigation may weaken their quasi-judicial role 
because they focus their attention on the achievement of a conviction from the 
beginning of investigation. Secondly, prosecutorial investigation may abrogate the 
filtering role of the prosecution service. A significant safeguard disappears in the 
criminal process. Finally, information and evidence are exclusively controlled by the 
prosecutors. Consequently, this increases the inequality of arms between the state and 
individuals. These problems are exacerbated where there is no proper monitoring 
mechanism. 
2. Prosecutor's Objectivity in Investigations 
Direct investigation hinders prosecutors in their quest for objectivity. Prosecutors, as 
seen in Chapter 3, have two contrary roles: a minister of justice and an advocate. In 
I Herbert L. Packer, The Limits o/the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. 1968) 
385,163-173. 
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most countries, research suggests that they put the emphasis on their adversarial role? 
Felkenes described this as 'conviction psychology' which indicates 'the set of attitudes 
held by the prosecutor tending to buttress his emphasis on conviction'. 3 
The prosecutors generally assume the guilt of the defendants from the beginning of 
the prosecution process because they believe only the guilty person is charged.4 They 
feel an obligation, as a guardian of the public interest, to prove the guilt of the 
defendants as well as send criminals to prison. According to Felkenes' study, most 
prosecutors consider convicting the charged person as more important than releasing an 
innocent person. For instance, one deputy district prosecutor who joined his study stated 
that 'my major concern is to see that the guilty are convicted and receive a proper 
. hm t'S punlS en. 
This can also be seen in the Korean prosecution service. Every year, the prosecutor 
general presents the aims of the Public Prosecutors' Office. The research on those aims 
for the last six years shows that the Korean prosecution service has a strong tendency to 
seek conviction. For example, Sung-Nam Shin, the prosecutor general in 2002, stated: 
The public prosecutors have to investigate the corruption cases thoroughly and punish the 
guilty persons. In particular, immoral entrepreneurs must be investigated completely and 
punished in order to help our country to be more competitive in the world market. 
Furthermore, their illegal money must be conflscated.6 
This approach can also be seen subsequent years (2003-2009), where the main interest 
of the Korean prosecution service was conviction and punishment. 
7 
This is no different 
from other countries. However, unlike other jurisdictions, the Korean prosecution 
service stresses thorough investigation by prosecutors. This may make the impact of 
2 George T. Felkenes. 'Prosecutor: A Look at Reality' (1975) 7 Sw.UL Rev. 98, 112; Walter W. Jr Steele. 
'Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline' (1984) 38 SMU Law Review 965, 982; Abbe Smith. 
'Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor' (2000) 14 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 355, 
380-384; Heather Schoenfeld. 'Violated Trust: Conceptualizing Prosecutorial Misconduct' (2005) 21(3) J 
Contemp Crim Justice 250,255; Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual 
Framework' (1988) 15 Am J Crim Law 197, 198. 
3 The 'conviction psychology' is often called as 'a tendency to behave overzealously'. See ibid 198; 
Felkenes op. cit. 110. 
4 ibid 112; Schoenfeld op. cit. 257-258 (Schoenfeld stated that 'prosecutors could neutralize misconduct 
because they believe they are prosecuting guilty defendants. '); Susan Bandes. 'Loyalty to One's 
Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision' (2006) 49(2) Howard Law J 475, 491. 
5 Felkenes op. cit. 
6 Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, The Annual Report of the Public Prosecutors' Office in 2002 
fKeomchalyeongam] (KSPO, Seoul 2003), 1345. 
~. Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, The Annual Report of the Public Prosecution Service (KSPO, 
Seoul 2004-2010) Appendix ch 2-4; Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System 
(2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 530. 
248 
Chapter 7 Prosecutoriallnvestigation: Functional Overlap and Its Impacts 
conviction mentality more significant. 
2.1. The Conviction Mentality in Korea 
The conviction mentality can be influenced by both external and internal elements. 
There are a number of studies investigating the causes. Firstly, because of the 'score-
keeping mentality', the prosecutors generally place emphasis on procuring convictions.s 
This tendency is encountered by the influence of external elements such as institutional, 
professional, and political factors.9 In particular, as Fisher noted, institutional pressure 
plays a significant role in leading the prosecutors to focus on conviction rate. This 
pressure stems from the nature of agencies, the adversarial system, and professional 
'b'l' 10 responsl 1 Ity. 
Secondly, the public prosecutor, as a minister of justice, has a responsibility that they 
have to seek justice and that guilty persons cannot avoid punishment. This leads them to 
concentrate on obtaining a conviction. II Smith argued that 'Too often prosecutors 
believe that they and only they know what justice is.' The prosecutors regard doing 
justice as punishing guilty persons instead of protecting innocent defendants. 12 
Finally, cognitive process can have an impact on the prosecutor's decisions. 13 As 
Bandes suggested, people have a tendency to follow their beliefs. Likewise, prosecutors 
readily accept the evidence which is compatible with their beliefs. 14 This section 
8 ibid 109-110; C. Ferguson-Gilbert. 'It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play the Game: 
Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors' (200 I) 38 California Western Law 
Review 283, 289-292. 
9 Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J 
Crim Law 197, 197; Kenneth Bresler. 'I Never Lost a Trial: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal 
Convictions' (1995) 9 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 537,537; Bennett L. Gershman. 'Prosecutor's 
Duty to Truth' (2000~ 14 ibid 309,30:; Daniel S. Medwed. ':Ine ~eal Deal: P~osecutorial Resistance to 
Post-Conviction ClaIms of Innocence (2004) 84 Boston UOIverslty Law ReVIew 125, 125. 
10 Fisher op. cit. 204-215. 
II See Randolph N. Jonakait. 'The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct' (1987) 23(6) Crim Law Bull 18 
quoted from Heather Schoenfeld. 'Violated Trust: Conceptualizing Prosecutorial Misconduct' (200S) 21(3) 
J Contemp Crim Justice 250, 252. 
12 Abbe Smith. 'Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor' (2000) 14 Georgetown Journal of 
Legal Ethics 355, 378. 
13 Susan Bandes. 'Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision' (2006) 49(2) Howard 
Law J 475;Dianne L. Martin. 'Lessons about Justice from the Laboratory of Wrongful Convictions: 
Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence' (2001) 70 UMKC Law Review 
847;Keith A. Findley and Michael S. Scott. 'The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
Cases' (2006) 2 Wis Law Rev 291 ;Karl Ask and par Anders Granhag. 'Motivational Bias in Criminal 
Investigators' Judgments, of Witness ~eliability' ~2007) 37.(3) J Appl Soc Psychol561 ;James McCloskey. 
'Convicting the Innocent (1989) 8 CnmJust.Ethlcs 2;Cralg A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper and Lee Ross. 
'Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information' 
(1980) 39(6) J Pers Soc Psychol 1037. 
14 Bandes op. cit. 492. 
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explores the conviction mentality in Korea by considering two aspects: conviction as a 
measurement of success and the nature of the adversarial role. 
2.1.1. Conviction as a Measurement of Success 
A conviction seems to be an effective way to measure the success of prosecutors. IS As 
Fisher suggested, the elements influencing such a measurement can be categorised into 
two groups: external and internal indices. 16 The media, victims, and the police are the 
external factors. 17 Indeed, the prosecutors improve their reputation when they strictly 
pursue criminals than when they release the accused by finding exonerating evidence. 18 
On the other hand, there is an internal culture which regards convictions as an 
indicator of job performance. 19 Medwed identified that 'prosecutors with the highest 
conviction rates (and, thus, reputations as the best performers) stand the greatest chance 
for advancement internally. ,20 Even though seeking justice is an important aim of the 
prosecutors, it may not be a measure of their professional competence. In order to gain a 
good reputation, they need 'heavy' convictions and sentences?1 
Due to such internal and external pressures, the Korean prosecutors show a strong 
tendency towards obtaining a conviction: 
[PP3-/S] Indeed, conviction is very important to the prosecutors. For example, in cases the 
charged persons are found not guilty in court, the prosecutors who take charge of the cases 
are absolutely criticised by the managers. Then, they can't take up important cases again 
because the managers don't trust them anymore. 
On the contrary, an acquittal is in general regarded as a mistake. The Korean Supreme 
U Albert W. Alschuler. 'Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining' (1968) 36 U.Chi.L.Rev. SO, 106; Stanley Z. 
Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J Crim Law 197, 
205' Daniel S. Medwed. 'The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of 
Inn~cence' (2004) 84 Boston University Law Review 125, 134; George T. Felkenes. 'Prosecutor: A Look 
at Reality' (1975) 7 Sw.UL Rev. 98, 114-115; Judith A. Goldberg and David M. Siege\. 'The Ethical 
Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims ofInnocence' (2001) 38 California 
Western Law Review 389, 409. 
16 Fisher op. cit. 205. 
17 Jong Gu Kim, a former minister of justice an~ ~ chie~ of~e prosec~tors, stated that 'the media and the 
victims largely influence the prosecutors to begm mvestlgatlon of partIcular cases and to punish the 
suspects.' See Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, 
Seoul 2004), 535. 
18 ibid 535. 
19 Felkenes op. cit. 114; Fisher op. cit. 206; Medwed op. cit. 134-135. 
20 ibid 134-135; Felkenes op. cit. 112; Martin H. Belsky. 'On Becoming and Being a Prosecutor' (1983) 
78 Northwestern University Law Review 1485, 1492. 
21 Fisher op. cit. 206. 
250 
Chapter 7 Prosecutoriallnvestigation: Functional Overlap and Its Impacts 
Prosecutors' Office published a special news article in relation to the conviction rate in 
2008. This article introduced the Dae-Gu Seo-Bu Prosecutors' Office as one of the best 
offices because the office achieved one-hundred per cent of conviction rate in 2007.22 
Sang H. Lee, a prosecutor in this office, said that 'There was no acquittal for the last 
year. This achievement indicates that there was no mistake at all in the prosecutor's 
decisions. ,23 This statement shows different perspectives between the conviction and 
acquittal. The conviction is considered as a successful prosecutorial performance, 
whereas the acquittal is treated as a failure.24 Conviction rates, as Alschuler suggested, 
'seem to most prosecutors a tangible measure of their success. ,25 
2.1.2. The Nature of the Adversarial Role 
The adversarial role itself creates a vigorous pressure which forces prosecutors to focus 
on conviction and punishment. 26 Such a pressure, as Fisher stated, 'can lead the 
prosecutor to behave over zealously, using improper means to gain a conviction or 
ignoring evidence of innocence or mitigation. ,27 
For instance, in 2003, a public prosecutor of In-Chon Public Prosecutors' Office 
summoned a witness to his office who had testified to a defendant's innocence in court. 
He interrogated this witness and obtained a statement which is different from his 
testimony in court. The prosecutor submitted this account as evidence to prove gUilt. 28 
In this case, the prosecutor tried to undermine the evidence which had been 
advantageous to the defendant. In other words, he ignored his quasi-judicial role, and 
instead, used his adversarial role in order to obtain a conviction. 
22 Dae-Gu Seo-Bu Prosecutors' Office prosecuted 24,966 criminal cases in 2007 and all of them were 
convicted. The news article did not include the number of the cases. Therefore, the author found the 
statistics with reference to the Annual Report of the Public Prosecution Service {Gum-Chal run-Gam] See 
Korean Supreme Prosecutors' Office, The Annual Report of the Public Prosecutors' Office in 2007 
fKeomchalyeongamj (KSPO, Seoul 2008), 712. 
h JS Kim and others. 'The New Record of the Dae-Gu Seo-Bu Prosecutors' Office' News-Pros (1 
February 2008). 
24 George T. Felkenes. 'Prosecutor: A Look at Reality' (1975) 7 Sw.VL Rev. 98, 114-115; Daniel S. 
Medwed. 'The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence' (2004) 84 
Boston University Law Review 125, 134-136; C. Ferguson-Gilbert. 'It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, 
It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors' 
(2001) 38 California Western Law Review 283, 289. 
25 Albert W. Alschuler. 'Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining' (1968) 36 V.ChLL.Rev. 50, 106. 
26 Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J 
Crim Law 197,208; Susan Bandes. 'Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision' 
(2006) 49(2) Howard Law J 475, 488-490. 
27 Fisher op. cit. 208. 
28 2003 DO 7482 (2004) 26 March 2004 (Korean Supreme Court) (The Supreme Court ruled that 'the 
testimony in court takes priority over the statements which are written by the prosecutors in their office.') 
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Felkenes and Fisher illustrated this characteristic differently. Felkenes focused on 
the conflict of different roles - judicial and advocate, whereas Fisher found the cause in 
the nature of the adversary system. 29 According to the Felkenes's argument, the 
prosecutor's roles as a minister of justice and an advocate conflict with each other 
. I 30 contmuous y: 
On the one hand he must be the aggressive state's advocate demanding strict compliance 
with state law, while on the other hand he is the quasi-judicial officer of the court seeking 
justice even for those he would prosecute. Wrestling with this perspective of himself creates 
ambivalence on the part of the prosecutor. He is tom between his image as a powerful, 
d d ti 
. . 31 
callous attorney an a crusa er or Justice. 
This conflict often causes chaos, and subsequently, leads prosecutors to lose their 
objectivity.32 They choose their adversarial role rather than the quasi-judicial because 
the conviction rate is considered as an important measurement to evaluate their job 
performance.33 Unlike Felkenes's study, Fisher argues that the adversary system itself 
makes prosecutors focus on their adversarial role. 34 To support this argument, he 
examined three aspects of the adversary system. 
First, the public prosecutors have a role to play in attacking the defendant's 
credibility in the adversary system. Therefore, they do not have many opportunities to 
understand defendants as well as their personal and social circumstances. The 
prosecutors are inevitably closer to the persons who pressure them to punish the 
defendant, for instance, the victims, police officers, and civilian witnesses as opposed to 
defendants and their witnesses. 
Second, prosecutors feel pressure to win as an advocate of the victim and a 
representative of 'the entire law enforcement subculture.' 3S Fisher described this 
tendency as follows: 
29 George T. Felkenes. 'Prosecutor: A Look at Reality' (1975) 7 Sw.UL Rev. 98; Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In 
Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J Crim Law 197. 
30 Bandes described this conflict as 'a prosecutor's conflicting 10yalties ... between the duty to do justice 
and the duty to act as a zealous advocate.' See Susan Bandes. 'Loyalty to One's Convictions: The 
Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision' (2006) 49(2) Howard Law J 475, 485. 
31 Felkenes op. cit. 118. 
32 ibid 119; Bandes op. cit. 483-485. 
33 Felkenes op. cit. 119. 
34 Fisher op. cit. 208; Bandes o~. cit. 488-49~. , . 
3' ibid 209 (Fisher stated that thiS subculture mcludes prosecution (from peers and superiors to clerks 
and secretaries), police, probation, court officers, newspaper reporters, and even sympathetic judges. ') 
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A prosecutor leaving the courtroom after winning a guilty verdict or stiff sentence in an 
important case will likely receive warm congratulations from members of this network. 
One who dismisses charges against a factually gUilty defendant because of insufficient 
evidence or some other imperative of justice will encounter, at best, condolences for her 
loss. Such losses, like wins, are more than personal to the prosecutor; they are experienced 
I . ty36 as osses to soc Ie . 
Such a view is obviously similar to the idea which regards the conviction rate as a 
measurement of success. 37 Where the prosecutors achieve a conviction, they 
receive plaudits both externally and internally. In contrast, an acquittal is regarded 
as a failure. However, there is a difference between those two perspectives. The 
former focuses on the adversarial role of the prosecutor, whereas the latter puts 
emphasis on the conviction itself. 
Finally, the enthusiasm of the defence counsel can also lead to losing their 
objectivity. 38 Defence counsel use all 'truth-defeating' tactics to protect 
defendants. 39 For instance, they examine a witness in order to damage the 
reliability and do not disclose the evidence which is adverse to the defendant.40 
Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to expect prosecutors to behave as an 
impartial fighter. The 'In-Chon' case, as seen above, is a good example of this 
argument. In that case, nobody may know whether or not the original testimony of 
the witness in court is true. However, it is obvious that the prosecutor lost his 
objectivity as a minister of justice and used an inappropriate method in order to 
procure a conviction. 
In short, the prosecutors have difficulty in striking a balance between two roles: 
quasi-judicial and adversarial. However, they readily choose the adversarial role 
because the conviction is an important indicator of their job performance. 
Moreover, the nature of the adversarial role leads the prosecutors to oppose the 
36 ibid 210. 
37 Albert W. Alschuler. 'Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining' (1968) 36 U.Chi.L.Rev. 50, 106; Stanley Z. 
Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J Crim Law 197, 
205' Daniel S. Medwed. 'The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of 
Inn~cence' (2004) 84 Boston University Law Review 125, 134; George T. Felkenes. 'Prosecutor: A Look 
at Reality' (1975) 7 Sw.UL ~ev. 98,114-11.5; Judith A. ?o~dberg ~d David M. Siege\. 'The Ethical 
Obligations of Prosecutors 10 Cases InvolvlOg PostconvlctlOn Claims ofInnocence' (2001) 38 California 
Western Law Review 389, 409. 
38 Fisher op. cit. 210-211. 
39 ibid' Murray L. Schwartz. 'Zeal of the Civil Advocate' (1983) Law & Social Inquiry 543,549-550. 
40 ibid' 549-550; David Luban. 'Calm~ng the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal 
Ethics' (1981) 40 Maryland Law ReView 451, 458 (Luban states that the evidence which is detrimental to 
the defendant can be the client's secrets which the defence counsel should keep.) 
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defendants rather than to protect their rights. 
2.2. The Impact of the Investigative Prosecutors on 'Conviction 
Mentality' 
Prosecutors tend more toward a 'conviction mentality' when they conduct investigations 
on their own initiatives. Jong-Gu Kim argued that 'Korean public prosecutors generally 
receive the best reputation when they discover high profile corruption cases, investigate 
them, and achieve a conviction. ,41 This indicates an important fact that the 'conviction 
mentality', unlike other jurisdictions, can affect prosecutors from the beginning of the 
investigation rather than at the later stage of the prosecution. The prosecutors seek to 
construct a case from the start even when they have insufficient information. According 
to the description of investigation by Delmas-Marty, when the prosecutors 'gather proof 
of the crime and identify the perpetrator', they come to have a passion to achieve a 
. • 42 
conVIctIOn. 
Whereas the police construct a case for the prosecution, the Korean prosecutors 
investigate a case with the goal of conviction.43 The prosecutors try to gather evidence 
which is useful to prove the defendant's guilt from the beginning. In particular, they use 
several methods in order to gain confessions and information from the suspects and 
witnesses. These tactics include inducements, threat and even torture. 
Case examples, as noted in detail in Chapter 6, show such abuse very well. One 
suspect was tortured to death in the prosecutor's interview room. In another case, the 
prosecutor threatened a suspect to lie before judges. For the prosecutor who has 
conviction mentality, the vulnerabilities of the suspects were not a significant factor to 
consider. Rather, he tried to use them in order to obtain a confession. Thus, in 2008, four 
juveniles were forced to make false confessions by the prosecutor without the 
participation of the appropriate adults. Defence counsel in this case stated that the 
prosecutor lost his objectivity because of his passion to achieve a conviction which 
could give him fame: 
41 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 
531. 
42 Mark A. Summers (tr), Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Criminal Process and Human Rights: Toward a 
European Consciousness (M~inus Nijhoff ~blishers, 19~5)'.1 O. 
43 McConville suggested that case construction by the pohce IS generally (although not invariably) 
geared towards producing sn:ong cases - that is, convi~tions.' H~wever, the e~nviction as an aim will be 
more appropriate to the pubbc prosecut?r than ~e pohee. See Mike MeConvtlle, Andrew Sanders and 
Roger Leng, The Casefor the ProsecutIOn: Police Suspects and the Construction of Criminality 
(Routledge, London 1991) 227, 148-172. 
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[DL2-IS2] In the Suwon homeless girl murder case, the prosecutor provided the reporters 
from the newspapers and TV with the results of the investigation. He appeared even on TV 
programmes. The suspects were all innocent juveniles. They were threatened and induced 
to falsely confess to murder without appropriate assistance from the defence counsel and 
even their parents. Nevertheless, he publicized that he got the real criminals whom the 
police had missed. He became a hero by the media: 'An almost forgotten murder case was 
solved by the capable prosecutor.' ". But, the suspects became an infamous criminal after 
this wrongful investigation and prosecution by the prosecutors. I don't know the 
personalities of this prosecutor. But, I am certain he didn't look at the case with objectivity 
because of his ambition offame. 
Prosecutors in general focus on obtaining a conviction. Because of this, where they 
also investigate, they look towards a conviction from even before they have sufficient 
evidence to charge. That is to say, the decision to prosecute is already made when they 
begin to conduct an investigation. Furthermore, they often use unethical or even illegal 
methods in order to complete their goals. In this situation, it is not possible to hope the 
prosecutors to perform a quasi-judicial role with objectivity: 
[DL3-/S] I've never seen the prosecutors serving as a quasi-judicial officer, who protects 
the benefits of defendants. I have to say that all prosecutors work only to prove the 
defendant'S guilt. We shouldn't expect the Korean prosecutors to consider the interest of 
defendants. 
[P03-/S] Investigation agencies including the prosecution service in Korea tend to infringe 
the defendant's rights. How can the Korean prosecutors protect suspects? The prosecutors 
themselves work as an interrogator. It's very ridiculous to expect the prosecutors to protect 
defendants in their interrogation room and in court. 
[JI-IM] The quasi-judicial role of the Korean prosecutors is the expression only in the book. 
They don't consider the defendant's benefits at all because they are investigators rather than 
prosecutors. Only the defence counsel can work for defendants. 
3. A Defect in Filter Mechanism 
Prosecutorial investigation also causes a defect in the filter mechanism in the criminal 
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process. One of the significant functions of the public prosecution service, as Professor 
Uglow stated, is to review the investigations independently as a 'second filter'. 44 
However, the prosecutor's direct involvement in the investigation can result in a faulty 
situation in which no independent filter exists to screen investigations. In particular, 
given the impact of tunnel vision, the separation of the function of investigation and 
prosecution must be a significant element to protect defendants. 
Unlike the conviction mentality, 'tunnel vision' is based on unintentional cognitive 
bias. The conviction mentality leads prosecutors to focus on conviction intentionally, 
whereas the prosecutors can make a wrongful decision without such intention as a result 
of their tunnel vision. 
3.1. Tunnel Vision in the Criminal Process 
Tunnel vision technically refers to physical vision which focuses on the central part of 
the objective while excluding peripheral fields.4s This can be used as a metaphor to 
describe a natural human tendency to focus on a single desired objective excluding all 
else. In the criminal justice system, tunnel vision has been generally used to refer to 
investigator's tendency only to focus their attention on the evidence which is necessary 
to prove the guilt. 46 Martin defined tunnel vision as 'a compendium of common 
heuristics and logical fallacies' and suggested that 'Investigators focus on a suspect, 
44 Steve Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), 19S-196(Professor Uglow 
stated that 'The prosecutor's first action is to review the police case, not simply to decide whether to take 
court action but also to confirm the nature and level of the charge against the accused and whether the 
mode of trial is appropriate. ') 
4S The term 'tunnel vision' is not only used in the legal field, but also in different research works. For 
instance, in the medical field, tunnel vision is used to refer to the patients with retinitis pigmentosa (RP). 
These patients suffer from narrowing of visual fields (tunnel vision). For the patients, special glasses have 
been developed in order to expand the vision. See Arthur B. McKie and others. 'Mutations in the pre-
mRNA splicing factor gene PRPC8 in autosomal dominant retinitis pigmentosa (RPI3)' (2001) 10(15) 
Hum Mol Genet 1555. 
In the website visibility research, tunnel vision is used to describe the phenomenon which occurs 
when 'Web site users get too familiar with the content and layout of frequently visited Web sites.' This 
phenomenon is 'one of the main visibility concerns facing information delivery and knowledge exchange 
through Web sites' . See Rami N. Hasan and M. H. Samadzadeh. 'A Study of Tunnel Vision and Rotation 
as Aspects of Web Site Visibility' (International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and 
Computing ITCC, 2005) <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org!xpls/abs all.jsp?amumber= 1425194> 
In addition, Cao and Nijholt transplanted this phenomenon into the crisis management field. They 
Suggested that 'Under stress due to info~ation ~verload ~nd a lac~ of time, crisis managers tend to rely 
on standard operating ?r?ce~ures an~ th~lr pre.vlo~ expertences Without re-examination ... Correct but 
ambiguous or contradlctmg mformatlOn IS easIly discarded. We call the above phenomena 'tunnel vision". 
See Yujia Cao and Anton Nijholt. 'Modality Planning for Preventing Tunnel Vision in Crisis Management' 
(Proc. of the AISB Symp. on Multi~odal Output Generation (MaG) 2008). 
46 Richard A. Leo and Deborah DaVIS. 'From False Confession to Wrongful Conviction: Seven 
psychological Processes' (2009) Journal of Psychiatry and Law 22. 
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select and filter the evidence that will "build a case" for conviction, while ignoring or 
suppressing evidence that points away from gUilt. ,47 In other words, all information 
which is consistent with their belief is regarded as relevant and probative. However, the 
evidence which is inconsistent with their conclusion is overlooked and discredited.48 
All human beings are vulnerable to tunnel vision. All professionals in the criminal 
justice system will have difficulty in avoiding unintentional mistakes because of this: 
[P03-ISI] Investigators can have a bias even with a very worthless statement or petty 
evidence. Let me introduce a case that I experienced. When I investigated a robbery a few 
years ago, I got one suspect. His appearance was very similar to the description of the 
victim. Furthermore, five million Won (about GBP 2,500) was paid in his bank account at 
the very next day of the crime. The amount of money was the same as the victim's. So, all 
of my team members came to believe that he is the real criminal. We coercively 
interrogated him for a long time. But, he was innocent. Fortunately, he could prove the 
source of the money. It was our mistake. But, if there had been no one who could prove the 
source of his money, the result would have been different. It's very awful. Any investigator 
can make this kind of mistake. 
Tunnel VISIon can inevitably lead investigators, prosecutors, defence lawyers, and 
judges to focus on a particular conclusion. As Raeder suggested, 'Once a hypothesis is 
selected, evidence that does not fit may be ignored. ,49 
In terms of wrongful convictions, tunnel vision is a well-known phenomenon. 50 
According to Findley and Scott, 'tunnel vision' has a role to play in most wrongful 
convictions and these facts can be noted in the official inquires. S I The Philips 
Commission on Criminal Procedure in England and Wales stated that 'A police officer 
who carries out an investigation, inevitably and properly, forms a view as to the guilt of 
the suspect. Having done so, without any kind of improper motive, he may be inclined 
to shut his mind to other evidence telling against the guilt of the suspect or to 
overestimate the strength of the evidence he has assembled.' S2 
47 Dianne L. Martin. 'Lessons about Justice from the Laboratory of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, 
the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence' (2001) 70 UMKC Law Review 847, 848. 
48 Keith A. Findley and Michael S. Scott. 'The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases' 
(2006) 2 Wis Law Rev 291, 292. . . 
49 Myrna Raeder. 'What D.oes Innocence Have to Do WIth It? A Commentary on Wrongful Convictions 
and Rationality' (2003) Mlch S! L Rev 1315, 1327. 
so ibid; Findley and Scott op. CIt. 293 
51 'b'd 
52 ~:e 'Sir Cyril Phillips, 'The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: Report' HMSO (Cmnd 8092, 
London) para 6.24. 
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In the USA and Canada, there are also official reports which referred to tunnel vision 
and its effect. For example, in the USA, after examining thirteen wrongful convictions 
which were sentenced to death, Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment 
concluded that tunnel vision pervasively influences the decision process in the criminal 
., t S3 JustIce sys em: 
The Commission has unanimously recommended that law enforcement agencies take steps 
to avoid "tunnel vision," where the belief that a particular suspect has committed a crime 
often obviates an objective evaluation of whether there might be others who are actually 
'1 S4 gut ty. 
The Canadian official inquiry dealing with the wrongful conviction of Thomas 
Sophonow in Manitoba also highlighted the impact of 'tunnel vision,.55 Mr Sophonow 
was convicted of murdering 16 year-old Barbara Stoppel in 1982. After three-year 
imprisonment, the Manitoba Court of Appeals quashed the conviction. However, despite 
this judgment, his co-workers and neighbours still suspected him. He struggled to seek 
exoneration for 15 years. At last, in 2000, the Winnipeg Police Service officially 
announced that another suspect had been identified through the two-year re-
investigation and Mr Sophonow was not responsible for the murder. Attorney General 
of Manitoba made an apology to him, and stated that 'he had endured three trials and 
two appeals, and spent 45 months in jail for an offence he did not commit. ' 
The Inquiry investigating this case also regarded tunnel vision as one of the 
elements which can lead the professionals in the criminal justice system to make 
wrongful decisions. S6 In particular, the report noted that the Winnipeg police 
investigators ignored a potential suspect due to this: 
Tunnel Vision is insidious. It can affect an officer or, indeed, anyone involved in the 
administration of justice with sometimes tragic results. It results in the officer becoming so 
focussed upon an individual or incident that no other person or incident registers in the 
officer's thoughts. Thus, tunnel vision can result in the elimination of other suspects who 
'3 Illinois. Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, Report of the Governor's Commission on 
Capital Punishment (State of Illinois, Springfield, Ill. 2002), 20. 
54 ibid. 
55 The Commission of Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow, 'Thomas Sophonow Inquiry Report' The 
Government of Manitoba < 
h1W:llwww.gov.mb.caljustice/publicationslsophonow/recommendations/english.html#tunnel> Accessed 
on 23 March 2011. 
56 ibid. 
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should be investigated. Equally, events which could lead to other suspects are eliminated 
from the officer's thinking. Anyone, police officer, counselor judge can become infected by 
th
o • 57 IS VIrUS. 
In short, tunnel vision refers to a tendency to focus on certain suspects and evidence 
which is helpful to prove the guilt. In particular, it can affect every person involved in 
the criminal justice system because, as we shall see later, it stems from the cognitive 
process of human beings.58 For similar reason, the phenomenon of tunnel vision can be 
observed in most jurisdictions. 
3.2. Elements Leading to Thnnel Vision 
There is considerable research on 'tunnel vision' in criminal justice system. Legal 
researchers draw their attention to the 'information processing and behavioural biases 
leading a person to selectively attend to, seek out, produce, and interpret evidence', 
whereas cognitive scholars tend to limit the definition of the tunnel vision to the 'focus 
of attention.' 59 For instance, Safer and others defined 'tunnel vision' as 'a highly 
restricted narrowing of attention to certain aspects of a situation. ,60 They suggest that a 
traumatic situation makes persons focus only on part of the whole picture. On the 
contrary, in a neutral situation, they extend their attention to the broad scene.61 Of the 
legal researchers, Burke explores several aspects of the cognitive bias leading the legal 
professionals to have tunnel vision: confirmation bias, selective information processing, 
and belief perseverance. 62 
First, confirmation bias is the tendency to both seek and interpret evidence in order 
57 ibid; Illinois. Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, Report o/the Governor's Commission on 
Capital Punishment (State of Illinois, Springfield, Ill. 2002), 21. 
58 Burke states that the prosecutors are 'irrational because they are human, and all human decision makers 
share a common set of information-processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality.' See Alafair 
S. Burke. 'Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science' (2006) 47(5) 
William and Mary Law Review 1587, 1590-1591; Richard A. Leo and Deborah Davis. 'From False 
Confession to Wrongful Conviction: Seven Psychological Processes' (2009) Journal of Psychiatry and 
Law 2. 
S9 ibid 22. 
60 Martin A. Safer and others. 'Tunnel Memory for Traumatic Events' (1998) 12(2) Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 99. 
61 ibid. 
62 Burke op. cit. 1593 (Burke classified the features into four categories: confinnation bias, selective 
information processing, belie~ ~erse~erance, ~d the avoidance of c?gnitive dissonance. However, in this 
paper, 'the avoidance of cogmtlve dissonance IS excluded because It may cause unnecessarily additional 
explanation. ) 
259 
Chapter 7 Prosecutorial Investigation: Functional Overlap and Its Impacts 
to confirm existing beliefs, expectations, or theories.63 Wason and Johnson-Laird note 
that this bias arises from the people's natural tendency to prefer information confirming 
their hypothesis as opposed to disconfirming information.64 Nickerson states that a case 
is unwittingly built in a biased way in the criminal process. He defines this tendency as 
'confirmation bias' which refers to 'unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of 
evidence. ,65 In particular, he emphasises the unintentional involvement in case-building. 
Accordingly, the legal professionals perceive, accept, or interpret the evidence in a 
biased way without intention or even not knowing what they are doing.66 
Leo and Davis suggest that confirmation bias pervasively influences 'tunnel 
vision'. 67 Investigators have a tendency to accept evidence which supports their 
'existing beliefs, perceptions, and expectations and to avoid or reject evidence that does 
not. ,68 Once the investigators fix upon a suspect, they seek to obtain a confession 
through interrogation.69 If a suspect confesses to the crime, this confession would be an 
important source of 'continuing' confirmation bias even though it is a false confession.7o 
Furthermore, such a confession occasionally leads even the defence counsel to exclude 
the possibility of innocence. 
In the criminal justice system, innocent persons are occasionally charged and 
convicted wrongfully due to this confirmation bias.71 For instance, Martin refers to the 
Donald Marshall Jr. case as follows: 72 
63 ibid 1593-1594; Keith A. Findley and Michael S. Scott. 'The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases' (2006) 2 Wis Law Rev 291, 309; Raymond S. Nickerson. 'Confirmation Bias: A 
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises' (1998) 2 Review of General Psychology 175, 175. 
64 Peter C. Wason and Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Content 
(Harvard Univ Pr, 1972),210-2.1 1.. . . 
6~ Evans stated that 'Confmnatlon bIas IS perhaps the best known and most WIdely accepted notion of 
inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning.' See Raymond S. Nickerson. 
'Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises' (1998) 2 Review of General Psychology 
175, 175. 
66 ibid 176. 
67 Richard A. Leo and Deborah Davis. 'From False Confession to Wrongful Conviction: Seven 
Psychological Processe~' (~OO~) Jow:na1 of Psychiatry and Law 2, 22~27. 
68 ibid 22-23. Unlike cnmmal mvesttgators, the prosecutors have a dIfferent source for 'tunnel vision' 
such as the institutional and political culture of their office and conviction psychology. See ibid 26; Daniel 
S. Medwed. 'The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence' (2004) 84 
Boston University Law Review 125; Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A 
Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J Crim Law 197. 
69 Richard A. Leo and Richard J. Of she. 'The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of 
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation' (1998) Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 429, 429-496. 
70 Leo and Davis op. cit. 25-26. 
71 ibid 23 (Leo and Davis stated that investigators sometimes have 'erroneous assumptions', e.g. 'a 
erson who is sexually attracted to a vic~im. will often kill her if rejected.') 
~ T. Alexander Hickman, 'Ro~al Commlssl~n on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution: Report' 
Lieutenant Governor in CounCIl (Nova ScotIa ). 
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Police wanted to believe that Marshall was the killer and did not want to believe that a 
middle-aged white man had in fact killed Seale [victim] and attacked Marshall. The police 
did not bother to investigate the crime scene or search for independent witness. Instead, 
they pressured Marshall's teenaged acquaintances with threats of criminal charges and 
imprisonment into becoming informers against him.
73 
In this case, the police pinpointed Marshall as the culprit because of these wrong 
assumptions. Furthermore, confirmation bias led them to find evidence, which 
supported their beliefs, and in the end, succeeded in proving the guilt of the innocent 
person. 
Second, people in general have a tendency to stick to their prior beliefs, and this can 
prevent them from evaluating the strength of evidence.
74 
Burke defines this cognitive 
process as 'selective information processing' and argues that people focus on the 
evidence supporting their prior beliefs even when they have to assess contradictory 
'd 7S eVl ence. 
Similarly, Findley and Scott suggest three sources of tunnel vision: tunnel vision as a 
function of cognitive biases; institutional pressures reinforcing tunnel vision; and 
prescribed tunnel vision. 76 In particular, the cause of tunnel vision is noted in two 
aspects - the natural tendency of a human being and reinforcing sources. This is to say, 
tunnel vision is created by the 'cognitive distortions', which help a person to perceive 
and interpret evidence in a wrong way, and this is reinforced by the institutional 
pressures from victims, the community and the media. 77 
Individuals readily accept the information which is compatible with their prior 
beliefs, whereas when they are confronted with dissonant information, they try to find 
weaknesses which can refute this information in order to defend their beliefs. 78 In 
73 Dianne L. Martin. 'Lessons about Justice from the Laboratory of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, 
the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence' (2001) 70 UMKC Law Review 847,860. 
74 Alafair S. Burke. 'Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science' 
(2006) 47(5) William and Mary Law Review 1587, 1596. 
7S ibid 1597; Lord, Ross, and Lepper suggest that people 'are apt to accept 'confirming' evidence at fact 
value while subjecting 'disconfmning' evidence to critical evaluation, and as a result to draw undue 
support for their initial positions from m!x~d or rand.01~ e~pirical fin~ings.' For .more details, see Charles 
G. Lord, Lee Ross and Mark R. Lepp~r. Blase~ ASSimilatIOn and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of 
Prior Theories on Subsequently ConSIdered EVIdence' (1979) 37(1 I) J Pers Soc Psychol 2098, 2098-2109. 
76 Keith A. Findley and Michael S. Scott. 'The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases' 
(2006) 2 Wis Law Rev 291, 307-345. 
77 ibid 323. 
78 Kari Edwards and Edward E. Smith. 'A Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments' (1996) 
71(1) ibid 5,5-24; Peter H. Ditto and David F. Lopez. 'Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential 
Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions' (1992) 63ibid568, 568 ('Information 
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particular, the natural human tendency, as Edwards and Smith suggested, is to retrieve 
memories which are useful to disprove an incompatible argument. They argue that 
persons search their memories when they encounter disconfirming evidence, but this 
searching naturally concentrates on refutable materials. 79 The 'selective information 
processing' is based on a bias which regards any incompatible evidence as insignificant. 
In this sense, there is a difference between the confirmation bias and selective 
information processing. The former is the tendency to seek or interpret evidence to 
confirm the hypothesis, whereas the latter is a bias which tends to refute disconfirming 
evidence to defend prior beliefs. 
Finally, 'belief perseverance' is the tendency to stick to the prior beliefs even when 
those beliefs are overturned by the disconfirming evidence.8o Psychological researchers 
have analysed this natural tendency. For instance, Anderson and others conducted 
several experiments by using a debriefing paradigm. 81 In these experiments, they 
initially provided experimental subjects with two fabricated case studies. Besides, they 
asked those subjects to compose an explanation of them. Then, the subjects were 
debriefed regarding the fictitious nature of those case studies. However, notwithstanding 
that the cases were simulated, the subjects adhered to the theories which they had 
concluded based on wrong information. Even after the evidence supporting their 




In the criminal process, the police and prosecutors often show such tendency. They 
are in general reluctant to admit the correctness of an acquittal. 83 Rather, they continue 
to adhere to their beliefs in guilt even after the defendants are found 'not guilty'. In 
Korea, the Chul-Gyu Lee case shows this phenomenon very well in which a chief of the 
Ansan Police Station was arrested and charged with bribery, but was found not gUilty in 
consistent with a preferred conclusion is examined less critically than information inconsistent with a 
preferred conclusion. ') '9 Karl Edwards and Edward E. Smith. 'A Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments' (1996) 
71(1) J Pers Soc Psycho I 5, 18. 
80 Alafair S. Burke. 'Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science' 
(2006) 47(5) William and Mary Law Review 1587, 1599. 
8J Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper and Lee Ross. 'Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of 
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information' (1980) 39(6) J Pers Soc Psychol 1037, 1037-
1049. " .. I b I' f: . th Co 
82 Anderson et a1. state that mltIa e Ie s may persevere 10 e lace of a subsequent invalidation of the 
evidence on which they are based, even when this initial evidence is itself as weak.' See ibid 1045. 
B3 Daniel S. Medwed. 'The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence' 
(2004) 84 Boston University Law Revie~ 125, .1 38; Mc~loskey.ha~ a similar perspective on this 'belief 
perseverance': 'It is human natur~ to re.sl~t any mformatIon that mdlca~es that we have made a grievous 
mistake.' See James McCloskey. Convlctmg the Innocent' (1989) 8 Cnm.Just.Ethics 56, 56. 
262 
Chapter 7 Prosecutoriallnvestigation: Functional Overlap and Its Impacts 
the Supreme Court. 84 The statement of the prosecutor, who was in charge of 
investigating this case, indicates that he still clings to his belief in guilt: 
I couldn't search the defendant's house. It's my fault not to find sufficient evidence. 
However, it's 100 per cent correct that Shim [Provider of bribes] gave the defendant bribes. 
Until now, I'm very certain about his conviction. I believe that the judgment of acquittal of 
8S 
the Supreme Court was totaIly wrong. 
The Korean Supreme Court found Chul-Gyu Lee not gUilty.86 Nevertheless, the 
prosecutor still adheres to his prior beliefs while criticising the verdict of the Supreme 
Court. 87 
In short, cognitive bias is based on several distinctive features leading a person to 
have tunnel vision. Firstly, persons seek information which is helpful to support their 
hypothesis. Secondly, if they are confronted with the information which is incompatible 
with their beliefs, they focus their attention on discrediting this information. By contrast, 
they are prone to accept the confirming information supporting their beliefs. Finally, this 
bias continues to exist even after the hypothesis is completely discredited by the 
disconfirming information. 
'Tunnel vision' is mainly caused by the cognitive bias and can be reinforced by 
external elements. Tunnel vision is a natural human tendency which leads a person to 
decide in a biased way. It can be intensified by social contexts including institutional 
pressures, the media, and victims. As Bandes suggested, a social context and 
institutional norms can contribute to develop 'tunnel vision' .88 Valuable social ends or 
'unthinkable evil' can have a role to play in reinforcing 'tunnel vision' in a social 
context. Individuals in the criminal justice system seek to follow the institutional norms 
and to adopt organisational goals, cultures, beliefs, and perspectives on problems.89 In 
this circumstance, they can lose their individual judgement, and subsequently, come to 
have 'tunnel vision'. 
84 2004 DO 711 (2004) 13 May 2004 (Korean Supreme Court); 2004 NO 1409 (2004) 14 January 2004 
(Seoul High Court); Jun Ki Kim. 'The former Chief of Ansan Police Station Found Not Guilty' Kyung-
Hyang (10 May 2005). 
8S Ho Jin Jo and Woo Sung Kwon. 'Chief of the Police Station Found Not Guilty' Oh My News (6 July 
2005). 
86 2004 DO 711 (2004) 13 May 2004 (Korean Supreme Court). 
87 Alafair S. Burke. 'Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science' 
(2006) 47(5) William and Mary ~aw Re~ie~ 1587, 1599-1601. 
88 Susan Bandes. 'Loyalty to One s ConvictIons: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision' (2006) 49(2) Howard 
Law J 475, 481-483. 
89 ibid 482-483. 
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3.3. A Safeguard against Tunnel Vision 
Cognitive bias has a major role to play in forming 'tunnel vision' in the criminal process. 
Because this bias is a natural human tendency, it is very difficult for the legal 
professionals themselves to control. Accordingly, the criminal process needs effective 
filters to screen errors resulting from cognitive bias. 
The police and prosecutors, as Nickerson pointed out, 'can and do engage in case-
building unwittingly, without intending to treat evidence in a biased way or even being 
aware of doing SO.'90 In this regard, 'tunnel visions' is different from the 'conviction 
mentality'. Conviction mentality is usually formed through the motivated goal, e.g. 
achieving a conviction,91 whereas tunnel vision unintentionally influences the decision 
making process. 92 In other words, the prosecutors with conviction mentality seek 
evidence in order to prove the defendant's guilt. They have an intention to convict the 
defendant. By contrast, they do not recognise cognitive biases which they can have 
while seeking and interpreting evidence. Due to this reason, the criminal process needs 
filters which provide legal actors with objective benchmarks. 
However, the prosecutor's investigation, as we have seen, eliminates one of the 
significant filters in the criminal process, which should exist between investigation and 
prosecution: 
[DL2-ISJ] The prosecutor also makes a mistake while investigating a crime. But, the 
problem is that there is no system to control and review the prosecutorial investigation. At 
present, the police investigations are reviewed by the prosecutors. Indeed, it can help to 
reduce mistakes taking place during the investigation. But, no one can review the 
investigation conducted by the prosecutors before the trial. This is a big problem in the 
Korean criminal process. 
The judgment of Yang-Ho Byun Case93 showed the problems caused by both tunnel 
90 Raymond S. Nickerson. 'Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises' (1998) 2 
Review of General Psychology 175, 175-176. 
91 Leo and Davis define motivational bias in relation to 'goal pursuit' as another cause which leads to 
wrongful convictions. In p~i.cular, they p~~t out that :The p~imary ~oal of investigators and prosecutor 
should be accuracy - identlfymg and conv1ctmg the gutlty whtle makmg sure to avoid prosecution of 
innocents.' See Richard A. Leo and Deborah Davis. 'From False Confession to Wrongful Conviction: 
Seven Psychological Processes' (2009) Journal of Psychiatry and Law 2, 27. 
92 Nickerson suggests the importance of separation between intentional and unintentional selection of 
information even though it is difficult to classify in practice: 'The line between deliberate selectivity in 
the use of evidence and unwitting molding of facts to fit hypothesis or beliefs is a difficult one to draw in 
practice, but the distinction is meaningful consequently.' See Nickerson op. cit. 
~3 2008 DO 8137 (2009) 1/2 Panre Gongbo 183 (Korean Supreme Court). 
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vision and the loss of filter mechanism. Yang-Ho Byun, a former high-profile public 
servant in the Ministry of Finance, was arrested by the Central Investigation Department 
(CID) of the Supreme Prosecutors' Office accused of receiving bribes in 2006. The 
prosecutors investigated the case and charged him. The trial continued for nearly three 
years until the Korean Supreme Court found him not guilty in 2009.94 
The Korean Supreme Court made a point that 'the prosecutors focused their 
attention only on the confession of another defendant. As a result, they did not consider 
other evidence which could discredit the confession. ,95 There was also a possibility that 
the defendant made a false confession by inducements.96 Nevertheless, the prosecutors 
did not look carefully at such contradictory evidence. If there had been an objective 
filter to review the results of prosecutorial investigation, the defendant may well have 
been freed much earlier than this. 
In short, because of 'tunnel vision', the police and prosecutors in general 
unintentionally focus their attention on the evidence which is compatible with their 
beliefs by ignoring other evidence. Thus, the criminal proceedings need an independent 
monitoring system to review the results of the investigation. However, the prosecutorial 
investigation eliminates the separation of the functions between the investigation and 
prosecution. This functional overlap results in the loss of a significant filter to review 
the investigation. 
4. Disclosure of Evidence 
As we have seen, the investigation conducted by prosecutors can lead to the deepening 
of any conviction mentality and of any tunnel vision. This will have its impact on a 
defendant's right to a fair trial. But their monopoly over the investigation also means a 
complete control over information. The lack of disclosure for courts and defendants 
94 ibid; Jung Ryu and Si Hyun Kim. 'Korean Supreme Court raises doubts on the reliability of a lobbyist's 
confession' Chosun I/-Bo (16 January 2009); Ji Sung Jeon. 'Yang Ho Byun Found not Guilty' Dong-Ah 11-
bo (16 January 2009); Chosun I1-bo Editorial. 'Centrallnvestigation Department needs a courage to 
discontinue the weak cases' Chosun I/-Bo (13 February 2009). 
95 2008 DO 8137 (2009) 1/2 Panre Gongbo 183 (Korean Supreme Court). 
96 ibid' Martin also notes the general unreliability of the informers: 'Although strictly speaking the 
inform'er may be simply the individual who reports a crime, the more usual sense of the term connotes a 
person who provides in~ormation ~r testimo?y for ben~fit. These info~ers may ~rovide information to 
police as a routine practice, or the mformer IS an associate or accomplJce who gams a benefit by 
providing information or offering to testify ag~in~t the key susp~c.t.' See Dianne L. Martin. 'Lessons about 
Justice from the Laboratory of Wrongful Convl~tJOns: Tunnel VISion, the Construction of Guilt and 
Informer Evidence' (2001) 70 UMKC Law ReView 847, 856-857. 
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may increase the inequality of arms between the state and defendants.97 An important 
example is the concealment of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors.98 The disclosure of 
all relevant evidence should be a significant safeguard for defendants. 
4.1. Equality of Arms and Disclosure of Evidence 
The principle of equality of arms is one of the important elements for a fair trial. With 
respect to the import of 'equality of arms', the Strasbourg Court stated that 'each party 
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case- including his 
evidence- under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-
vis his opponent. ,99 This judgment stems from the civil proceedings. Yet, as Dijk and 
others suggest, the principle of equality of arms is more important in the criminal cases 
than in the civil cases because the criminal proceedings fundamentally start from 'the 
. l' fth art' ,100 mequa lty 0 e pIes. 
One of the important elements to guarantee the equality of arms is the right to access 
information. This right implies that the defendants should have 'the same access to the 
d d . . th ,101 H records an other ocuments pertaimng to e case. owever, defence lawyers have 
difficulty in acquiring this information.
l02 
For a fair trial, as Murphy and Whitty have stated, access to information is an 
essential element: 'a fair trial is impossible if a defendant is unaware of the charges 
against him or her, is unable to prepare a defence, or is prevented from presenting their 
case fully in court.' 103 In this sense, disclosure of evidence by the prosecutors must be 
one of the key issues to guarantee the equality of arms. 104 
97 The Korean Supreme Court declares that the public prosecutor should have a duty to disclose all 
evidence which is for or against the defendant as a representative of the public interest. See 2001 DA 
23447 (2002) 152 Panre Gongbo 753 (Korean Supreme Court). 
98 Ashworth and Redmayne state that the principle of equality of arms 'has recently crystallized as the 
right of a defendant to have disclosure of 'all material evidence for or against the accused'.' See Ashworth 
and Redmayne op. cit. 33. 
99 Dombo Beheer B. V. v The Netherlands (1994) 18 EHRR 213 (European Court of Hwnan Rights) para 
33 (In this case, the Strasbourg Court emphasises that this principle can apply to both civil and criminal 
proceedings: 'Although C~n~ct~g States h~ve greater lat!tude over ~he co?cept of a 'f~ir hearing' in civil 
proceedings than they do 10 cnm10al proceed1Ogs, the requirement of equahty of arms' 10 the sense of a 
'fair balance' between the parties applies in both types of proceedings. ') 
100 P. Van Dijk and others (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th 
edn Intersentia, Oxford 2006) 1190,580. 
101 ibid. 
102 Kamasinski v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 36 (European Court ofHwnan Rights) para 88. 
103 Therese Murphy and Noel Whitty. 'What is a Fair Trial? Rape Prosecutions, Disclosure and the 
Human Rights Act' (2000) 8(2) Feminist Legal Studies 143, 148. 
104 Ashworth and Redmayne op. cit. 33; Edwards v United Kingdom (1993) 15 EHRR 417 (European 
Court of Homan Rights) para 36 (For a fair trial, the criminal procedure demands the prosecutor 'to 
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There is an imbalance existing between the state and an accused individual. los The 
door-to-door search for a witness by the police is an example. lo6 The defence counsel, 
even if they have a similar investigative team, would not obtain the same results as the 
police because witnesses have a tendency to want to cooperate with the prosecution 
rather than the defence. lo7 In addition, for the accused, it is difficult to have access to 
crime scene because the crime scene and relevant evidence are occupied by the 
investigators. 
As a consequence, the suspects have no choice but to depend on the police as well as 
prosecutors 'to find, collect, develop, and disclose the evidence.' 108 However, such 
evidence is unlikely to be sufficient to prove their innocence. As Findley illustrated, the 
police as well as prosecutors do not want to cooperate with the accused or to send not 
exculpatory evidence: 
Police are an arm of the prosecution; they typically work closely with prosecutors, who, 
while theoretically charged with responsibility to "do justice," in practice often develop a 
conviction psychology in which catching and convicting the suspect is the highest value.
I09 
For a similar reason, the police are reluctant to help the accused to have access to the 
evidence, which can undermine likelihood of conviction.
llo 
Zacharias notes that such 
disclose to the defence all material evidence for or against the accused.'); David J. Harris, M. O'Boyle 
and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Butterworths, London, Dublin, 
Edinburgh 1995),213; Sybil D. Sharpe. 'The Human Rights Act 1998: Part 3: Article 6 and the Disclosure 
of Evidence in Criminal Trials' (1999) Crim L R 273-286,273-274. 
105 Keith A. Findley. 'Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for the 
Truth' (2008) 38 Seton Hall Law Rev 893, 898. 
106 Fred C. Zacharias. 'Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice' 
(1991) 44 Vand.L.Rev. 45, 78 n 143. 
107 ibid (Zacharias stated the reasons as follows: 'the witness's identification with the prosecution, dislike 
for a person the government has targeted as a defendant, fear of all criminals, and prosecutorial or police 
suggestions that the witness should not cooperate. ') 
108 Findley op. cit. 
109 ibid. 
110 Steve Uglow, Criminal Justice (2nd edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), 268-269 (Professor Uglow 
placed the emphasis on 'the need for the accused to have access to information necessary for the proper 
preparation of the defence' with reference to Taylor case - 'a senior policeman withheld information from 
the CPS that a witness identifying the defendants had made an earlier statement that one of the girls he 
had seen might have been black (neither defendant was) and that he had claimed a reward. The officer 
withheld the information fearing that it would be disclosed to the defence.'); 2000 HUNMA 474 (2003) 
15(1) Panrejib 282 (Korean Constitu~ional Court) see ~ 113 above; Kyles v Whitley (93-7927) (1995) 514 
US 419 (U.S. Supreme Court) (In thIS case, the non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence by the police 
plays a main role in reversing defendant's capital m~der conviction. The non-disclosed items are as 
follows: 'initial eyewitness statements taken by pohce (arguably closer to fitting Beanie); police records 
establishing Beanie's initial call to the police; his inconsistent statements to the police, and his suggestion 
that the police search defendant's rubbish; evidence linking Beanie to other crimes committed at the same 
grocery store and to an unrelated murder; and a computer printout of the license numbers of the cars 
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unfair evidence is produced by the informational monopoly: 
The fear that the government will develop an informational monopoly is one reason why 
code drafters impose an occasional duty on prosecutors to step out of the competitive 
role.
111 
In this regard, the disclosure of evidence by prosecutors is very important. The 
disclosure has a main role to play in breaking the informational monopoly by the state. 
Such an obligation of prosecutors is necessary to strike a balance between the state and 
defendants. 
4.2. Disclosure of Evidence in Korea 
In Korea, there was a significant debate with respect to the disclosure of evidence. In 
2000, In-Chon Seo-Bu Police Station (SBPS) refused a request from a defence counsel 
for access to the interview documents of the suspect. The defence lawyer instituted a 
suit against the Chief of the SBPS. He argued that 'such refusal by the police could 
infringe the defendant's right to assistance of counsel by limiting the access of the 
counsel to the information which is necessary to both understand the case and defend 
the accused.' 112 The Korean Constitutional Court held that 'the restriction on the 
defence counsel's access to the records as to the interview with the suspects violated the 
right to assistance of counsel, which is protected on the basis of article 12(4) of the 
Korean Constitution, by preventing the defence counsel's activities.' 113 
The KCPA introduced the statutory scheme for disclosure of evidence through the 
amendment in 2007. 114 According to article 266-3 and 266-4 of the KCPA, the 
prosecutor has a duty to disclose evidence on the basis of the request of the 
defendants. liS However, this provision limits the disclosure of evidence to the trial 
stage. Accordingly, the defendants cannot demand the disclosure of evidence before the 
police found in the parking lot on the night of the murder.') See Fisher op. cit. 1379 n 3. 
111 Zacharias op. cit. 77. 
112 2000 HUNMA 474 (2003) 15(1) Panrejib 286 (Korean Constitutional Court). 
113 ibid 289-291 (In this case, one of the judges stated that 'at the beginning of the investigation, 
disclos~re of much information may disturb fact-fmding procedure by helping the suspect to destroy 
important evidence'. See ibid 292. 
114 There are two provisions for the disclosure of evidence in the CPA 1954 in Korea, which were 
established on 1 June 2007: arti~le 266-3 ~d.266-4. 
J\~ The Korean Ministry of JustIce (tr), Crlmmal Procedure Act (Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 266-3(1). 
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trial. I16 Disclosure at the investigation stage coupled with legal advice is an important 
element because it can preserve the right to a fair trial by giving the defendant 
significant information. 117 In this regard, the current scheme is not enough to protect 
the defendants. 
In particular, the disclosure of evidence is very limited in practice because of the 
prosecutorial investigation which increases the inequality of arms between the 
prosecutors and defendants. There are two aspects to this: the control over information 
and the neglect of the duty to disclose. 
First, the prosecutors' investigation enables them to control over almost all 
information in relation to the defendants from the beginning of investigation. Such 
information includes all evidence which proves guilt or innocence. Prosecutors achieve 
an 'informational monopoly', which is significant and harmful as it can damage 
fairness. 118 Gershman identified the problems arising from this informational monopoly: 
The most fonnidable threat to rationality and fairness in the adversarial system comes not 
from restrictions on the exclusionary rule, or the erosion of due process constraints on 
prosecutorial excesses, but from the prosecutor's institutional role in controlling access to 
infonnation relevant to a defendant's guilt, and the prosecutor's ability to withhold 
. th . h d Ii d t' . 119 eVIdence at mIg t prove a e en an s Innocence. 
As Zacharias stated, this is the reason why in some countries, the legislators require the 
prosecutor to step 'out of the competitive role' in the criminal process. 120 However, the 
Korean prosecutors use their control of information to increase their competitive edge 
116 ibid (1) A defendant or his defence counsel may file an application with the public prosecutor to ask 
the prosecutor to allow him to inspect or copy, or deliver in writing, a list of the documents or articles 
relating to the case indicted and the following documents that are likely to have influence over admission 
of indicted facts or sentencing: Provided, that if the defendant employed his defence counsel, only the 
inspection shall ~e applie~ to the de~endB?t ... ~2,> If it is deemed that there is a re~onable gr~und to 
disallow inspectIOn, copYIng, or dehvery m wntIng of documents, such as the natIOnal securIty, needs to 
protect witnesses, likelihood. of de~tru~tio? of evidence, and specific. grounds under which it is anticipated 
that it is likely to hinder the mvestlgatIon Into related cases, the pubhc prosecutor may refuse to allow the 
inspection or copy, or deliver in writing, such documents or place a limitation thereon.; At the forum for 
the introduction of the scheme to enforce the prosecutors to disclose evidence, Professor Min and Park 
argue that this regime should be extended to the investigation stage. See Presidential Committee on the 
Judicial Refonn, 'Committee Report: the Refonn for the Advanced Judicial System' PCJR (Seoul ), 197-
198. 
117 Steve Uglow op. cit. 268; Nicola Padfield, Text and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process (4th 
edn Oxford University Press, Oxford: New Yo~k 2008) 5~6, ~67 (Pa~field stated that 'Clearly, any failure 
to disclose relevant evidence.undennm~s ~e nght to a farr trIal, an~ It can be argued that if relevant 
evidence has to be excluded In the pubhc. Interest, then the prosecutIon should not be sustained. ') 
118 Zacharias op. cit. 77; Gershman op. CIt. 449. 
119 ibid. . 
120 See above n 111 and accompanymg text. 
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which is already formidable. Prosecutorial investigation can make worse the current 
circumstances because it allows the prosecutors to control access to the information. 121 
Second, the prosecutors, as seen earlier, may lose their objectivity because of a 
'conviction mentality'. In particular, this may lead to the concealment of the 
exculpatory evidence although the prosecutors have a general duty to disclose 
information for the defendants. In 2002, the Korean Supreme Court ruled that the state 
should compensate for a damage caused by the prosecutor's concealment of exonerating 
evidence. 122 In that case, a suspect was arrested by the police in 1996 accused of rape 
and robbery. He was interviewed by the prosecutor of the Seoul Nambu Prosecutors' 
Office and charged. During the course of first instance proceedings, the police found 
exculpatory evidence and forwarded it to the prosecutor's office. However, the 
prosecutor did not disclose this evidence, and as a result, the original court found him 
guilty. Such concealment of the exculpatory evidence was noted in the appellate 
., d th . t' h d 123 jurisdIctIOn, an e convlc Ion was quas e . 
As one judge said in the interview, it is very rare for the prosecutors to provide the 
court with exculpatory evidence: 
[J4-/C] We don't expect prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence for the defendants. 
I've never seen such prosecutors. That is impossible. You can easily realise that the 
prosecutors being directly involved in the investigation can't have objectivity during the 
trial. 
The prosecutors have access to all information because they conduct an investigation by 
themselves. However, there is a risk that the information is used only to achieve a 
conviction due to the loss of prosecutorial objectivity and a lack of an effective 
mechanism for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. In this regard, the Korean 
criminal justice system needs an effective regime to guarantee the disclosure of 
evidence. 
121 Gershman noted that 'The power to control evidence is the power to conceal it. This can result in the 
conviction and punishment of innocent persons.' In particular, he introduced four cases taking place in the 
USA: Randall Dale Adams ('The court found that the prosecutor 'knowingly used perjured testimony and 
knowingly suppressed evidence. '); James Richardson ('the prosecutor had suppressed evidence that 
would have shown Richardson'S innocence.'); James 'Shabaka' Brown ('the prosecutor misrepresented to 
the jury that ballistics evidence proved the defendant's guilt, when in fact the prosecutor knew that the 
ballistics report showed that the bullet that killed the deceased could not have been fired from the 
defendant's weapon. '); Eric Jackson ('the prosecutor c.oncealed evi~en~e that .would have shown that the 
fire was not arson-related, but was caused by an electrical malfunction. ) See Ibid 451-453. 
122 2001 DA 23447 (2002) 152 Panre Gongbo 753 (Korean Supreme Court). 
123 ibid. In this case, the exculpatory evidence was the result of the DNA test. The other person's DNA 
which was different from the defendant's was found in the victim's underwear. 
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s. Monitoring Systems for the Prosecution Service 
The various legal powers and sufficient resources have led the prosecutors to be directly 
and extensively involved in the investigation in Korea. However, the prosecutors readily 
lose their objectivity because of a 'conviction mentality' and 'tunnel vision'. They can 
brace the adversarial role rather than the quasi-judicial responsibility which is of 
importance to protect the defendant's rights to a fair trial. The Korean prosecutors focus 
their attention on achieving conviction and seek to find evidence which is compatible 
with their beliefs in conviction. 
In this context, the presumption of innocence provided for by the right to a fair trial 
is just a symbolic expression. Rather, the 'presumption of guilt' prevails in the process. 
Such a situation is perhaps desirable for dealing with large number of cases in an 
efficient way on the basis of crime control values. However, as Packer suggested, the 
efficiency can be achieved only by the supposition that 'the screening processes 
operated by police and prosecutors are reliable indicators of probable guilt.' 124 Yet, such 
an assumption should not be easily arrived at because 'conviction mentality' and 'tunnel 
vision' can prevent the police and prosecutors from making evidence based decisions. 
Packer described the criminal process relying on the presumption of guilt as follows: 
Once a man has been arrested and investigated without being found to be properly innocent, 
or, to put it differently, once a determination has been made that there is enough evidence of 
guilt to permit holding him for further action, then all subsequent activity directed toward 
him is based on the view that he is probably guilty. The precise point at which this occurs 
will as soon as the suspect is arrested, or even before, if the evidence of probable gUilt that 
has come to the attention of the authorities is sufficiently strong. But in any case the 
presumption of guilt will begin to operate well before the "suspect" becomes a 
"d fi d t ,,125 e en an. 
Furthermore, the prosecutors have much easier access to information and evidence 
than the defendants. More importantly, they can control the disclosure of such 
information from the beginning of the investigation. Consequently, the principle of 
equality of arms cannot be properly guaranteed in Korea. The defendants do not have 
sufficient resources to defend themselves. 
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124 Herbert L. Packer, The Limits o/the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. 
1968) 385, 160. 
12' ibid. 
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Under these circumstances, the Korean criminal justice system does not have an 
effective method to ensure the objectivity of the prosecutors. Acquittals have an adverse 
impact on the prosecutor's reputation. This can lead the prosecutors to focus too heavily 
on the need to achieve convictions. 126 Nevertheless, no appropriate mechanism has 
been set up to monitor prosecutorial misconduct which is in general caused by this 
overzealousness. 
Firstly, the court should take charge of restricting prosecutorial zealousness, but the 
role is limited to the cases in which the convicted defendants claim that due process was 
infringed. Moreover, the courts may be lenient on the prosecutorial misconduct because 
they focus on the 'fundamental fairness' of the trial rather than the detailed propriety of 
conducts. 127 Likewise, they do not want to overturn convictions even if there is some 
misconduct by the prosecutor because the reversal may have an effect on the finality 
. I 128 and waste tna resources. 
In addition, as seen in Chapter 6, judges cannot make informed decisions because of 
the trial based on prosecutor's written records. The documents provide the courts with 
incomplete information so that judges cannot effectively determine whether the 
prosecutors used coercive methods or elicited an involuntary confession. The very high 
convictions rates exceeding ninety-nine per cent in Korea is a good example to show 
such circumstances. 
Table 7.1 The conviction rates in Korea (2005-2009) 
Acquitted Defendants 
Year Conviction Rate Charged N % 
2009 99.2 1,196,776 9,704 0.8 
2008 99.5 1,316,987 7,168 0.5 
2007 99.5 1,217,284 5,765 0.5 
2006 99.6 1,094,113 4,350 0.4 
2005 99.7 1,145,597 3,087 0.3 
Source: Korean Supreme Court, Judicial Yearbook from 2005 to 2009.129 
126 Chosun Il-bo Editorial. 'Central Investigation Department needs a courage to discontinue the weak 
cases' Chosun /I-Bo (13 February 2009) 
127 Stanley Z. Fisher. 'In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework' (1988) 15 Am J 
Crim Law 197,212. 
128 Heather Schoenfeld. 'Violated Trust: Conceptualizing Prosecutorial Misconduct' (2005) 21(3) J 
Contemp Crim Justice 250, 260; Gershman stated that 'courts have tolerated other truth-disserving 
conduct by prosecutors in order to protect adversarial integrity and prosecutorial discretion.' See Bennett 
L. Gershman. 'Prosecutor's Duty to Truth' (2000) 14 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 309, 318. 
129 Korean Supreme Court, Judicial Yearbook {Sabeopyungam] (KSC, Seoul ), from 2005 to 2009; To see 
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Secondly, the investigations by the prosecutors are reviewed only internally by the 
superiors through the 'Kyuljae' system of consultation and approval. 130 However, 
according to the statements of one judge whom I interviewed, this mechanism does not 
seem to work properly: 
[J2-IMJ The superiors in the prosecutor's offices don't carefully look at the decisions made 
by the prosecutors. They just correct a number of sentences and misspells. For most cases, 
they don't playa role in monitoring the prosecutor's practices. 
Another judge argues that this is a significant method in Korea as there is no other 
scheme to screen the results of the prosecutorial investigation: 
[J2-RS] At present, the consultation and approval by the superiors is the only method to 
review the prosecutor's decisions. Even though the impact is very trivial, this method can 
contribute to control the decisions made by individual prosecutors. Without this, a big 
problem may take place. 
Unlike police investigations which are monitored independently by the prosecutors, the 
prosecutorial investigations move on to the court without an appropriate review.13l In 




[J4-1C] The charged cases can be screened by us Uudges) in court even though it often 
takes long time. But, there is no way to monitor the case being determined not to charge by 
the prosecutors. I have no idea which guidelines they use for such a decision. 
Only the prosecutors can review their actions and inspect their misconducts. The 
Inspection Department of the Ministry of Justice can have a role to play in checking the 
. . d I wful t'" b th 133 H . prosecution servlce an un a ac IVltIeS y e prosecutors. owever, It cannot 
carry out an independent monitoring role because, as seen in detail in Chapter 4, the 
the number of suspects charged by the prosecution service, see ch 3 n 33. 
130 The Ministry of Justice (tr), Public Prosecutor's Office Act [Keomchalcheongbeop} partially amended 
on 2 J December 2007 No. 8717 (1949) art 7(1). 
131 Ordinance 665 of the Ministry of Justice for the duties of the Judicial Police Officer 2009 partially 
amended on 29 May 2009 art 54. . . 
132 For further discussion about the deCISions not to prosecute, see below. 
133 Bo Hak Seo. 'political Independence and Checks on the Public Prosecutor's Powers' (2004) Next 9, 14. 
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prosecutors run the Ministry of Justice including the inspection department. 134 The 
prosecutors seek to be actively involved in the affairs of the Ministry of Justice rather 
than to be independent from them. Most actions of the Ministry of Justice are directed 
and decided by the prosecutors since the key posts of the ministry including the 
inspection department are occupied by prosecutors. Unlike other jurisdictions, there is 
no independent authority to inspect both the wrongdoings by the prosecutors and the 
operations of prosecution service. 135 Professor Seo argued that 'In Korean society, the 
. II h d' I .. ., 136 prosecutors vlrtua y ave Ip omatlc lInmumty. 
As a consequence, the errors above of discussed and indeed individual corruption of 
the prosecutor can distort the outcome of the investigation and prosecution. In 2004, 
prosecutor Do-Hun Kim was sentenced to prison convicted of bribery. According to the 
judgment, he accepted KRW 20,000,000 (approximately equal to GBP 10,000) from a 
. ~ h' h 137 I dd" h' suspect 10 return lor not c arg10g er. n a Itlon to t IS case, Prosecutor Yung 
Kwang Kim was also convicted of bribery and sentenced to prison. 138 In this case, the 
prosecutor had discontinued the investigation after taking KRW 10,000,000 
(approximately equal to GBP 5,000) from the suspect.
139 
The judge said: 
The prosecutors playa key role in the criminal proceedings with considerable powers for the 
investigation and prosecution. Thus, they must have a high sense of integrity. However, 
Prosecutor Kim took bribes from his suspect. This bribery cannot be forgiven under any 
circumstance. 140 
134 Tae-Hun Ha. 'Political Prosecutor [Jungchi KumchaIJ' (2008) (9) Participatory Society [Chamyusahol); 
Sang Hee Han. 'The Change of the Prosecution Service' (2008) (9) Participatory Society [Chamyusaho/]; 
In Seop Han, 'Legal Control on High Profile Corruption: the Public Prosecutor's Role and Limitation' in A 
Vision/or the New Millennium: The Establishment o/Transparent Society (The Korean Association for 
Public Administration, Seoul 1999) 99, 109 n 12 (Professor Han stated that 'many prosecutors wants to 
work in the Ministry of Justice or the Supreme Prosecutors' Office because working in those places can 
ive them a benefit in terms of the personnel assignments and promotion. '). 
~5 Bo Hak Seo op. cit. 13-14; Yong Se Kim. 'The Problems of the Current Investigation System' (2000) 
19(1) Daejon Social Sciences Joumal77, 90; Jun Young Mun. 'The Checks on the Prosecutorial Powers 
by the Citizens' (2005) 29 Democratic Legal Studies [Minju Beophak] 173, 185-186 (With respect to the 
exclusive charging power of the prosecutor, Professor Mun suggested that • As a matter of fact, there is no 
mechanism to control the charging decision of the prosecutor in the Korean criminal justice system. The 
prosecutor can even withdraw the prosecution without a limitation.') 
136 Bo Hak Seo op. cit. 14. 
137 Myung Hun Ji. 'The former prosecutor, Do-Hun Kim, was sentenced to prison' Dongailbo (4 June 
2004); Sung Hun Lee and Chang Jae Yu. '.Diary to Rec~rd ~ssures' ibid(22 August 2003); Yun Duck 
Jung. 'The Former Prosecutor, Do-Hun Kim, Found Gullty m the Appeal Court' ibid(4 June 2004). 
138 2006 NO 2576 (2007) 19 January 2007 (Seoul High Court). 
139 Hy Jin Jung. 'Former Prosec~to~ Sent.enc~d to Prison' Dongai/bo (28 October ~006); Kyung Ki Lee. 
'Corruption Case in the Legal Field Naellshmmun (27 June 2008); Sung Hyun Kim. 'Prosecutor Young 
Kwan Kim Sentenced to Suspension of Execution' Newsis (19 January 2007) 
140 Hy Jin Jung op. cit. 
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There are not many corruption cases involving prosecutors. Those two cases became 
public as a by-product of other significant scandals. The former was discovered while 
investigating a case of defamation of character, which involved a high profile public 
servant working in the Presidential Office. The latter was published during the 
investigation into a large scale corruption in the legal circle. 
Such a small number of corruption cases can be explained by two aspects. First, as 
seen above in the judgment, the prosecutors may have a higher sense of integrity than 
any other public servants. Second, the prosecutors monopolise most powers in the 
criminal proceedings. There is no authority to take an inquiry into the prosecutor's 
activities except for the prosecution service itself. Subsequently, the prosecutors may be 
reluctant to uncover their colleagues' misconduct. To solve such a problem, the Mu-
Hyun Noh administration tried to establish an independent investigation authority which 
could conduct an investigation into the prosecutors. However, this trial failed because of 
the strong objection of the prosecution service. 141 These cases show that the prosecutors' 
power can be manipulated because of individual corruption. Nevertheless, there is no 
effective system to screen the decisions taken by the prosecutors. 
Finally, there is no external system to check the prosecutor's discretion and there is 
no independent regime to review the decisions by the prosecutors. 142 Concerning the 
power to charge [Kisodokjumjui] , the only independent method to review is, as 
Professor Lee stated, the victim's right to appeal against decisions taken by the 
prosecutor not to file an indictment [Jaejungshinchungkwon].143 This right became 
nominal in 1973 under the military government. 144 However, the development of 
democracy led this almost extinct right to be reactivated in 2007. By the reform of the 
criminal procedure, the range of appeals was expanded to all crimes provided in the 
141 See Ha Young Kim. 'Ten Agendas for Reforming the Prosecution Service' Press ian (20 October 200S); 
Sang Won Sun. 'Concerns about the Strengthening of Prosecutor's Power' ibid(26 September 2008). 
142 Bo Hak Seo. 'Political Independence and Checks on the Public Prosecutor's Powers' (2004) Next 9, II; 
Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and Democratic Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) Seo-
Kang Law Journal 43, 43-44; Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Public Prosecution' (1988) 
29(2) Seoul Law Joumal39, 46-47 (Prof~ssor Shin arg~ed that :the Korea~ prosecutors have a very 
strong power, which cannot be observed In other countrIes. BeSIdes, there IS no proper monitoring regime 
by the people. Therefore, the Korean criminal justi~e sy~te~ ?ee,ds a mechanism to control the abuses of 
rosecutorial powers and to enforce the prosec~tor s obJectiVIty. ). 
fu Ho Joong Lee. 'Reformation and DemocratIc Control of the Public Prosecution Service' (2008) 9(2) 
Seo-Kang Law Journal 43, 65 (Professor Lee stated that 'the Prosecutors' Office Act also has a provision 
that the victims can request an internal rev!ew ~s to t?e pros~cutorial decisi~ns not to charge. However, 
this measure is ineffective because the revIew IS camed out In the prosecutIOn service. ') 
144 ibid' Sang Jin Park. 'Suggestions for Reforming the Prosecution of Organization and Prosecution of 
power' (2002) IS Kun Kuk Journal of Social Science 7S, 87. 
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Criminal Act. 145 This is the only measure to review the prosecutorial decisions, but it is 
not enough to control prosecutorial powers because of three limitations. 
First, the courts in charge of reviewing cases are in general reluctant to disagree with 
the decisions by the prosecutors. 146 Furthermore, even though the judges decide to 
charge the suspects, the trial work is still conducted by the prosecutors, and they do not 
want to challenge the original decisionsl47: 
[J4-IC] The right to appeal against the prosecutorial decisions not to charge is useless. Even 
though we [judges] decide that the indictment should be tiled because the prosecutor's 
decision is wrong, the prosecutors, who are in charge of the trial work, do not anything. 
They argue the innocence of defendants in court. They don't want to listen to the judicial 
decisions. 
Second, only the victims have the right to appeal. Accordingly, in many cases in 
which there are no direct victims, the decisions taken by the prosecutors cannot be 
reviewed. Finally, the abuse of prosecutorial discretion is a significant issue, e.g. 
charging the evidentiary weak cases. However, such decisions cannot be reviewed by 
any independent authority because the right to appeal was limited to the decisions not to 
charge. 148 
The Special Prosecutor (SP) is another mechanism used to check prosecutorial 
discretion. This is not to review, but a significant add-on. The SP is a temporary 
investigative position, which is established by the National Assembly on a case-by-case 
basis.149 Its main role is to investigate and prosecute high profile corruption cases. ISO 
Albeit the SP is called a prosecutor, they are in theory independent of the prosecution 
service because this system stems from the distrust in the prosecutorial investigation. 1 S I 
145 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop} partially amended 
on2} December 2007 No. 8730(1954) art 260. 
146 Kuk Cho. 'The Appeal Against Decisions of the Prosecutor as an Exception Being Emphasised' (2000) 
8 Hyungsapanre-Yungu 550, 550-566 (Professor Cho stated that 'the courts do not their duty to check the 
exclusive powers of the prosecutor.') cited from Jun Young Mun. 'The Checks on the Prosecutorial 
powers by the Citizens' (2005) 29 Democratic Legal Studies [Minju Beophak] 173, 188 n 22. 
147 KCPA art 260 (6). 
141 Ho Joong Lee op. cit. 67. 
149 The Korean criminal procedure adopted the US style special prosecutor system for investigation and 
prosecution. See Kuk Cho. 'The Unfinished "Criminal Procedure Revolution" of Post-Democratization 
South Korea' (2002) 30(3) Denver J Int Law Policy 377. . 
ISO Dong-Woon Shin. 'The Reform of the Korean Pubhc Prosecution' (1988) 29(2) Seoul Law Journal 39, 
US. fth C In" 151 Yong Se Kim. 'The Problems 0 e urrent vestJgatJon System' (2000) 19(1) Daejon Social 
Sciences Journal 77, 79; Kuk Cho. 'The Ongoing Reconstruction of the Korean Criminal Justice System' 
(2006) 5(1) Santa Clara Journal ofintemational Law 100, 118. 
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The Special Prosecutor Act was first introduced in 1999 and was established in order to 
conduct an investigation of a particular crime allegedly committed by the Prosecutor 
General and a number of subordinates. 1S2 
Due to the organisational characteristics of the SP, successful results are difficult to 
achieve. A SP is appointed by the President from several candidates recommended by 
both the Korean Bar Association and the Supreme Court. However, in general, a former 
public prosecutor is appointed. Moreover, public prosecutors as well as investigators 
from the prosecution service are employed to support the SP's investigation. In these 
circumstances, it has been very rare for the SP to draw a different conclusion from the 
original prosecutorial decisions. Professor Kim argued that 'the special prosecutor 
cannot work properly because it does not entirely exclude the prosecutorial influence 
upon the investigation'. 153 However, the reason behind the use of a SP is that Korean 
citizens do not trust prosecutorial investigations. I 54 The prosecution service has been 
often considered to conduct investigation of particular crimes unfairly due to political 
influences, and thereby has lost the public confidence in its operations. 
According to the survey conducted by Jungangilbo and East Asia Institute, the 
reliability of the Prosecutors' Office is lower than the Police Agency and Supreme 
Court. ISS In another survey on the public trust in the prosecution service, 'seventy-one 
per cent of the respondents stated that the operations by the public prosecution service 
are unjust.' This survey was designed by Yun-Kun Woo, who was a member of the 
National Assembly.156 Similarly, in the recent survey on the integrity of the government 
agencies, the integrity of the prosecution service was reported as the lowest level among 
38 central agencies. IS7 The lack of monitoring mechanism results in lack of confidence 
in the prosecution service, and consequently, causes distrust in the criminal justice 
1S2 The Act for Appointment of the Special Prosecutors for Investigation of Strike Inducement Case and 
the Lobby to Prosecutor General's Wife Case 1999 6031; Min Bae Kim. 'The Establishment of the Special 
Prosecutor Act' Chosun II-Bo (20 September 1999) 
153 Yong-Se Kim op. cit.; Similarly, Professor Cho noted that 'the SP is a temporary organisation for 
investigation of a particular offence. Because of such an organisational feature, the SP cannot carry out 
sufficient investigation.' See KuK Cho op. cit.(2002) 386. However, Shin stated that 'albeit the SP's 
investigation is not sufficient to discover the truth, the system itself is helpful to check prosecutorial 
unfairness. ' See Youn Su Shin. 'The necessity of the Special Prosecutor System' Korean Lawtimes (25 
January 2000). 
154 Yong-Se Kim op. cit.; Kuk Cho op. cit.(2006) 118. 
ISS See Chang Woon Shin. 'Public Opinion Survey about the Power Organizations' Jungangilbo (14 June 
2008) and ibid 'The Public Opinion Survey about the Influence and Credibility of25 Powerful 
Organizations' (3 July 2007)' . . 
156 See Tae Jong Kim. 'Unjust Prosecution Service' fun-Hap News (19 October 2008). 
1S7 See Min Ki Chae. 'The Result of the Survey on the Integrity of Government Agencies' Chosunilbo (9 
December 2010). 
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system. IS8 
6. Conclusion 
To ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial, the Korean Constitution [Heonbeop] 
provides for fundamental rights such as presumption of innocence, privilege against 
self-incrimination, equality of arms, and right to counsel. 159 However, in order to 
preserve those rights, each legal actor in the criminal process, as Packer suggested, 
should playa role as a mechanism to monitor the procedure. 160 The operations taken by 
the police and prosecution service must be monitored by lawyers, courts and an 
independent authority in order to prevent their powers from being abused, and 
subsequently, from threatening the defendant's constitutional rights. 
However, prosecutor's direct involvement in the investigation is inappropriate to 
perform such a role in three aspects. Firstly, prosecutorial investigation may weaken the 
prosecutor's quasi-judicial role, which is created to guarantee the basic rights and 
interests of the defendants. From the beginning of the investigation, the prosecutors 
focus their attention on the achievement of a conviction. This tendency leads to the 
abuse of investigative and prosecutorial arms, e.g. tortures, threats and inducements. 
Secondly, prosecutorial investigation may abrogate the filtering role of the prosecution 
service. As a result, a significant safeguard disappears in the criminal process, which 
independently reviews the results of the investigation including the protection of the 
defendant's rights. Finally, the monopoly of information and evidence by the 
prosecutors increase the inequality of arms between the state and individuals. The 
vulnerable status of the defendants is aggravated in this context. 
In the face of those problems, the Korean criminal justice system does not have a 
proper monitoring mechanism to review the prosecutors' decisions and to inspect their 
actions. Consequently, the defendant's right to a fair trial cannot be properly guaranteed. 
". In a survey on the criminal trial, 83.7 per cent of respondents stated that the criminal trials were unjust. 
See Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (III): From 1st to 13th 
Conference' PCJR (Seoul May 2004), 259. 
159 See ch 1. 
160 Herbert L. Packer, The Limits o/the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. 
1968) 385, 163. 
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Chapter 8 An Empirical Study of the Impact on Police 
of the Police and Prosecutors Relationship 
1. Introduction 
This study has demonstrated that the statutory framework, government policy and day-
to-day operational practices of the prosecution service have led the prosecutors to 
occupy a dominant role with the Korean criminal justice system. The thesis argued that 
this has had serious consequences, particularly for notions of due process and the 
defendant's right to a fair trial. 
This chapter now explores the extent to which the role and practices of the Korean 
prosecutor impacts on the operations of the police themselves, in particular on their 
function of investigating crime. This is based on a survey of 1,144 police officers which 
produced data relating to police officers' perceptions of their role: how clearly they 
understood that role, any conflicts within it and whether they were overloaded. I The 
study seeks to measure the stress levels of officers and, by distinguishing those who 
investigate crime from other officers, to assess the extent to which the prosecutorial 
system in Korea has an impact on those levels. 
The chapter, first of all, define what is meant by job stress and its likely impact on 
an occupational group. It considers the features of stress and the factors contributing to 
stress. It also explains why this study differs from previous research. Then, the 
methodology of the study is clarified. Finally, the findings are presented and the results 
are discussed. 
2. Job Stress 
Job stress is an important element which can decrease productivity in organisations by 
giving rise to health-related and organisational problems such as employee 
dissatisfaction, alienation, absenteeism, and turnover.2 Parker and DeCotiis defined job 
I The fieldwork was conducted in various parts of Korea from 20th July to 19th October 20 I O. 
2 Donald F. Parker and Thomas A. DeCotiis. 'Organizational Determinants of Job Stress' (1983) 32(2) 
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stress as 'the feeling of a person who is required to deviate from normal or self-desired 
functioning in the work place as the result of opportunities, constraints, or demands 
relating to potentially important work-related outcomes.') In other words, job stress is a 
dysfunctional emotional response to unpleasant stimuli such as uncomfortable, 
undesirable, and threatening workplace conditions.4 
2.1. Elements Leading to Job Stress on Police 
Police work is a stressful and demanding occupation because potentially it leads police 
officers to face violent and threatening situations. S Many studies have been conducted 
to address the correlation between the nature of the police work and increased levels of 
physiological and psychological stress.6 
Hart and others categorised the police stressors into three groups: personal, 
occupational and organisational. 7 Personal stressors include established characteristics 
of personality that have an effect on the relationship between the stress and health. 8 
Organ Behav Hum Perform 160, 161; Jamal stated that 'Notwithstanding conceptual variation, job stress 
usually results in disruption of the individual's psychological and physiological homeostatis [sic], forcing 
deviation from normal functioning in interactions with job and work environments.' See Muhammed 
Jamal. 'Relationship of Job Stress and Type-A Behavior to Employees' Job Satisfaction, Organizational 
Commitment, Psychosomatic Health Problems, and Turnover Motivation' (1990) 43(8) Human Relations 
727,728. 
3 Parker and DeCotiis op. cit. 165. 
4 Daniel Cameron Montgomery, Jeffrey G. Blodgett and James H. Barnes. 'A Model of Financial 
Securities Salespersons' Job Stress' (1996) 10(3) Journal of Services Marketing 21, 24. 
S Paula Brough. 'A Comparative Investigation of the Predictors of Work-related Psychological Well-being 
within Police, Fire and Ambulance Workers' (2005) 34(2) New Zealand Journal of Psychology 127, 130-
131; Ronald J. Burke and Aslaug Mikkelsen. 'Burnout among Norwegian Police Officers: Potential 
Antecedents and Consequences.' (2006) 13(1) International Journal of Stress Management 64, 64; Kevin 
G. Love and others. 'Symptoms of Undercover Police Officers: A Comparison of Officers Currently, 
Formerly, and Without Undercover Experience' (2008) 15(2) ibid 136, 136-137 (Love et a!. state that 
'police officers and ?thers ass?~iated with 'high-~sk' professions (e.g., fi~efigh.ters, air traffic controllers, 
and emergency medIcal techmcIans) are prone to mcreased levels of physIologIcal and psychological 
strain and indeed trauma because of the nature of their work. ') 
6 Ingrid V. E. Carlier, A. E. Voerman and Berhold P. R. Gersons. 'The Influence of Occupational 
Debriefmg on Post-traumatic Stress Symptomatology in Traumatized Police Officers' (2000) 73(1) Br J 
Med Psychol 87 (Carlier et al. analyse the correlation between traumatic events e.g. confrontation with 
aggressive mob, fmding a corpse, and murd~r~d child and stress.); Pam~la A. Collins and A. C. Gibbs. 
'Stress in Police Officers: A Study of the Orlgms, Prevalence and Seventy of Stress-related Symptoms 
within a County Police Force' (2003) 53(4) Occupational Medicine 256 (Collins and Gibbs assessed the 
strain of the police officers, which was associated with a series of potential home and work related 
stressors. They mainly dealt with two groups of stressors such as organisational and operational stressors) 
7 Peter M. Hart, Alexander J. Wearing and Bruce Headey. 'Police Stress and Well-being: Integrating 
Personality, Coping and Daily Work Experiences' (1995) 68(2) J Occup Organ Psychol133 . 
• ibid 137 (Hart et el. used six indicators in order to analyse the personal stressors of the police. For 
'nstance, for measurement of satisfaction with life, Dieren et al. 's SWLS were employed.) For more 
~etails on SWLS, see Ed Diener and others. 'The Satisfaction With Life Scale' (1985) 49(1) J Pers Assess 
71. 
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Secondly, occupational stressors refer to various work experiences confronted by police 
officers on a daily basis.9 Dealing with victims, arresting perpetrators, and doing shift 
work are examples of occupational stressors. Finally, organisational stressors include 
different systematic interactions within the criminal procedure such as quality of 
communication, the amount of paper work, support or lack of support from superiors or 
fellows and career progression. 10 
Among those three groups of stressors, organisational stressors have more impact on 
police stress than other factors. II The unfriendly leadership style of supervisors or 
conflicting job demands have been regarded as significant causes of job stress by 
creating an undesirable organisational climate. 12 In addition, imbalances between an 
individual's ability and the skills demanded, lack of training, and insufficient resources 
can also increase job stress. 13 McCreary and Thompson's study on the measures of 
stressors in policing,14 Burke and Richardson's study on psychological stress in 
organisations,IS and Kop and others' study on the burnout of Dutch police officers l6 all 
show the significance of the organisational factors.
17 
In particular, Collins and Gibbs 
9 ibid 138; Collins and Gibbs derme these factors as 'operational stressor' and include variables as 
follows: Dealing with someone who is drunk; Verbal aggression from the public; Having to use force to 
restrain; Physical aggression from the public; Answering call for officer assistance; Dealing with a drug 
addict; High-speed driving; Attending a domestic dispute; Searching for a missing person; Giving 
evidence in court; Adult victim of violence or abuse; Attending a serious road traffic accident; Being at 
risk of hepatitis or AIDS; Administering first aid; Interview suspect of serious crime; Crowd control or 
riot duty; Attending a sudden death; Child victim of violence or abuse; and Informing a relative ofa death. 
See Collins and Gibbs op. cit. 260. 
10 ibid; Burke and Mikkelsen op. cit. 65; Hart et al. op. cit. 138-145. 
11 ibid ISO. 
12 Parker and DeCotiis op. cit. ; Jamal op. cit. 728; According to Kop et a1.'s analysis, '[police] officers 
mostly mentioned organizational aspects as stressors. In particular they cited poor management, in terms 
of incapable or uninterested supervisors, bad mutual relationships, and a lack of internal communication. ' 
See Nicolien Kop, Martin Euwema and Wilmar Schaufeli. 'Burnout, Job Stress and Violent Behaviour 
among Dutch Police Officers' (1999) 13(4) Work & Stress 326, 330. 
13 Susan Michie and Sian Williams. 'Reducing Work Related Psychological III Health and Sickness 
Absence: A Systematic Literature Review' (2003) 60(1) Occup Environ Med 3, 4; Jan A. Landeweerd and 
Nicolle P. G. Boumans. 'The Effect of Work Dimensions and Need for Autonomy on Nurses' Work 
Satisfaction and Health' (1994) 67(3) J Occup Organ Psychol207, 215; Cordes and Dougherty stated that 
'Individuals experiencing qualitative overload feel they lack the basic skills or talents necessary to 
complete task effectively.' See Cynthia L. Cordes and Thomas W. Dougherty. 'A Review and an 
Integration of Research on Job Burnout' (1993) 18(4) Academy of management review 621, 631. 
14 Donald R. McCreary and Megan M. Thompson. 'Development of Two Reliable and Valid Measures of 
Stressors in Policing: The Operational and Organizational Police Stress Questionnaires' (2006) 13(4) 
International Journal of Stress Management 494. 
is Ronald J. Burke and A. M. Richardson, 'Psychological Burnout in Organizations: Research and 
Intervention' in R. T. Golembiewski (ed), Handbook 0/ organizational behavior (2nd edn Marcel Dekker, 
New York 2001) 327. 
16 Kop et a1. op. cit. 
17 Burke and Mikkelson stated that 'worksetting and organizational conditions have been found to be 
more significant predictors of burnout than personal demographic and personality factors. ' See Burke and 
Mikkelsen op. cit. 65-66. 
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explored 'the pattern of stressors most strongly associated with symptoms of mental ill-




2.2. Role Stressors: Significant Organisational Factors 
In an organisation, every individual performs various roles. These roles are significant 
factors that may increase job stress. Cooper and others refer to such organisational roles 
as 'the behaviours and demands that are associated with the job an individual 
performs.' 19 Beehr and others defined the role stress as ~anything about an 
organizational role that produces adverse consequences for the individual. .20 
For instance, lack of clarity about a role or competing job demands can act as 
stressors as they make role obligations 'vague, irritating, difficult, conflicting or 
impossible to meet. ,21 However, the role stressors themselves, as Sager and Wilson 
suggested, are not job stress, but instead are influential factors which may result in job 
stress. 22 In particular, role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload have been 
frequently referred to as the main role stressors. 
Role Conflict 
Role conflict occurs when a person faces incompatible demands and expectations, 
which are not readily achieved at the same time.23 For instance, in Korea, police 
18 In this study, Collins and Gibbs employed 19 scales to measure the organisational stressor: Demands of 
work impinging on home; Lack of consultation/communication; Not enough support from senior officers; 
Working long hour; Pressure to get results; Urgent requests preventing completion of planned work; Not 
enough control over work; Deadlines/time pressures; Too much work; Paperwork; Subject to complaints 
investigation; Working shifts; Working unpredictable hours; Not enough support from fellow officers; 
Recalled when off duty; Slow career progression; Not enough scope for initiative; Uncertainty about 
house move; Not enough work. See Collins and Gibbs op. cit. 260-261. 
19 Cary L. Cooper, Philip Dewe and Michael P. O'Driscoll, Organizational Stress: A Review and Critique 
of Theory. Research, and Applications (Sage Publications, Inc, 2001), 37. 
26 Terry A. Beehr, Jeffrey T. Walsh and Thomas D. Taber. 'Relationship of Stress to Individually and 
Organizationally Valu:d States: Highe~ ?rder needs as a Moderator' (1977) 19(11) Jo~rnal of 
Occupational and Envrronmental Medlcme 771, 41; Robert L. Kahn and Robert P. Qumn, 'Role stress: A 
framework for analysis' in Alan A. McLean (ed), Occupational Mental Health (Rand McNally, New York 
1970) 50. 
21 Margaret Hardy and W. Hardy, 'Role Stress and Role Strain' in ibid Margaret E. Hardy and Mary E. 
Conway (eds), Role Theory: Perspectives for Health Professionals (2nd edn Appleton & Lange, Norwalk 
1988) 159, 76 (Hardy and Hardy dermed the role stress as a 'social structural condition in which role 
obligations are vague, irritating, difficult, conflict, or impossible to meet. '); Cooper et al. op. cit. 38. 
22 Jeffrey Sager and Phillip H. Wilson. 'Clarification of the Meaning of Job Stress in the Context of Sales 
Force Research' (1995) 15 Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management 51, 54. 
23 Jim I. M. Jawahar, Thomas H. Stone and Jennifer L. Kisamore. 'Role Conflict and Burnout: The Direct 
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investigators can have conflicting demands placed upon them on one hand by their 
superiors and on the other by prosecutors.24 This context can lead to role conflict of the 
police. 
In addition, the prosecutors in general do not maintain open lines of communication 
with police investigators. Where there are potential conflicts, the police investigators try 
to avoid the situation rather than to ask for clarification and voice their concerns.2S As a 
result, one-sided directions can also accelerate the role conflict of police investigators.26 
Those circumstances stem from the dominant position of the prosecutors and may have 
a role to play in increasing the job stress. 
Role conflict is believed to increase tension, job dissatisfaction, and withdrawal 
behaviours. In particular, as Schaubroeck and others suggested, 'Lack of agreement 
between received roles can be expected to produce an uncomfortable overall attitude 
toward the job because it diminishes one's perceived effectiveness in the work unit. ,27 
People who experience role conflict have a tendency to avoid the work situation by 
being absent or leaving the organisation. 
Role Ambiguity 
Role ambiguity is defined as 'the lack of clarity and predictability of the outcomes of 
one's behaviour. ,28 It is regarded as one of the significant organisational factors, which 
may lead to job stress for police officers.29 Role ambiguity happens when a person has 
insufficient information to carry out job duties, when uncertainty exists concerning job 
and Moderating Effects of Political Skill and Perceived Organizational Support on Burnout Dimensions' 
(2007) 14(2) International Journal of Stress Management 142, 149; Daniel Cameron Montgomery, Jeffrey 
G. Blodgett and James H. Bames. 'A Model of Financial Securities Salespersons' Job Stress' (1996) 10(3) 
Journal of Services Marketing 21, 24; Cooper et al. state that those incompatible demands can be given to 
a person 'either within a single role or between multiple roles occupied by the individuals.' See Cooper et 
al. op. cit. 38. 
24 Hwan-Beom Lee, Soo-Chang Lee and Deog-Bo Shim. 'The Effects of Police Investigator's Role 
Conflict on Job Stress in Korean Police Investigation Structure' (2007) 45( I) Korea Journal of Public 
Administration [Hangjeong Nonchong] 255, 259. 
25 Mi-Young Hong, The Relationship between the Police and Prosecutors: A Survey (Korean National 
Assembly, Seoul 2005), 8. 
26 ibid. 
27 Cooper et al. op. cit. 38-39; John Schaubroeck, John L. Cotton and Kenneth R. Jennings. 'Antecedents 
and Consequences of Role Stress: A Covariance Structure Analysis' (1989) 1 O( 1) J Organ Behav 35, 36. 
28 Robert J. House and John R. Rizzo. 'Role Conflict and Ambiguity as Critical Variables in a Model of 
Organizational Behavior' (1972) 7(3) Organ Behav Hum Perform 467,474. 
29 Cooper et al. op. cit. 38; Schaubroeck et al. op. cit. 35-37; O'Driscoll and Beehr stated that 'Role 
ambiguity, in parti~ular, ~as Ii~ked with ~~b dissa~isfaction, ~hi~h was in tum associated with . 
psychological stram and mtentlons to ~Ult. See MI.chael P. 0 Driscoll and Terry A. Beehr. 'Supervisor 
Behaviors, Role Stressors and Uncertamty as Predictors of Personal Outcomes for Subordinates' (1994) 
15 (2) ibid 141, 153. 
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requirements, or when means and ends are vague.30 
For instance, the prosecutorial domination, as seen in detail in Chapter 3, can be an 
important factor which diminishes the autonomy of the police. Professor Seo argued 
that 'in Korea, the police officer has been regarded as one of the difficult occupations 
because they have lots of responsibilities without proper powers to conduct their duties. 
As a consequence, such a situation plays a significant role in destroying the morale of 
the police.'3l This circumstance brings about a loss of ownership of case on part of the 
police. In particular, a lack of autonomy of police investigators may increase role 
ambiguity. 
In terms of job stress, autonomy can be defined as 'the degree to which the job 
provides substantial freedom, independence, and discretion to the individual in 
scheduling the work and in determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out. ,32 
Particularly, autonomy has been found to be a significant factor which has considerable 
impact on job stress.33 As Cooper and others suggested, autonomy is the ability to 
determine one's work methods, work schedules, and even issues such as breaks and 
vacations, all of which has an ameliorating impact onjob stress.
34 
When considering previous studies, such a low degree of autonomy may lead to a 
high level of 'role ambiguity' and, as we shall see later, 'role overload' of police 
investigators because they are bound by restrictive directions from the prosecutors 
which can inhibit their ability to respond to job demands. 
In addition, police investigators do not have enough feedback from the prosecutors 
30 Daniel Cameron Montgomery, Jeffrey G. Blodgett and James H. Barnes. 'A Model of Financial 
Securities Salespersons' Job Stress' (1996) 10(3) Journal of Services Marketing 21, 25. 
31 Bo Hak Seo, 'The Reasonable Allocation of Investigative Powers between the Police and Prosecutors' 
in Supreme Prosecutors' Office and National Police Agency (eds), Public Hearing/or Allocating 
Investigative Powers in Korea (SPO; NPA, Seoul 2005) 197,209-211; Hak-Bae Kim op. cit. 18; Kuk Cho 
op. cit. 117-120; Dong-Hee Lee. 'A Comparative Study on the Structure of Crime Investigation 
Authorities in Korea and the Reform Strategy' (2004) 7 Korean Police Journal 146, 176-177. 
32 R. Kenneth Teas. 'An Empirical Test of Models of Salespersons, Job Expectancy and Instrumentality 
Perceptions' (1981) 18(2) J Market Res 209,212. 
33 Monica Martinussen, Astrid M. Richardsen and Ronald J. Burke. 'Job Demands, Job Resources, and 
Burnout among Police Officers' (2007) 35(3) Journal of Criminal Justice 239 (In this study, job resources 
were measured by the degree of autonomy that the police experienced in their work and social support 
from supervisors and co-workers. In terms of the relationship between job resources, job demands, and 
burnout, the results suggested that both job demands and job resources were associated with all three 
burnout dimensions.); Zhao et al. suggest that autonomy is an important source of job satisfaction of 
police officers. In every regression, autonomy. emerged as a significant variable related to all three types 
of satisfaction: satisfaction with work, supervisor, and co-workers. See Jihong Zhao, Quint Thurman and 
Ni He. 'Sources of Job Satisfaction amo~g Police Officers: A Test of Demographic and Work 
Environment Models' (1999) 16(~) Just~ce Q 153, 167-168; Jan A. Landeweerd and Nicolle P. G. 
Boumans. 'The Effect of Work Drrnenslons and Need for Autonomy on Nurses' Work Satisfaction and 
Health' (1994) 67(3) J Occup Organ Psychol207, 207. 
34 Cooper et aI. op. cit. 105. 
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even though they always conduct investigations under the direction from the 
prosecutors. This circumstance, as Coman and Evans suggested, may cause role 
ambiguity of the police investigators as it can increase uncertainty.35 
Finally, the Korean prosecution service conducts investigations with its own 
investigative units.36 Such a direct investigation by prosecutors may lead the police 
officers to regard the prosecution service as another investigation agency rather than a 
supervisory institution.37 In other words, the police investigators do not seem to treat 
the supervision by prosecutors as a method to protect the rights of defence or to review 
police investigations.38 Instead, the police may deem that the prosecutors use the police 
investigation as a subsidiary organ to support their investigation.
39 
This can bring about the role ambiguity of police investigators as well as role 
conflict. 40 The police officers are perhaps uncertain of the value of prosecutorial 
supervisions. Moreover, for the similar reason, they seem to be confused whether they 
have to follow the instructions from the prosecutors or not even though they have a 
statutory dUty.41 
Role Overload 
Role overload takes place when a person is faced with multiple obligations, demands or 
35 Coman and Evans stated that 'Stress related to poor relationships with superiors also derives from 
inadequate communication of information to officers. This may lead to lack of clarity in the officer's role 
prescriptions (role ambiguity), so that individual officers may be uncertain about the actual work duties 
they may be expected to perform at any given time.' See Greg Coman and Barry Evans. 'Stressors facing 
Australian police in the 1990s' (1991) 14 Police Stud.: Int'l Rev.Police Dev. 153, 157. 
36 See ch 3 and S. 
37 Jong Gu Kim, The Reform of the Korean Criminal Justice System (2nd edn BuB-Mun-Sa, Seoul 2004), 
529-536. 
38 Jong-Gu Kim stated that 'due to excessive investigations by the prosecutors, the Korean prosecution 
service has been considered not as a leading protector of hwnan rights, but as an objective to be 
monitored for the protection of principled rights of defence.' See ibid 533. 
39 Hak-Bae Kim op. cit. 6; Professor Lee argued that 'the police officers are the subsidiary supporters for 
prosecutorial investigations in the Korean criminal procedure.' See Jae-Sang Lee, Korean Criminal 
Procedure (2nd edn Park Young Sa, Seou1200S), 100. 
40 'Clarity' has been considereq as a significant element to create role ambiguity of the police. See 
Jennifer M. Brown and Elizabeth A. Campbell, Stress and Policing: Sources and Strategies (John Wiley 
& Sons, Chichester; New York; Brisbane; Toronto; Singapore 1994),28-29 (Brown and Campbell 
Suggested an example in regards to the role ~biguity ~esulting from a lack o~ clarity: 'there is a lack of 
clarity about the role and purpose of~e p~hc~ ~xempl .. fied ~y two extreme pIctures of the British police 
officer - the bobby on the beat exerclsmg ~~1V1dual dlscretton and as a member of a riot squad 
functioning as a paramilitary officer. In Bntam, the. sw:ne officers may b~ required to perfonn both roles. 
There is no explicit evidence to .demonstrate th~t fl.lpp~ng fonn commumty policing to riot control is a 
ource of stress in itself. There IS, however, an IOdlcatton that exposure to public order duties is stressful. ') 
!I 2007 GOHAP 4 (2007) 51 Kakgong 13 September 2007 2453 (Daejon District Court) (In this case, 
young-II Kim, a police investigat?r w?rking a~ th~ Chung-Nam POli,ce ~gency, rejected the prosecutor's 
direction by arguing that such a dIrection can mfnnge the defendant S rights.) 
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duties, which are considered too much work to fulfil in the time available.42 Such role 
overload has been discussed by two aspects: quantitative and qualitative overload.43 
Firstly, individuals who are unlikely to finish the work in the allotted time experience 
quantitative role overload. Secondly, qualitative role overload refers to the individual's 
perception that a task cannot be effectively completed because he does not have enough 
skills which are necessary to their work. 44 Empirical investigations have mainly 
concentrated on the impact of the quantitative overload on an individual's stress.4S 
Role overload has been found to be a significant factor leading to job stress.46 
According to Schaubroeck and others' study, role overload has a direct influence upon 
job tension.47 In particular, this study showed a clear difference between role overload, 
role conflict, and role ambiguity.48 Thompson and others confirmed the linkage 
between the support from supervisors as well as co-workers, role overload for 
policewomen and their job stress. 49 However, a certain level of role overload is 
necessary for optimal mental health of the individuals.so That is, too few as well as too 
many working hours generally cause serious stress for individuals. S I 
Role overload may be a significant role stressor of Korean police investigators. Lee 
and others suggest that the complicated investigation process in Korea results in role 
overload for police investigators. The police investigation in Korea is inefficient due to 
42 Montgomery et al. op. cit. 25; Cooper et al. op. cit. 39 (Cooper et al. stated that 'Not only can role 
overload lead to excessive demands on an individual's time, but it also create uncertainty about his or her 
ability to perform these roles adequately. ') 
43 Cordes and Dougherty op. cit. 631; In particular, Gomme and Hall assessed the role overload of 
prosecutors based on the nature and extent of qualitative an~ ~uantitative aspects. See Ian. M: Gomme and 
Mary P. Hall. 'Prosecutors at Work: Role Overload and Stram (1995) 23(2) Journal ofCrtmmal Justice 
19I. 
44 Cordes and Dougherty op. cit. 631. 
4' ibid. 
46 ibid 628; Cooper et al. op. cit. 39. 
47 John Schaubroeck, John L. Cotton and Kenneth R. Jennings. 'Antecedents and Consequences of Role 
Stress: A Covariance Structure Analysis' (1989) 10(1) J Organ Behav 35, 53 
48 ibid. 
49 In this study, Thompson et al. argued that 'Supervisor support reduced work stressors of role overload 
and role ambiguity, and consequently emotional exhaustion. Thus supervisor support is associated with 
perceptions of the family enviro~ent, via i~ impact on role ~tressors and emotional exh~ustion.' See 
Briony M. Thompson, Andrea Krrk and DaVId Ferry Brown. Work Based Support, EmotIOnal Exhaustion, 
and Spillover of Work Stress to the Family Environment: A Study of Policewomen' (2005) 21 (3) Stress 
Health 199, 204. 
'0 Shelley Coverman. 'Role Overload, Role Conflict, and Stress: Addressing Consequences of Multiple 
Role Demands' (1989) Social Forces 965, 979. 
'I Grace K. Baruch and Rosalind C. Barnett. 'Role Quality, Multiple Role Involvement, and 
psychological Well-being in Midlife Women.' (1986) 51(3) J Pers Soc Psychol 578,583-584 (Baruch and 
Barnett suggest that 'to th~ degree that ~ ~art~cular role yields ~ net gain ?f benefits over costs, 
involvement in that role WIll have a poslttve u:np~ct on well-bemg, even If such involvement also 
increases the number of roles a woman occupIes. ) 
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the prosecutor's pre-eminent position. S2 The investigation process is ruled by the 
prosecutors. S3 In order to deal with criminal cases, the police investigators as well as 
other investigative authorities must send the cases to the prosecutor's office regardless 
of the seriousness of offences. 54 Although many criminal cases are very trivial, all 
investigative authorities must file the cases and dispose of them through complicated 
procedures. 55 Thus, the Korean investigation procedure requires unnecessary 
paperwork and bureaucratic red tape. S6 
Bureaucratic red tape and excessive paperwork have been frequently discussed as an 
important source of occupational stress. 57 Burke and Mikkelson identified bureaucratic 
red tape as a significant factor in police stress: 'Policing is also an occupation that 
provides few successes, little positive feedback, difficult and upsetting interpersonal 
contact with members of the general public, considerable red tape and bureaucracy, 
unmet expectations, the need to manage one's emotions, and authoritarian or 
'1' .. ,58 I h rt' k d k paraml ltary supervision. n so, excessive paperwor an unnecessary wor may 
cause role overload of police investigators in Korea.
59 
'2 Hwan-Beom Lee et al. op. cit. 259; Hak-Bae Kim, 'The Reasonable Reallocation of the Investigative 
powers between the Police and Prosecutors: The Perspective of the Police' in Supreme Prosecutors' Office 
and National Police Agency (eds), Public Hearing/or Allocating Investigative Powers in Korea (SPO; 
NPA, Seoul 2005) 2, 17. 
'3 The Korean Ministry of Justice (tr), Criminal Procedure Act [Hyungsasosongbeop] partially amended 
on 21 December 2007 No. 8730 (1954) art 195. 
'4 ibid art 196. 
" There is only one exception to this principle. The chief of the police station can prosecute some minor 
offences, which are punishable by fmes of not more than KRW 200,000 (approximately equal to GBP 100) 
or detention for less than thirty days. However, the number of cases dealt with by the police occupies 
generally 2 per cent of all offences. That is, 98 per cent of cases are investigated under the prosecutorial 
direction. See ch 5. 
'6 Dong-Hee Lee. 'A Comparative Study on the Structure of Crime Investigation Authorities in Korea and 
the Reform Strategy' (2004) 7 Korean Police Joumal146, 165-176. 
" Jon Vagg. 'Context and Linkage: Reflections on Comparative Research and 'Internationalism' in 
Criminology' (1993) 33(4) Br J Criminol541, 300; Jerome E. Storch and Robert Panzarella. 'Police 
Stress: State-Trait Anxiety in relation to Occupational and Personal Stressors' (1996) 24(2) Journal of 
Criminal Justice 99, 103; Collins and Gibbs op. cit. 262 (Collins and Gibbs suggest that time pressures, 
poor support from senior ranks and too much paperwork are important factors to cause stress of the police 
officers); Alyssa Taylor and Craig Bennell. 'Operational and Organizational Police Stress in an Ontario 
police Department: A Descriptive Study' (2006) 4(4) The Canadian Journal of Police & Security Services 
223,227 (In this study, bureaucratic red tape was illustrated as one of the main organisational factors 
causing the police stress) 
,. Ronald J. Burke and Aslaug Mikkelsen. 'Burnout among Norwegian Police Officers: Potential 
Antecedents and Consequences.' (2006) 13(1) International Journal of Stress Management 64, 65. 
'9 Jennifer M. Brown and Elizabeth A. Campbell, Stress and Policing: Sources and Strategies (John 
Wiley & Sons, Chichester; New York; Brisbw:'e; Toron!o; Singap~re 1994),29-30 (Brown and Campbell 
suggest that poor management such as excessive attention to detatl and poor consultation contribute to 
police officer stress.); Peter Finn and Julie Esselman Tomz, Developing a Law Enforcement Stress 
Program/or Officers and their Families (National Institute of Justice: Issues and Practices, DIANE 
Publishing, 1997), 8 (Finn and Tomz state that poor supervision can have impact on the stress of the 
police: 'the actions and attitudes of police supervisors can either increase or help alleviate the stress of the 
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2.3. Previous Research and the Scope of the Study 
So far most studies have drawn attention to factors within the police force itself that 
contribute to stress. External aspects resulting from the relationship between the police 
and prosecutors have been hardly examined. There are two studies which were 
conducted to examine any correlation between the prosecutorial role and the stress of 
police officers. Firstly, there was a survey of 500 police officers working in the 
investigation divisions in Seoul, Korea. 6o In this survey, eighty-six per cent of 
respondents answered that they had experienced difficulties while conducting 
investigations.61 For instance, suspects, victims, and witnesses often refused to give a 
statement to the police, arguing that they want to make a statement before the 
prosecutors because the police investigators do not have sufficient powers to investigate 
or end the case. 
In the second study, Lee and others argued that prosecutor's pre-eminent position 
had an adverse impact on the police investigation by increasing the stress on police 
officers. This was based on a survey of 248 police investigators working at the Kyung-
Buk Police Agency in Korea.62 The researchers identified three features: complicated 
procedures, unilateral instructions by prosecutors and a lack of police powers. 63 
Correlations between tho~e factors and role stressors were examined. They employed 
Montgomery and others' theoretical framework which provided a number of scales to 
measure the relationship between the organisational and personal characteristics, role 
stressors, and job stress.
64 
However, it is unclear from these studies whether police investigators have a 
different level of stress from other police officers since Lee and others depended on one 
sample population - police investigators. Furthermore, they did not consider the 
investigative function of the prosecution service and personal characteristics of the 
police investigators.65 This current study considers those aspects as well. First of all, it 
examines the stress of all police officers by. employing stratified random sampling 
which makes clear different perspectives between police investigators and normal police 
job.'); Nancy Otis and Luc G. Pelletier. 'A Motivational Model of Daily Hassles, Physical Symptoms. and 
Future Work Intentions among Police Officers' (2005) 35(10) J Appl Soc Psychol 2193, 2193. 
60 Mi-Young Hong, The Relationship between the Police and Prosecutors: A Survey (Korean National 
Assembly, Seoul 2005) 
61 ibid 16. 
62 Hwan-Beom Lee et al. op. cit. 
63 ibid 259. 
64 ibid 257-265; Montgomery et al. op. cit. 
65 Hwan-Beom Lee et a1. op. cit. 265-266. 
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officers.66 Secondly, the effects of the investigative function of prosecutors and the 
work experience of the police investigators are considered as independent variables. 
More importantly, the findings are expanded based on interviews with legal 
professionals. 
As a result, this study explores one personal and four organisational features: 67 
• Communication between the police and prosecutors 
• Autonomy of police investigators 
• The efficiency of investigation process 
• Officer'S perspective on the prosecution service 
• Work experience (Personal factor) 
These factors are identified as contributors to the role stressors of police investigators. 
As this study focuses on organisational influences, many other personal characteristics 
except for work experience have been excluded in order to reduce the variables.68 
There may be other significant personal features such as the relationship with spouses, 
number of children or income, which can have an impact on the role stressors. However, 
such intrusive personal questions can decrease the response rate. As a result, only a 
small number of demographics are chosen in order to enhance the response rate. 
3. Analytical Framework and Hypotheses 
In this study, three role stressors are systematically considered based on Lee and others' 
analysis as well as Montgomery and others' model of job stress in order to examine the 
stress on police investigators. Firstly, one individual characteristics and four 
66 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York 2008) 
748pp 173-4,699. 
67 Young-Lan Lee. 'Korean Investigation System' (1995) 7 Korean Criminal Justice Journal 187-205pp 
199-204; Bo Hak Seo, 'The Reasonable Allocation of Investigative Powers between the Police and 
Prosecutors' in Supreme Prosecutors' Office and National Police Agency (eds), Public Hearing/or 
Allocating Investigative Powers in Korea (SPO; NPA, Seoul 2005) 197, 208-211; Kuk Cho. 'The Ongoing 
Reconstruction of the Korean Criminal Justice System' (2006) 5( 1) Santa Clara Journal of International 
Law 100, 118-120; Hak-Bae Kim, 'The Reasonable Reallocation of the Investigative Powers between the 
police and Prosecutors: The Perspective of the Police' in Supreme Prosecutors' Office and National Police 
Agency (eds), Public Hearing/or Allocating Investigative Powers in Korea (SPO; NPA, Seoul 2005) 2, 
14-19; Hwan-Beom Lee et al. op. cit. 258-259. 
68 In addition to work experience, type-A behaviour pattern, locus of control, education and marital status 
can be significant indicators for the personal characteristics. See Montgomery et al. op. cit. 27-28 and 
Burke and Mikkelsen op. cit. 69. 
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organisational factors are selected which have an effect on the role stressors f police 
investigators. Secondly, those individual and organisational factors are hypothesised to 
have an impact on role conflict, role ambiguity and role overload, which are ften 
referred to as significant role stressors.69 Then, the correlations between the antecedent 
variables, role stressors and job stress are explored. Finally, the stress levels b twe n the 
police investigators and normal police officers are compared. 
As a consequence, this enables us to develop, as seen in igure 8.1 a tructural 
model. On the basis of previous studies and such an analytical model I hav ugge ted 
19 hypotheses, as we shall see in Table 8.1. 
Figure 8.1 A model of police investigator's job stress 
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Table 8.1 Hypotheses to test 
Variance Hypothesis 
1 Role conflict will result in job stress of the police investigators. 
Role stressors 2 Role ambiguity will result injob stress of the police investigators. 
3 Role overload will result injob stress of the police investigators. 
4 
Police investigators will have a low level of communication with 
prosecutors. 
Communication 5 
Lack of communication between the police and prosecutors will 
lead to role ambiguity of the police investigators. 
6 
Lack of communication between the police and prosecutors will 
lead to role conflict of the police investigators. 
7 
Police investigators will consider that they have a low degree of 
autonomy under the prosecutorial domination. 
Autonomy 8 
Lower levels of autonomy will lead to higher levels of role 
ambiguity. 
9 
Lower levels of autonomy will lead to higher levels of role 
overload. 
10 
Prosecutorial domination will make double structure leading to 
inefficiency in the work process of police investigators. 
Process 11 
Inefficient investigative process based on double structure will 
result in higher levels of role conflict. 
12 
Inefficient investigative process based on double structure will 
result in higher levels of role overload. 
13 
The public prosecution service is regarded as another investigative 
agency by the police investigators. 
14 
Police investigators will have negative perspective on the 
prosecution service and prosecutorial instructions. 
Perspective The negative perspective on the Prosecution Service and 
15 prosecutorial instructions will result in higher levels of 'role 
conflict' of the police investigators. 
The negative perspective on the Prosecution Service and 
16 prosecutorial instructions will result in higher levels of 'role 
ambiguity' of the police investigators. 
17 





Work experience of police investigators will lead to lower levels of 
role ambiguity. 
Stress level 19 
Police officers working at the investigation divisions have higher 
levels of stress than their counterparts in other departments. 
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4. Method 
The data were collected through a self-completed questionnaire distributed to three 
different police training centres - Police Investigation Academy (Seoul), Police 
University (Yong-In), and Police Training Institute (A-San) - from 23 August to 6 
October in 2010. Those educational institutions were chosen for the variety of possible 
samples. Police officers from all over the country participate in the training programmes 
managed by the national police agency. Therefore, the survey at the training centre can 
help the researcher to achieve various samples. 
Of the 1,500 surveys that were distributed, 1,144 usable surveys were collected 
leading to overall response rate of 76.2 per cent. The surveys were sent to a designated 
contact person within each training centre who then distributed them to the respective 
administrators to coordinate training programmes. The surveys were completed before 
or after the training session. Upon completion, the surveys were gathered by the course 
administrator. Then, they were turned over to the researcher via the contact persons of 
the training centres. 
Table 8.2 presents the demographic statistics for the population 0 f I, 144 po lice 
officers and whole population of the police in Korea. As can be seen in the table, the 
final sample (N= 1,144) is a good representation of 100,460 Korean police personnel in 
20 I O. However, among the respondents, the ratio of the police investigators is 
comparatively higher than normal. As this study aims to explore job stress of the police 
investigators, it needed a high ratio of police investigators. In particular, the relationship 
between the police investigators and prosecutors was compared with the relationship 
between the police officers and their superiors. As a consequence, a comparatively large 
number of samples for police investigators were collected. 
Table 8.2 Sample demographics and population 
Final Sample Korean Police Population 
(N= 1,144) (N = I 00,460) 
N % N % 
Sex 
Male 
1,037 90.6 93,844 93.4 
Female 
107 9.4 6,616 6.6 
Division 
Investigation 730 63.8 22,453 22.4 
Other 
414 36.2 78,007 77.6 
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Rank 
PO 88 7.7 12,399 12.3 
Assistant Sergeant 208 18.2 19,697 19.6 
Sergeant 250 21.9 33,696 33.5 
Inspector 424 37.1 28,756 28.6 
Chief Inspector 99 8.7 3,753 3.7 
Superintendent 75 6.6 2,159 2.2 
and above 
Years of Sef'Vlce 
1-5 years 144 
12.6 
6-10 years 130 
11.4 
11-15 years 231 
20.2 
16-20 years 226 
19.8 

























Scales for the measurement of variables were mainly selected from previous studies. 
However, in order to make those scales appropriate for the police officers, slight 
modifications were carried out. 
First of all, job stress was measured by four items, which were selected from Parker 
and DeCotiis's job stress items. An example item is. 'I have felt fidgety or nervous as a 
result of my job.'7o Four items for job stress are mainly associated with the feeling of 
anxiety because, as Parker and DeCotiis suggested. role stressors were found to be more 
70 Donald F. Parker and Thomas A. DeCotiis. 'Organizational Determinants of Job Stress' (1983) 32(2) 
Organ Behav Hum Perform 160, 169. 
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strongly related to anxiety than to time stress.71 
Secondly, for the role stressors, eleven items were selected from two studies. 'Role 
Conflict' and 'role ambiguity' were measured by eight items developed by Rizzo and 
others.72 Sample items for those variables are as follows: 
Role Conflict (Q23) 'I work under incompatible policies and guidelines.' 
Role Ambiguity (Q26) 'I feel certain about how much authority 1 have.' 
For the 'role overload', three items were employed from Schaubroeck and others' 
study.73 They identified that 'role overload' has a significant and direct effect on job 
tension and is differentiable from role conflict as well as role ambiguity.74 One sample 
. . th 75 Item IS us: 
Role Ambiguity (Q30) 'I have too much work to do everything well.' 
Finally, the antecedent variables - organisational and personal characteristics of the 
police - were measured by 17 items. Among them, 13 items were selected and modified 
based on Lee and others' study and Teas's research on the organisation, task, and 
constraint variables. 76 The other four items were made with reference to previous 
studies discussing different perspectives of the police on the prosecution service.77 
Firstly, four organisational characteristics were measured by 16 items. The samples for 
these features are as follows: 
Communication (Q7) 'I frequently participate in the decision making process by 
prosecutors. ' 
Autonomy (QII) 'I frequently feel difficulty in dealing with duties due to lack of discretion.' 
Process (QI6) 'For the supervision of prosecutors, I need to make unnecessary paperwork.' 
Perspective on the Prosecution Service (Q19) 'Prosecutors put more emphasis on the 
investigation than the maintenance of prosecution.' 
71 ibid 172. 
72 John R. Rizzo, R. J. House and Sidney I. Lirtzman. 'Role Conflict and Ambiguity in Complex 
Organizations' (1970) 15(2) Adm Sci Q 150, 156. 
73 John Schaubroeck, John L. Cotton and Kenneth R. Jennings. 'Antecedents and Consequences of Role 
Stress: A Covariance Structure Analysis' (1989) 10(1) J Organ Behav 35, 44. 
74 ibid 53. 
75 'bid 44. 
76 ~wan-Beom Lee op. cit.; R. Kenneth Teas. 'An Empirical Test of Models of Salespersons, Job 
Expectancy and Instrumentality Per~eptions'.(19~1) 18(2) J Market ~es 209. 
77 Hak-Bae Kim op. cit.; Jong Gu Kim op. CIt. MI-Young Hong op. CIt. 
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Secondly, work experience was surveyed with two items: rank and years of service. For 
the measurement of years of service, the item was recorded on a scale of one to twenty-
one. Similarly, rank of police officers was recorded on a scale of one to six. 
After all scales were completed, they had been pre-tested by use of 112 samples of 
police officers in the investigation development courses of the Police Investigation 
Academy (Seoul) in June of 2010.78 The result of the pilot test was examined based on 
statistical methods such as confirmatory factor analysis and Cronbach's coefficient 
alpha.79 Some of items were further modified as a result. In total, 37 items composed of 
the final survey questionnaire.8o Most of items were measured by five-point Likert 
scale (from 'Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree' with a 'Neutral' option).81 
In particular, this study was not only designed to observe job stress for police 
investigators in the relationship with prosecutors, but it also constructed to compare the 
results with those of surveys on normal police officers and police investigators in the 
relationship with their superiors: 
Group 1 - Police investigators (N=623) who gave their perspectives on the organisational 
characteristics and job stress in the relationship with prosecutors. 
Group 2 - Police investigators (N=107) who provided their views on the organisational 
characteristics and job stress in the relationship with superiors. 
Group 3 - Normal police officers (N=414) who presented their ideas on the organisational 
characteristics and job stress in the relationship with superiors. 
However, the questionnaire for police investigators, which is referred to as 'Type-A' 
survey, could not be applied to police officers in Group 2 and 3. Hence, 12 items for 
78 The pilot test was carried out in the Korean Police Investigation Academy from 20th to 27th June 20 I O. 
Of the 120 surveys that were distributed, 112 usable surveys were collected. The surveys were sent to a 
designated contact person in the training department who then distributed the questionnaires to the 
respective administrators to coordi?ate training programmes. The surveys were com~l~ted before or after 
the training session. Upon completion, the surveys were gathered by the course admmlstrator. Then, they 
were turned over to the researcher via the contact person. 
79 For the details on statistical methods, see below 'Statistical Methods' 
80 See a copy of Type-A questionnaire in the Appendix. 
81 Likert scale is one of the most common techniques for conducting an investigation of attitudes, which 
is a prominent area in muc.h survey re~ear~h. ~ith regard t~ the. value of Likert scale, Bryman stated that 
'The Likert scale is essenttally a multiple-indicator or multiple-Item measure of a set of attitudes relating 
to a particular area. The goal of the Li~ert scal~ is to me.asure intensity of feelings about the area in 
question. In its most common format, It cO.mpnses a senes.of.statem~nts (known as 'items') that focus on 
a certain issue or theme. Each respondent IS then asked to mdlcate hiS or her level of agreement with the 
statement.' See Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford; New 
York 2008) 748, 146. 
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'communication', 'autonomy', and 'process' were slightly modified to ask the 
relationship of police officers with their superiors. This questionnaire was referred to as 
'Type-B' survey.82 In Type-B questionnaire, for instance, the term of 'prosecutor' was 
replaced by 'superior': 
Communication (Q7) 'I frequently participate in the decision making process by 
superiors. ' 
Autonomy (Q14) 'I often do not feel responsibility to my work because superiors decide 
almost everything.' 
Process (QI6) 'For the supervision of superiors, I need to make unnecessary paperwork.' 
4.2. Statistical Methods 
To analyse the data, statistical methods were used. First of all, in order to assess the 
reliability and validity of the questionnaire as well as the analytical model, confirmatory 
factor analysis was carried out by use of AMOS 18.83 In addition, Cronbach's alpha 
was computed to summarise the internal consistency of the resulting subscales using 
PASW 18.84 Then, as the items were recorded in ordinal scale, non-parametric tests 
were employed to find out the degree of difference in the opinions of police officers in 
three sample groups. 85 However, such comparisons between groups cannot be 
necessarily used to make inference of a causal relationship.86 Hence, more detailed 
82 See a copy of questionnaires in the Appendix. 
83 Kim and Muller identified factor analysis as 'a variety of statistical techniques whose common 
objectives is to represent a set of variables in terms ofa smaller number of hypothetical variables.' In 
particular, factor analysis can be separated into two categories: exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis. Exploratory factor analysis may be described 'as an expedient way of ascertaining the minimum 
number of hypothetical factors that can account for the observed covariation, and as a means of exploring 
the data for possible data reduction.' In contrast, confrrmatory factor analysis refers to 'a means of 
confuming a certain hypothesis, not as a means of exploring underlying dimensions.' For instance, the 
researcher anticipates that there are two different underlying dimensions and that particular variables 
belong to one dimension while others belong to the second. In this circumstance, confirmatory factor 
analysis is employed to test such expectation. For more details, see Jae-On Kim and Charles W. Mueller, 
Introduction to Factor AnalysiS: What it is and how to do it (Sage Publications, Inc, 1978),9; Barbara M. 
Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS: Basic Concepts, Applications, and Programming (2nd 
edn Routledge, New York; Hove 2010) 
84 Cronbach's alpha is a commonly used test ofintemal consistency. A computed alpha coefficient varies 
between I (referring to perfect internal reliability) and 0 (referring to no internal reliability). For more 
details, see Alan Bryman op. cit. 149-153 and Paul R. Kinnear and Colin D. Gray, SPSS /6 Made Simple 
(lst edn Psychology Press, ~ove, East Sussex; New York ~008), 428-435. 
8S Such a statistical method IS generally used to compare different groups of samples. In particular, as in 
this study, it can be employed for the ordinal scales. For ~or~ details on a comparison of data, see Kultar 
Singh, Quantitative Social Resea~ch M"ethods ~Sage .Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2007), 122-176. 
86 pamela A. Collins and A. C. Gibbs. Stress 10 Police Officers: A Study of the Origins, Prevalence and 
Severity of Stress-related Symptoms within a County Police Force' (2003) 53(4) Occupational Medicine 
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information on differences was considered with reference to the results of correlation 
and multiple regression analysis. 
These two statistical methods were generally used to measure the relationship 
between variables. 87 Firstly, by use of correlation analysis, the strength and the 
direction of association between variables were observed. 88 Bryman and Cramer 
suggested that 'Correlation entails the provision of a yardstick whereby the intensity or 
strength of a relationship can be gauged. To provide such estimates, correlation 
coefficients are calculated. These provide succinct assessments of the closeness of a 
relationship among pairs of variables. ,89 Secondly, based on regression analysis, the 
strength and measure of the relationship between variables were determined by 
ascertaining the value of the regression coefficient.9o Regression analysis is a set of 
techniques which utilises the presence of an association between two variables to 
predict the values of the dependent variable from the independent variables 
(regressors).91 
5. Measurements of Properties 
Before analysing the hypothesised relationship in the structural model, the scales used 
to define abstract concepts were examined through the confirmatory factor analysis and 
Cronbach's coefficients alpha.92 Byrne stated about the importance of confirmatory 
factor analysis [CFA] as follows: 
[A]n important preliminary step in the analysis of full latent variable models is to test first 
for the validity of the measurement model before making any attempt to evaluate the 
256,258. 
87 Bryman and Cramer stated that 'Survey designs are often called correlational designs to denote the 
tendency for such research to be able to reveal relationships between variables and to draw attention to 
their limited capacity in connection with the elucidation of causal processes.' See Alan Bryman and 
Duncan Cramer, Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS 12 and 13: A Guide for Social Scientists 
(Routledge, London; New York 2005), 16; Kultar Singh, Quantitative SociarResearch Methods (Sage 
Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2007), 145. 
88 ibid 145; Bryman and Cramer op. cit. 213-222. 
89 ibid 214. 
90 Kultar Singh, Quantitative Social Research Methods (Sage Publications Pvt. Ltd, 2007), 145; Bryman 
and Cramer op. cit. 230-246; In this study, the non-parametric test, correlation analysis, and mUltiple 
regression .analysis were carried out by using PASW. F~r more details on this method, see Kinnear and 
Gray op. CIt. 
9\ ibid 436. 
92 Barbara M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS: Basic Concepts, Applications, and 
Programming (2nd edn Routledge, New York; Hove 2010); Bryman op. cit.; For more details on 
confirmatory factor analysis and Cronbach's coefficient alpha, see above nn 83, 84. 
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structural model. Accordingly, CFA procedures are used in testing the validity of th 
indicator variables. Once it is known that the measurement model is operating adequately, 
one can then have more confidence in findings related to the assessment of the 
hypothesized structural model.93 
Firstly, two models (Model A and B) were examined through the A Y u f 
AMOS 18. As seen in Figure 8.2, Model A was a causal structure mod I which ha five 
factor variances. In Model B, one factor referring to the perspective n th pr uti n 
service was excluded as this model focused on the internal relati nship with superi r in 
the police organisation. In other words, Model A was created to test th d t in r up 1 
consisting of police investigators who responded to 'Type A' questi nn ir wh 
Model B was designed to test the data of Group 2 and 3 which were surv yed ed 
upon Type B questionnaire. However, Group 2 and 3, as discussed ab ve, w r di r nt 
from each other as they respectively represent police investigat r and n rm I p lice 
officers. 
Figure 8.2 A model to test job stress of police investigators (Model A) 
93 Byrne op. cit. 164. 
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Note. In this figure, double-headed arrows which represent correlations among the independent factors in 
the model are excluded for the purpose of simplicity. Nevertheless, such specifications are essential to the 
analysis. Indeed, they were added to test the models. 
Several fit indices were used to evaluate models. Table 8.3 presents the results of the 
CFA. As can be seen in the table, fit indices for all models were a significantly good fit 
to the data: CFI > .953, TLI > .945, RMSEA < .045,p < .01. 
Table 8.3 Goodness-of-fit statistics for the confirmatory factor analysis models 
Model Group N )(1 df P TLI CFI RMSEA 
A 623 935.209 451 .000 .945 .953 .042 
2 107 413.190 340 .004 .953 .961 .045 
B 
580.171 345 3 414 .000 .957 .963 .041 
Note I. )(1 = Minimum Discrepancy, df = Degrees of Freedom, P = Probability Value, TLl = Tucker-
Lewis Index (TLI yields values ranging from zero to 1.00, with values close to .95 or higher being 
indicative of good fit), CFI = Comparative Fit Index (A value >.90 was originally considered 
representative of a well-fitting model. However, at present, a value close to .95 has been advised to 
indicate a good fit to the data), RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation (Values less than .05 
indicate good fit, and values as high as .08 represent reasonable errors of approximation in the 
population)94 2. Three groups: Group 1 - Police investigators who gave their perspectives on the 
organisational characteristics and job stress in the relationship with prosecutors; Group 2 - Police 
investigators who provided their views on the organisational characteristics and job stress in the 
relationship with superiors; Group 3 - Normal police officers who presented their ideas on the 
organisational characteristics and job stress in the relationship with superiors. 
Secondly, Cronbach's coefficient alpha assessed the internal consistency of a 
measure. As Bryman stated, the researchers need to be sure that all their 'designerism 
indicators are related to each other. If they are not, some of items may actually be 
unrelated to designerism and therefore indicative of something else. ,95 In order to 
evaluate the internal consistency, the coefficient values were computed by PASW 18. In 
this study, scale reliabilities for the research variables, as can be seen in Table 8.4, were 
all higher than .70 which is typically employed as a rule of thumb to refer to an 
acceptable level of internal reliability.96 
94 ibid 78-80. 
95 Bryman op. cit. 150. 
96 ibid 151. 
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Table 8.4 Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the research variables 
Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 
(N = 623) (N'" 107) (N'" 414) 
Communication .772 .878 .856 
Autonomy .805 .742 .760 
Process .797 .S40 .SIS 
Perspectives on PS .714 .S06 .S41 
Role Conflict .846 .875 .863 
Role Ambiguity .882 .S53 .856 
Role Overload .801 .811 .726 
Job Stress .896 .916 .886 
In short, both the validity of models and reliability of surveys were found to be 
reasonably adequate to test the hypothesised structural models. As a consequence, as 
Byrne stated, the findings related to the assessment of hypotheses were trustworthy. 97 
6. Research Findings 
Research findings are discussed in three aspects. Firstly, organisational features were 
explored. Secondly, the impact of organisational and individual characteristics on the 
role stressors was investigated based upon correlation and regression analysis. Finally, 
the influence of role stressors on job stress was examined. In particular, the findings on 
the police investigators [Group 1] were compared with the results of Group 2 and 3. 
In terms of organisational features, four characteristics were set up as hypotheses: 
poor communication, low autonomy, inefficient work process and negative perspective 
on the prosecution service. Based upon the results of surveys and interviews, the 
validity of those predictions is examined in this section. 
6.1. Communication between the Police and Prosecutors 
As hypothesised [Hypothesis 4], police investigators experienced a low level of 
97 Byrne op. cit. 164. 
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communication with prosecutors. In particular, such an assumption wa c nfirmed again 
by the comparison with two other groups of police officers. 
54.8 per cent of police investigators in Group 1, as seen in Table 8.5 an w r d that 
they did not participate in decision making process by the prosecutors. 
Table 8.5 A comparison between groups for a variable of communication 
Positive Response 
(Agree and Strongly Agree) 
GI _ 10.3 
G2 _IBIIIBI_IBIIIBIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIBIIIBIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII' 48.6 
G 3 11111'l1li111IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII11IIII11IIIliliiiiIIIIIIII'11""1111"" 3 5.7 
G 1 IIIIIIIIIIIIBI 1 0.0 
G2 
G 3 11"'11" 11'1&11_1&111111"11111 'l1li"11 27.6 
45.8 
Que tion 
I frequently participate in d ci ion making pr c 
by the prosecutors/ superior . [Q7) 
Prosecutors/ uperiors are friend ly and 
approachable. [Q8] 
G 1 IIIIIIIIIl 7.4 
G2 
G 3 lBlilE' IIIIE ___ 'E"  24.7 
42.0 Prosecutors/ Superiors often ask me my opini n 
about their directions. [Q9] 
GI _ 8.3 
liiiiil 28.0 G2 
G3 1IIII_lIIIElIIIEilBI'II 20.0 
I frequently receive feedback from pro e ut rsl 
superiors. [Q 10] 
Note. Tn the tables of comparison between groups in terms of organisational characteristics, I, 2 and 
G3 respectively refer to Group 1,2 and 3: Group I - Police investigators who gav th ir p r pe tive n 
the organisational characteristics and job stress in the relationship with prosecutors; r up 2 - Poll 
investigators who provided their views on the organisational characteristics and j b tr in Ih 
relationship with superiors; Group 3 - Normal police officers who presented their id a n the 
organisational characteristics and job stress in the relationship with sllper/ors .. 
In contrast, only 10.3 per cent of respondents said that they were inv Iv d in u h a 
process. Similarly, 72.9 per cent of police investigators indicated that th prosecut r 
did not ask police investigators about the prosecutorial instructions. In particular, 1.6 
per cent of police investigators said that they did not rec ive feedback fr m the 
prosecutors. Interviews with detectives show how the prosecutorial instructi n ar 
passed to the police without communication: 
[P03-IS/] I've worked as a detective for 10 years. But I've never communicat d with 
prosecutors in terms of investigation. All decis ions regarding inve ligation hav been made 
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only by the prosecutors without discussion. That is one-sided communication. It's very rare 
for the police officer to communicate well with prosecutor. 
[P05-IS] When I worked in the Serious Crimes Division, I sometimes rang up prosecutors 
to discuss the process of investigations and to attain advice. Now, prosecutorial instructions 
are conducted only based upon documents. We receive just papers including prosecutorial 
demands and follow those instructions. 
As Mi-Yung Hong stated, police investigators tend to obey the instructions from the 
prosecutors even if such directions are perceived as unreasonable.98 Where the police 
investigators raise an objection against the prosecutorial supervision, the prosecutors 
rarely discuss such an issue with police investigators, but instead, they often ignore it or 
. .. al h . tth ffi 99 bnng cnmm c arges agams e 0 lcers. 
The lack of communication can be addressed by two aspects. Firstly, police 
investigations are in general conducted based on one-sided directions. The prosecutors 
make decisions without discussion with the police investigators. loo In addition, the 
prosecutors often order the police investigators to cease the investigation and to send the 
, ffi ·th .. 101 cases to the prosecutors 0 Ice WI out glvmg a reason. 
Secondly, police investigators do not have proper feedback from the prosecutors. In 
the organisational structure, feedback has been defined as on-going and timely 
information given by a supervisor regarding the job performance. 102 For instance, the 
results of investigations decided by the prosecutor can be significant feedback for the 
police investigators because such information can provide the police with praise, 
. d' .. 103 H th K recognition, suggesttons, an cntlclsm. owever, e orean prosecutors generally 
do not give such information to the police. In short, one-sided directions as well as 
98 According to the result of the survey, 68.1 per cent of respondents answered that they followed the 
unreasonable instructions from the prosecutors without refusing. See Mi-Young Hong, The Relationship 
between the Police and Prosecutors: A Survey (Korean National Assembly, Seoul 2005), 8. 
99 See pt 7 Discussion. 
100 Lee et a1. argued that 'one-sided decision-making process by the prosecutors causes conflicts between 
the police and prosecutors in Korea.' See Hwan-Beom Lee et a1. op. cit. 259. 
101 Hak-Bae Kim op. cit. 16 (Kim stated that 'the criminal cases involved with the prosecutors and their 
staff are generally investigated onl~ by ~e p~osecutors. Although the police investigators initiate 
investigations of those cases, ~uch mvestl~atlons are stopped by the pros~cution service.') 
102 R. Kenneth Teas. 'Supervisory BehaVior, Role Stress, and the Job Satisfaction of Industrial 
Salespeople' (1983) 20(1} J Market Res 84, 85 (T~as de~med feedback as '!he degree to which 
organizationally mediated performance feedback IS prOVided to a member. ); Montgomery et a1. op. cit. 
25-26. 
103 Ajay K. Kohli. 'Some Unexplore~ Sup~rvisory Beh~vio~ ~d their Influence on Salespeople's Role 
Clarity, Specific Self-Esteem, Job Satl~f~ctlon, and M~tlvatlon (1985) 22(4) J Market Res 424 (Kohli 
suggested that such various types of critique can have Impact on the role clarity.) 
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insufficient feedback generally result in the poor communication between the p lie and 
prosecutors. 
The results of surveys on Group 2 and 3 showed very di ffe rent fi gure. N rm I 
police officers (Group 3) had a much higher level of eommunieati n with their up ri r 
than police investigators (Group 1). In particular, police inve ti gator ( r up 2) in 
general, communicate much better with their superiors than with pr s ut h e 
differences between groups were statistically significant (Kruskal-Walli t, Xl = 
339.706, df = 2,p < .01).104 
6.2. Autonomy of Police Investigators 
As assumed [Hypothesis 7] , many police investigators consider d that th y h d I w 
degree of autonomy. More than half of the police investigator jndie t d that th y had 
difficulty in conducting investigations because of a lack of auton my. 
Table 8.6 A comparison between groups for a variable of autonomy 
Positive Response 
(Agree and Strongly Agree) 
, 
G 1 "" 




IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIliliiiililiiii111'" 3 S .3 
IIIIIII!IIIIIIIII_IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII 4 1. 1 
I I 65.S 
02 Mlilli iiiiili 58.9 
03 11111 I I 11111111111160.6 
01 ::::::::::::::::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:::: 56.S 
02 1111" 11' 1IIII_1IIII_1IIIII1IIIBI1E1l" 49.5 
03 :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::m::::::::::::::::: 52.2 
G 1 11111l1li" liliiiil1li'l1li' iIIIIIII' liliiiiIIIIIIII"'II1II"" 43 .5 
0 2 .'" iiii20.6 
G3 F""" illililiilill'28.3 
Questions 
I frequently feel difficulty in dealing with dutie 
due to lack of discretion. (Q II) 
I don't have many opportunitie t u e my per onal 
initiative or discretion.[Q 12] 
I have too much responsibility and t 0 ~ w mean 
to meet it. [Q 13) 
I often do not feel responsibility to the 
investigation/work because the pr secut rl uperior 
decides almost everything. [Q 14] 
104 The responses to these four questions were recoded into one variable with a cale r 11 to twenty by 
summing up the points of each item. Then, the differences between groups were computed by PA WIS. 
With a p-va1ue < .01 , the result is significant at the .0 I level. For more details on the 5t tistical test, se > 
Paul R. Kinnear and Colin D. Gray, SPSS 16 Made Simple (1st edn Psychology Press, H ve, a t u se ; 
New York 200S), 266-269. 
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As seen in Table 8.6, 52.5 per cent of police investigators in Group 1 said that they 
'frequently feel difficulty in dealing with duties due to lack of discretion'. On the 
contrary, only 13.6 per cent of respondents answered that they did not feel such 
difficulty. In addition, 56.8 per cent of police investigators indicated that they did not 
have sufficient discretion to fulfil their responsibilities. In particular, the low autonomy 
of police investigators was confirmed to result in a loss of responsibility. A large 
number of police investigators (43.5 per cent of respondents) said that they often did not 
feel responsibility to the investigation because the prosecutor decided almost everything. 
In contrast, the rate of police investigators who felt responsibility under the 
prosecutorial domination reached only to 29.3 per cent. As Hak-Bae Kim argued, 'a lack 
of autonomy of police investigators causes a loss of responsibility of the police. In 
practice, most police investigators carry out their duties in a passive way only by relying 
on the direction from prosecutors.' lOS This lack of autonomy has also led non-
cooperation from suspects, victims, and witnesses who consider the police investigation 
. . 'fi 106 to be an mSlgm lcant process. 
Finally, the level of a\,ltonomy of the police investigators in Group 1 was different 
from those of the other police officers in Group 2 and 3. Such a difference between 
groups was found to be statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis Test,)(l = 31.860, df= 2, 
P < .01).107 As seen in Table 8.6 [Q12 and 13], the degree of autonomy of police 
investigators under the prosecutorial domination was lower than two other groups. At 
the same reason, the level of difficulty [Q 11] which the police investigators felt during 
the investigation was higher than the other groups. Particularly, the level of lack of 
responsibility [Q14] resulting from prosecutorial domination was much higher than 
other police officers in different groups. For instance, the rates of police officers who 
responded that they did. not feel responsibility because superiors decided almost 
everything were respectively 20.6 per cent in Group 2 and 28.3 per cent in Group 3. 
However, as stated above, in Group 1, 43.5 per cent of police investigators indicated a 
lack of responsibility. 
6.3. The Efficiency of the Investigation Process 
police investigators in Korea can conduct investigations only under prosecutorial 
instruction. To have such an instruction, police investigators must submit document and 
105 Hak-Bae Kim op. cit. 16. 
106 ibid 17-18. 
107 For more information on statistical method, see n 104 above. 
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forms, and report the results of operations to the prosecutor as well a to their uperi r. 
Basically, those procedures are regulated by the rules made by the prosecut r ' .ffic . 
Such a work process causes inefficiency of police investigation [Hyp thesis 10]. A 
seen in Table 8.7, 58.1 per cent of police investigators in Group 1 said that th y had t 
fill out unnecessary paperwork for the direction of prosecutors. 














(Agree and Strongly Agree) 
1111 II 11111'63.9 
11111 54.2 
53.8 
lUI I 111111158.1 









1 frequently carry out dUlies based n c mpli aled 
procedure. [Q 15) 
For the direction of prosecutors! up rior , [ have 
to make unnecessary paperwork.[ 16) 
I have to report the result of p ration t my 
superior and prosecutor/ other sup ri r. [ 17] 
I frequently feel difficulty in ondu ting duti due 
to poor direction by prosecllt r/ lip rior. [ IS] 
In contrast, only 14.1 per cent of police investigators told that they did n t hav uch 
difficulty. In addition, a large number of police investigator (63.2%) rep fted their 
actions not only to the superior but also to the prosecutor. As a c nsequenc 3. p r 
cent of respondents in Group 1 indicated that they worked in a complicat d pr ce . L 
and others described such a circumstance as follows: 
The Korean police investigators have much difficulty in conducting investigation because 
they must h~ve instructions from the prosecutors even in an emergent itualion. In 
particular, the complex procedure for prosecutoria l supervision make the police 
. . ffi' 108 investigation me IClent. 
108 Hwan-Beom Lee et al. op. cit. 259. 
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Poor directions by the prosecutors were found to make the police investigators' work 
more difficult. 57.3 per cent of police investigators stated that they frequently had 
difficulty in conducting investigations due to poor directions by the prosecutor. Only 
13.6 per cent of respondents in the same group said that they did not have such 
difficulty. 
The supervisions in Korea are conducted by examining the documents prepared by 
the police investigators rather than by participating in investigations in the field. I09 
Prosecutors do not have much time to direct police investigations in a precise way 
because they have a large number of cases to investigate and to direct. 110 As a 
consequence, the directions by prosecutors do not sufficiently reflect real situations. III 
Such poor supervision has occasionally led to unnecessary work for the police 
investigators. 112 A police officer said that such a problem was not rare: 
[P03-ISJ] There are lots of prose cut oria I instructions which don't make sense at all. For me, 
I have sometimes ignored those ridiculous directions. One day, the prosecutor ordered me 
to drop by his office. So, I argued against his instruction in his office. 
Those views of police investigators are significantly different from those of other 
police officers in Group 2 and 3 (Kruskal-Wallis Test, ,Xl = 52.586, df = 2, P < .01 ).113 
The rate of police investigators who have to fill out unnecessary paperwork for the 
direction reached to 58.1 per cent [QI6]. However, for the nonnal police officers, such a 
rate was 36.0 per cent which is much lower than that in Group 1. Between Group 2 and 
3, there was no such difference. In other words, the prosecutorial domination caused the 
work process of police investigators to be inefficient by increasing paperwork and 
bureaucratic red tape. 
Differences can be easily observed in other items. The police officers in Group 2 and 
3 as well as police investigators in Group 1 pointed to complicated procedures [Q 15], 
double reporting to different superiors [Q17], and poor directions by the superiors [Q18]. 
However, the response rates which agree with the questions were all lower in Group 2 
109 Bo Hak Seo op. cit. 211-212. 
110 Hak-Bae Kim op. cit. 17. 
III Bo Hak Seo op. cit. (Professor Seo said that 'the direct investigation by the prosecutors is one of the 
main reasons to make the poor prosecutorial ~upervision. ') . 
112 According to the result of the survey admmlstered by MI-Young Hong, 60 per cent of police officers 
in her study answered that they ex?erienced u~easonable supervisions from the prosecutors, which were 
incompatible with the field operatlons. In. addltton, 72 per cent of!h.e sample population answered that 
they conducted unnecessary works resultmg from the poor supervIsIon by the prosecutors. See Mi-Young 
Hong op. cit. 13.. . . 
113 For more information on statistical method, see n 104. 
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and 3 than in Group 1. Consequently, as hypothesised, prosecutorial d minati n w 
confirmed to give rise to inefficiency in the police investigation . 
6.4. Perspectives on the Prosecution Service 
As expected, the prosecution service was regarded as another investigati n agency y 
the police rather than as a supervisory authority [Hypothesis 13]. In particul r a larg 
number of police investigators have negative ideas on the prosecuti n servi e and their 
supervision [Hypothesis 14]. 
A large number of police investigators (67.5 per cent of resp ndent in r up 1 a 
seen in Table 8.8, indicated that the prosecution service put m r mpha i n 
investigation than on prosecution. 
Table 8.8 A comparison between groups for a variable of per pectiv 
Negative Response 
(Disagree and Strongly Disagree) 
G 1 mU"lIIIIIlIIIIIlIIIBIlIIIBIlIIIBIlIIIBIiillllh illllJliii 67.5 
G 2 ge"m" IIIIIILQIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIBII_dn o. 1 
G3 _11IIIIIIIIliliiii11IIIIIIIIliliiii11IIIIIIIIliliiii 75 .3 









tlllB!lIIIIIlIlIIII!III"IIlIIII' 1IIIIl!lll'IID"" 5 6.0 
i i iii1 65 .9 
11111111 II 1111111 56.6 
""11 52.3 
liii i! Ii i i iilUIl 58.7 
1111111 111111 74 .0 
77.5 
Willi i iii Ii 111111172 .9 
Questions 
Prosecutors put more emph i n m intaining 
prosecution than investigating crime. [ I ) 
Prosecutor always protects the human rights and 
justice. [Q20) 
Prosecutorial supervisions alway rrc p nd with 
justice. [Q2 1] 
Prosecutors do not pass their burd n to the p Ii e 
through the instruction . [Q22] 
Only 9.7 per cent of police investigators said that the Korean prosecuti n ervice w 
interested in trial work. Police investigators have in general negative view n th 
prosecution service. Firstly, police investigators are sceptical about the pr s ut ri 1 
role as a protector of human rights and justice. 54.3 per cent f r spond I1t in r up I 
did not agree with that prosecutors always protected the human rights and justice [ 2 . 
In contrast, the rate of police investigators who agree with such a tatement wa nly 
3 7 
Chapter 8 Impact on Police of the Police and Prosecutors Relationship 
3.9 per cent. 
Secondly, police investigators were found not to trust the prosecutorial supervision 
in terms of justice. 56.6 per cent of police investigators did not agree with that the 
prosecutorial supervision always corresponds with justice [Q21]. Such an idea was 
supported only by 2.8 per cent of police investigators. As Hong argued, the police 
officers do not trust in the instructions from the prosecutors as they often infringe the 
rights of defendants rather than protect them. Only a small number of police 
investigators regard the instructions from the prosecutors as necessary to their 
investigations. 114 Finally, the prosecutorial instruction was mostly considered as a tool 
to transfer the workload of the prosecution service to the police. Seventy-four per cent 
of police investigators stated that prosecutors passed their workload to the police [Q22]. 
Unlike other results, a negative perspective on the prosecution service was 
widespread between the police irrespective of groups (Kruskal-Wallis Test, Xl = 8.441, 
df= 2,p > .01).1lS 
6.5. The Impact of Demographics and Organisational Features on the 
Role Stressors 
To assess the influence of individual and organisational characteristics upon the role 
stressors of police investigators [Group 1], firstly, correlations between research 
variables were analysed. Then, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed 
by means of the results of the correlation analysis. Finally, the differences between three 
sample populations were examined. 
6.S.1. Levels of Role Stressors, Demographics, and Organisational 
Characteristics 
The antecedent variables of the role stressors are demographics and organisational 
characteristics. 
Firstly, of demographics, as seen in Table 8.9, 'years of service' of respondents was 
inversely related to all role stressors: 'role conflict' (p < .01), 'role ambiguity' (p < .01), 
and 'role overload' (p < .05). Similarly, 'rank' of the police investigators had a 
relationship with role ambiguity (p < .01) and role overload (p < .01). 
114 Mi-Young Hong op. cit. 10-17 (Hong states that the majority of police officers do not trust instructions 
from the prosecutors as they often lose their objectivity while conducting investigations.) 
115 See n 104. 
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Table 8.9 Means, standard deviations (SD), and correlation coefficients for the variables in Group I (N = 623) 
Demographics 
I. Sex: Male (1) Female (1) 
2. Education (years) 
3. Work Area: City (1) -+ RuralArea (5) 
4. Rank: Lowest (J) -+ Highest (6) 
5. Years of Service 
Organisational Variables 
6. Communication: Worst (1) -+ Best (10) 
7. Autonomy: Insufficient (J) -+ Sufficient (10) 
8. Work Process: IneffICient (1) -+ Efficient (10) 
9. Perspective: Negative (1) -+ Positive (10) 
Role Stressors 
10. Role Conflict: Lowest (1) -+ Highest (10) 
11. Role Ambiguity: Lowest (1) -+ Highest (10) 
12. Role Overload: Lowest (1) -+ Highest (15) 
M SD I 2 
1.13 .33 




.94 -.020 -.035 
1.52 -.182" .144·· 
6.45 -.238·· -.188·· 
2.71 .102· -.007 
2.89 -.064 -.030 
2.72 -.150·· -.048 







.003 -.042 -.281·· 


















.116·· -.047 -.127·· -.205·· .409·· 
.024 -.255·· -.302·· -.158·· .250·· 









Note. The mean scores of organisational variables and role stressors as well as correlation coefficients were computed after recoding. Four observed variables in 
each factor based on a five point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree) were respectively recoded into one 
category with minimum score I and maximum score 20 by summing points assigned to responses for each factor. However, for 'role overload' factor, there were 
only three observed variables, and consequently, maximum score in the recoded category was 15. In addition, the scores of 'autonomy' and 'work process' were 
recoded such that a high score indicates a positive view on each variable, e.g. a high score of autonomy refers to sufficient autonomy. At the same reason, 'role 
ambiguity' was recoded to correspond with other two latent factors. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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In other words, high rank or experienced police investigators generally had a low level 
of 'role ambiguity' and 'role overload'. However, 'work area' was unexpectedly found 
to have a positive and significant relationship with 'role conflict' (p < .01). That is, 
police investigators who work in rural area had higher level of role conflict than those in 
city area. Apart from those three individual variables, 'sex' and 'years of education' had 
no relationship with role stressors. 
Secondly, all organisational variables had a significant and negative relationship 
with three role stressors (p < .01). That is, police investigators who have better 
communication with prosecutors or a positive perspective on the prosecution service 
had lower level of role stressors. In addition, sufficient autonomy and efficient work 
process were also respectively related to a low level of role stressors. 
To examine the relationship between demographics, organisational characteristics, 
and role stressors, hierarchical multiple regressions were conducted with three role 
stress dimensions as dependent variables. 1 The predictors were entered in two blocks. 
On the first step, demographic variables such as work area, rank, and years of service 
were entered.2 Then, four organisational features were entered on the second step. The 
results are presented in Table 8.10. 
Overall, demographics accounted for a small part of the variance in role conflict and 
role overload, respectively three and one per cent. However, ten per cent of the variance 
was explained by demographics in relation to 'role ambiguity'. In particular, 'years of 
service', which was employed to reflect the work experience of police investigators, 
was found to playa significant role in decreasing a level of role ambiguity (jJ = -.24). 
The work experience had a negative effect on role conflict (jJ = -.18) as well. Those who 
have much work experience had a low level of role conflict. With regards to 'work area', 
there was an unexpected outcome. Work area had an effect on a rise in role conflict of 
police investigators (j3 = .11). In other words, police investigators who work in rural 
areas have a higher level of role conflict. 
1 In order to examine the difference between effects of demographics and organisational features, 
hierarchical multiple regression was employed. For this analysis, as Pallant stated, 'Variables or sets of 
variables are entered in steps (or blocks), with each independent variable being assessed in terms of what 
it adds to the prediction of the dependent variable, after the previous variables have been controlled for.' 
For more information on hierarchical multiple regression, see Julie Pall ant, SPSS Survival Manual: A Step 
by Step Guide to Data Analysis Using SPSS/or Windows (3rd edn Open University Press, 2007), 147, 
160-164. 
2 Of the demographics, 'sex' and 'years of education' were excluded in the regression analysis because 
they were found to have no relationship with the role stressors. See Table 8.8. 
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Table 8.10 Hierarchical multiple regression analysis for role stressors (role conflict, role 
ambiguity, and role overload) 




Years of Service 
















Role Ambiguity Role Overload 
P R2 ~R2 P R2 ~ R2 









Note. This study had a relatively large sample (N = 623) to which Central Limit Theorem could be 
applied. As a result, there is no question on normality of the data.) Multicollinearity among independent 
variables and auto correlation problems of the data were examined by Tolerance test, Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF), and Durbin-Watson value. Firstly, none of the Tolerance values was 0.1 or less. All VIF 
values were well below 10. Finally, Durbin-Watson Values were from 1.7 to 2.0, which are between 
acceptable ranges, i.e., 1.5 - 2.5.4 
• < .05, .. <.01, ... < .001 
After controlling for demographic variables, organisational characteristics 
significantly contributed to the prediction of all three role stressors. Such characteristics 
explained thirty-five per cent of role conflict, sixteen per cent of role ambiguity, and 
thirty-one per cent of role overload. When examining individual predictors, firstly, role 
conflict was significantly predicted by 'work process' (j) = -.49) and 'perspectives on 
prosecution service CPS), (j) = -.11). Police investigators who scored low on 'work 
process' and 'perspectives on PS' reported a high level of role conflict. Secondly, 
3 For more information on Central Limit Theorem, see Thomas H. Wonnacott and Ronald J. Wonnacott. 
Introductory Statistics (4th edn John Wiley & Sons, 1985). 163-165; Prem S. Mann. Introductory 
Statistics (6th edn John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 309-310; Sheldon M. Ross. Introductory Statistics (3rd edn 
Academic Press, London; New York 20 I 0), 304-311. 
4 Pallant op. cit. 155-156. 
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'autonomy (8 = -.18)' and 'perspectives on PS (8 = -.1 0)' significantly predicted the r Ie 
ambiguity of police investigators. Those, who scored lower on 'autonomy' or more 
negative on 'perspectives on PS,' had higher levels of role ambiguity. Finally, the 
impact of 'work process' on the role overload was statistically significant (fJ = -.5 ). 
Those who regarded the investigative process as inefficient had a high level f r I 
overload. 
Taken together, as hypothesised [Hypothesis 8], police investigat rs wh r p rted 
lower levels of autonomy experienced greater levels of role anlbiguity. Hyp the i II 
and 12 were confirmed: police investigators who experienced inefficiency re ulting 
from double reporting system under the prosecutorial domination indicated higher 
levels of role conflict and role overload. Hypothesis 15 and 16 were als c nfirmed: 
police investigator who had the negative perspectives on pr secuti n ervice 
experienced greater levels of role conflict and role ambiguity. Finally gr at r w rk 
experience, as hypothesised [Hypothesis 17 and 18] 1 d to low r I vel f ri c nflict 
and role ambiguity. However, surprisingly, lack of communicati n b twe n p Ii 
investigators and prosecutors had no significant effect on role conflict [Hyp th i 5] 
and role ambiguity [Hypothesis 6]. In addition, contrary to Hypothesis 9 lower level f 
autonomy had no effect on role overload. Such results are presented in Figur 8.3. 
Figure 8.3 The impact of demographics, and organisational characteristics on role 5tr S5 r 
WOIlK 
1':XI'f:nmNCli 
Note. [---.~] denotes con finned hypotheses, whereas [ - - - - ... ] refers to rejected pr dicti n . 
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6.5.2. Comparisons between Sample Populations 
The overall level of role stressors of police investigators and normal police officers in 
Group 1, 2, and 3 is shown in Table 8.11. The scores of police investigators in Group I 
were compared to the mean scores of two other groups. 
Table 8.11 Mean scores of role stressors for police investigators in Group 1 and comparison 
groups 
Role Stressors Group J: Comparison Groups • Police Investigators 
(N=623) 
Group 2: Group J: 
Police Investigators Normal Police Officers 
~N= 107~ ~N-414~ 
M SD M SD M SO Xl 
Role Conflict 13.42 2.69 12.17 3.22 13.04 2.90 IS.61"· 
Role Ambiguity 11.26 2.80 9.90 2.70 10.79 2.S9 22.4S"· 
Role Overload 10.6S 2.07 10.18 2.2S 9.78 1.97 47.17'" 
Note. The mean score was based on a five-point scale. The scores were recoded to compare and analyse. 
For more details on recoding, see a note in Table 8.8. 
a Two groups, as stated before, were separated by work department and different work conditions: 
Group2 - Police investigators (N = 107) provided their views on the organisational characteristics and job 
stress originated from their relationship with superiors; Group3 - Normal police officers (N ... 414) 
presented their ideas based on the relationship with superiors. Unlike these groups, Group I focused on 
police investigators (N = 623) and their relationship with prosecutors. For more details, see Part 4.2 
[Measures] . 
• < .05, .. <.01, ••• < .001 
The levels of role stressors of police investigators in Group 1 were higher than those 
of other police investigators and normal police officers in Group 2 and 3. Firstly, the 
, 
mean of role conflict that police investigators in Group 1 scored was 13.42, which is 
greater than that of normal police officers. However, in terms of relationship with 
superiors, the police investigators reported lower level of role conflict (M = 12.17) than 
normal police officers (M = 13.04). In other words, the prosecutorial domination played 
a significant role in increasing the level of role conflict of police investigators. Such 
differences were statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis Test, X' = 15.61, df = 2, P 
< .001). 
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Secondly, the levels of role ambiguity were also significantly different from each 
other (.r = 22.45, df = 2, p < .001). In particular, the police investigators having a 
relationship with prosecutors scored the highest in the dimension of role ambiguity (M = 
11.26). However, as in the dimension of role conflict, the police investigators in Group 
2 reported lower level of role ambiguity (M = 9.90) than normal police officers (M = 
10.79). That is, ambiguity was the result of the relationship with the prosecutors. 
Finally, the level of role overload of the police investigators in Group 1 (M = 10.65) 
was also higher than that of other sample populations. However, unlike other 
dimensions, police investigators in general had higher level of role overload than 
normal police officers (M = 9.78) regardless of group. However, the level of role 
overload of police investigators increased in the relationship with the prosecutors from 
10.18 to 10.65. Those differences were also statistically significant (.r = 47.17, df = 2, p 
< .001). In short, the police investigators who work with prosecutors experienced 
greater levels of role stressors than their counterparts in other circumstances. In addition, 
differences were found in the relationship between demographics, organisational 
features, and role stressors. 
To assess the relationship between demographics, organisational features, and role 
stressors in Group 2 and 3, hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed by 
entering same variables as in the analysis of Group 1. However, as stated earlier, 
'perspectives on prosecution service' was excluded from this analysis because it was 
constructed to measure only the relationship between the police and prosecutors for 
Group 1. The results are presented in Table 8.12. 
In this analysis, as in the results for Group I, demographics explained a small part of 
the variance. 'Years of service' predicted the role ambiguity for Group 2 at the 
significant level of 0.01. However, the role stressors of normal police officers in Group 
3 were not significantly affected by demographics. As a result, most of the variances 
were accounted for by organisational characteristics resulting from the relationship with 
their superiors. Those organisation features explained respectively thirty-seven and 
forty-six per cent of role conflict, sixteen and eleven per cent of role ambiguity, and 
thirty-one and thirty-two per cent of role overload in Group 2 and 3. However, 
individual predictors which have a significant effect on role stressors were very 
different between groups in three aspects. 
Firstly, 'communication' with prosecutors was not a significant factor for role 
stressors for Group 1. 
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Group2: Police Investigators (N = 107) 
Role Conflict Role Ambiguity Role Overload 
p L\R2 P AR.Z P AR2 
.04 .07· .03 
-.14 -.06 -.13 
.09 .22 -.13 
-.25 -.44" -.08 
.37'" .16" .31'" 
-.06 -.25' .25" 
-.09 -.02 -.13 
-.50'" -.14 -.50'" 
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Group3: Nonnal Police Officers (N = 414) 
Role Conflict Role Ambiguity Role Overload 
P t\R2 P ,1R2 P ,1R2 
.00 .03'· .01 
-.05 .02 -.09 
.01 -.04 -.17 
-.06 -.15 .11 
.46'" .n··· .32'" 
-.16'" -.25'" -.04 
-.16" -.12
0 -.04 
-.52'" .04 -.53 •• 
0 
Note. The data for this analysis were, as in Group I, normally distributed. Multicollinearity among independent variables and auto correlation problems of the data 
were not detected: none of the Tolerance values was 0.1 or less. All VIF values were well below 10. Durbin-Watson Values were between acceptable ranges: 1.73 < 
DW<2.16. 
* < .05, ** <.01, *** < .001 
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However, in other groups, 'communication' with superiors significantly predicted role 
stressors: role ambiguity (ft = -.25) and role overload (ft = .25) in Group 2; role conflict 
(ft = -.16) and role ambiguity (ft = -.25) in Group 3. In the relationship with superiors, 
poor communication was reported as a significant factor to increase the level of role 
ambiguity of both police investigators (ft = -.25) and normal police officers (ft = -.25). In 
addition, for normal police officers, poor communication with their superiors resulted in 
a high level of role conflict (ft = -.16). 
Secondly, a high level of role conflict of police investigators in Group 1 was mainly 
explained by inefficient work processes and negative perspectives on prosecution 
service. However, the level of role conflict of normal police officers was accounted for 
not only by 'work process' (ft = -.52), but also by 'communication' with superiors (ft = -
.16) and 'autonomy' (ft = -.16). 
Finally, unlike Group 1 and 3, 'autonomy' was not a significant predictor for the role 
stressors of police investigators in their relationship with superiors. In other words, 
when it comes to the relationship with superiors, the police investigators did not 
experience a lack of autonomy which has an effect on role stressors. In short, the levels 
of role stressors between police investigators and normal police officers were different. 
Such a difference became more apparent in relationship with prosecutors. 
6.6. The Impact of Role Stressors on Job Stress 
At the first stage in the structural model, the relationship between demographics as well 
as organisational features and role stressors was explored. To verify the rest of the 
sequence, this part deals with the relationship between role stressors and job stress. 
6.6.1. Levels of Role Stressors and Job Stress 
To examine the impact of role stressors on job stress of police investigators in Group I, 
firstly, correlation analysis was performed. Table 8.13 presents correlation coefficients 
between role stressors and job stress. As predicted, three role stressors had a significant 
and positive relationship with job stress (p < .01). Police investigators who experienced 
a high level of role stressors (role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload) reported 
greater level of job stress. 
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Table 8.13 Means, standard deviations (SO), and correlation coefficients for Group 1 (N= 623) 
Role Stressors 
1. Role Conflict: Lowest (1) - Highest (20) 
2. Role Ambiguity: Lowest (1) - Highest (20) 
3. Role Overload: Lowest (1) - Highest (15) 
Job Stress 
















Note. The mean scores of job stress and correlation coefficients were computed after recoding variables. 
Four observed variables in job stress based on a five point scale (J = Strongly Disagree. 2 .. Disagree. 3 
= Neutral. 4 = Agree. 5 = Strongly Agree), as in the analysis of role stressors, were recoded into one 
category with minimum score 1 and maximum score 20 by summing points assigned to responses . 
• p < .05, •• p < .01 (two-tailed) 
Secondly, multiple regression analysis was conducted with job stress as a dependent 
variable in order to explore the impact of role stressors on job stress. Regression results 
in Table 8.14 show that the three significant and positive relationships between role 
stressors and job stress in the correlation analysis remained significant in the 
multivariate models. Such characteristics explained forty-nine per cent of job stress of 
police investigators in Group 1. When exploring individual predictors, job stress was 
predicted by all three role stressors: role conflict (j3 = .16), role ambiguity (j3 = .11), and 
role overload (j3 = .58). In other words, as hypothesised [Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3], the 
increase of levels of each role stressors resulted in raising the level of job stress. 
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Taken together, in the causal structure for Group 1, organisational fi atures and 
demographics had an effect on job stress of police investigators via three role stressors. 
Such relationships are collectively presented in Figure 8.4. 
Figure 8.4 The results of analysis and structural model for Group 1 
WOIU( 
EXl'll lUl(N(;Ii ..... .,. .. , ........ ; .. ... ... " 
, , , , 
, , 
, , 
Note. [--•• ] denotes con finned hypotheses, whereas [ - - - - .. ] refers to rejected pr dictions. 
According to the results of the causal structure model, 'work process' had an effect 
on job stress by way of 'role conflict' and 'role overload. ' Similarly, 'perspective n 
the prosecution service' influenced job stress via 'role conflict' and ' role ambiguity.' 
However, 'autonomy' had an impact simply on 'role ambiguity' . Nevertheles , such an 
influence also increased the job stress of police investigators. 
Finally, 'work experience' had an inverse impact on ' role conflict and ' role 
ambiguity'. As a consequence, experienced police investigators had comparatively 
lower level of job stress because the factor played a role in reducing th level f two 
role stressors. As previous studies noted, work experience is helpful to deer a e I vel 
of job stress of police officers. l For instance, in the study of stress among US marshals 
I Vivian B. Lord. 'An Impact of Community Policing: Reported Stressors, Social Support, and Strain 
among Police Officers in a Changing Police Department' (1996) 24(6) Journal of Criminal Justic 503, 
515-516 (Lord argued that 'Experienced sergeants may have discovered other means to cope with tres 
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Newman and Rucker-Reed argued that police officers 'who chose to remain in police 
work throughout their careers eventually adapted to the job-related stressors and 
experienced a decrease in their stress levels.,2 In general, the police come to understand 
their roles more clearly and how to achieve a high level of performance as they gain 
more work experience.3 However, the effect was not considerable. 
6.6.2. Comparisons between Sample Populations 
In order to compare the job stress between the police investigators and normal police 
officers, the impact of role stressors onjob stress in Group 2 and 3 was also explored by 
conducting multiple regression analyses. Table 8.15 presents the results of such analyses. 






* < .05, U <.01, u* < .001 
Job Stress 
Group2: Police Investigators 
(N= 107) 





Group3: Nonnal Police Officers 
(N= 414) 





As in the analysis for Group 1, role stressors explained a large portion of job stress for 
both groups: forty-seven per cent for Group 2 and forty-eight per cent for Group 3. 
However, job stress for police investigators in Group 2 was accounted for mainly by 
or may have less stress in general than inexperienced sergeants. It is a hopeful indicator that less stress 
comes with experience andlor age. '); Robert J. Kaminski and David W. M. Sorensen. 'A Multivariate 
Analysis oflndividual, Situational and Environmental Factors Associated with Police Assault Injuries' 
(1995) 14(3) Am J Police 3; Deborah W. Newman and M. LeeAnne Rucker-Reed. 'Police Stress, State-
Trait Anxiety, and Stressors among US Marshals' (2004) 32(6) Journal of Criminal Justice 631; Burke and 
Mikkelsen op. cit. 72-75 (Burke and Mikkelson suggest that police officers who had longer police tenure 
reported less cynicism. Moreover, such officers were found to report higher levels of meaningful work.) 
2 Newman and Rucker-Reed op. cit. 634; However, in other studies, work experience is occasionally 
found not to have an impact on the job stress. See Collins and Gibbs op. cit. 259; Peter M. Marzuk and 
others. 'Suicide among New York City Police Officers, 1977-1996' (2002) 159(12) Am J Psychiatry 2069 
(Marzuk et al. found that 'Marital problems, alcoholism, and job suspensions are the most important 
individual characteristics associated with police suicides ... [However] Age, race, years of service, and 
rank were not associated with this risk. '); Montgomery et al. op. cit. 30. 
3 Kaminski and Sorensen op. cit. 30-38; Burke and Mikkelsen op. cit. 72-79. 
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'role overload' (j3 = .l6). Role conflict and role ambiguity did not reach conventional 
significance threshold. In contrast, for the normal police officers [Group 3] all three 
role stressors were found to be statistically significant factors which have an efli ct n 
job stress: role conflict (j3 = .28), role ambiguity (j3 = .08), and role overload (j3 = .5 1). 
As the results in Group 1, a high level of role stressors resulted in a greater J vel f job 
stress. 
I 
Figure 8.5 collectively shows the results of analyses for Group 2 and 3. When it 
comes to the relationship with superiors, organisational charact ristics did n t have 
much effect on job stress of police investigators. Autonomy and work proces were not 
significant variables leading to job stress for police investigator. H wever, p r 
communication with superiors resulted in the increase of job stre s through r Ie 
overload. Work experience was also a significant factor to reduce job stress a m r 
experience led to a lower level of job stress by decreasing role ambiguity. 
Figure 8.5 The Results of Analysis and Structural Models for Group 2 and 3 
Group2: Police Investigators 




Group3: Normal Police effie rs 
(N = 4 14) 
",ORK 
IlI'fRlI\U 
Given the causal structure of Group 2, in which only role overload had an impact n j b 
stress, most factors causing job stress of the police investigators, as sh wn in • igur - 8.4 
were found to result from the relationship with the prosecutors. 
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For the normal police officers, work experience was not a significant variable. 
However, their communication with superiors was one of the most important elements 
predicting job stress. Communication had an impact on two role stressors leading to job 
stress - role conflict and role ambiguity. In addition to communication, autonomy and 
work process influenced job stress by means of two different role stressors, e.g. role 
conflict and role ambiguity for autonomy and role conflict and role overload for work 
process. 
The overall level of job stress of police investigators and normal police officers is 
presented in Table 8.16. The mean score of job stress for police investigators in Group 1 
was compared to that of Group 3.4 
Table 8.16 Mean scores of job stress for police investigators in Group I and comparison groups 
Group J: Group 3: 
Police Investigators Normal Police Officers 
(N= 623) (N= 414) 
M SO M SO 
Job Stress 14.55 2.90 14.00 2.91 
z -3.09·· 
Note. The mean scores were based on a five-point scale. However, for comparison and analysis, the 
scores were recoded. For more details on recoding,see the note in Table 8.8. 
• For more information on comparison groups, see note in Table 8.10 
• < .05, •• <.01 (two-tailed) 
A significant difference was indicated between Group 1 and 3 at the .01 level (Mann-
Whitney U Test, p < .01).5 As hypothesised [Hypothesis 19], due to the prosecutorial 
4 The comparison to the Group 2 was not shown in the Table 8.15. The items for job stress were 
constructed to examine a general level of job stress for police investigators. Subsequently, there was no 
significant difference between Group 1 and 2. The mean level of job stress for the police investigators in 
Group 1 was slightly higher than that of police investigators in Group 2. Police investigators in Group I 
scored 14.55 on average, which is .02 higher than other police investigators in Group 2. However, the 
difference between two groups was found not to be significant at the .05 level (Mann-Whitney U Test, p 
= .941). That is, police investigators in Group 1 and 2 had a similar level of job stress. 
S It is very difficult to indicate whether the difference between stress levels is significant or not because 
of a lack of empirical studies dealing with the relationship between the police and prosecutors. However, 
such a difference seems to be similar to that of other previous studies although the level of job stress for 
Korean police officers appears to be much higher than others. For instance, in Jamal and Baba's study, 
managers (M= 9.86) had a higher level of job stress than nurses (M= 9.16). See Muhammed Jamal and 
Vishwanath V. Baba. 'Job Stress and Burnout among Canadian Managers and Nurses: An Empirical 
Examination' (2000) 91(6) Canadian Journal of Public Health 454, 455; In another research of Jamal, 
workers working with non-standard schedules (M = 11.72) had a greater level of job stress than those with 
standard work schedules (M= 10.36). See Muhammed Jamal. 'Burnout, Stress and Health of Employees 
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domination, police investigators experienced a greater level of job stress than normal 
police officers. Indeed such an impact, as we have seen at the results of regression 
analyses, can explain a part of job stress for police officers. In other words, there should 
be a number of other elements which can have an effect on job stress. For instance, 
investigation or normal policing itself can make a difference in the level of occupational 
stress. Nevertheless, when considering the explanatory powers of each variable in this 
study, such a difference is an important finding because it can indicate that prosecutorial 
domination in the investigation process plays a significant role in causing the increase in 
job stress of police investigators. 
7. Discussion 
In this study, I performed a systematic comparison of how the organisational 
characteristics associated with the prosecutorial domination had an effect on job stress 
of police investigators. Through empirical observation, the level of job stress of police 
investigators was measured and a number of factors which have an impact on job stress 
of police officers were found. 
The most significant finding is that the police investigators experienced a higher 
level of job stress than normal police officers. Such a difference stemmed mainly from 
three aspects. The first aspect is the negative perspectives on the prosecution service. 
The Korean prosecution service, as seen in Chapter 3, dominates the criminal process. 
In particular, it places emphasis on the investigations which are conducted by 
prosecutors themselves. One of judges whom I interviewed said that the prosecution 
service does not exist in the Korean criminal justice system: 
[J4-IC] The Korean prosecutors consider the investigation as the most important function 
for themselves. They generally think they can increase their powers by conducting 
investigations. The Korean prosecution service is a power-oriented group. In this situation, 
if they don't investigate, they can't achieve their goal, that is, power. Judges often say, in 
Korea there is no prosecution service. Only two investigative agencies carry out their duties. 
The Korean prosecution service is another investigation agency. The prosecutors don't care 
for maintaining prosecution. They regard their role is finished when arrest the suspects and 
get confessions from them 
on Non-standard Work Schedules: A Study of Canadian Workers' (2004) 20(3) Stress Health 113, 117. 
Indeed, those figures were recalculated because of a different range of scales. 
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In this circumstance, as Jong Gu Kim stated, police investigators regard the prosecution 
service as another investigation agency.6 A police officer who works as a detective in 
the police station said that the prosecution service is a rival of the police: 
[P05-1S] The prosecutors like to investigate cases by themselves. The investigative 
prosecutors are more easily promoted to high position than other prosecutors. Generally 
they move to the good positions. ... The police agency and prosecution service are all 
equal investigative agencies. But the prosecution service deals with more important cases. 
For example, they investigate high profile civil servants, politicians, and entrepreneurs. By 
doing so, they gain praise from society. However, those investigations can be conducted by 
the police as well. The police can have sufficient ability to carry out such investigations. 
But, the prosecutors argue only they can investigate important cases. They behave as if only 
they owned those investigations. I don't like such a situation. Sometimes, we begin the 
investigation of important cases based on our own information. But, if the prosecutor orders 
us to send the cases to the prosecutors' office, we have to give them to the prosecutors. 
Such circumstances often take place. That is the most unsatisfactory event for the police.' 
As a consequence, a large number of police investigators do not trust prosecutor's 
quasi-judicial role by which the prosecutors are expected to protect defendant's rights 
and justice. 8 
The police investigators in general have negative perspectives on the prosecutorial 
supervisions. They do not think that prosecutor's direction is a significant method to 
protect defendant's rights. Instead, such direction is mostly regarded as a tool to transfer 
the workload of prosecutors to the police. In this situation, a high level of role conflict 
of police investigators must be a natural result. Notwithstanding their statutory role, 
police investigators often become confused whether they have to follow the instructions 
from the prosecutors or not. 
F or instance, in 2006, a superintendent, who worked at the police station in Kang-
Lung, was charged as a result of the rej ection of a prosecutorial direction.9 In this case, 
the prosecutor directed the police officer to bring a suspect into a police station for 
custody, who had been interviewed by the prosecutor. However, he refused such a 
6 Jong Gu Kim op. cit. 529-536. 
7 The interviews with legal professionals show that the Korean prosecution service focuses on 
investigation. For various statements of legal professionals, see ch 3 and 4. 
8 For more information on the quasi-judicial role of the prosecutors, see ch 3. 
9 2007 GOHAP 6 (2007) 48 Kakgong 30 April 2007 1713 (Chunchon District Court Kanglung Branch 
Court) 
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direction by arguing that the investigators working in the prosecutor's office should 
bring the suspect into the police station because such an activity is not the role of the 
police. In this instance, the police officer must have experienced the role conflict in 
which he was not sure whether to follow prosecutorial instructions or not. In the end, he 
rejected the prosecutorial instruction and was charged. 
There is another example which shows such 'role conflict' of the police investigator. 
In 2005, based upon the complaints, the Police Agency, which is the headquarters of the 
Korean police, issued a guideline directing the police officers not to bring the suspects 
of the prosecutor's offices into the police station although the prosecutors directed the 
police to do so. The National Police Agency (quoting the complaints from the district 
agencies) argued that 'the prosecutors' offices should deal with their suspects 
themselves because the investigation is conducted by the prosecutors themselves and 
they have sufficient resources to administer their work. ' However, this measure caused a 
conflict between the police and the prosecution service, and was abrogated by the 
decision of the government. IO A large number of police officers consider that some 
instructions from the prosecutors are misused as a tool to shift prosecutor's works onto 
the police. In this context, the police investigators experience role conflict because they 
have to follow a prosecutorial instruction which is incompatible with their perception on 
the role of the police. 
In addition to role conflict, the negative view on the prosecution service leads the 
police investigators to report a high level of role ambiguity. A large number of police 
investigators were not certain about the quasi-judicial role of the prosecution service. 
They rejected the idea that the prosecution service protects defendant's rights or a 
prosecutorial instruction corresponds with justice. II Police investigators are unclear 
whether the prosecutorial supervision is needed to protect the suspects and whether the 
prosecutors review the investigations with objectivity. Such a lack of clarity, as Hardy 
and Hardy suggested, leads to job stress by making role obligations vague. 12 This result 
corresponds with a previous study on the role ambiguity of the police officers stemming 
10 See Jae-Hyun Rho. 'The New Guideline of the Police Agency in relation to the Prosecutorial 
Investigation' fun-Hap News (7 November 2005) and Won Su Jung. 'Activities related to the 
Prosecutorial Investigation are not the Work of the Police' Dong-Ah I/-bo (8 November 2005) 
11 The Korean prosecution service argues that 'the criminal justice system needs prosecutorial supervision 
over the police investigation in order to protect human rights and due process.' See Hoe-Jae Kim. 'The 
Scope of Supervision of the Public Prosecutor over the Investigation of the Police' (Public Prosecutors' 
Office and Police Agency, Seoul 11 April 2005) 99-196, 122-124. 
12 Margaret Hardy and W. Hardy, 'Role Stress and Role Strain' in Margaret E. Hardy and Mary E. 
Conway (eds), Role Theory: Perspectives for Health Professionals (2nd edn Appleton & Lange, Norwalk 
1988) 159,76. 
324 
Chapter 8 Impact on Police o/the Police and Prosecutors Relationship 
from a lack of clarity on the role and purpose.13 Role conflict and role ambiguity 
affected by negative perspectives on the prosecution service result in a greater level of 
job stress. 
The second aspect is that prosecutorial domination causes a complicated and double 
reporting structure for the police investigation. Such complexities lead to role conflict 
and role overload resulting in an increase in job stress. In particular, where the 
instructions from superiors and prosecutors were incompatible each other, the level of 
role conflict must have been higher than normal. As lawahar and others suggested, role 
conflict takes place because the police investigators face incompatible demands and 
expectations from multiple role partners, which are not readily achieved at the same 
• 14 time. 
Such a situation often takes place in practice. In 2006, Young-II Kim, the Chief 
Inspector working at the Chung-Nam Police Agency, rejected prosecutor's direction 
based on the internal instruction. However, the prosecutor charged this police officer 
and he was convicted of: a violation of prosecutorial orders. IS Where two directions 
from superiors and prosecutors are incompatible each other, police investigators cannot 
help but experience the role conflict. 
In addition, as several police investigators said, the superiors in the police 
organisation are in general reluctant to give specific directions to the investigators: 
[P03-ISI] In terms of investigation, I've never received instructions from the superiors. 
They mainly ask me to quickly finish a case within due date. They haven't given me 
specific directions. 
[P05-IS] Mostly, the superiors don't give clear directions on the investigation. We always 
13 Jennifer M. Brown and Elizabeth A. Campbell, Stress and Policing: Sources and Strategies (John 
Wiley & Sons, Chichester; New York; Brisbane; Toronto; Singapore 1994),28·29 (Brown and Campbell 
suggest an example in regards to the role ambiguity resulting from a lack of clarity: 'there is a lack of 
clarity about the role and purpose of the police exemplified by two extreme pictures of the British police 
officer - the bobby on the beat exercising individual discretion and as a member of a riot squad 
functioning as a paramilitary officer. In Britain, the same officers may be required to perform both roles. 
There is no explicit evidence to demonstrate that flipping form community policing to riot control is a 
source of stress in itself. There is, however, an indication that exposure to public order duties is stressful. ') 
14 Jim I. M. Jawahar, Thomas H. Stone and Jennifer L. Kisamore. 'Role Conflict and Burnout: The Direct 
and Moderating Effects of Political Skill and Perceived Organizational Support on Burnout Dimensions' 
(2007) 14(2) International Journal of Stress Management 142, 149. 
IS 2007 GOHAP 4 (2007) 51 Kakgong 13 September 2007 2453 (Daejon District Court); Criminal Act 
[Hyungbeop) 1953. partia!ly ~ended o~ 29 July 200~ No.7623 art. 139 'A perso~ who, while perro~ing, 
or assisting m, pohce duties, mterfere With the execution by a prosecutor of functIons for the vmdlcatlon 
of human rights or who does not follow his instructions, shall be punished by penal servitude for not more 
than 10 years.' Cited/rom Korea (Republic) and Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Korean Criminal Code (The 
American series offoreign penal codes, F.B. Rothman, South Hackensack, N.J. 1960) 74·75. 
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report the results of investigation to the superiors. But, the decision is made only by the 
prosecutors. The superiors generally don't give different directions from the prosecutorial 
instructions. If! say 'prosecutors directed the case like this', then superiors rarely give their 
ideas on the case. 
This situation, as one superintendent pointed out, largely results in a lack of 
responsibility of the directors of the police investigation division: 
[P04-ISJ] In principle, prosecutorial directions are considered as more important than 
those from superiors. However, I think the directors of investigation division of the police 
should have responsibility for the investigation. If they face a complicated case, they are 
reluctant to direct the detectives. Instead, they order the subordinates to get the instructions 
from the prosecutors. They tend to avoid their responsibility. That's the big problem with us. 
Together with role conflict, police investigators experience a high level of role 
overload due to inefficient work process dominated by prosecutors. Such a high level of 
role overload consequently results in a rise in the job stress of police investigators. As 
Vagg and Spielberger suggested, excessive paperwork occurring with high frequency 
substantially contributes to the stress for most police officers. 16 A detective working at 
the police station in Seoul says that such a process is a waste of police workforce: 
[P05-IS] There are lots of petty offences. Two friends were in a small tight after drinking. 
In a minute, they made up with each other. However, the work of the police doesn't stop at 
this moment. We have to till out forms and send them to the prosecutors' office even though 
the cases are very trivial. Such a process is a waste of police workforce. It's not only a 
waste of time, but it's also inconvenient for citizens. If the police themselves can deal with 
those petty offences, it will save the time and money. But now we can't do that. 
This shows how the prosecutorial domination has an impact on role overload of police 
investigators and what their job stress is. 
Finally, the Korean police investigators feel that they do not have sufficient 
autonomy to fulfil their duties. The prosecutorial domination can be an important factor 
which diminishes the autonomy of the police. Professor Seo argued that 'in Korea, the 
16 Peter R. Vagg and Charles D. Spielberger. 'The Job Stress Survey: Assessing Perceived Severity and 
Frequency of Occurrence of Generic Sources of Stress in the Workplace' (1999) 4 J Occup Health Psychol 
288,288-289. 
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police officer has been regarded as one of the difficult occupations because they have 
lots of responsibilities without proper powers to conduct their duties. As a consequence, 
such a situation plays a significant role in destroying the morale of the police.' 17 This 
circumstance brings about a loss of ownership of case on part of the police. 
This results in a high level of role ambiguity of police investigators. As House and 
Rizzo suggested, the police do not see themselves as exercising discretion or taking 
responsibilities, and consequently, a lack of clarity and predictability of the outcomes of 
one's behaviour led to the role ambiguity. IS Such a role ambiguity, as seen in the results 
of previous studies on job stress of police officers, causes a rise in job stress for police 
investigators. 
The police investigators often do not feel ownership of case and tend to attribute the 
blame to prosecutors. The interview with a detective clearly shows such a loss of 
ownership: 
[P03-IS/] In the criminal process, there is no discretion that a police investigator can 
exercise. So, in cases that victims raise an objection to the results of investigation, I often 
talk to them thus: 'if you want to make a complaint, please go to the prosecutors' office. I 
haven't decided at all. Every decision was made by the prosecutors. I don't have tiny 
powers.' 
Such a problem is suggested not only by police officers, but also implied by a judge: 
[J2-IM] Now, the police investigators seem to conduct their duties without having 
responsibility. They mostly think that they don't need to pay much attention to the 
investigation of crimes because the prosecutors themselves investigate crimes again. As the 
police officers aren't provided with the powers to carry out investigations, they don't feel 
the responsibility for the results of Investigations. As a consequence, the Investigations 
can 'I be thoroughly conducted. 
In short, the prosecutor's complete control over the police investigation leads the 
police officers to avoid the responsibility for their investigation. The police rely on 
17 Bo Hak Seo, 'The Reasonable Allocation of Investigative Powers between the Police and Prosecutors' 
in Supreme Prosecutors' Office and National Police Agency (eds), Public Hearing/or Allocating 
Investigative Powers in Korea (SPO; NPA, Seoul 2005) 197, 209-211; Hak-Bae Kim op. cit. 18; Kuk Cho 
op. cit. 117-120; Dong-Hee Le~. 'A Comparative Study on the Structure of Crime Investigation 
Authorities in Korea and the Reform Strategy' (2004) 7 Korean Police Journal 146, 176-177. 
18 Robert J. House and John R. Rizzo. 'Role Contlict and Ambiguity as Critical Variables in a Model of 
Organizational Behavior' (1972) 7(3) Organ Behav Hum Perform 467, 474. 
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decisions made by prosecutors. As seen in the statement of a judge, prosecutors tend to 
keep police at arm's length from the responsibility. The police investigators lose any 
clear sense of their powers and responsibility, and consequently, have a high level of job 
stress. In this respect, the Korean criminal justice system needs to look carefully at the 
suggestion by Runciman report of Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) 
concerning prosecutorial supervision over the police investigation and a loss of 
commitment of the police: 19 
[W]e believe that the police should consult the CPS at the earliest possible stage in serious 
and complex cases where the sufficiency of evidence seems likely to be a serious issue, and 
that the CPS should be free to ask the police to search for further evidence before deciding 
fmally whether to continue the prosecution. But we do not consider it appropriate for the CPS 
to supervise police officers in the investigation. It is the responsibility of the police to 
investigate crime. There is no reason to believe that another service, whose members are 
recruited and promoted for their legal skills and experience, would be more proficient at 
investigating crime or at supervising and monitoring investigations conducted by those 
specifically trained for the purpose. Moreover, serious confusion of roles would be likely to 
result to no good purpose if the CPS, whose task is to assess the results of investigations in 
terms of the prospects of prosecution to conviction for the offence involved, were to direct 
investigations themselves. Such a step would also remove accountability in this area from the 
police, with whom it most naturally belongs. Although, therefore, the CPS must be in a 
position to advise on the evidence that is required if the case is to go forward to trial, it 
should not be in the position o/supervising the gathering of the evidence. 
Another interesting finding in this study is that the low degree of communication 
between police investigators and prosecutors, unlike predictions, does not have an effect 
on role stressors. In contrast, poor communications with a superior, which are observed 
in Group 2 and 3, have an adverse impact on the role stressors although such 
communications are reported better than those with prosecutors. In other words, normal 
police officers and police investigators communicate comparatively well with their 
superiors. Nevertheless, they experience a high level of role ambiguity. Such an 
interesting fact may be explained by a difference between face-to-face communication 
and information processing by depending on documents. 
19 Walter G. Runciman, 'The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Report' HMSO (Cm 2263, London) 
ch 2 para 67 (Emphasis added) 
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In the relationship with superiors, the communication is conducted based on face-to-
face method. However, the police investigators communicate with prosecutors mostly 
by documents. They send the documents to the prosecutor's office and receive a written 
instruction from the prosecutor. Therefore, the face-to-face communication rarely takes 
place between police investigators and prosecutors. Such information processing. as 
Marginson suggested, may play a significant role in decreasing the role ambiguity of 
1
., . 20 po Ice InVestIgators. 
Written documents, in most organisations, use a limited variety of language.21 They 
mainly convey facts which are restrictive in use and of interpretation. The information 
in the impersonal documents, as Roberts stated, tends to be aggregated, simplified, and 
relatively objective, reproducing the sequential complexity of the situation in more 
straightforward media. 22 Hence, unlike face-to-face communications, information 
processing based on documents may help the communicators to clearly understand what 
should be done and how it should be done. As a result, role stressors can be avoided or 
at least reduced by such a type of communication media?3 This avoidance or reduction 
of role Stressors is also noted in the interview with a police investigator: 
[P03-IS/] To be honest, it's more comfortable to communicate with prosecutors than with 
superiors. We don't need to meet the prosecutors, you know, face-to-face. We communicate 
through investigative documents. I don't need to wait in front of prosecutor's office. I don't 
need to explain the results of investigation in person because they are all in the papers. 
Actually, it is much clearer to communicate by documents than by face-to-face. And it can 
also save my time. 
Face-to-face communications can facilitate 'equivocality reduction' by leading 
communicators to overcome a difficult frame of reference and to be capable of 
processing complex and subjective messages?4 However, communication by depending 
20 David Marginson. 'Information Processing and Management Control: A Note Exploring the Role 
Played by Information Media in Reducing Role Ambiguity' (2006) 17(2) Management Accounting 
Research 187. 
21 ibid 189; Richard L. Daft and Robert H. Lengel. 'Organizational Information Requirements, Media 
Richness and Structural Design' (1986) Management science 554. 
22 John Roberts. 'The Possibilities of Accountability' (1991) 16(4) Accounting, Organizations and Society 
355. 
23 Daft and Lengel op. cit. 560 (Daft and Lengel suggest that 'Communication media vary in the capacity 
to process rich information. In order of decreasing richness, the media classifications are (I) face-to-face, 
(2) telephone, (3) personal documents such as letters or memos, (4) impersonal written documents, and (5) 
numeric documents. The reason for richness differences includes the medium's capacity for immediate 
feedback, the number of cues and channels utilized, personalization, and language variety. ') 
24 ibid 560. 
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on documents may be more effective because they process explicit messages and 
standard data.2s 
8. Conclusion 
The prosecutor's domination causes an adverse impact on the police investigation by 
monopolising most powers and making the police a supplementary agency. A large 
numbers of police investigators experience low autonomy, lack of ownership, ~d an 
inefficient work process. Moreover, they have negative perspectives on the prosecution 
service and prosecutorial supervision. Such experiences and views result in a high level 
of role stressors. As a consequence, as Hart and others and others suggested, job stress 
of police investigators is increased, and their job performance is downgraded.26 
There are few factors which offset such an impact. Only the work experience has a 
part to play in reducing the level of role conflict and role ambiguity of the police 
investigators. However, this influence is found to be very slight. As a result, the Korean 
criminal justice system needs to be reformed. The police and prosecution service have 
to find out their own roles which cannot be replaced by others. The prosecution service 
should focus its attention on reviewing the investigation and trial work. The 
investigation should be performed by the police on their own responsibility. 
However, this does not mean a complete exclusion of the prosecution service from 
the investigation. The police can take advice from the prosecutors in terms of 
investigation. At the same time, the prosecutors also need to ask the police to perform a 
particular investigation in order to conduct an effective prosecution. As a result, the 
police and prosecution service must cooperate for the criminal justice rather than 
conflict with each other. 27 
2' Marginson suggested that 'the sense of role clarity that is achieved through control reports is acquired 
irrespective of any deficiency or uncertainty in the information emanating from the general environment 
or significant others (e.g. the superior) about acceptable role behaviours. The person autonomously 
'knows' what should be done.' See David Marginson. 'Information Processing and Management Control: 
A Note Exploring the Role Played by Information Media in Reducing Role Ambiguity' (2006) 17(2) 
Management Accounting Research 187, 189. 
26 Peter M. Hart, Alexander J. Wearing and Bruce Headey. 'Police Stress and Well-being: Integrating 
Personality, Coping and Daily Work Experiences' (1995) 68(2) J Occup Organ Psychol 133, 150 (Hart et 
al. argued that' According to the empirical models reported in this paper, organizational, rather than 
operational, experiences are more important in determining psychological well-being. This is consistent 
with a growing body of evidence suggesting that police organizations are the main source of 
psychological distress among police officers. ') 
~7 Professor Fionda emphasised the co-operation between the prosecution service and the police as well 
as independence of the prosecution service: 'The importance of consultation and co-operation on a 
practical level between the police and the CPS cannot be underestimated in a process which requires 
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9. Study Limitations and Further Direction for Research 
Limitations of this study are some bias from leading questions and the restricted 
explanatory power for job stress. Firstly, a few questions in relation to the views of the 
prosecution service and its supervision may hint at the preferred or desirable answer. 
Efforts were made to minimise the effect of any leading questions. The survey was 
pretested to determine whether they were any suggestive questions and to monitor the 
relevance of the questions. Nevertheless, a few leading questions might influence 
response. However, the data, which were produced by those questions, showed 
conflicting views. This might indicate that leading questions did not have a significant 
impact on the response. 
Secondly, observed organisational and personal factors can explain only a part of the 
job stress. There may be other, unspecified variables which can account for the job 
stress for police officers. It would have been interesting to examine empirically more 
elements which have an effect on the job stress. Such information could have allowed 
the managers of the police agency or the policy makers for the relationship between the 
police and prosecutors to assess better the adverse impact of job stress of the police. 
However, such extensive variables were not included in this survey due to a couple 
of reasons. Firstly, there were not sufficient studies on the relationship between the 
police and prosecutors. In particular, empirical works on this relationship were hardly 
noted. As a result, I could not find proper variables to estimate the police investigator's 
stress which is influenced by prosecutor's preeminent position. Secondly, because of the 
limited length of the questionnaires, a large number of variables could not be included 
in the survey. 
In the future research, other various elements which have an impact on the job stress 
for the police investigators under the prosecutorial domination need to be considered. In 
addition, comparisons with other professionals such as prosecutors, judges, defence 
lawyers, and correctional officers can be useful. 
interdependence between each branch in order to operate efficiently .... At the same time, it is difficult for 
the CPS to perfonn to the required standards of objectivity without a finn and explicit statement of its 
independence. See Julia Fionda. 'The Crown Prosecution Service and the Police: A Loveless Marriage?' 




This study was designed to answer the following questions: to what extent does the 
prosecution service dominate criminal proceedings in Korea?; is that dominant position 
of the prosecution service appropriate to preserve the defendant's constitutional rights 
and to achieve efficiency in the criminal procedure?; and do the functions, discretion, 
and accountability of the Korean prosecution service correspond to the international 
standards? 
To research these questions, unlike previous studies, several empirical methods have 
been employed including content analysis, a survey based on self-completion 
questionnaires, and semi-structured interviewing. In addition, in order to gain insight 
into the Korean criminal procedure, the role, power and accountability of the Korean 
prosecution service are compared to those of five representative systems in England and 
Wales, the USA, France, Germany and Japan. 
This study has found that a ninety-nine per cent conviction rate does not 
demonstrate any great capability of the prosecution service. Rather, it leads to restricted 
constitutional rights of the defendants and meaningless trials which serve only to 
confirm the prosecutorial decisions. In addition, this domination over the criminal 
justice system and the powers of direct investigation increase occupational stress for 
police officers. This in tum leads to the performance of the police being downgraded, 
and as a result, inefficiency in the criminal justice system. 
The first finding is that the prosecution service plays a dominant role in the Korean 
criminal process and prosecutors focus their attention on investigation. The public 
prosecutors can decide: whether or not to initiate criminal investigations; how to end the 
investigations; what to charge; and whom to charge. Although the suspect has confessed 
to a crime and there is sufficient evidence to prove his guilt, they can suspend the 
prosecution instead of bring him to the criminal court. Moreover, they have an impact 
on outcomes of the trial by recommending a sentence and by appealing against verdicts 
as well as sentences. Due to these various functions, powers and discretion, the Korean 
prosecution service has been regarded as the most influential organisation within the 
Korean criminal justice which has sometimes been described as 'Prosecutorial Justice'. 
Occasionally, the Republic of Korea has been termed a 'Prosecutorial Republic' .1 
I Hee Su Kim et al. argued that 'the prosecution service is a very powerful organisation in Korea, and in 
fact, manipulates society by using its various powers and discretion. By conducting investigations of high 
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A key element among these functions is the investigation of crime. The Korean 
prosecutor focuses on this task and it is considered the most significant duty for the 
prosecution service. The Korean prosecutors, unlike other jurisdictions, have not only 
legal authority, but also sufficient resources to carry out their own investigations. All 
prosecutors' offices, even the Supreme Prosecutors' Office, have their own investigation 
units. In terms of prosecutorial investigation, the Korean prosecution service is one of 
the most developed systems in the world. 
Such a highly developed version of prosecutorial investigation embraces Packer's 
crime control model and can be explained as a result of Korea's history. The origins lay 
within the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945). Although modem criminal procedure 
was established in 1954, the Korean War (1950-1953) meant that there were very 
unstable social circumstances. The most significant objective in the establishment of the 
new system was to stabilise society with limited resources by controlling efficiently the 
offences against the state as well as individuals. 
One critical element in achieving that objective was to concentrate most powers in 
the criminal proceedings in the prosecution service, which was a nationalised and 
hierarchical organisation. The law provided that all police forces were subject to the 
orders from the prosecutors. Under this order-obedience relationship, most decisions in 
relation to the investigation and prosecution are made by prosecutors. The government 
is able to control every aspect of law enforcement through its oversight and influence of 
the prosecution service. 
At the same time, the Korean law opened what may be termed a "high speed rail link" 
from confessions to convictions in order to maximise efficiency by reducing the 
workload of the courts. That is to say, where the suspects confess to crimes before 
prosecutors, such confessions are not only accepted into evidence but their evidential 
impact is such that these will determine the outcome, namely conviction, despite the 
suspect's denials in court. For these reasons, Packer's crime control model illustrates 
well the Korean criminal process: 
The process must not be cluttered up with ceremonious rituals that do not advance the 
progress of a case. Facts can be established more quickly through interrogation in a police 
station than through the formal process of examination and cross-examination in a court ... 
profile cases, the prosecutors have gathered much information on politicians, entrepreneurs, and civil 
organisations, and have exclusively used such data. Due to the considerable powers of the prosecution 
service, the terms such as "Prosecutorial Republic" and "Prosecutorial Fascism" are often used to 
describe the prosecutorial potential. Indeed, this context leads the political party in power to control the 
prosecutorial decisions.' See Hee Su Kim and others, Prosecutorial Republic of Korea (Sam in, Seoul 
2011) 276, 147. 
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The criminal process, in this model, is seen as a screening process in which each successive 
stage - pre-arrest investigation, arrest, post-arrest investigation, preparation for trial, trial or 
entry of plea, conviction, disposition - involves a series of routinized operations whose 
success is gauged primarily by their tendency to pass the case along to a successful 
conclusion. What is a successful conclusion? One that throws off at an early stage those 
cases in which it appears unlikely that the person apprehended is an offender and then 
secures, as expeditiously as possible, the conviction of the rest, with a minimum of 
occasions for challenge, let alone post-audit. By the application of administrative 
expertness, primarily that of the police and prosecutors, an early determination of probable 
innocence or guilt emerges. Those who are probably innocent are screened out. Those who 
are probably guilty are passed through the remaining stages of the process.2 
The only distinctive feature of the Korean system which departs from this 
description is that facts are established, not in the police station, but through 
interrogation in the prosecutor's room. Such measures were introduced to safeguard 
suspects against brutal interrogation by the police but have meant that the problems are 
now centred in the prosecutor's office instead and have reduced a suspect's ability to 
challenge any confession, which will playa major role in determining the conviction. 
It can be argued that such measures contribute to effective crime control and 
prevention. The pre-eminent position of the prosecutors and their direct involvement in 
the investigation provides advantages. This can improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
in dealing with cases. Most important decisions in the criminal proceedings are taken by 
the prosecutors. They make a decision to initiate investigations, charge the suspects, 
maintain prosecutions, and recommend sentences. Thus, the decisions taken by the 
public prosecutors at an investigation stage progress seamlessly to verdicts and 
sentences without obstacles such as prosecutorial and judicial reviews. Packer termed 
this as 'an assembly-line conveyor belt': 
[It] moves [down] an endless stream of cases, never stopping, carrying the cases to workers 
who stand at fixed stations and who perform on each case as it comes by the same small but 
essential operation that brings it one step closer to being a finished product, or, to exchange 
the metaphor for reality, a closed file.) 





The Korean prosecution service seems to deal with a large number of cases in an 
effective and efficient way.4 This is shown by the very high conviction rate, exceeding 
ninety-nine per cent. 
However, the roles, duties, and discretion of the Korean prosecution service do not 
correspond to the international standards. The wide ranging powers and functions of the 
Korean prosecutor over the whole of the criminal justice system means that they can be 
convincingly described as 'monopolist'. Their role is very different from that in other 
representative systems where the prosecution service mainly plays a role as a filter with 
objectivity. 
In the English, US and French systems, the public prosecution service acts as a 
'supplementary filter.' In England and the USA, the police review cases as a gatekeeper 
before any prosecutorial review. As a result, a large number of cases are initially 
discontinued by the police. Then, the prosecution service acts as a supplementary filter. 
In the English and US criminal process, two filters exist in order to prevent innocent 
suspects from being charged and convicted. 
In particular, in England, the police drop cases by considering not simply evidentiary 
sufficiency, but also public interest. Thus, prosecutors have relatively less discretion. 
The discretion of the police is more extensive than in the USA. In addition, the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors not only provides specific conditions for the public interest test, but 
it emphasises that such factors can be taken into account at sentencing in the trial rather 
than requiring pre-trial decisions by prosecutors. As a result, the English law does not 
allow the prosecution to have extensive discretion, but requires them to serve as a 
supplementary filter. 
In France, the role of preliminary filter is assigned not only to the police, but also to 
the investigating judge. Minor offences are firstly dropped by the police, and serious 
crimes, where there is no sufficient evidence, are discontinued by the investigating 
judges. Then, those filtered cases are reviewed again by the public prosecutors. In other 
words, the French system of criminal justice does not permit the prosecution service to 
monopolise the pre-trial stage, but tries to separate the discretion and leads the police 
and the judges to be involved more actively in the pre-trial process. 
In Germany, the prosecution service acts as a 'key filter'. All cases can, in theory, be 
concluded only by the public prosecutors at the pre-trial stage as the police do not have 
discretion to discontinue. Nevertheless, the function of the German prosecutors, unlike 
their counterparts in Korea, can be defined as a filter rather than monopolist because 
4 Presidential Committee on the Judicial Reform, 'Committee Report (III): From 1 st to 13th Conference' 
PCJR (Seoul May 2004), 102. 
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most prosecutorial decisions are monitored by the court. Furthermore, cases where there 
is sufficient evidence cannot be discontinued by the prosecutors due to the principle of 
compulsory prosecution. In short, the prosecution service, as in other representative 
systems, simply serves as a filter, albeit a key one to screen the cases. 
In Japan, the public prosecutors have more extensive filtering role than their 
counterparts in other jurisdictions. They do not simply filter cases, but they also have 
the right to 'forgive' the offenders by considering various conditions as if they were 
quasi-judges. The prosecution service can be described as 'benevolent paternalist'. The 
Japanese law provides public prosecutors with considerable discretion. Unlike their 
counterparts in Germany, about ninety per cent of cases are concluded by the public 
prosecutors without intervention from the court. In particular, most cases are dropped 
based on application of the public interest test. The concept of public interest is 
interpreted more broadly than in other jurisdictions. Prosecutors will often refuse to file 
an indictment where they regard the prosecution as inappropriate considering the 
circumstances of the offence and the offender, even where the offender has confessed 
and there is ample evidence. This leads to the description of Japanese prosecutors acting 
as a benevolent paternalist. 
However, they do not monopolise pre-trial procedure and in general cannot 
intervene in the police investigation. As a result, the Japanese police are empowered to 
carry out investigations acting on their own responsibility. S After the police finish the 
investigation, the prosecutors can direct the police to conduct supplementary 
investigations or may conduct investigation with their own units. Unlike in Korea, these 
units are only installed in some offices rather than in all branches. Investigations by the 
prosecutors are limited. Moreover, the prosecutorial decisions to charge are controlled 
by an independent committee consisting of citizens. By use of their considerable 
discretion, prosecutors discontinue a large number of cases. Nevertheless, the system of 
criminal justice does not allow the prosecutors to monopolise the procedure, but still 
stresses their filtering role. 
5 In the interview with Togashi Susumu, a Japanese police officer working for the Japanese National 
police Agency for about 15 years, he stated as follows: 'The Japanese police officers mostly feel 
responsibility for the investigation. There're several reasons. Firstly, the police are able to conduct an 
investigation by themselves without intervention from the prosecution service. In other words, police 
officers have to work with their own accountability. Secondly, the prosecutor sends the result of the case 
to the police. In particular, when the accused person is found not guilty in the court, the result is given to 
the police officer, who investigated the case, by the prosecutor. So, the police generally try hard to gather 
sufficient evidence. For the similar reason, in case of serious crimes, the police officers voluntarily ask 
the prosecutors to supervise the investigation even though they're not legally subject to the prosecutorial 




Unlike other representative systems, in Korea, the prosecution service can be 
described as 'monopolist' where over ninety per cent of criminal cases are concluded as 
a result of decisions by the prosecution. All investigations are conducted either by the 
police under the supervision of the prosecutors or by the prosecutors themselves 
utilising their own investigation units. Prosecutor's decisions mostly determine the 
outcomes of trials based on the strong evidentiary impact of investigative dossiers. 
Nevertheless, such decisions in general are not reviewed by either the court or any 
independent body. Thus, if the prosecutor decides to charge a suspect, there is no 
independent mechanism to screen the prosecutorial decisions before the trial. 
Such extraordinary ftmctions and extensive powers of the Korean prosecution 
service restrict reliable fact finding by the courts. They are inappropriate to preserve the 
defendant's constitutional rights. Ironically, such a system does not achieve efficiency in 
the criminal procedure either. 
First of all, due to the evidentiary impact of the prosecutor's interview documents, 
judges cannot make informed decisions as to whether to admit confessions into 
evidence and what weight to put on them. Unlike electronic recordings, the documents 
provide judges with incomplete information to determine whether the prosecutors 
employed coercive methods or extracted an involuntary and unreliable confession. 
Wrongful convictions are in general based on interview documents rather than tape-
recording or audio-visual. In the interview documents, the accounts of disputants are 
incomplete, selective, and potentially biased about what occurred. The written interview 
is law enforcement's version of instant replay. Thus the interview reports, summarised 
and interpreted by prosecutors, cannot be appropriately reviewed by the courts. The 
judges do not have sufficient information to determine the propriety of investigation 
process or to challenge the evidence being provided by the prosecutors. 
The interview is one of the most important investigative stages as it contributes to 
both reorganise the investigator's statements of the accused offence and construct a case 
on the basis of the accounts from the suspects, witnesses, and victims. In particular, for 
the purpose of constructing a case, obtaining a confession is regarded as a significant 
factor. The stress on obtaining a confession can lead interviewers to resort to various 
interrogative methods ranging from torture to trickery. However, while such tactics can 
produce reliable confessions, they lead to untrustworthy self-incriminating statements 
leading to wrongful convictions. False confessions resulting from the pressure of the 
interrogation have become one of the main concerns in the criminal justice systems 




Thus, each jurisdiction has set up procedural safeguards to protect the suspects 
against false confessions. The drafters of the KCPA also realised this problem. But their 
method was different from other jurisdictions, permitting the prosecutor's interview 
records to be accepted as presumptive evidence with the aim of controlling coercive 
questioning tactics by the police. This attempt, however, failed as it led to coercive 
methods being used in the prosecutor's interview. In particular, the risk of abuse cannot 
be properly controlled as there are weaknesses in interviewing practices: secrecy and 
abridged documents; length of detention; and lack of disclosure. Prosecutorial 
interviews are conducted in a relatively secret way. The interrogation process cannot be 
effectively monitored even by internal methods. Indeed, such secrecy undermines the 
privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, the lengthy detention period in the 
Korean system increases the inequality of arms between the defence and prosecutors. 
The prosecutors can detain suspects generally up to 480 hours for investigation which 
include interrogation. Detention can be extended up to 960 hours for the investigations 
of crimes against the security of the state. This is employed as an important method to 
elicit confessions. Particularly, a lack of schemes to guarantee the disclosure of evidence 
exacerbates the abuse of interviewing tactics. 
Secondly, the direct investigation by the prosecutor cannot guarantee the defendant's 
basic rights. Direct investigation hinders prosecutors in their quest for objectivity. 
Prosecutors have two contrary roles: a minister of justice and an advocate. In most 
countries, research suggests that they put the emphasis on their adversarial role. The 
prosecutors generally assume the guilt of the defendants from the beginning of the 
prosecution process because they believe only the guilty person is charged. This is no 
different from other countries. However, unlike other jurisdictions, the Korean 
prosecution service stresses thorough investigation by prosecutors. This can affect 
prosecutors from the beginning of the investigation rather than at the later stage of the 
prosecution. The prosecutors seek to construct a case from the start even when they 
have sufficient information. In particular, prosecutors use several unethical methods in 
order to gain confessions and information from suspects. 
Prosecutorial investigation also causes a defect in the filter mechanism in the 
criminal process. One of the significant functions of the public prosecution service is to 
review the investigations independently as a filter. However, the prosecutor's direct 
involvement in the investigation can result in a faulty situation in which no independent 
filter exists to screen investigations. In particular, given the impact of the tunnel vision, 
the separation of the function of investigation and prosecution must be a significant 
element to protect defendants. 
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Prosecutor's monopoly over the investigation also means a complete control over 
information. The lack of disclosure for courts and defendants may increase the 
inequality of arms between the state and defendants. Unfair evidence is produced by the 
informational monopoly. In this regard, the disclosure of evidence by prosecutors is 
very important. The disclosure has a main role to play in breaking the informational 
monopoly by the state. Such an obligation of prosecutors is necessary to strike a balance 
between the state and defendants. However, there is a lack of an effective mechanism 
for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence in Korea. This may increase a risk that the 
information is used only to achieve a conviction. 
Finally, the prosecutor's domination causes an adverse impact on the police 
investigation by monopolising most powers and making the police a supplementary 
agency. A large numbers of police investigators experience low autonomy, lack of 
ownership, and an inefficient work process. Moreover, they have negative perspectives 
on the prosecution service and prosecutorial supervision. Such experiences and views 
result in a high level of role stressors. As a consequence, job stress of police 
investigators is increased, and their job performance is downgraded. 
There are few factors which offset such an impact. Only the work experience has a 
part to play in reducing the level of role conflict and role ambiguity of the police 
investigators. However, this influence is found to be very slight. As a result, the Korean 
criminal justice system needs to be reformed. The police and prosecution service have 
to find out their own roles which cannot be replaced by others. 
The Korean prosecution service may contribute to increase the efficiency by dealing 
with a large number of criminal cases with minimal efforts but a ninety-nine per cent 
conviction rate does not demonstrate any great capability of the prosecution service. 
Rather, it leads to restricted constitutional rights of the defendants and meaningless 
trials which serve only to confirm the prosecutorial decisions. 
Since 1987, along with the development of a democratic state, the Korean system of 
criminal justice has tried to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial. To this end, a 
number of constitutional rights have been provided in the Constitution such as the right 
to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to request judicial hearing 
for arrest and detention, an exclusionary rule for illegally obtained confessions, the right 
to open trial, and the presumption of innocence. However, incorporating those basic 
rights in the constitution has not been enough to guarantee due process values in the day 
to day operations of the criminal process. 
What this study has shown is that justice cannot be achieved by the monopoly of one 
legal actor over all criminal proceedings. It can be accomplished based on democratic 
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values such as public accountability, checks and balances, and separation of powers. 
The roles, duties and discretion of the Korean prosecution service must be reformed to 
guarantee the defendant's constitutional rights. Firstly, investigation should be separated 
from prosecution. The prosecution service should be independent from the investigation. 
Instead, the service needs to turn its attention to reviewing the investigation as the 
second filter, charging offenders and carrying out prosecutions. By doing so, the 
prosecution service can recover its quasi-judicial role. With a significant filter between 
the investigation and prosecution should come a decrease of wrongful convictions. 
This functional separation will also contribute to increase the sense of ownership of 
the police by providing them with the main responsibility for investigation. Furthermore, 
the negative views of the prosecution service held by the police will be reduced. The 
prosecution service will not be regarded as another investigation agency. The police and 
prosecution service can find their own distinctive roles in the criminal process. However, 
this new relationship would not necessarily mean the clear separation between the 
investigation and prosecution. Such obvious separation is not only impossible, but also 
undesirable. Rather, the police, as noted in the interview with a Japanese police officer, 
will seek advice or supervision from the prosecutors. As a consequence, the police and 
prosecution service will co-operate towards a common goal, criminal justice, rather than 
acting in conflict with each other. 
Secondly, courts must no longer accept without challenge the documentary evidence 
advanced by the prosecution. The KCPA must not give precedence to the prosecution 
interview record as opposed to that of the police. Indeed the interview of the suspect by 
the prosecution should become the exception rather than the rule. Inappropriate 
interrogation measures by the police can be prevented by establishing procedural 
safeguards rather than by prosecutors' repeating the interview. For example, electronic 
recordings of interview will protect the suspects from both giving false confessions by 
coercive interrogation methods. However, electronic recording itself is not a perfect 
safeguard. Hence, the system needs a number of other procedural reforms, e.g. a 
uarantee of the right to counsel during the interrogation, the mandatory presence of 
: propriate adults for vulnerable populations, limitations to the length of interrogation, 
;d a prohibition of promises of leniency to induce confessions. 
Finally, prosecutorial powers and discretion must be controlled based on a system of 
checks and balances. Prosecutor's decisions must be put under scrutiny of courts, 
citizens, or independent monitoring mechanisms. Criminal process needs a system that 
makes it impossible for the prosecution service to undertake actions unilaterally without 
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the cooperation or consent of other authorities.6 As Hampton and Kavka suggest, this is 
the foundation of rule of law. 7 
For last 20 years, Korea has sought to move from a colonial authoritarian regime to 
a liberal democratic state. This entailed embedding due process values within the 
criminal justice sy~tem. However, those measures for defendants' rights in the 
Constitution have proved inadequate in face of the institutionalized culture of the 
prosecution service. Those elements must be reformed to be compatible with the values 
of due process. In the criminal proceedings, the reform of powers and functions of the 
prosecution service must be a significant priority for the development of democracy in 
South Korea. 
6 Bernard Manin, 'Checks, Balances and Boundaries: The Separation of Powers in the Constitutional 
Debate of 1787' in Biancamaria Fontana (ed), The Invention of the Modern Republic (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1994) 27 quoted in Jose Maria Maravall and Adam przeworski (eds), 
Democracy and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 10. 
7 Jean Hampton. 'Democracy and the Rule of Law' (1994) The Rule of Law IS; Gregory S. Kavka, 




1. Data Sources for Interviewees 
Demographics 
Final Sample Police Public Defence Judges 
Officers Prosecutors Lawyers 
(PO) (PP) (OL) (J) 
N=20 100% N=S N=S N-S N==S 
Sex 
Male 19 95 4 5 5 5 
Female 5 
Years of Service 
1-5 years (1) 
6-10 years (2) 5 25 2 2 2 
11-15 years (3) 7 35 2 
16-20 years (4) 6 30 2 
21 years and above (5) 2 10 
Work Condition 
Incumbent (I) 17 85 5 3 5 4 
Retired (R) 3 IS 2 
Work Area 
Seoul(S) 12 60 4 2 4 2 
Metropolitan City (M) 2 10 2 
City (C) 5 25 2 
Rural Area (R) 5 
Note. In the main body, each interviewee was introduced as an acronym. For instance, 'PP3-IS' refers to 
an incumbent prosecutor who had 12 years' experience in the prosecution service and worked in Seoul 
when the interview was conducted. 
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Bibliographical Notes jor Interviewees 
P03-ISi ChiefInspector with 13 years' experience: mainly worked as an investigator 
in Seoul; two years in a small city. 
P03-IS2 Chieflnspector with 12 years' experience: mainly worked at the Information 
Department in the district police agency; one year in Seoul. 
P04-ISi Superintendent with 18 years' experience: mainly worked as an investigator 
in different cities; for recent three years, worked as a director of the 
investigation division at the police station. 
P04-IS2 Inspector with 20 years' experience: worked as a detective in the police 
station. 
P05-IS Inspector with 21 years' experience: worked as a detective in the police 
station. 
PP2-RR Retired prosecutor: worked as a junior prosecutor in rural area for six years; 
acted as a lawyer for last four years. 
PP3-ISl Junior prosecutor with eight years' experience: mainly directed police 
investigations working at the Criminal Department; worked at the High 
Tech Crime Department for last one year. 
PP3-IS2 Junior prosecutor with ten years' experience: mainly worked for the 
direction of the police investigation at the Criminal Department. 
PP3-RC Retired prosecutor: worked as a junior prosecutor in the city for ten years; 
after retirement, worked as a lawyer for ten years. 
PP5-IC Senior prosecutor with 24 years' experience: worked as both investigative 
and trial prosecutor in different areas. 
DLl-IS Defence lawyer with five years' experience: worked as a detective for four 
years in a city; after retirement, worked as a lawyer for five years in Seoul. 
DL2-ISi Defence lawyer with six years' experience: worked in a law firm in Seoul. 
DL2-IS2 Defence lawyer with six years' experience: mainly worked as a court-
appointed attorney in a city. 
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DL3-IS Defence lawyer with 14 years' experience: worked in a law firm in Seoul. 
DL4-IS Defence lawyer with 16 years' experience: worked in a law firm in Seoul. 
JI-IM Junior judge with two years' experience: worked at the criminal court in a 
metropolitan city; before being appointed as a judge, worked as a defence 
lawyer for eight years. 
J2-RS Retired judge with 10 years' experience: mostly worked at the Criminal 
Court; after retirement worked as a representative lawyer in a law firm. 
J2-IM Junior judge with 10 years' experience: worked only at the district court in a 
metropolitan city; had been in charge of both civil and criminal cases. 
J3-IS Senior judge with 13 years' experience: worked in both civil and criminal 
J4-IC 
court in Seoul and other cities. 
Senior judge with 16 years' experience: worked at both civil and criminal 
court in various cities including Seoul. 
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2. Self-Completion Questionnaires 
Type A: Relationship with Public Prosecutors 
INTRODUCTION 
This survey has been designed to find out the impact of organisational characteristics of 
the Korean police on the job performance. It is your opportunity to give your opinions 
on what you think about the features that you felt could have been improved. Finally, 
you and your response remain anonymous at all times. Your answers will be only used 
to gain statistical data. Please tick or circle the answer that represents you and your job 
conditions. 
BACKGROUND 
1. Sex: o Female DMaie 
2. Education (Please circle the highest year of school completed): 
123456 789101112 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23+ 
(primary) (high school) (college/ university) (graduate school) 
3. Are you currently working at the: 
o Investigation Divisions D Other Divisions 
4. Working Area: 
0 Seoul D Metropolitan City D City 
0 Rural Area D Other Region 
5. Rank of Position: 
0 PO D Assitant Sergeant D Sergeant D Inspector 
0 Chief Inspector D Superintendent and Higher ranks 
6. How many years have you worked as a police officer (Years of Service): 
12345 6789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1920 21+ 
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RELATIONSHIP WITH PROSECUTORS 







7 I frequently participate in 
decision making process by the 1 2 3 4 5 
prosecutors. 
8 Prosecutors are friendly and 
approachable. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Prosecutors often ask me my 
opinions about their directions. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 I frequently receive feedback 
from prosecutors. 1 2 3 4 5 
[ Autonomy 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Allree 
11 I frequently feel difficulty in 
dealing with duties due to lack 1 2 3 4 5 
of discretion. 
12 I don't have many opportunities 
to use my personal initiative or 1 2 3 4 5 
discretion. 
13 I have too much responsibility 
and too few means to meet it. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 I often do not feel responsibility 
to the investigation because the 
1 2 3 4 5 




RELATIONSHIP WITH PROSECUTORS 
Process 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree 
15 I frequently carry out duties 
based on complicated procedure. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 For the direction of prosecutors, 
I have to make unnecessary 1 2 3 4 5 
paperwork. 
17 I have to report the result of 
operations to both superior and 1 2 3 4 5 
prosecutor. 
18 I frequently have difficulty in 
conducting duties due to poor 1 2 3 4 5 
directions by prosecutors. 
Perspective on the Prosecution Service 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree 
19 Prosecutors put more emphasis 
on maintaining prosecution than 1 2 3 4 5 
investigating crimes. 
J) Prosecutor always protects the 
human rights and justice. 1 2 3 4 5 
21 Prosecutorial supervisions 
always correspond with justice. 1 2 3 4 5 
22 Prosecutors do not pass their 












23 I have to do things that should 
be done differently. 1 2 3 4 5 
);l I work under incompatible 
policies and guidelines. 1 2 3 4 5 
. 
25 I receive incompatible requests 
from two or more people. I 2 3 4 5 
2S I have to work under vague 
directives and orders. I 2 3 4 5 
[ Role Am biguity 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree 
7J I feel certain about how much 
authority I have. I 2 3 4 5 
28 I know that I have divided my 
time properly. I 2 3 4 5 
'.l} I know what my responsibilities 
are. I 2 3 4 5 
l) I know exactly what is expected 




31 I have too much work to do 
everything well. 
32 The amount of work I am asked 
to do is unfair. 
33 I never seem to have enough 
time to get everything done. 
JOB STRESS 
34 I have felt fidgety or nervous as 
a result of my job. 
35 My job gets to me more than it 
should. 
?6 There are lots oftimes when my 
job drives me right up the wall. 
J7 Sometimes when I think about 







































Type B: Relationship with Superiors 
INTRODUCTION 
This survey has been designed to find out the impact of organisational characteristics of 
the Korean police on the job performance. It is your opportunity to give your opinions 
on what you think about the features that you felt could have been improved. Finally, 
you and your response remain anonymous at all times. Your answers will be only used 
to gain statistical data. Please tick or circle the answer that represents you and your job 
conditions. 
BACKGROUND 
1. Sex: D Female D Male 
2. Education (Please circle the highest year of school completed): 
123456 
(primary) 
789 10 11 12 
(high school) 
13 14 15 16 171819202122 23+ 
(college/ university) (graduate school) 
3. Are you currently working at the: 
D Investigation Divisions D Other Divisions 
4. Working Area: 
0 Seoul o Metropolitan City o City 
0 Rural Area o Other Region 
5. Rank of Position: 
0 PC o Sergeant D Inspector 
0 Chief Inspector o Superintendent and Higher ranks 
6. How many years have you worked as a police officer (Years of Service): 
12345 6789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1920 21+ 
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RELATIONSHIP WITH SUPERIORS IN THE ORGANISATION 
Communication 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree 
7 I frequently participate in 
decision making process by the 1 2 3 4 5 
superiors. 
8 My superiors are friendly and 
approachable. 1 2 3 4 5 
9 My superiors often ask me my 
opinions about their directions. 1 2 3 4 5 
10 I frequently receive feedback 
from the superiors. 1 2 3 4 5 
Autonomy 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree 
11 I frequently feel difficulty in 
dealing with duties due to lack 1 2 3 4 5 
of discretion. 
12 I don't have many opportunities 
to use my personal initiative or 1 2 3 4 5 
discretion. 
13 I have too much responsibility 
and too few means to meet it. 1 2 3 4 5 
14 I often do not feel responsibility 
to my work because the 
1 2 3 4 5 




RELATIONSHIP WITH PROSECUTORS 
( Process 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Altree 
15 I frequently carry out duties 
based on complicated procedure. 1 2 3 4 5 
16 For the direction of superiors, I 
have to make unnecessary 1 2 3 4 5 
paperwork. 
17 I have to report the result of 
operations to different superiors. 1 2 3 4 5 
18 I frequently have difficulty in 
conducting duties due to poor 1 2 3 4 5 
directions by superiors. 






19 Prosecutors put more emphasis 
on maintaining prosecution than 1 2 3 4 5 
investigating crimes. 
J) Prosecutor always protects the 
human rights and justice. 1 2 3 4 5 
21 Prosecutorial supervisions 
always correspond with justice. I 2 3 4 5 
22 Prosecutors do not pass their 












23 I have to do things that should 
be done differently. 1 2 3 4 5 
J:l I work under incompatible 
policies and guidelines. 1 2 3 4 5 
25 I receive incompatible requests 
from two or more people. 1 2 3 4 5 
as I have to work under vague 
directives and orders. 1 2 3 4 5 
Role Ambiguity 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
disagree Agree 
1J I feel certain about how much 
authority I have. 1 2 3 4 5 
28 I know that I have divided my 
time properly. 1 2 3 4 5 
2} I know what my responsibilities 
are. 1 2 3 4 5 
1) I know exactly what is expected 




31 I have too much work to do 
everything well. 
32 The amount of work I am asked 
to do is unfair. 
33 I never seem to have enough 
time to get everything done. 
JOB STRESS 
34 I have felt fidgety or nervous as 
a result of my job. 
35 My job gets to me more than it 
should. 
l) There are lots of times when my 
job drives me right up the wall. 
Jl Sometimes when I think about 
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